IR 05000255/1988025
| ML18053A668 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18053A667 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-25, NUDOCS 8812020144 | |
| Download: ML18053A668 (11) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/88025(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI'
Inspection Conducted:
October 13 through November 14, 1988 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson J. K. Heller Approved-1 ~"'
(fa~ a~. d By: B. L. Burgess, 1hfef--
Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Inspection on October 13 through November 14, 1988(Report No. 50-255/88025(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of quarterly management meeting; followup on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; and physical securit Results:
The plant continued refueling and maintenance operation Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Strengths observed during this period include: continuing presence of senior managers on shift has kept outage on schedule, strong commitment to excellence on the part of the operations staff (several SRO's in particular), identification of false Masoneilan parts (10 CFR 21).
Weaknesses observed include valving errors during the ILRT, damage to service water pump P-7C from poor cleanliness practices, surveil 1 ance procedures were not adequately checked out before issuance.
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
- D. P. Hoffman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Division
- G. L. Heins, Senior Vice President, Energy Supply
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- H. C. Tawney, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- K. V. Cedarquist, Inservice Inspection Engineer
- L. K. Kenaga, Staff HP
- J. T. Fremeau, Director, Nuclear Safety
- D. VandeWalle, Configuration Control Manager
- W. E. Garrity, Engineering Manager, Energy Supply Service
- T. C. Bordine, Plant Licensing Administrator
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
- R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administ.rator
- R. E. Mccaleb, Quality Assurance Director
- R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst
- R. M. Bazesinski, I&C Superintendent
- K. E. Osborne, Projects Superintendent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- W. L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- W. L. Axelson, Branch Chief, Project 2
- 8. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
- E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. K. Heller, Resident Inspector
- T. V. Wambach, Project Manager, NRR
- H. J. Miller, Director, DRS
- Denotes those present at the Management Meeting on October 20, 1988
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on November 16, 1988 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefly.
- Quarterly Management Meeting A Quarterly Management meeting was held at the Palisades site, with the personnel indicated in Para*graph 1.a in attendanc The status of the ongoing outage was discussed including detailed discussions of the steam generator eddy current test results, control rod drive mechanism (CROM)
seal housing cracks (see paragraph 5.c below) and personnel contamination Other topics of discussion included the stuck fuel bundle event and corrective actions, the Configuration Control Project, and status of the Palisades PRA developmen Followup of Previous Inspection Findings 92701 and 92702)
(Closed) Open Items 255/86035-09(0RP) and 255/86035-ll(ORP): Verify the structural integrity of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) piping associated with the steam generators. This Open Item documented that the AFW flow controls were unable to control AFW flow below 100 gpm which required the operators to cycle (on-off) the AFW pumps during low flow demands condition This additional on-off cycling may increase the potential for thermal induced fatigue of the AFW pipin The inspector reviewed Actfon Item Request (AIR) A-PAL-86-12 The AIR discussed the potential fatigue problem; provided a copy of the NOE inspection plan; discussed the NOE results; concluded that AFW piping associated with the steam generators was in good condition despite the cyclic operational mode; and, recommended that the piping be placed on normal ISI interval once the AFW control valves are repaired or modified (see Open Item 255/86035-lO(ORP)).
