IR 05000259/1979019
| ML18024B067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1979 |
| From: | Herdt A, Modenos L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18024B066 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-79-19, 50-260-79-19, 50-296-79-19, NUDOCS 7910290220 | |
| Download: ML18024B067 (8) | |
Text
~ AEgy
+0
~o 4'
I O~
r+
+**a+
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/79-19, 50-260/79-19 and 50-296/79-19 Iicensee:
'Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Bro s Ferry Site near Decatur, Alabama Inspector:
L.
o Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCRES Branch ate Signed 6'ai/7(
Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on August 8-10, 1979 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours onsite in the area of concrete expansion anchor installation.
Results No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7919390
l
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees-H. L. Abercrombie, Assistant Plant Superintendent-J. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. D. Guthrie, Civil Engineer-G. J. Jones, Outage Director D. E. McCloud, Power Regional Staff R.
Summers, Outage Engineer R.
W. Cameron, Civil Engineer R. R. Funk, Civil Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
'*B. Sullivan
+Attended exit interview.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
Concrete Expansion Anchors In response to IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
submitted their response to the Bulletin on June 19, 1979 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP) Units 1, 2 6 3.
The response was reviewed by IE:Region II and was found to be partially responsive to the Bulletin.
Prior to August 1973 TVA had no testing and inspection requirements.
Inspection was limited to visual determination of proper setting according with manufacturer's recommendations.
Routine testing of anchors began with the issuance of BFN Construction Procedure No. BF-107 which was based on TVA General Construction Specification No. G-32 which was issued in September 1972.
TVA was questioned on how they can assure operability of systems as the bulletin requires for pre 1973 installations without any form of testing of those anchors.
TVA tried to justify their position that they had documentation and records showing that the same methods of instal-lation were employed for post and pre 1973, therefore, they had high degree of confidence fhyt Qefr'$nsta$ $afiopp wipe pygmy gfgcfq /
IE:Region II decided that their reasons were not valid and requested for steps to be taken by TVA to satisfy the requirements of the bulietin.
At the time of the response all 3 units for BFNP were operating and the bul-letin did not require a reactor shutdown solely for purposes of this in-spection.
A meeting was arranged between TVA and IE:Region II at the offices of Region II on August 3, 1979 so TVA could present their program for inspec-tion and schedule for testing each unit.
In the interim between our dis-cussions and the set date of the meeting, TVA decided to do some testing to assure themselves they had a viable program.
The licensee found some cut anchors on safety related systems and submitted on July 24, 1979, LER-79-13 to identify the problem
.
In the meeting of August 3, 1979, TVA proposed to inspect 100 percent of all safety related systems pre and post 1973.
The inspection would be limited only to visual inspection, with no pull testing on safety related systems being performed while the plants were operating.
A pull test would be done on
~ non-safety related systems with similar parameters of the safety related systems under. question.
A visual inspection consists of taking measurements of the self-drilling anchors.
Based upon the review of the licensee's data presented, Region II agreed that their method would be acceptable with a final decision on whether to pull test safety related systems made after some test data is evaluated.
The schedule for testing was for Unit 1 to be completed by the end of August 1979 and Unit 3 would be done next since it would be down for refueling, with Unit 2 coming after Unit 3 is completed before the end of the year.
During the inspection of August 8, 1979, it was pointed out to TVA that their procedure BF MMI 5.1-A "Inspection Programs for Verifying Correct Installation of Self-Drilling Type Concrete Anchors" Unit 1, 2 8 3 was inadequate.
The inspection program did not include plate gap, edge distance and plate hole diameter.
These parameters must be inspected for proper installation and the licensee agreed to revise the procedure to include these items.
Tolerances used to pass or fail an inspected anchor were not included in the procedure and justification of these arbitrary tolerances should be included in their procedure.
TVA informed the NRC that they are conducting laboratory tests to verify those tolerances and would be incorporated into the procedure.
Design size for anchor bolts had not been checked to verify proper size was installed.
TVA agreed to verify all supports for proper size.
There seemed to be a lack of data control at the site and listing of safety related systems and supports in those systems was not available.
TVA agreed they would have a handle on the data control and provide a list of safety related systems that will be tested for each unit.
The inspector witnessed testing of support SIC UB-5 and SLC PS-8 which fell under the post 1973 installation in unit 1 and listed as part of a lot that was tested as per Specification G-32.
Oversize holes were observed with some plate gap.
The oversize holes and edge distance has to be evaluated for each plate and TVA has agreed to include in their procedure the acceptance. criteria for this parameter This IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the NRC.
No items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identifie /