IR 05000259/1979028
| ML18024B116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Price D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18024B114 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-79-28, 50-260-79-28, 50-296-79-28, NUDOCS 7911270083 | |
| Download: ML18024B116 (8) | |
Text
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I UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/79-28, 50-260/79-28, and 50-296/79-28 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Iicense Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur,'Alabama.
Approved by:
H.
Inspector:
i!i D. S.
P e
C 'c-
. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed C'
D te ig ed
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smmv Inspection on September 17-20, 1979.
Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of corporate gA audit program, IE Circulars, temporary procedure changes, plant operations, and licensee event reports.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
+H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent
>J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent M. A. Haney, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor R. Cole, gA Site Representative, Office of Power G. T. Jones, Outage Director D. B. Thompson, Electrical Engineer J.
Cowles, Mechanical Engineer
+R.
G. Cockrell, Reactor Engineer
+R.
G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor
+R. T. Smith, equality Assurance Supervisor NRC Resident Inspector-R. F. Sullivan t
+Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 20, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
.Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Infraction (259/79-09-01) Failure to follow quality assurance (gA)
procedures and ANSI N45:2.12.
The inspector reviewed the status of open audit items and a
QA Topical Report change committed to in the licensee's response to this noncompliance.
One category B audit item remained open and was being tracked by the licensee.
A proposed change in commitment from ANSI N45.2.12-1974 to N45.2.12-1977 was still being reviewed by the licensee.
This noncompliance remains open pending resolution on this commitment change.
4.
4j Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph "2" IE Circular Followup The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following IE Circulars to ascertain whether they had been received by licensee management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate corrective action taken or scheduled:
78"18)
79-02, 79"04, 79-05, 79-07, 79-09, 79-13)
UL Fire Test - Closed Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC AC Power Supplies - Closed Loose Locking Nut on Limit or Que Valve Operators - Closed Moisture I,eakage in Stranded Wire Conductors - Closed Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase - Closed Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator Diaphragms in Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Closed Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors - Open IE Circular 79-13 had not been received by the licensee.
The inspector gave the plant superintendent a copy of the Circular.
Temporary Procedure Changes IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/79-24, 50-260/79-24, and 50-296/79-24)
paragraph 3, documents one example of the licensee's failure to use temporary changes to procedures.
The inspector reviewed approximately
SIs during this inspection to ascertain whether the example noted on the earlier inspection was an isolated occurrence or indicative of a larger problem.
No further examples of failure to use temporary procedure changes were noted.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Plant Operations The Unit 2 reactor scrammed on the morning of September 17, 1979.
The reactor was at power operation with surveillance instruction (SI)-4.2.A.3)
Reactor Water Level Functional Test and Calibration, in progress.
During the performance of this SI, one channel of the group 1 primary containment isolation system was tripped without first resetting its redundant channel which had been previously tripped.
This caused a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure which resulted in a reactor scram.
'The licensee identified the root cause of the scram,>o'have been a procedural problem and committed to revising SI-4.2.A.3 to require double verification for the resetting of the group 1 isolation signal after each channel trip.
While performing the scram recovery, it was found that steam line drain inboard isolation valve FCV 1-55 would not open.
This valve had auto-matically shut, as required, on the group 1 isolation signal.
This resulted in an inability to equalize around and then open the MSIVs, This condition existed for about 45 minutes until the valve was opened by electrically jumpering a limit switch in the valve operating circuitr ~
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During this period of time reactor pressure was controlled by the main steam safety/relief valves, and vessel level by the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
systems.'uring a visual inspection by the licensee o'f the RCIC turbine, water was observed issuing from the turbine shaft steam seals and the governor va'lve leakoff line.
The turbine was secured and the problem investigated.
It was determined that water had backed up from the barometric condenser into the steam seal and valve leakoff lines and had entered the RCIC oil system.
The water back up was caused by a problem with the barometric condenser condensate pump whose breaker was found in the tripped position.
In addition, a stop check valve (71-32) on the discharge of the barometric condenser vacuum pump had failed to open, preventing the pump from drawing a vacuum on the condenser.
The oil system was drained and refilled and the RCIC system tested satis-factorily with no recurrence of the probl'ems.
The licensee is still investigating the cause of the condensate pump breaker trip.
Operating personnel are being cautioned to test stop check valves which have been manually shut and then opened to insure they are not stuck on their shut seat.
The inspector witnessed the startup of the Unit 3 reactor on September 17, 1979.
This included approach to criticality, criticality, and power increase'o the heating range.
The inspector did not identify any safety concerns on the startup.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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