(Open) Open Item 255/86035-lO{ORP): AFW flow control valves will not control flow below 100 gp The licensee has initiated Facility Change (FC) FC-789, "Install Bypass valves around auxiliary Feedwater Flow control valves
- The FC was in progress at the time of the report and will be reviewed during a future inspectio {Open) Open Item 255/86035-12(0RP): Replace valve CV-0521, 11Steam Supply to P.88 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- Current plans are to repair the valve rather than replace it. The repair was in progress at the time of this report and will be reviewed during a future inspectio (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-15(0RP): Replace an instrument air compressor with one of higher capacit FC-801 and work order 24804144 removed Instrument Air Compressor C-28 and replaced it with one of higher capacit (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-30{0RP): Evaluate removal of CV-0733, 11 Condensate Hotwell Makeup Valve" because repeated air leakage from the positioner has been identified as a drain on the plant air syste AIR A-PAL-86-139 concluded that CV-0733 should not be removed or isolated from the condensate syste The valve is needed to quickly provide makeup water to the hotwell, when one of the atmospheric dumps are opene The other hotwell makeup valves are not sized to provide
- required makeup flow when the atmospheric dumps are opene Event recorder charts from previous trips showed that CV-0733 often opens as required during a plant tri In parallel with the review, the licensee completed Specification Change (SC)86-221 and work order 24606507 which replaced the positione (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-33(DRP): Implement Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) program enhancement Consumers Power Company letter dated June 30, 1986, in response to Unresolved Item 255/86005-02(DRP) provided the corrective action plan for deficiencies noted in the LLRT progra Highlights of the enhancements implemented are: computerized trending program; establish a valve history file; an augmented LLRT program for any outage in excess of thirty days; and, dedicated operators to perform the local leak rate tes (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-38(DRP): Evaluate replacement of the Control Rod Drive thermocouple chart recorde The chart recorder was replaced by SC 87-149 and work order 2470467 (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-55(DRP): Develop and implement electrical and mechanical PM's that will ensure reliable High Pressure Air compressors and system operatio PPACS activities ESS-075, ESS-091 and ESS-092 have been initiated to periodically check High Pressure air compressors C-6A, C-6B, and C-6 The inspector reviewed ESS-075 and the work order history file for air compressor C-6A, C-6B and C-6C and found nine work orders that addressed the PM's of the nine work orders, the six pertaining to C-6B and C-6C were reviewe The inspector found the PM's were being completed on a prescribed frequency and problems were identified and resolve No violations, unresolved items, open items or deviations were identifie.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the secondary and central alarm stations, the turbine, containment and auxiliary buildings; to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee The results of these activities are discussed belo * The inspector observed the rel ease of T-63A, "Filtered Waste Monitoring Tank" on October 26, 198 The release path from T-63A to the dilution water pumps was by FIC-105 During the release the inspector noted a CPIT tag affixed to the controller, indicating that it was not controlling properl The auxi-liary equipment operator discussed the measures he took, to assure the controller was functioning properl The inspector discussed this with the shift engineer who stated no work was outstanding on the controller and that a maintenance activity (work order 24806209) had been completed the previous wee A subsequent review revealed that the work order associated with the tag was complete The tag was remove During a tour of the control room on October 31, the inspector observed the on shift crew respond to a transient caused by High Pressure Air Compressor C-6 The air receiver tank was losing pressure faster then the compressor could suppl The control room operator initiated a lineup to cross tie with C-6 In order to locate the leak, the Auxiliary Operator sent to C-6B requested that the operating shutdown cooling pump be secured. After some discussion between the control room operators, shift engineering and shift supervisor the shutdown cooling pump was secure Approximately five minutes later the shutdown cooling pump was starte For about three minutes after the shutdown cooling was re-established,. water was emitted from the control rod tool access flange Once the shutdown cooling flow was normalized, water stopped flowing from the flange During discussion with the operators, the inspector was informed that this was not the first time water was ejected from the tool access flange The licensee has initiated DR-PAL-88-20 The cause and corrective action for the water emitting from the tool access flange is considered an open item (Open Item 255/88025-0l(DRP)). The following 50.72 reports were made by the license (1)
On October 27, the licensee determined, as the results of continuing reviews of the Control Room Heating and Ventilation system, that the design may not be adequate to maintain Thyroid Dose below 30 RE This report has been the topic of numerous NRC/Consumers Power conference calls, and will be reviewed by a Region III radiation specialist during a future inspectio (2)
On November 2, two inadvertent safeguard actuations occurred while three of four channels of the Reactor Protection System had been reset to perform control rod indication calibratio The remaining channel remained trippe The first occurred when a licensee operator placed one of the reset channels in trip. The resulting two of four logic caused a reactor tri The second occurred approximately five minutes late The channel had been reset, when a contractor electrician caused a short and a channel tri The resultant two of four logic caused a reactor tri For both events, the control rods were
already fully inserted when the safeguard activation occurre This item will be reviewed when the LER is issue (3)
On November 3, tne licensee determined that the plant may have been in a degraded condition during power operation due to spurious service water pump trips (see paragraph 3.d.(3) below).
This item will be reviewed when the LER is issue (4)
On November 10 an inadvertent safeguards actuations occurred, when load shedding was cause while an electrician was installing jumper The load sequencer was jumpered out of service. After a second review the licensee determined it was not reportable and retracted the repor The inspectors have reviewed this item and have no further question The inspector routinely attended the Correcti~e Action Review Board (CARB), and reviewed corrective action documents (Deviation Reports (DR), and Event Reports (ER)).
