IR 05000255/1988005
| ML18054A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A253 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-05, 50-255-88-5, IEIN-87-028, IEIN-87-28, NUDOCS 8803030133 | |
| Download: ML18054A255 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/88005(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
January 1 through February 3, 1988 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson N. R. Williamsen C. D. Anderson B. L. Burgess R. C. Kazmar
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~/P-Approved By:
B. L. Burges~Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary
~(~7 Date Inspection on January 1 through February 3, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/88005(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors and Region III staff of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; outage activities; physical security; radiological protection; reportable events; information notices; and containment integrity verificatio Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- D. P. Hoffman, Plant General Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager R. M. Rice, Operations Manager D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor K. E. Osborne, Plant Projects Superintendent
- K. M. Haas, Reactor Engineering Superintendent
- R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on February 3, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefly.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings:
(Closed) Open Item 255/85009-03(DRP): Revise the test procedure for check valves CK-3402-ES and CK-3403-ES so that, consistent with ASME Section XI, the flow rate will be measured using a pressure differential no greater than that observed during the preoperational tes The subject valves had been included in test procedure R0-12 which specified for test purposes, a water source of demineralized water from a header with a pressure of 100 ps The valves are now included in procedure Q0-13, 11 Iodine Removal Valves Stroke Test
, Revision 1, June 30, 1986 and a special test rig is used with a properly specified differential pressure of 15.4 psi The valves have been successfully tested under Q0-1 (Closed) Open Item 255/85013-08(DRP): Subsequent to a turbine trip followed by a reactor trip, there was a failure of Safeguards Bus 1-C to fast-transfer to startup transformer power, thus requiring the Emergency Diesel to start and pick up the load This Open Item resulted from the review of Licensee Event Report 255/84-015, which is similar to LERs84-001 and 85-00 The common cause of failure for all three LERs was the 2400 volt breakers which failed to operate properl The licensee has written and implemented more comprehensive and more frequent preventive maintenance procedures for the switchgear and cubicles associated with Bus 1-C, as well as buses 1-D and 1-The Periodic
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- Preventive Activity Control (PPAC) System numbers are SPS-001, SPS-058, and SPS-05 This Open Item is close (Open) Open Item 255/86005-0l(DRP): The licensee must develop stabiliiation criteria for their containment that will ensure that the containment atmosphere is stabilized prior to the beginning of the measured leakage phase of the Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT).
In an ILRT on January 21, 1986, the licensee initially declared stabilization of the containment atmosphere after only 5.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> at test pressur Subsequent anomalies in the test data showed that even after 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> into the test, the containment atmosphere had apparently not stabilize The licensee has added a cautionary note to test procedure No. RT-36, 11 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test 11 stating that the stabilization period should be increased; however, the note does not present any specific criteri The licensee is sending a representative to a seminar on ILRT, to be held in mid-February, 1988, which is expected to result in more specific criteria for the perception of stabilizatio This item will remain open until proper stabilization criteria is developed and added to the procedur (Closed) Open Item 255/86005-03(DRP): Revise the procedures for local leak rate testing so that the 11 as-found 11 testing will have a sufficient level of confidence even in those unusual cases where the leak rate is so high that the test duration is quite shor Because of a high local leak rate during a test, the test duration for one particular penetration was only 10 second The test should have been repeated in order to verify the short time perio The licensee has corrected the procedures for local leak rate testing by adding a statement that an off-normal local leak rate test must be repeated until a sufficient level of confidence in the measured leak rate is realize The inspector made a spot check of the procedures to verify the completion of this actio (Closed) Violation 255/86018-03(DRP): The Shift Supervisor's Log did not contain entries for the diesel generators (DG) inadvertent actuation of June 17, 1986, nor did the log contain entries for the 10 CFR 50.72 notifications for either the June 17, 1986, DG actuation or the June 10, 1986 inadvertent DG actuatio The appropriate entries had been made in the Shift Engineers log, but not in the Shift Supervisor's lo The corrective action has included emphasizing to all Shift Supervisors the need to complete accurate logs, per Administrative Procedure 4.01, 11Shift Operations, 11 Paragraph 5.7.2.b; monitoring of the log entries by the Palisades Operations Superintendent; and a change in the duties of the Shift Supervisor in the Emergency Plan so that the Shift Supervisor will function as the Site Emergency Director and hence have first-hand knowledge of emergency information which he must enter in his lo This violation is close (Closed) Open Item 255/86031-0l(DRP): Surveillance Procedures R0-52 and M0-78, for the testing of the three pumps in the Fire Suppression Water System, contained errors in that (a) they did not take any data in the
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11as found 11 condition, and (b) they did not refer to the ancillary function of the pumps which is to supplement the Service Water System under certain condition The procedures for these fire pumps, P-9A, P-98 and P-41 have been correctly revised to include the 11as found
engine speed for the diesel-driven pump Further, the basis document for M0-78 now states that the fire protection pumps and power supply is to be tested monthly because credit is taken for the fire pumps providing a backup water supply to the critical service water heade (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-13: Implement a program for periodic inspection/calibration of important Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
