IR 05000259/1979034
| ML18024B386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18024B382 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-79-34, 50-260-79-34, 50-296-79-34, NUDOCS 8003060376 | |
| Download: ML18024B386 (9) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/79-34, 50-260/79-34, and 50-296/79-34 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Approved by:
H.
I~
SUHtfARY C
. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Inspection on September 17 - October 12, 1979 Areas Inspected Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur, Alabama Inspector:
/
R. F. Sullivan Ir Pl
'7 D te igned I(
2.I Date igned This routine inspection involved 69 resident inspector-hours in the areas of plant operations, plant tours, reportable occurrences, refueling, plant physical
"
protection, and radiation area controls.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fied in five areas.
One item of apparent noncompliance was found in one area l,Infraction-installation of non-approved jumpers in the main steam line tunnel high-temperature monitoring safety circuit, paragraph 5).
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~I'
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent J.
B. Studdard, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor J.
A. Teague, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical M. A. Haney, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical J.
R. Pittman, Maintenance Supervisor, Instruments R.
G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor G. T. Jones, Outage Director R. T. Smith, QA Supervisor W. C. Thomison, Assistant Results Supervisor S.
G. Bugg, Plant Health Physicist D.
C.
Cummin, Outage Health Physicist A. L. Burnett, Shift Engineer B. E. Baggett, Shift Engineer J.
A. Marbutt, Assistant Shift Engineer R. E. Jackson, Captain, Public Safety J.
D. Glover, Shift Engineer R. R. Smallwood, Shift Engineer R. Cole, gA Site Representative Office of. Power Other licensee employees contacted included Licensed Senior Reactor Opera-
'tors and Reactor Operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, (}A personnel and engineering personnel.
Management Interviews Management interviews were conducted on September 20, 27, October 5 and 12, 1979 with the Plant Superintendent and selected members of his staff.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities.
The licensee was informed that one apparent item of noncompliance was identified during this report period.
Plant management felt concern for personnel safety and provided justification for action taken.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspectio ~,
Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff.
Frequent visits were made to the shift engineer's office and control rooms to review current reactor operating status.
Special visits to specific locations in the protected areas were made as deemed advisable to observe activities and to verify system or component status.
Selected portions of the daily journals and operations data sheets were reviewed on at least a weekly basis during the report period.
The inspector made general plant tours on the following dates:
September 21, 26, October 1 and 9, 1979.
Selected areas in the turbine building, reactor buildings, refueling floor, and the outside areas were visited.
Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, valve positions, snubber condition, instrument readings and recordings, annunciator alarms, house-keeping, radiation area controls and vital area controls. Informal discus-sions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities and equipment status.
The inspector witnessed control room operations in Unit 1 following the trip of both recirculation pumps at 12:22 pm on September 26, 1979.
This included placing both pumps back in operation and control rod movements to return the reactor to normal power operation.
Shift changes in the control rooms were observed on September 26 and October 5, 1979.
The, inspector reviewed the circumstances leading to the pump trips and subsequent instrumentation problems which led to the manual shutdown of the reactor at 7:00 pm of the same day when the problem could not be corrected within the time interval permitted by the Technical Specifications.
LER's 259/7925 and 259/7926 were submitted by TVA to describe the occurrence.
The inspector's observations included the following:
At 12:00 noon, a high temperature alarm and trip of the D line channel logic was received in the control room.
This resulted in a "half isolation" by causing a trip of the B trip system.
Operations determined that the high temperature indication was not, valid and the decision was made to jumper D channel to permit troubleshooting.
The jumper was first applied to the wrong terminals which resulted in tripping A and B recirculation pumps (LER 259/7926).
At 12:23 p.m., the jumper was placed on D channel which cleared the "half isolation".
The jumper was removed at 2:23 p.m.
which reinitiated the "half isolation".
The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)
convened to consider the application of a jumper on D channel which was subsequently approved in accordance with Standard Practice BF8.2 Temporary Alterations.
The ap-proved jumper was applied at 3:18 p.m. prior to sending personnel into the main steam tunnel to identify and replace the suspect temperature switc "
While personnel were in the tunnel trouble shooting, a trip of the A line channel occurred at 4:00 pm which gave a "half isolation" in the A trip system.
At 4:25 pm this trip was by-passed by a jumper or relay block and troubleshooting on D switches as well as A switches continued.
The problem was not corrected by changing out temperature switches and the decision was made at 5:30 pm to shutdown the reactor.
The reactor was manually scrammed at 6:59 pm.
The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were closed at 1:14 am "
on September 27.
The by-passes on A line and D line logics remained in place until after the MSIV's were closed.
The inspector identified as apparent noncompliance the non-PORC approved bypass of the D channel logic from 12:23 p.m. until 2:23 p.m.
and the non-PORC approved bypass of the A channel logic from 4:25 p.m. until the MSIV's were closed (259/79-34-01).
Standard Practice BF8.2 requires that temporary alterations, including inhibits and jumpers, be reviewed by PORC prior to making the alteration.
6.
Reportable Occurrence Review The below listed licensee event reports were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significan'ce of each event.
LER No.
259/7920 Date 9/28/79 Event Drywell oxygen concentration exceeded 4g 259/7922 10/09/79 Fire protection annunciation inoperable 259/7921 10/01/79 Isolation valve FCV-71-3 would not close 260/7913 260/7913 Rev
296/7912 296/7913 06/28/79 09/24/79 09/14/79 09/14/79 RCIC Trip during test RCIC trip during test Turbine pressure switch setpoint out of limits Carbon dioxide pilot valve line set Corrective action indicated on the above reports was determined to be adequate.
The inspector's questions were satisfactorily answere ~,
-4-7.
U-3 Refueling Outage Activities During the report period the inspector made visits to the Unit 3 reactor building and refuel floor to observe work in progress and discuss activities with personnel involved.
The inspector reviewed circumstances associated with the failure of a chairf hoist on October 7, 1979 which resulted in dropping the tube bundle back into the shell of B RKR heat exchanger.
Some damage occurred to the bundle and structural supports.
Repairs are not expected to delay startup.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified by the inspector.
8.
Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspector made observations of certain plant physical protection activities.
These included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, vital area access control and physical barriers.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.