(1)
DR-PAL-88-135 states that Radiation Detectors RIA-2313 and 2324, "Main Steam Safety and Dump Valve Gross Gamma Activity Monitor" are Technical Specification required monitors, used in implementation of Emergency Operating Procedures, and are not powered by a vital power suppl The DR has an evaluation due date of three months after startup, and will document if these instruments should be powered by a vital power suppl The inspector does not disagree with the DR or the evaluation due date, but has asked the licensee if compensatory measures should be implemented to preclude any operability question if the meters are required to have a vital power suppl (2)
DR-PAL-88-191 documents that a pressurizer code safety valve failed to meet the Technical Specifi~ation setpoint range during a refueling frequency surveillance tes The* CARB had marked this item not reportable per 50.73, "Licensee Event Reporting System".
This makes three of three pressurizer code safeties that failed to meet the setpoint range during the surveillance test. The inspector questioned if the correct reportability determination was made since this item may meet the reportability requirements of 50.73(a)(2)(i) or 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
as defined in NUREG-1022, "Licensee Event Report System".
NUREG-1022 provides a description of the System and Guidelines for Reportin (3)
DR-PAL-88-088 documents that spurious service water pump trips, due to line overcurrent, would occu Each pump has two trip relays (high current and a time/current relay). Activation of both is required to cause a pump trip. During periods of high heat loads the pumps have operated above the high current reset relay, such that additional heat load activated the time/current relay and caused a pump tri When this was presented to the CARB, reportability was not discusse The
inspector asked the licensee to review this item for reportability since this item appears to fit the requirements of 50.7 The DRs and ERs addressed above, represent a very small fraction of the number reviewed by the inspector The inspector did not have questions pertaining to the other The inspector was informed that two valve lineup errors occurred during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT).
The first prevented containment pressurization and the second was a valve throttled versus fully ope The second error should not have effected the ILR The lineup required a dual verificatio For both cases the same individuals were involve The licensee reviewed the lineup sheets and verified by direct or indirect means that the remaining valves verified by these individuals were in the correct position. Disciplinary action was taken against the individuals. Additional discussion is contained in Inspection Report 255/8801 During auxiliary building tours the inspector found the followin (1)
An unmarked, unconnected electrical cable hanging from a cable tray next to the 590 level elevator entranc The licensee reviewed this item and found that the other end is marked a spar The end was marked spare and placed neatly in the cable tray.
(2) Three emergency lanterns located on the 590 level that were unplugged and not lit. The system engineer indicated that these were new installations and had not been declared operabl (3)
Three plant announcing system speakers did not appear to be working properl The first was at the C-30 panel, which was stuffed with rag The second was at the boric acid mixing tan The volume was turned down to the point it was barely audibl The third was located outdoors, and did not appear to functio These items were reported to the license The Technical Engineer and the inspector discussed the applicability of Technical Specification 3.0.4 (mode change with inoperable equipment) as it applies to inoperable fire barrier In this case, the action statement allows continuous operation The inspector provided the Technical Engineer with a NRC interpretation pertaining to Technical Specification 3.0.3 and 3. On October 18, 1988, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) for refueling was observing the return of a fuel assembly to the spent fuel poo The operator started lateral movement before the assembly was fully raise The SRO stopped the movement which could have resulted in
- significant damage to the fuel assembl This exemplary level of conscientious performance is commendabl The licensee reported *a 10 CFR 21 defect on October 21, 1988, associated with parts supplied by SW Controls, Inc. for use in Masoneilan valve Parts manufactured by an unauthorized vendor were represented as being genuine Masoneilan part The parts were purchased as commercial grade or non-Q and were in some cases qualified for Q applications by the license Dimensional errors and manufacturing process variations led to the discovery of the non-genuine parts. Additional followup will be conducted by the NRC (Open Item 255/88025-02(DRP)).
Two opens item and no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie.
Maintenance (62703)
The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling; removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicabl FC-825
"Generator Artificial Intelligence Diagnostics".
The machinists were observed installing field run electrical condui The FC had instructions pertaining to placement of conduit on safety related walls and non safety related walls., During the interview, the inspector was able to ascertain that the individuals were knowledgeable of these instructions and that plant posting makes identification of safety related walls eas * MSS-M-19
"Disassembly, Inspection, Reassembly of Main Steam Isolation Valves".
On October 26, 1988, maintenance personnel asked the inspector if it was appropriate to performed a procedural step that had been performed the previous da The new instructions were written on a sheet of notebook paper and contained a requirement to increase the torque (by a factor of six) applied to the packing stuffing bo The inspector*relayed the question to the Maintenance Manager, who had the appropriate personnel review the matter and issued a Temporary Change Notic The inspector subsequently reviewed this item and determined that two problems could have occurred if the work had been performed as instructed. A quality hold point pertaining to torquing of the nuts may have*been missed and an improper procedure change may have been mad The inspector has discussed this with the Plant Engineer Supervisor and the Quality Assurance directo Both informed the inspector that reviews of this item were continuin Pending completion of the licensee review the inspector considers this an open item (Open Item 255/88025-03(DRP)) *
8 During the previous refueling outage, the licensee found a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CROM) seal housing with a through wall crac Thirteen additional CROM housings were inspected, with cracks (not through wall) found iri tw The three CROM seal housings wer replaced with spare The problem appeared isolated to a single manufacturing lot, since the three CROM housings were the only ones purchased/manufactured to that lot numbe All cracks were found by standard dye penetrant inspection of the inside of the CROM seal housin As part of the long term corrective action, all (45 total) CROM housings were examined using dye penetrant during the current refueling outag This examination identified 11 of 45 CROM seal housings with crack The seal housings that were previously examined had no indications of crack The vendor's (Combustion Engineering) analysis indicated that 100 mils of material could be removed and still maintain minimum wall thicknes The cracks in the nine CROM seal housings were removed by grinding 3 to 10 mils from the housin The other two were replaced with spare One housing that was not reused was sent to the vendor for destructive examinatio As part of the examination, a crack that was removed by grinding and had passed a dye penetrate examination was sectioned. This revealed a crack 150 mils deep (approximately 50 percent through wall).
The original color contrast dye penetrant method was determined to be incapable of identifying crack-like indications smaller than 2x10E-6 inche Florescent penetrant was determined to have a minimum sensitivity of about 4.0xlOE-7 inches and was able to identify cracking that still existed on seven of the seal housing Material removal up to a total of 30 mils of the base metal was required to remove all existing indication Future action planned by the licensee include continued efforts to identify the stimulus to the transgranular stress corrosion cracking, replacement of the CROM seal housings, and evaluation/
inspection of other CROM pressure boundarie Completion of these actions is an open item (Open Item 255/88025-04(DRP)).
Two open items and no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie.
Surveillance (61726)
The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: RI-69 Surveillance of the Subcooled Margin Mete *
- When the inspector observed this activity the technician was recording the data with a penci The inspector questioned this practic He was informed by the technician that problems had been encountered while performing the tes The input parameters were not providing the desired outpu As a result, the official performance of RI-69 was-delayed until sufficient information was obtained to analyze the proble R0-19 RT-36 DW0-1 SH0-1 T-218 RT-80 Calibration of Control Rod Drive Indication Containment Integrated Leak Rate Tes Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc Service Water Pumps P-7A, P-78 and P-7C Performance Test was performed on October 18, 198 The test indicated degraded performance of the P-7C pump and corrective maintenance was initiate Upon disassembly a wrench (1-1/2 inch combination) was found in the pump and the two lower stages were found to be damage Repair of the vane damage to the pump bowls was in progress at the conclusion of the inspection perio It is suspected that the wrench was sucked off the bottom of the suction bay during fourth from the last day of plant operation when operators recotded a drop in motor running current on hourly log This falls within the pump's 7-day LCO allowed in the Technical Specifications. Various other maintenance debris was found in the suction bay, and corrective action to improve cleanliness controls is in progres This will receive additional review after the planned LER is submitte Emergency Safeguards System Test - Right Channel This test required approximately 20 changes during it's performance and indicates a continuing problem with *
providing accurate procedures for surveillance test Action~ have been taken to have the system engineer on site during testing, and a "comments" sheet is being kept by the Shift Supervisor for use during the next procedure review/revision. Detailed procedure walkdowns are not widely use No violations, deviations, open items or unresolved items were identified Physical Security (71707) Routine facility security measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maint~ining facility security
- protection were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force member On October 21, 1988 at approximately 3:00 p.m., the inspector was informed that a licensee employee was onsite and under the influence of drug The name was provided to the license The licensee's investigation determined that the individual was taking medication as the result of minor surgery from the previous da The licensee medical consultant determined that the medication should not impair his work activit The individual did submit to the licensee Fitness for Duty program, and tested negative for any additional drug The inspector toured the Central Alarm Station and the Secondary Alarm Station. All activities observed appeared appropriate and correc During a tour of the turbine building, the inspector observed a guard stationed at the exciter/generator repair area reading material that did not appear appropriat This was discussed with site security supervisio The inspector was informed that the guard was not employed by Consumers Power, but was employed by the turbine generator repair contractor and that the matter would be reviewe No violations, deviations, open items or unresolved items were identified.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Open items are discussed in Paragraphs 4b, 4i, 5b, and 5.
Management Interview A management interview was conducted on November 16, 1988, upon conclusion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar