IR 05000255/1988022
| ML18054A498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1989 |
| From: | Danielson D, Schapker J, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A496 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-22, NUDOCS 8901240215 | |
| Download: ML18054A498 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/88022(DRS) Docket No. 50-255 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant-Inspection At: Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: September 15-16, 26-28, November 3-4, License No. DPR-20 ___ Qecember 13, 1988, and January 9-10, 1989 -~--- I r J ;_ r -~I-{..__ __ _ Inspectors: J. F. Schapker --1, j) i4 ~ ./I' ' r /Ii,.,-£_ K. D. Ward .J5rl-iJ-l'-'l-Llfth--r~ Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary I /-- - 11 l7 ;;-7 Date 1/17/f'i Date Da'te Inspection on September 15-16 5 26-28, November 3-4, December 13, 1988, and January 9-10, 1989 (Report No. 50-255/88022(DRS)) Areas Inspected: Unannounced safety inspection of licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings (92701); review of inservice inspection (ISI) program (73051) and procedures (73502); observation of steam generator (SG) eddy current examination (ET) (73753); review of ISI Data review and evaluations (73755); and onsite followup of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cracking (92700).
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified for inadequate quality verification to assure SG tube plugs are installed in the proper locatio The licensee is in the process of reviewing template manufacture and installation procedures, and alternative procedures (i.e., marking of defective tubes) to assure future deficiencies of this nature do not occu The licensee's ET program is currently in the process of upgrading to enhance the detectability of defects in the SG tubin This program improvement is in the process of qualification which is scheduled for completion by June 198 * DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo) *
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- K. E. Osborne, Projects Superintendent J. G. Lewis, Technical Director D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst J. S. Erickson, Senior Engineer R. E. McCaleb, QA Director G. Y. Yeisley, Senior QA Engineer
- B. V. Van Wagner, ISI Supervisor K. V. Cedarquist, Senior Engineer J. E. Schepars, Staff Engineer, PRA J. M. Decker, Diviiion Supervisor, NOT Services S. R. Wellman, NOT Project Supervisor
- R. P. Margol, QA Administrator
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst Allen Nuclear Associates (ANA)
B. L. Curtis, President, ECT-LIII NOE Technology (NOE) R. Looper, ECT-LIII U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) T. Wambach, Project Manager, NRR E. Murphy, Materials Engineer, NRR C. Dodd, NRC Consultant-ECT E. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector R. Landsman, Reactor Inspector Other members of the plant staff and contractors were also contacte *Denotes those present at the exit intervie Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (255/88004-01): Steam generator sleeves not examine A relief request was made by the licensee concerning the eddy current examination (ET) of previously installed sleeve This request was due to high radiation exposure times to perform the examination, and that the previous ET of sleeves had shown no degradatio At the time of the NRC inspection the relief request had not been formally grante Subsequently, NRR completed its review of the relief request on March 29, 1988, and
- *
it wcts granted as part of Amendment No. 112 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 Steam Generator Augmented Inservice Inspection Program (TAC No. 56365).
Steam Gent:rator Eddy Current Examination (ET) - As a result of a steam generator (SG) tube leak indication, the Palisades _Plant was shutdown on August 8, 198 Eddy current examination (ET) was performed to identify the source_ of leakage and to assess the cause of the leak, and to evaluate the SG tubes reliabilit Background On December 4, 1987, a SG tube leak was identified which resulted in the shutdown of the plan The ET examination which was planned for the 1988 fall outage was performed during the Palisades Technical Specification Section 4.14, 11Augmented Inservice Inspection Progri:ir.i for Steam Generator The initial scope of the 1987 examination included the following: c
0
All unplugged ET indications called 30% or greater in either of the previous two ihspections period A random sample of 2% of the tubes in the hot leg and 1% of the tubes in the cold leg of each steam generator. Forty tubes in the vicinity of the leaking tube ( 11 B 11 Quad 2, Line 35, Row 122).
