IR 05000259/1981020
| ML18025B639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1981 |
| From: | Girard E, Herdt A, York J, Zajac L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B638 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-20, 50-260-81-20, 50-296-81-20, NUDOCS 8109090506 | |
| Download: ML18025B639 (16) | |
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t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/81-20, 50-260/81-20, 50-296/81-20 Licensee:
Tennessee Yalley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52 DPR-68 Date igned 5'z7 9/
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur, Alabama and the NRC Region II Offices in Atlan
,
eo gia P
Inspector
.
S'r~ Sr E. H.
irar J.
W.
or L. D.
'ac Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division Date Signed e/i7/e~
Date Signed
~/i7 Si Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on July 23 and July 27-31, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 80 inspector-hours onsite and at the NRC Region II Office in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings (Units 1, 2 and 3), reportable occurrences (Unit 1),
IE Bulletin (Units 1,
2 and 3), inspector followup items (Units 1,2 and 3) and welding (Unit 1).
Results No violations or deviations were identified.
810909050b 8108i8 PDR ADOCK 05000259 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
~J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
"T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
~J.
E. Swindell, Outage Supervisor T. J.
Chi lders, Torus System Outage Director
~D. T. Nye, Manager 79-02 and 79-14 Program
"C. J. Rozear, Compliance Engineer
~"R. M. Jessee, Welding Engineer
~~K. A. Hasting, Welding Engineer
~"M. E. Gothard, PSI/ISI Engineer Level III Examiner J. T. Lewis, Mechanical Engineer-Codes and Standards A. K. Griffin, Mechanical Engineer B.
R. Shadrick, Power Plant Maintenance Specialist HE E. Hodge, Mechanical Engineer J.
R. Nebrig, Mechanical Engineer T. W. Kerr, Engineering Aide
, NRC Resident Inspectors R.
F. Sullivan J.
Chase
- G. Paulk
- Attended exit interview at Browns Ferry site
"*Attended exit interview at NRC Region II office Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 23, 1981 for the inspection conducted at the Region II offices, and on July 31, 1981, for the inspection conducted at the site with those persons identified in paragraph
above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detai
the following new items which were identified as a result of the inspection:
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 260/81-20-01:
"Nut on Hanger Bolt Not fully Engaged" - Paragraph 3.e.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 296/81-20-01:
"Weld Size and Quality on Pipe Hangers" - Paragraph 3'.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 259, 260, 296/79-20-01:
Seismic qualification for deisel generator batteries.
TVA forwarded documentation packages dated August 8, 1979 and August 15, 1979 to NRC Region addressing the subject unresolved item.
Region II has reviewed these documents and the concerns originally expressed are considered resolved.
b.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 259, 260, 296/81-07-03:
Identification of portion examined for welds examined on a sampling basis.
This item involved the inspector's finding that the licensee's ultra-sonic examination (UT) procedure did not require and records for several welds examined did not appear to adequately identify the portions of welds examined for welds examined on a sampling basis.
The inspector discussed this item with the cognizant TVA PSI/ISI engineer and was informed that:
( 1)
The areas examined on the welds sampled can be identified by the examiner but that the information has not been added to the records yet.
C.
(2)
The procedure will be revised in about three months to specify identification of the portion inspected.
The item will remain open pending satisfactory review of the subject records and procedure in subsequent NRC inspection.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 259,260/81-07-05:
Technical Specification changes.
The licensee's PSI/ISI engineer informed the inspector that Technical Specification changes would be submitted to the NRC to cover updating of the inservice inspection ( ISI) code requirements'his'item will remain open pending licensee submittal and NRC accept-ance of the proposed Technical Specification changes.
d.
(Open) Unresolved Item 259, 260; 296/81-13-10:
ISI reports.
The inspector identified the following reports which the licensee could not find in the site records:
(1)
Reports for ISI during Unit 1 outages dated-(a)
9/13/77 1/15/78 (b)
1/03/80 3/22/80
(2)
Report for ISI during Unit 2 outage dated (a)
4/27/79 6/01/79 (3)
Reports for ISI during Unit 3 outages dated (a)
9/08/78 - 11/25/78 (b) 11/23/80 -'1/18/81 The licensee stated that they believed copies of the reports were available in files at another of their offices and indicated they would obtain copies for inclusion in the site files.
This item will remain open pending Region II's verification of the reports and their proper filing.
(e)
(Open) Violation 260/80-34-03:
Undersize socket welds This item involved socket welds which had been completed and accepted by TVA but which the NRC inspector found did not meet the minimum size requirements specified by the applicable code.
The welds identified as undersize were nine pipe to socket fillet welds on a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System by pass line for Unit 2.
TVA's letters of response for this item, dated February 18 and March 30, 1981, have been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
In the response letters TVA indicated that weld metal was added to the welds and that they had been re-examined and accepted.