instrumentation power supplie A preventive maintenance program has been developed for instrument power supplies, as described in PPACs*
FWS071 and FWS07 The inspection/calibration will be done during each refueling outag (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-16: Evaluate the instrument air system for the addition/deletion of drain traps or blowdown point Seven (7)
blowdown points have been installed per FC-694 and W0-2460600 The licensee reported that all seven points have been blown down, with significant amounts of dry desiccant being cleared from two of the blowdown point (Closed) Open item 255/86035-17(DRP): Verify removal of contaminants in the instrument air system by blowdown and disassembly and inspection of a random sample of instrument-air-supplied component Blowdown has been successful, as indicated in Open Item 255/86035-1 Further, the blowdown is done on a 30-day schedule, per Preventive Periodic Activity Control system Number X-OPS-35 The licensee reported that the disassembly of about forty (40) instrument-air-supplied components showed that there were no further contamination problem A number of minor deficiencies still exist in the instrument air system and the licensee 1 s long range plans to upgrade the system include the fol lowing:
Replace one of the three Plant Instrument Air Compressors during the 1988 refueling outage with a larger compressor, such that a single Plant Instrument Air Compressor can handle the normal combined load of the plant and the Feedwater Purity Buildin The other two Plant Instrument Air Compressors are scheduled to be replaced subsequently, as part of the five-year pla *
A study is underway on whether to add a layer of activated alumina in the top of the desiccant towe The alumina would protect the silica gel from water spikes which are believed to cause the problem of excessive desiccant fine *
Another study is being done on the possible replacement of the prefilter drain trap controller, which at present cannot cycle more frequently than once very fifteen minutes, resulting in operational problem If a new controller is installed for the prefilter drain trip, it would have a minimum cycle time in the order of five minutes, rather than fiftee *
(Closed) Open Item 255/86035-48(DRP): Replace the frequency and load indication meters and ancillary equipment for the Emergency Diesel Generator instrumentatio Replacement was scheduled to be completed
- before the end of the 1988 refueling outage, but was actually completed during the January 1988, forced outag (Closed) Open Item 255/87004-0l(DRP): Revise The Preventive Periodic Activities Control (PPAC) program for high-usage circuit breakers in safety-related load centers in favor of a higher frequency of refurbishment or replacemen Subsequent to the failure of a circuit breaker on a charging pump, the licensee has analyzed the usage of safety related circuit breakers and has revised the PPAC description of preventive maintenance for the charging pump and air compressor electrical breaker The breakers for these two types of components will be shipped out to the vendor for a complete overhaul on a 24 month interval, rather than the prior four year interva No violations or deviations were identifie.
Operational Safety Routine Inspections The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets~ and equipment status boards wer~ routinely checked against ope~ating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and in the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work week.*
An ongoing review of licensee corrective action program items at the Deviation Report level was performe Analyzed AFW Pump Start Timing Problem On January 1, 1988, Consumers Power Company notified the senior resident inspector of the unfavorable results of an analysis of a change in auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump start timin The Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) (formerly Exxon) analysis concluded that the AFW flow parameters during two of three phases of the Main Stearn Line Break (MSLB) accident were not bounded by the existing analysis;
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that some increase in fuel damage would result; and that a complete reanalysis of the MSLB would likely demonstrate the acceptability of current AFW flo The licensee did not consider the unanalyzed condition to 11significantly 11 compromise plant safety and did not make a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) repor Further discussions with ANF determined that if appropriate credit were given for concentrated boric acid flow reaching the core, then the excess feedwater would have no effect on the potential return to powe Therefore, a follow up 10 CFR 50.73 report is not planned to be submitte The licensee did modify the AFW pump start timing prior to plant startup, which further ameliorated any concerns in this are Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Operator Exam During plant heatup on January 23, 1988, the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system was prematurely disable Primary coolant system temperature was in the 385 degrees F to 430 degrees F window, wherein LTOP could be defeated as soon as there was a 11 valid bubble 11 in the pressurize At about 7:00 a.m., a steam dome had started to form in the top of the pressurizer and the Shift Supervisor and a licensed operator had agreed that when there was a bubble, LTOP could be turned off, thus preparing the way for increasing the primary system pressur The licensed operator determined that a bubble existed and then defeated the LTOP syste This was done when the bubble was about 2% smaller in volume than is required by the proposed Technical Specification The licensee had recently defined a valid steam bubble as one with 60% (or less)
water in the pressurizer to provide an adequate surge volume to allow sufficient operator response time in the event of an inadvertent HPSI pump star Further, the administrative limit for a valid bubble is 55% (or less) water in the pressurize Within a few minutes the Shift Supervisor realized the error and LTOP was re-enable Subsequently, the steam bubble continued to expand and LTOP was properly defeated with about 43% water remaining in the pressurize The cause of the above event was attributed to miscommunication between the Shift Supervisor and the operator (inadequate training on a recently revised procedure, and operator error in not following the procedure correctly).