Dent profilometry examination of selected tubes, including all periphery tube Sludge depth examination of selected tube The scope of the inspection was expanded when a crack-like indication was detected with the 4C4F probe in the cold leg bend region of tube 11 B 11 Quad 1, Line 29, Row 4 This tube was one of the 65 tubes in the 11 B 11 cold leg random sampl As required by proposed Technical Specification, Section 4.15.3.1, (part C), a 6% supplementary sample was initiated with the 4C4F technique (389 tubes were randomly selected for inspection).
The 6% supplementary sample resulted in the detection of two cold leg bend crack-like indication In addition, while performing the 4C4F 11greater than or equal to 30% 11 and 11 random sample 11 tests in the 11 B 11 hot leg, two or more cold leg-bend crack-:-like indications were found (these indications were detected as a result of overshooting the normal boundaries of the 4C4F hot leg test) *
In order to bound the probable areas associated with these cold leg bend cracks, the licensee conducted a review of past (1983) indication The review identified a specific area where the majority of 1987 and 1983 cold leg bend cracks were concentrate This area is bounded by 11 B 11 Quad 1, Line 32 through 11 B 11 Quad 4, Line 26 and 11 B 11 Cold Leg, Row 14 through Row 9 To better assess the extent of cold leg bend cracking, approximately one-third of the remaining tubes in this bounded area (398 tubes) were inspected with the 4C4F techniqu Three additional crack-like indications were detected in this sampl A review of 1983 and 1985 ET signals against 1987 signals indicated that the majority of these crack-like indications were previously presen As a further conservative measure, the most recent 1983 or 1985 historical signal data for each of the tubes within the bounded area which had not been tested in 1987 (956 tubes) was reviewe Only one additional crack-line indication was detecte A similar review of 11A 11 SG historical data was not considered applicable because there is no such 11area 11 associated with cold leg bend cracking in the 11A 11 S In 1983, only four cold leg bend crack-like indications were detected in performing the 11A 11 SG 100% inspectio In the 1987 inspection, no such 11A 11 SG bend defects were note To further characterize the crack-line indications and to examine locations where the 4C4F technique was indeterminate as to flaw condition, the motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) was use Flaw sizing was based on the 4C4F and 540 SFW examination for this examination perio All known eddy current indications 30% or greater detected with the 540 SFW technique in 1985 or 1983 were examined by the 540 SFW technique, and all known eddy current indications 30% or greater detected in 1985 or 1983 with the 4C4F technique were examined by the 4C4F techniqu The random sample tubes were inspected with both the 540 SFW and 4C4F technique The majority of the pluggable indications found in 1987 were circumferential cracks, primarily in the cold leg of 118 11 S Review of historical signal data (1983 and 1985) showed that most of these indications were previously present but had not been reporte This 11 non-reporting 11 of defects can be attributed to the following factors: c
Extremely small amplitude signal response ((1/4 volt).
Insufficient interpreter indoctrination to the technique in 198 Poor signal to noise ratio that is inherent with the 4C4F techniqu Inspection Due tu the SG leak experienced on August 8, 1988 the licensee shut down and performed additional inspections as required by Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code 1977 Edition, through Summer 1978 Addenda, and the Palisades Technical Specification Section 4.1 The NRC employed the service of a special consultant for eddy current to review the licensee's ET inspection progra The program review by the NRC consultant, an NRR materials specialist and a Region III NRC specialist concluded that the licensees program and personnel qualifications were adequate to identify potential tube degradation as required by the Palisades Technical Specificatio The licensee is currently upgrading the ET equipment and procedures which will enhance the sensitivity of the ET inspectio A review of the ET contractors personnel qualifications as required by SNT-TC-lA was acceptabl This review was limited to the personnel qualifications submitted to the licensee and certified by the ET contractor. The NRC inspector did not verify the background training and experience of the individual inspectors as certified by the ET contracto The NRC inspector reviewed the data analysis guidelines for the ET at Palisade The guidelines address the specific type of ET responses expected due to the SG geometries, denting, sludge, copper, etc., and-the type of defects of past experience with the appropriate ET signal response for eac A special training course addressing the data analysis guidelines is administered to all data analyser At the conclusion of the course interpreter qualification examinations were administered to the attendee The NRC inspector reviewed the qualification examinations for the data analysers which exhibited appropriate and quantitative examination material covered in the data analysis guideline The NRC inspector observed ET examinations in progress including backshift operations of ET operators, interpreters, and analys The licensee performed the ET examination utilizing CPCo NOE services supplemented by four NOE contractor Two independent interpretation groups reviewed the ET dat Eddy Current Examination Findings The identity of the leaking tube was not known when eddy current testing bega Chemistry calculations indicated the suspect tube was in 11 B 11 S A 100% inspection with the 4C4F technique of the hot legs of both 11A 11 and 118 11 steam generators was initiate On September 9, 1988, pressurization of the secondary side to approximately 55 psi resulted in the positive identification of the leaking tube ( 118 11 Quad 2, Line 33, Row 122).