TVA stated they would be in full compliance with specified requirements by April 1, 1981.
The NRC inspector attempted to verify the adequacy of the licensee's corrective action, in part, through examination of weld sizes on the HPCI bypass lines for all three units.
The results of the examination were as follows:
( 1)
Unit 1 (piping cold and welds readily accessible)
proper weld sizes verified (2)
Unit 2 (piping too hot for complete gage measurements on welds)
- one of nine welds appeared to be-undersize.
(3)
Unit 3 (piping was hot and was insulated, only two welds were partially accessible for measurement)
- the two welds partially accessible appeared to have proper size.
This item will remain open pending further examination of socket welds by Region II for verification of the licensee's corrective actions.
In observing the socket welds described above the inspector noted two conditions not related to the socket welding which he questioned.
They were as follows:
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(1)
The nut and bolt in a supporting mechanical joint in the pipe hanger for the Unit 2 HPCI bypass line were not fully engaged.
The engagement included all but the last few threads in the nut.
The bolt did not appear to have adequate length.
The licensee stated that a Trouble Report would be written to assure proper bolting for the hanger.
The inspector informed the licensee that this would be identified inspector followup item 260/81-20-01,
"Nut on Hanger Bolt Not Fully Engaged."
(2)
In the vicinity of the Unit 3 HPCI bypass line the inspector noted a hanger fillet weld which appeared undersize.
As measured by the inspector the weld was under 3/16".
Also, other visual features of the weld were questioned - it appeared to the inspector to have excessive convexity and overlap.
This weld was identified as a
clevis to plate weld on Reactor Heat Removal System hanger H-25.
The licensee's cognizant engineer informed the inspector that the hanger drawing (47A452-550-R1)
specified, and a
recent.
check (which was performed in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14) veri-fied a 1/4" size for the questioned weld.
The engineer stated the weld quality had not been verified in the recent check, as this was not required by IE Bulletin 79-14.
The licensee agreed to recheck the questioned weld and other welds on nearby supports on the same line.
The NRC inspector informed the licensee that his concerns for the adequacy of the subject hanger welds.would be identified as unresolved item 296/81-20-02," Weld Size and guality on Pipe Hangers."
L'.
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-13-11:
Radiographic film identification not legible.
The inspector was informed that action was being taken to assure proper film identification but that it was not complete.
This item will remain open pending Region II's verification of proper film identifi-cation in subsequent inspection.
g.
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-13-18:
Base metal adjacent to support welds does not appear to have been adequately examined.
This item involved apparent inadequate examination of the reactor vessel support skirt, in that the code requires that base metal be examined for two plate thicknesses adjacent to the weld, whereas the licensee's procedure does not require this and the records do not indicate the examination was performed.
The licensee's ISI engineer informed the inspector that the examination was not performed because of inaccessibility, and that it is accounted for in thei r Relief Request ¹3.
The ISI engineer stated that the applicable ISI procedure (N-UT-9) would be revised to note this.
This item wi 1 1 remain open pending verification by Region II of the inaccessibility of the weld, proper relief request and revision of the procedure.
I
e h.
(Open) Deviation 259, 260, 296/81-13-20, guality of radiographic films for containment penetration welds are in nonconformance with ASNE Code requirements.
The inspector reviewed the discrepant radiographs with licensee non-destructive examination supervisory personnel who concurred with the findings previously reported.
The licensee stated they would provide a
letter response for this item to Region II by August 13, 1981.
Mithin the area inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions.
A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.e.
5.
Reportable Occurences - Licensee Event Reports (Unit 1)
(Open)
Licensee Event Report BFRO-50-259/81037:
Reactor Mater Cleanup System Isolation Valve.
This item was reported to Region II June 30, 1981 and it concerned an indication found during ISI.
The indication was located in a valve and was near to Reactor Mater Cleanup (RWCU) System weld DRWC-1-2.
The licensee stated in their report that, while their evaluation showed the indication to be acceptable, they had decided to either replace the valve containing the indication or to repair the indication.
The cause of the indication was not identified.
An indication had been previously discovered and repaired near the same location during the 1980 refueling outage, as reported to NRC Region II in Licensee Event Report (LER) BFRO-50-259/804 dated January 31, 1980.
The cause of that indication was not identified.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the condition reported, the inspectors discussed the current and previous indications discovered at weld DRWC-1-2 with cognizant licensee ISI, metallurgical engineering, and site maintenance engineering personnel.
The description of the previous indica-tion given in the TVA "Unit One - Cycle Three Refueling Outage Final Report" was reviewed.
In addition, the inspectors examined a
sample, reportedly containing the current indication, that had been cut out of the valve.
No visual evidence of the indication could be seen during this examination.
The licensee informed the inspectors that they intended to have the valve sample metallographically examined in an attempt to further characterize and determine the cause of the indication.
The licensee agreed" to notify Region II at the t,ime of any significant findings in the examination such that NRC personnel could arrange to view the finding t
This LER will remain open pending the licensee's completion of their exami-nations and Region II's review of their findings and corrective actions.
6.
Status of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins ( IEB's)(Units 1,2 and 3)
(Open)
IEB 80-BU-08:
Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds.
b.
As noted in IE Report 259, 260, 296/81-13, TVA's letter response to this bulletin was in error in that it stated that no backing rings were used for butt welds between containment penetration sleeves and process piping at Brown Ferry; whereas Region II found that backing rings had been used.
The inspectors reviewed and discussed the TVA radiographs which evidence these backing rings with TVA's supervisory NDE personnel.
TVA agreed to provide a corrected bulletin response to Region II.
In addition, they agreed to investigate and determine the cause of the discrepancies in their original report for the bulletin.
(Open)
IEB 79-BU-02:
Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchors.
Every bolt in all of the support plates for safety related components is removed and the concrete anchorage is inspected to IEB 79-02 cri-teria.
This is the procedure being used for all three units at Browns Ferry.
Approximately 100 or less hangers (total for all three units)
remain on which the concrete expansion anchors need to be inspected.
'uring the course of the TVA conducted inspections some concrete anchors were found to have a safety factor of less than two.
These concrete anchors were modified on an emergency basis (less than
hours)
so that their safety factor would exceed at least two.
C.
(Open)
IEB 79-BU-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems.
The inspectors discussed the details of the system-by-system status report of the inspections being performed for both bulletins (79-02 and 79-14) with the licensee.
The inspectors performed a visual inspection on five hangers supporting the Core Spray System (Bay 16) in the Torus of Unit 1.
Also inspector s observed TVA steamfitter sketchmen taking dimensions under more difficult conditions i.e.,
in a
higher than normal radiation area which required the wearing of extra protective clothing and full face masks.
The hangers being measured under these conditions were in the Main Steam System and were numbers MDH-8, MDH-9 and MDH-10.
The inspectors examined hangers F8-1,2,3 and 4 in the Drywell and Torus Purge Systems on Unit
and discussed TVA EN DES requests for more information on these hangers.
The inspectors reviewed part of a data package on the Residual Heat Removal System (Unit 3) that was being submitted to EN DES for evaluation (Ref.
Dwg.
No. 47W452 Hanger Nos. 1,2 and 3).
A
e Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inspector Followup Items (Units 1,2 and 3)
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-03:
Liquid pene-trant procedures do not provide complete instructions.
The licensee informed the inspector that the liquid penetrant procedure had been revised to provide adequate instructions and that the revision would be issued shortly.
This item will remain open pending the licensee's issuance of the revised procedure and its review in subse-quent NRC inspection.
(Open)
Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-04:
Magnetic particle procedure does not provide complete instructions.
The inspectors found that the status of this item was the same as for the item in 3.e above.
I (Open)
Inspector Fol lowup Item 259/81-13-17:
Inservice inspection program does not appear to meet minimum requirements of Section XI of ASME Code.
d.
The inspectors were informed by the licensee that Sections 7. 1.1.3 and 7. 1.3 and Table A of their new ISI program (now in its final review cycle);
and their relief requests would adequately address the ques-tions raised for this item.
This item will remain open pending a
review of the subject program and relief request areas in subsequent inspection by Region II.
(Open) Inspector Fol 1 owup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-06:
The inspectors reviewed a
licensee response to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated July 2, 1981, which provided their proposed actions for implementation of NUREG 0313.
TVA's implementa-tion of NUREG 0313 will be examined further by Region II in subsequent inspection.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-09:
Corrosion in carbon steel piping.
The inspector discussed the licensee's examination of Emergency Equip-ment Cooling Water System piping with the cognizant metallurgical engineer.
The inspector was informed that the examination did not reveal any serious corrosion in the piping.
This item is considered closed.
V Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identifie ~4
8.
Welding (Units 1',2 and 3)
The NRC inspectors selected and visually examined the following completed welds associated with the current safety-related torus modifications to verify compliance with requirements given in the licensee's drawings, work conti ol documents (work plans), specifications and the applicable codes:
'Meld - ~" fillet weld on Tie Down 32 stiffener plate Drawing - 48 M 1246-1 Work Plan 6452 Applicable Code - AWS Dl. 1 TVA Specification - G29C b.
Weld - ~~" filletweld on ring girder 87 (Meld 7A)
Drawing 48M1248 - 1R2 Work Pl an - 6473 Applicable Code ASME Section III TVA Specification G29M C.
Meld - ~" fillet weld on bottom plate of vent header restraint in bay
Drawing - 48 N1245 -
RO with Field Change Request 619 Work Pl an 6454 App1 icabl e Code AWS Dl. 1 TVA Specification G29C Within the areas examined, no deviations or violations were identifie ~ <
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