Corrective actions planned or taken include discussion of the error with operating shifts and rebriefing of shifts on the heatup and cooldown procedure to be done immediately before its use, until such time as all shifts have been through heatup and cooldown training on the plant simulator utilizing the revised procedure The licensee plans to include an evaluation of the significance of the event in their Licensee Event Repor Management lessons learned include an awareness of the potentially adverse safety impact that last minute changes to operating procedures can hav A violation is not proposed as allowed under 10 CFR 2, Appendix C wherein: the licensee identified and corrected their error, took corrective actions to prevent recurrence, was of minor safety significance, and was not a violation which should have been prevented by a prior corrective action [255/88005-01 (DRP)].
No other violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Turbine Generator Control Console Electrical Drawing Configuration Verification (TGS 24706342). Control Room (HVAC) Air Control Panel (EC-1888) Drawing Verification (VAS 24800133). Replacement of RIA-2318 (RIA 24705258, SC 87-228). Modification to LPSI Pump P-678 (ESF 24704362) Cable Replacement On Breaker 52-2524 (SPS 24706465).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: MI-2 Reactor Protective Trip Units (Channel A). MI-5 Containment High Pressure Initiatio DW0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillanc SH0-1 Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Outage Activities The reactor was taken critical at 9:45 a.m. on January 26, 1988, following the forced outage begun on December 4, 1987 for steam generator (SIG) inspection and repai The licensee balanced the turbine and tied the generator to the grid at 3:12 p.m. on January 27, 198 This on-line date was four days ahead of the original outage schedul Major accomplishments during the 54 day outage included: S/G Eddy Current testing, secondary side inspections, sludge lancing and tube plugging (19 tubes); fuel handling system upgrade; cooling tower work; valve improvement program; Limitorque maintenance; local leak rate testing; wall thinning inspections; snubber reduction; and other work to prepare for the September 1988 refueling outag Several emergent issues arose during the outage which became 11 last minute 11 management issues included concerns over butyle cable environmental qualification, vital bus cable ampacity ratings and LTOP (Paragraph 3.C).
These issues did not appear to receive the prompt and timely attention required to prevent the urgent attention required just prior to plant startu No violations or deviations were identifie.
Physical Security The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations throughout the protected and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities including proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipmen Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit Illumination was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observe The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie At approximately 9:50 p.m. on January 6, 1988, the inspector found an unattended security badge inside the protected are The shift supervisor and security shift leader were notifie A check by showed that the badge had not been used to gain access anywhere the approximately five minute interval that it was unattende individual has been counsele No violations or deviations were identifie security during The
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Radiological Protection The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including: verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) progra Implementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were observe Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether: reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplishe (Close) LER 255/85031 Revision 1: Inadvertent auto-start of Diesel Generator 1-2 and a failure to shed load, December 28,, 1985, while.the plant was shut down for refuelin The auto-start occurred during testing of the newly-installed undervoltage relays which were found to be connected backward The relays had been installed according to the traditional open/closed convention but these replacement relays were reversed from normal conventio Furthermore, the pre-installation bench test failed to ascertain this reversal, due to personnel error in interpreting the readout of a digital mete The relays were subsequently reinstalled in a correct manner; the electrical engineers were informed that some relays have a reversed open/closed convention and the vendor manuals show this; and the failure to properly bench-test the relays was reviewed with the appropriate technicians and their supervisor The failure to properly shed load was due to unclean and misaligned contacts on the diesel generator breake The corrective action for this problem was to clean and align the contacts on both diesel generator breakers and also on the feeder breakers to the safeguards buse This maintenance was done according to procedure SPS-E-1, and is now performed every twelve to eighteen months on the 2400 volt breaker This LER is close (Closed) LER 255/87030: Safety Injection (SI) Tank T-828 was not being sampled for boron concentration weekly as specified in the Palisades Technical Specifications (TS).