Subsequent testing with the 4C4F probe and the MPRC showed the defect to be a circumferential
- crack at the lower edge of support Plate 1 The leaking tube is in the same vicinity as the 1987 "leaker" (tube 118 11 Quad 2, Line 35, Row 122) and was tested with the 4C4F technique in December, 198 At that time there was no detectable indication present in
-"B" Quad 2, Line 33, Row 122 (Note: The 4C4F limit of detectability for cracks is 40% thru-wall).
An inspection of all of the tubes in Rows 188 through 126 in the hot legs of both "A" and "B" SG's was then performed with the 4C4F techniqu Two additional crack-like indications were detected at support Plate 13 in tubes 118 11 Quad 2, Line 31, Row 122 and 11 8
~uad 3, Line 37, Row 12 The location of previous leaking tubes and tubes with crack-like indications (excluding U-bend indications) was reviewe This study showed that the majority of "cracked" tubes are located within the outer 10 rows of the periphery for both SG' Based on this and on the location of the 1988 leaking tube the inspection scope was changed to encompass the following:
0
0
0 All tubes located within the outer 10 rows of the periphery of both ' 1A" and "B" SG 1s, hot and cold legs with the 4C4F techniqu All tubes passing through support Plates 13 and 14 with the 4C4F technique in both "A" and 118 11 SG' A selected sample of 141 tube/support plate intersections in 118 11 SG at support plate 13 in the area of the leaker and the two other crack-line indications (Quad 2, Line 31, Row 122 and Quad 3, Line 37, Row 120) with the MRP Fifty-six randomly selected tube/support plate intersections in 118 11 SG with the MRP This sample was selected from tubes which contained saturated dents or indications)= 30% thru-wall with the 4C4F techniqu The intent of this sample was to help understand and characterize degraded areas in the SG' "B" cold leg inspectio Cold leg bend crack indications were detected in 118 11 SG in the same region bounded for cold leg bend cracking in 198 This resulted in testing all of the tubes in this area that had not been tested in 198 As a result, 1081 tubes were tested with the 4C4F technique in the region bounded by 118 11 Quad 1, Line 32 through "B" Quad 4, Line 26 and 118 11 Cold Leg, Row 14 through Row 9 Randomly selected tubes in both SG's with the 4C4F and 540 SFW techniques to be used in "post-outage" MIZ-18 qualification work.
