IR 05000259/1979023

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IE Insp Repts 50-259/79-23,50-260/79-23 & 50-296/79-23 on 790904-06.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Concrete Expansion Anchors & Piping Sys
ML18024B096
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/25/1979
From: Herdt A, Modenos L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18024B095 List:
References
50-259-79-23, 50-260-79-23, 50-296-79-23, NUDOCS 7911150181
Download: ML18024B096 (7)


Text

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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-259/79-23'0-260/79-23 and 50-296/79-'3 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License No. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Bro s Fer site near Decatur, Alabama Inspector:

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ate Signed Approved by:

A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch ate igned SUMMARY Inspection on September 4-6,1979 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 17 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of concrete expansion anchors (IE Bulletin 79-02)

and seismic analysis for asbuilt safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).

Results Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fied.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

+J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent

+R. T. Smith, QA Staff Supervisor

  • G. T. Jones, Outage Director

+D. Jent, Assistant Outage Engineer R. Summers, Outage Engineer J. Ellis, Civil Engineer H. Owens, Mechanical Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen and engineers NRC Resident Inspector

+R. Sullivan-Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 6,1979 with those persons indicated in Pargaraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Concrete Expansion Anchors In response to IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

initiated an inspection program as reported in IE Report, No. 79-19.

The totals of the inspection program as of September 6,1979 are as follows:

Anchors tested Defects, Minimum Embedment Defects, Greater than Maximum Allowable Plug Depth Rejected anchors Rejection rate 1782

65

8.08$

The rejection rate is based on the rejected and defected anchors versus the total anchors tested.

During the inspection, there were 505 bolts that did not meet minimum thread engagement.

These bolts were all replaced.

The licensee is per-forming 100$ inspection of all accessible anchors and is repairing/replacing any defective anchors found.

In addition', the licensee is performing based on deficiencies noted an engineering evaluation of inaccessible anchors that were not inspected.

The following supports were reviewed for adequate inspection data and field engineering evaluations were recorded on supports requiring further analysis or accepting the support as is due to their high factors of safety:

EECW EECW EECW EECW FPC FPC FPC RHR H"10 H-12 H-16 H-34 H-l R-19 R-43 R-13 Support RHR R-13 was identified to require repairs.

Work Plan No. 6388 which is an open order for repair of concrete anchors found defective during concrete inspection program, verified that repair for this support had been accomplished.

This work order will keep a running total of all repairs required by the plant and when they are completed.

The inspector witnessed the inspection of EECW R-43 support with 8 anchor bolts.

One sleeve was.found cut, 4 bolts were replaced that had not met minimum thread engagement.

The one cut sleeve was pull tested to the proof load of 7600 lbs and the sleeve did not indicate any shippage.

In the agreement made by NRC and TVA during the meeting of August 3, 1979 held at IE:Region II offices, that a pull testing 'of at least ten anchors of each type of failure to substantiate their contention that a visual inspection is sufficient had not been done.

The site management of TVA agreed that these tests will be completed before inspections of Unit 3 are begga.

This IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open until all inspectors and evalua-tions are completed and evaluated by the NRC.

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No xtems of noncompliance or devxatxons were edental.fred.

6.

Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems

.. In response to IE Bulletin 79-14, TVA submitted their 30 day response on August 15,1979.

Their response was to inspect Unit 1 and not to inspect Units 2 and 3.

This was immediately pointed out to TVA that it was not acceptable.

In the 60 day response on August 31, 1979 TVA revised their

schedule to include Units 2 and 3 in their inspection program but the length of their schedule appeared to be excessive.

It stretched the completion of this inspection program into November 25, 1980.

TVA is re-evaluating the schedule to improve this date.

The inspector interviewed and accompanied a mechanical engineer and an engineering aidein the inspection of support RHR R-34.

Discrepancies were recorded with size of plate, loose bolts and bolt patterns.

Mechanical Drawing No. 47W452-H-7 Rev.

2 and Hanger Drawing Mark-34 were used to check the support.

The engineer conducting the inspection had sufficient back-ground in this area to qualify him as an inspector.

Discussions with engineers on their method to be used when a discrepancy are identified, revealed that an EDS Nuclear Inc. Program was used for the seismic analysis of safety-related piping systems.

This program did not include dead load in their seismic analysis.

This program varies from the present day method of seismic analysis, in that dead load supports were located by using the ANSI B31.1 power piping code and then added vertical restraints were seismic analysis required them. It was pointed out that immediate action was required to find out if any major discrepancies between the two programs result in support modifications of the safety related systems.

This IE Bulletin 79-14 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the NRC.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.