Instead, tank T-828 was being sampled monthly along with SI tanks T-82A, T-82C, and T-82 In 1984 there had been a leaking check valve and the TS was *amended to require weekly testing of boron concentration in tank T-828 until the end of fuel cycle Five, at which time the leaking check valve was to be repaire The check valve was repaired at the end of fuel cycle Five and in accordance with the amended TS, the licensee reverted to monthly testing of SI tank T-82 Subsequently the licensee prepared a TS change request, which included cleaning up the Specification by deleting the various references to weekly testing of boron concentration in tank T-828 until the end of fuel cycle Fiv However, thru an administrative error, one unqualified reference to weekly testing of the boron concentration in tank T-828 remained in the T This discrepancy was discovered by corporate Quality Assurance personnel during an audit on September 3, 198 Another TS Change Request was submitted on September 11, 1987, to delete the weekly boron concentration sampling requirement and reinstate the monthly requirement for tank T-82 The licensee has reviewed applicable procedures for handling TS Change Requests, and concluded that the administrative error in processing the TS Change Request for tank T-28 was an isolated occurrenc The failure to test the boron concentration weekly did not produce a safety hazard, since the intent of the weekly testing requirement was to provide additional assurance of acceptable boron concentration during the time that the check valve was leakin When the valve was repaired at the end of fuel cycle Five, July, 1984, this additional assurance provided by weekly testing was not neede This LER is close (Closed) LER 255/87034: The normal range noble gas and particulate stack effluent monitors, RIA 2326 and 2325, respectively, were inoperable due to a low flow condition for approximately 13.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> without compensatory measures being take For this condition, Technical Specification 3.2 requires that a grab sample be taken at least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The cause of the violation was: (1) lack of reflash ability of the annunciator window, which was already lit from another input, and (2) an inadequate daily surveillance which did not require the operators to review pump and low-flow condition status light Daily performance of the surveillance by itself would not prevent recurrenc Therefore the design logic for the annunciator has been changed and the procedure revised. No citation will be issued since (per 10 CFR 2, Appendix C) the problem was licensee identified, fits a Severity Level IV or V, was reported and corrected, and could not have been reasonably expected to be prevented from previous corrective actions [255/88005-02 (DRP)].
(Closed) LER 255/87036: Waste Gas Decay Tank Released Contrary to Technical Specification This LER documents the licensee 1s failure to meet Technical Specification requirements for waste gas holdup prior to releas The event appears to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, for self-identification and correction of problem Therefore, a Notice of Violation is not being issued and the LER is considered closed [255/88005-03 (DRP)].
(Closed) LER 255/87038: On October 22, 1987, a non-licensed auxiliary operator (AO) worked 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period, in excess of the allowable 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> perio The LER incorrectly states that it is a violation of the March 25, 1983 Order Modifying License which restricts licensed operators work hour However, on October 21, 1987, Technical Specification (TS) Amendment 108 was issued, to be effective immediately, wherein Section 6.2.2 limits the working hours of personnel who perform safety-related functions, which would include AO Therefore, the LER should have stated that the event was in violation of TS 6. When the AO accepted the request to work 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of additional overtime he assured himself that he did not exceed the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period but failed to recognize that he would exceed the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> perio As corrective action, all senior reactor operators, reactor operators and AOs are required to read, as part of their required reading book, the LER and the applicable working hour restriction This event meets the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C for self-identification and correction of problems [255/88005-04 (DRP)].
No new violations or deviations were identifie.
Information Notice The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following Information Notice in order to verify receipt, appropriate review, proper distribution, and scheduling of corrective action (Open) IN 87-28, Supplement 1: Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactor Due, in part, to earlier operating problems, the licensee has been upgrading the plant air system In addition to the corrective actions listed in the closure of Open Items 255/86035-16 and -17, Paragraph No. 2, above, the following additional corrective actions are scheduled for the air systems:
The special performance test for the nitrogen backup system (T-FC722-501, C.V. Air Supply -- Nitrogen Backup Performance Test) will be made into a Technical Specification Surveillance tes *
That portion of special test procedure T-205 (High Pressure Air System Performance Verification Test) that deals with the check valves between the High Pressure Air System and the Plant Instrument Air System will be incorporated or referenced in a periodic tes Additional review of the licensee's actions on the IN 87-28 recommendations will be made after the licensee has had more time to evaluate the No violations or deviations were identifie.
Containment Integrity Verification A sample of containment isolation valves were verified to be operable and in their correct position using the licensee 1 s containment integrity checklist (CL3.3).
No discrepancies were identifie Several local leak rate tests were witnesse Appropriate corrective action was taken when deficiencies were identifie No violations or deviations were identifie.
Violations Not Cited Violations which meet the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C for not issuing a Notice of Violation (Where the violation was identified by the licensee; fits in Severity Level IV or V; was reported if required; was or will be corrected within a reasonable time, including measures to prevent recurrence; and was not a violation that could have been prevented by corrective action to a previous violation) are assigned tracking item number Four such violations were identified in this inspection report and are contained in Paragraphs No. 3 and No..
Management Interview A management interview was conducted on February 3, 1988, following the conclusion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar