IR 05000259/1979003
| ML18024A763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1979 |
| From: | Dance H, Price D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18024A758 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-79-03, 50-259-79-3, 50-260-79-03, 50-260-79-3, 50-296-79-03, 50-296-79-3, NUDOCS 7904110043 | |
| Download: ML18024A763 (10) | |
Text
~R RE00
~4
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.:
50-259/79-3, 50-260/79-3 and 50-296/79-3 I,icensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens, Alabama
!
rn.p-~-:
3 Zi'c.~,. i,/
D. S. Price h
Approved by:
5.M..-
.Zc.
H. C. Dance, ection Chief ONS Branch ate Signed Qjy c)
Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 29 - February 1, 1979 This routine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of reportable events,'pent fuel rack modifications, and review of safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation.
Results h
Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency - Failure to properly document test results-Paragraph 7).
T 904 11 0 0)3
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Em lo ees-J.
Dewease, Plant Superintendent H. Abercrombie, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. Metke, Plant Results Supervisor J.
Macks, Records Supervisor
-"J. Teague, Electrical Supervisor J. Swindell, Assistant Outage Coordinator R. Hunkepeller, Assistant Operations Supervisor J. Harrell, Outage Engineer M. Wingo, Nuclear Engineer W. Thomason, Chemical Engineer B. Shadrick, Outage Engineer R. Mullins, Outage Engineer D. Gent, Outage Engineer-F. J.
Long, Acting Deputy Director-H.
CD Dance, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
-R. F. Sullivan, Resident Inspector-Attended exit interview.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 1,
1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknow-ledged the noncompliance discussed in Paragraph 7 and stated that the surveillance instruction would be modified to clarify the required data to be recorded.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.
Unresolved items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Review of Nonroutine Events Re orted b
the Licensee The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
were reviewed in office for potential generic problems, to detect trends, to determine whether the information included in the report meets NRC reporting requirements, and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate.
Licensee action with respect to the reports was reviewed further at the site as discussed below, to verify that the events were reviewed and evaluate'd by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications, that corrective action was taken by the licensee and that safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operations were not exceeded.
a
~
LER No. 50-259/78-29 The licensee reported by letter on October 25, 1978, that the cable raceway between the Diesel Generator Building and the Standby Gas Treatment Building appeared to have settled two inches.
The cable raceway has been jacked up to its original design position and grouting laid underneath it.
An earth backfill will be performed when weather permits.
This LER is closed.
b.
LER No. 50-296/78-25 The licensee reported by letter on September 29, 1978 that four mainsteam isolation valves had exceeded the leakage limits of technical specification 4.7.A.2.i while performing local leak rate testing.
The cause of the leakage was determined to be normal valve wear, the valve was repaired and satisfactorily leak tested.
This LER is closed.
c ~
LER No. 50-296/78"30 The licensee reported by letter on November 27, 1978, that an inspection had revealed that grease had been injected into the oil reservoir of several Bergen Patterson Hydraulic Snubbers.
The LER stated that recurrence control action would consist of replac'ement of the oil fittings with fittings not compatible with grease guns.
In actuality, no replacement fittings are planned but rather the oil fittings are being modified such that removal of an aluminum split ring will be required prior to use of the oil fitting.
This modification has been accomplished for all applicable snubbers in Unit
and the accessible snubbers in Units 2 and 3.
The remaining snubbers will be modified in subse-quent outages.
This LER is close "
6.
Hi h Densit S ent Fuel Stora e Racks (HDSFSR)
,
The inspector reviewed documentation and made direct observations in areas concerning the installation of HDSFSR into the Unit 3 spent fuel pool.
The inspection was made to verify that expansion of spent fuel storage capacity is being done in accordance with regulatory require-ments contained in the facility Operational Quality Assurance Manual, Part II, Sections 1,
2 and 4, and Amendment No.
16 to Facility License for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3.
Areas reviewed included licensee work plans for installation of fuel storage racks into module positions two and seven, Boral inspection strip charts and observation of a portion of the performance of Special Test 161, High Density Fuel Storage Rack Test for Deformity, Corrosion, and Cracking.
Corrosion test specimens, which are to be installed in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool, are on site but awaiting receipt of an approved surveillance instruction from corporate headquarters prior to installation.
No fuel is presently stored in the HDSFSR installed in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool.
The inspector had no further questions.
Safet Limits Limitin Safet S stem Settin s
and Limitin Conditions for 0 erations The inspector observed panel instrumentation and reviewed plant records to verify that reactor operations were in conformance with Technical Specification requirements for safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions for operations.
Safet Limits The inspector reviewed a current process computer printout (OD-6, option 3) to confirm that the minimum critical power ratio was not exceeding the Limits of Technical Specification 1.1.A.
The printouts reviewed were from 0700, January 31, 1979, for Unit 1, 0707, January 31, 1979, for Unit 2 and 0900, January 31)
1979'or Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified in the data reviewed.
The inspector reviewed reactor wide range pressure charts to verify that reactor pressure did not approach the Technical Specification limit given in Paragraph 1.2.A. Data from 0000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br /> was reviewed as follows:
January 30, 1979, for Unit 1, January 30, 1979 for Unit 2, and January 29, 1979, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified in the data reviewed.
The inspector reviewed completed surveillance instruction (SI)
test records for reactor protection system high pressure (SI 4.1.
4.1.A-5) to verify that the limiting safety system setting given
~r
~
~
-4-by Technical Specification 2.2.C was not exceeded.
The data reviewed was from January 16, 1979, for Unit 1, January 22, 1979 for Unit 2, and December 5, 1978, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified.
Limitin Safet S stem Settin s
The inspector confirmed that Average Power Range Monitor rod block settings were set in accordance with Technical Specification 2.1.B.
Data from process computer log printout P-1 was used by the inspector to calculate the required rod block settings.
The data obtai:ned was from the following printouts:
0700, January 31, 1979 for Unit 1, 0707, January 31, 1979 for Unit 2, and 0900, January 31, 1979, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified in the data reviewed.
Limitin Conditions of 0 eration The inspector reviewed completed SI 4.1.A-7, reactor low water level functional test, to verify compliance with the trip point of Technical Specification 3.1.
The test dates were January 17, 1979 for Unit 1, January 23, 1979 for Unit 2 and January 10, 1979 for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified.
The inspector reviewed completed SI 4.2.B-1,2 and 3, check of reactor low water level to confirm that the trip set points for low reactor water level, given in Technical Specifications 3.2.A and 3.2.B were not being exceeded.
The tests reviewed were from January 27, 1979, for Unit 1, December 26, 1978, for Unit 2, and January 12, 1979, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified.
The inspector reviewed completed reactivity margin tests, SI 4.3.A.1, to confirm that shutdown margin checks had been made to assure compliance with Technical Specification 3.3.A.1 for reac-tivity limitations on core loading.
The tests reviewed were dated January 8,
1979, for Unit 1, June 11, 1978, for Unit 2, and November 17, 1978, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identified by the inspector.
The inspector reviewed completed SI 4.4.A.2, standby liquid control (SBLC)
system functional test, to verify normal system availability as required by Technical Specification 3.4.A.1.
The tests reviewed were from December 20, 1978, and December 20, 1977, for Unit 1, May 5, 1978 for Unit 2, and October 11, 1978, for Unit 3.
Technical Specification 4.4.A requires, in part, that SBLC System operability be verified at least once each operating cycle by manually initiating one of the SBLC system loops and pumping demineralized water into the reactor vesse I
~
~
~
"5-Both systems, including both explosive valves, are required to be tested in the course of two operating cycles.
Surveillance Instruction records indicated that only the 'A'xplosive valve had been tested during the previous two Unit 1 operating cycles.
Plant management stated that interview interviews with maintenance personnel verified that both the 'A'nd 'B'alves had been tested as required but an error had been made in recording this data on the surveillance data sheet.
A note to this effect was added by plant personnel to the completed SI 4.4.A.2 of December 20, 1978 prior to the inspector's departure from the site.
CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, states in part that test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.
The facility Operational equality Assurance Manual, in implementing this requirement, requires in Part II, Section 4.5.5, that test data be recorded on the data sheets provided and that the person responsible for the recording of the data verify the data by signature.
This finding of failure to properly document test results represents noncom-pliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI.
(259/79-03-01)
The inspector made direct observation of the residual heat removal service water system pump controls located on panel 9-3 of each unit to confirm that at least one operable pump was assigned to each emergency equipment cooling water system header as required by Technical Specification 3.5.C.2.
No discrepancies were found.
The inspector made direct observation of the core spray system controls, for each unit, located on panel 9-3 to confirm that each system appeared operable and was lined up for automatic initiation as required by Technical Specification 3.5.A.l.
No discrepancies were identified.
The inspector reviewed completed SI 4.6.A.7, startup of recircula-tion pump, to verify that the temperature limits of Technical Specification 3.6 '.7, were not exceeded prior to starting recircu-lation pumps.
The data reviewed was from January 22, 1979, for Unit 1, January 13, 1979, for Unit 2, and December 8,
1978, for Unit 3.
No discrepancies were identifie '
~
c I
L