540 SFW inspection of all tubes blocked to the 4C4F prob Testing is done to ensure passage of the 540 SFW prob The initial MRPC inspection sample at support Plate 13 resulted in detecting two additional crack like indication Neither of these indications (tubes 118 11 Quad 2, Line 31, Row 128 and 11 B 11 Quad 2, Line 36, Row 123) were detected with the 4C4F technique and are thought to be below the 40% thru-wall detection limit of the 4C4F prob To ensure that no other cracks were present in the vicinity of the leaker, the MRPC sample was expanded by 74 tube/support plate intersections at support Plate 1 No additional crack-like indications were found in the expanded sampl Flaw sizing is based on the 4C4F and 540 SFW examinations for this inspectio The corrosion growth determination is calculated from the 4C4F techniqu The 4C4F technique is qualified for the detection of circumferential cracking and the depth quantification of intergranular corrosion. A limited amount of testing was also performed with the 540 SFW technique which is qualified for the detection and sizing of wastage and pit In addition, the MRPC was used for crack detection and in-depth flaw characterizatio A total of 12 crack-like indications were detected with the 4C4F technique and the MRPC, two in 11A 11 SG and ten in 11 B 11 S Of the ten indications in 11B 11 SG, nine (including the leaker) were located at support Plate 13 in the vicinity of a lug; eight in Quad 2 and one in Quad The support plates are attached to the SG shroud by lugs in several locations around the periphery of each plat Each of the indicatJons is associated with a moderate amount of denting, either at the center of the support or at both the top and bottom of the plat Of the ten crack-like indications in 118 11 SG, six were not detectable with the 4C4F prob A 11 of the six are considered to be very sma 11 circumferentially (estimated to be 29 degrees circumferential extent or less) and below the 4C4F 40% thru-wall detectability limi In addition, the true nature of three of the six was somewhat ambiguous in that the MRPC may have actua l,ly been responding to deposits or dent The licensee elected to plug these three tube The leaking tube, 118 11 Quad 2, Line 33, Row 122, was inspected in the 1987 inspection with the 4C4F techniqu A review of the 1987 data shows no detectable indication of tube degradatio During the inspection of 11 8 11 SG, 4C4F crack-line indications were also found in the cold leg and hot leg bend region In the past all of these 11 bend 11 region indication? were plugged, but a question has always existed as to whether many of these indications are
actually pits, not crack In this inspection the MRPC was used to more accurately characterize the nature, extent and orientation of these indicC1tion The following criteria was established to distinguish between true cr~ck-like indications and pitting: (1) Crack indications shall have an aspect ratio of 1.5 or greater as determined from MRPC dat The aspect ratio is defined as the ratio of the dimensions of the major axis to the minor axis of the two-dimensional MRPC CLIP PLOT projection of an indication onto the Z-theta coordinate surfac (2) Crack indications shall have rapid rise times based on MRPC respons (3) A circumferential crack shall exhibit the above properties and be oriented parallel to the transverse plane of the tub (4) Indications exhibiting the above properties shall be characterized as circumferential cracks if not detected with the MiZ-12 540 SFW bobbin coil probe (Note: If an indication is detected with the bobbin coil probe, the indication may still be characterized as a crack-like indication if it meets Criteria (1)-(3) above).
(5) Indications whose characterization is questionable based upon application of the above criteria shall be subject to further evaluatio If not resolvable, the characterization shall be based upon 4C4F data and the indication reported as a crack-like indication ( 11xx 11 ). (6) Indications which fail to meet Criteria (1) through (4) above or Criterion (5) above shall not be reported as crack-like indication By applying this criteria, all of the bend indications tested with the MRPC were dispositioned as pit Flaw sizing was then performed with thE 540 SFW technique (Note: One hot leg bend 11crack
indication was unable to be tested with the MRPC due to logistics and was hence plugged).
Two tubes in 11A 11 SG cold leg (Quad 4, Line 17, Row 134 and Quad 4, Line 21, Row 136) were plugged for containing crack-like indications at support Plate 1 A total of 19 tubes were plugged for failing to pass the 540 SFW probe, five in 11A 11 SG and 14 in 118 11 S The majority of these tube were blocked near the 12th support plate on the periphery near support lug The ET examination was effective with respect to meeting the safety objections of the applicable Technical Specification requirements.
- Misplugged Tubes The licensee performed,profilometry examinations to detect denting growth during the previous outage (December 1987).
During this examination it was discovered that SG 118 11 tube in Quad 3, Line 2, Row 121 was misplugged in 198 During the August 1988 outage a tube in SG 118
, Quad 1, Line 79, Row 44, was found to be misplugge This is a violation (50-255/88022-01) of Technical Specification Section 4.14.4 and is an example of inadequate quality verification. The NRC inspector reviewed the Palisades Nuclear Plant Permanent Maintenance Procedures No PCS~M-42, Revision 5, and PCS-M-43, Revision 5 which appeared to be adequate to assure the tube plugging was correctly administere It appears the quality control verification of the template application was inadequat The licensee is in the process of* reviewing the adequacy of the template manufacture and installation procedure. Steam Generator Tube Leak On December 5, 1988, with the reactor at 91% power, the licensee identified a steam generator tube leak of about 0.35 gallons per minute in the 118 11 stea_m generato The unit was then shut dow It was found thclt the weld of the plug on Quad 2, Line 31, Row 122, had been leakin The tube was originally found to be unacceptable August 1988 and was plug welded at that tim The leaking plug was due to a defective circumferential weld, this appears to indicate inadequate quality inspection of the plugging proces This is an additional example of inadequate quality verification resulting in a violation of NRC requirements as addressed -in Paragraph 3.d above (50-255/88022-01).
Eddy current was performed 100% on tubes from Line 27 through Line 45 that pass through support Plate 13 on Quads 1 and 4 of the cold leg and Quads 2 and 3 of the hot le These are the primary areas that plugging of tubes were performed August 198 The eddy current was performed using the Zetec MIZ-18 digital system in conjunction with the morotized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) that gives a dimensional surface measurement of the length and width of a defec It was decided to remove the piug that was defective on December 8, 1987, from the tube in Quad 2, Line 35, Row 122 and re-examine the tube to see if the indication had propagate The indication had propagated and for safety reasons (stabilization), the licensee plugged the tubes around the defective tub The following SG tubes were plugged due to distorted indications: Quad 3 Line 34 Row 121 Quad 4 Line 31 Row 124 Quad 4 Line 35 Row 126 Quad 4 Line 36
- Row 127
There were several telephone calls between NRR and the licensee on the abov The NRC inspector participated in a conference call between NRR and the licensee on December 19, 198 Th~ NRC inspector reviewed the procedures, program, and other welding and NOE documentation, and observed eddy current examination. Onsite Followup of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (Closed) LER 86-040-3 (255/86040-3L)): Cracking of Control Rod Drive Seal Housing Background In December 1986 with the plant in hot shutdown condition (i.e., 530 degrees, 2150 psia), engineering wolkdowns identified control rod drive mechanism (CROM) Number 101 (head positirin 25) to be exhibiting primary coolant system (PCS) leakage of approximately 0.12 gallons per minut The CRD seal housing [SEAL;AA] was removed from the reactor head and during bench testing, exhibited leakage from the drive shaft tube penetratio Subsequently, on December 17, 1986, dye penetrant inspections identified positive circumferential indications around the inner diameter of the motor tube sleev On December 17, 1986, due to positive dye penetrant indications on CRD seal housing 101, an additional six seal housings were dye penetrant tested per ASME Section X No similar positive indications were note On December 19, 1986, CRD seal housing 101 was sent to Combustion Engineering to determine the primary failure mechanism via destructive and metallurgic examinatio A records search initiated by both the licensee and vendor indicated that CRD seal housing 101 was one of three spare CRD seal housings procured from Combustion Engineering in 197 Also indicated was that the seal housings were manufactured from the same materials and comprised the entire manufacturing lo The remaining seal housings were determined to be on the reactor head in Positions 23 and 2 On January 7, 1987, CRD seal housings 102 and 102 (head position 23 and 28 respectively) were removed and dye penetrant teste Both seal housings exhibited positive indications similar to CRD seal housing 10 Subsequently, both seal housings were sent to Combustion Engineering for further examinatio On January 9, 1987, due to the additional findings on seal housing 103 and 102, and per ASME Section XI, five additional CRD seal housings from the originally supplied lot were removed and dye penetrant teste No similar positive indications were note * *
The Combustion Engineering destructive and metallurgical analyses indicate that the axial and circumferential cracking existing on the inner diameter of the motor tube sleeve was a result of transgranular stress corrosion crackin Inspection During the refueling outage of 1988, as part of the long term corrective actions taken in response to the indications noted above, six CRD seal housings (Serial Numbers 2966-02, 09, 34=5, 36, 44 and 45) were removed and dye penetrant teste On September 21, 1988, test results revealed that five of the six CRD seal housings were exhibiting positive indications similar to those found in 198 Seal housing 35 did not exhibit unacceptable indications, while seal housing 02 contained a positive 360 degree indicatio Due to the positive indications noted in the 1988 sample, the remaining 39 CRD seal housings on the reactor head were removed and dye penetrctnt tested (PT).
As a result of these inspections, six additional CRD seal housings (Serial Numbers 2966-11, 14, 27, 30, 41 and 50) were found to be exhibiting positive indication Therefore, a total of 11 out of the 45 CRD seal housings tested in 1988 failed the (PT) examinatio Between the identification of the 1986 and 1988 positive dye penetrant indications, 13 CRD seal housings were inspected with no evidence of indicatio Ten of these 13 housings were again inspected in 1988 and again, no evidence of indications were note The remaining three housings not reinspected are spares that were not in servic These spare housings were rebuilt and inspected in March 198 Repair of the CRD seal housings was pursued in accordance with ASME Section XI via a honing proces As a result of this process, the indications were characterized to typically by 0.003 to 0.004 inches in dept The maximum depth indication has been determined to be 0.012 inche In addition to these repair efforts, CRD seal housing 02 was sent to Combustion Engineering for destructive examination and testin In order to provide assurance that the honing process was completely removing the existing indications, a fluorescent dye penetrant test (FPT) procedure was develope The nine previously repaired CRD seal housings were again removed from the reactor head and th_e fluorescent testing performe This testing revealed that indications remained within several seal housing A review of previous standard dye penetrant tests revealed a good correlation between remaining indications arid those originally identifie These remaining indications were then removed by localized grinding efforts and the seal housings reexamined using the fluorescent penetrant test. This further testing revealed no remaining indication The total maximum material removed to eliminate these indications was 0.015 inche The NRC inspector observed the FPT and mechanical processing to remove the defect I_ The cause of the indications identified in 1986 has been attributed to iransgranular stress corrosion crackin However, the initiating* factor of the transgranular stress corrosion cracking could not be determine There is evidence of a contaminant being present on the fracture surface; however, the specific contaminant could not be determine Metallurgical analyses of the housing indicate that the primary elements identified are consistent with those found in Type 304 stainless steel and dye penetrant fluid and develope Additional elements were identified which are known to promote transgranular stress corrosion cracking (i.e., potassium) in stainless steel; however, no explanation for their presence could be determine Nor could an exact correlation be derived between their existence and the crackin The presence of the containment and evidence uf transgranular stress corrosion cracking originally appeared to be an isolated case, associated with the manufacturing lot comprised of CRD seal housings 101, 102 and 10 Th~ positive dye penetrant indications exhibited on the 11 CRD seal* housings discovered in September 1988 have again been attributed to transgranular stress corrosion crackin This conclusion was primarily derived from da*ta taken and analyses performed by Combustion Engineering during dest~uctive testing of CRD seal housing 0 These efforts focused on evaluating stresses imposed by shrink fitting and welding processes during manufacturing, and operating stresses normally impose Analyses concluded that there is no evidence of fatigue cracking and that the indications are transgranular in natur Although no traces of corrosive contaminant were identified in the 1988 sampling, it is assumed that the crack initiation and subsequent growth were accelerated by the presence of a contaminan This was due to the fact that the steady stresses computed would not otherwise be anticipated to result in the cracking exhibite All 45 CRD seal housings currently installed on the reactor head were PT inspecte The licensee is performing an evaluation to determine the frequency and number of CRD seal housing PT inspections to be performed duri~g future outage An engineering analysis of the physical design is also in process to identify any seal housing design changes which would mitigate the possibility of this type of degradatio The NRC inspector informed the licensee that this is an open item (50-255/88022-02) pending the completion of the licensees analysis and NRC revie The activities inspected were adequate to assure the safety objectives and the ASME Code are being me i
- Open Items Open items ctre matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which will involve some ctction on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 10, 198 The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar }}