IR 05000255/1988027
| ML18054A541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-27, IEIN-85-053, IEIN-85-53, NUDOCS 8902170505 | |
| Download: ML18054A541 (10) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/88027(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI License No. DPR-20 Inspection Conducted:
December 13, 1988 through January 9, 1989 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson 8. L. Jorgensen J. K. Heller R.* B. Landsman Approved By: ~..$(Z~'Y 8. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary
"1/~~
Date
Inspection on December 13, 1988 through January 9, 1989 (Report No.50-255/88027(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of:
actions on previously identified items; plant operations; radiological controls; maintenance; surveillance; security; reportable events; and heat shrinkable tubin Results:
Of the areas inspected, no viol~tions or deviations were identifie Weaknesses identified include several personal errors in the operations area (release of wrong waste gas tank, failure to recognize rod sequencing malfunction, tagging error), control of control room prints, and modification control which resulted in a drain valve not being closable by it 1s remote operato Unresolved items included in this report are the rod sequencing error and print contro An open item is identified for the tagging erro Strengths identified include continued good performance in security, radiological controls (reduced contaminations), and maintenance; and improvement in plant cleanliness and housekeeping since the end of the outag Management displayed a conscientious and conservative attitude in the investigation and resolution of the steam generator tube lea *
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- H. C. Tawney, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- R. P. Margol, Quality Assurance Administrator
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director
- R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. K. Heller, Resident Inspector
- Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview on January 12, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Open Item 255/86035-94(DRP):
Reevaluate pressurizer heater component specification and replace components as necessar Project Number 5189-3056.3, dated August 31, 1988, documented this evaluation and concluded that the installed heaters are acceptable with the recommendation that modified replacement heaters be installed when eac heater does fai (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-95(DRP): Reevaluate mode of operation to determine if continuous heater energization is appropriat Project Number 5189-3056.3, dated August 31, 1988, documented this evaluation and concluded that the current mode of base loading the heaters and cycling the sprays to control Reactor Coolant System pressure should continu No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
2 Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 71711, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room Plant startup, steady state power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s) lineup and operation were observed as applicabl The performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, Shift Engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activitie Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or events, if any, were examine This included compliance to any reporting requirement Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operabi 1 ity of emergency systems, radi*at ion monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifie The following activities were inspected: The unit began the reporting period in a forced maintenance outage caused by increasing primary to secondary leakag The unit was returned to service on December 26, 198 Steam Generator tube inspected is discussed in Report 255/8802 During plant startup on December 26, 1988, a violation of control rod sequencing occurre The 45 (total) control rods are classified as either part length, shutdown or regulating rod The shutdown rods are fully withdrawn before the regulating rods are remove The regulating rods are divided into four group The order of group withdrawal is 1, 2, 3 and 4 with a group overlap of 80 inches (Manual Sequential should automatically control the overlap at 80 +/- 1.5 inches).
The reactor was made critical on December 25 at 3:23 p.m., but repair of the turbine control system delayed turbine startu Manual rod control in the 11Manual Sequential 11 mode was utilized to control T-AV While. at one time fully withdrawn to 131 inches, Group III rods were sequenced to 126 inches along with Group IV rods from 41 to 36 inches, at which time the power supply to the Primary Indication Position (PIP) computer faile This occurred just before midnight and was repaired by replacing a circuit card at 12:15 It was noted that a 11 Control Rods Out of Sequence 11 alarm remained lit after the repai Since the rod groups were within the 80 + 3 inches specified in Al~rm Response Procedure No. 5, the technicTan and operators concluded that the alarm was spurious or related to a... secondary position indicator (SPI) proble Startup then proceeded with turbine warmup, diesel generator testing, synchronization and turbine loadin At 4:10 a.m., the* operator identified that the group III rods were not fully out, and had not been moving out as require Group III was aligned by moving each rod to its fully withdrawn position by 4:19 The groups had been outside their specified overlap band since 12:31 a.m., and Reactor Engineering was called in to evaluate the impact on the cor Initial review indicated that no harm was done since group III was nearly out, and is less reactive in the last few inches of trave The operator 1s ability to recognize the lack of overlap between control rod groups was adversely affected by the following factors:
group overlap and rod alignment had been checked during the reactor startup and verified satisfactorily; there has not been a failure of the rod overlap feature in the recent.history of the plant; the failure of the overlap is not modeled during simulator training or stressed in the classroom (this is being changed); several activities diverted the attention of the Reactor Operator during the four hour period such as turbine startup, main generator paralleling, diesel generator testing, and I&C troubleshooting; it was the midnight to 8:00 shift, although not the beginning of the rotation; and most significant, the valid annunciator had been explained as being inoperable, and this condition had been prevalent in prior cycles of operation (the SP! system has recently been upgraded).
In summary, an apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.10. existed from 12:31 a.m. until 4:19 a.m. on December 26, 198 The cause was a combination of an equipment failure (Group III rods did not sequence out with Group IV) and the operator 1s failure to recognize the lack of overlap as exacerbated by the above factor Had the loss of sequencing been recognized, adequate procedures exist to properly control rod movemen Once the deviation was recognized, good corrective action was taken:
restoring rod configuration, evaluating the reactor physics concerns, caution tagging the rod control system and initiating repairs, evaluating the event, and making an information red phone call to the NR An LER will be submitted and further review of this unresolved item (255/88027-0l(DRP) will be conducted at that tim During a control room tour on January 7, 1989, the inspector observed a work order briefing between the shift engineer and maintenance personnel.* The work order involved service water system equipment modified during a 1988 refueling outag A question was asked that required reference to the system drawin The control room print was referenced and found not to reflect the modificatio The shift engineer, who was confined to the control room because of minimum manning requirements, requested a print from the operation department master fil Once the print arrived, the briefing continue The shift engineer and shift supervisor informed the inspector that it was during a similar discussion the previous day that they first learned that the control room prints were not complete 11 red-lined
prints (prints are 11 red-lined 11 to reflect configuration changes until
- print rev1s1ons are made and issued).
This was discussed with the Operation Superintendent and document control Personne The plant prints are maintained in three sizes (full, half and quarter).
The full size master prints are 11 red-lined 11, whereas the half sized prints are 11 red-lined 11 to reflect minor revisions and annotated 11 see file drawer OPS Dept or DCC Master 11 for major revisio The quarter size prints are not 11 red-lined 11 *
Attachment 3 of Administrative Procedure 9.02 and Attachment 12 of Administrative Procedure 9.03 provide instructions to update the drawings to support operability authorizatio The current method of 11 red-lining 11 the control room drawings does not appear to implement the requirements of Attachment 3 or Attachment 1 The Operatioh Superintendent, who was unaware of this situation, agreed to review this ite The inspector considers this an Unresolved Item pending further review by the inspector (Unresolved Item 255/88027-02(DRP)).
d.*
During valve lineups prior to plant operation on November 17, 1988 the licensee found that the Component Cooling Water room drain isolation valve, MV-RW118, could not be closed due to lack of clearance between piping and the remote chain operato With the valve not closed, a potential unmonitored release pathway existed from the dirty waste tank through the floor drain into the turbine building and to the atmospher When this potential was discovered, a four hour non-emergency report was made at 3:10 p.m. on December 19, 198 Further NRC evaluation will be conducted after the licensee submits the LER. On December 24, 1988 at 9:55 a.m., a batch release of waste gas was initiate At about 10:35 a.m. the operator was checking the flowrate and discovered that he had opened the wrong valve releasing tank T-68A instead of T-68 The operator closed the valve terminating the release at 10:38 Licensee evaluation of the cause and factors affecting the apparent personneJ is continuin Further NRC followup will be conducted after the LER is submitte On December 13, 1988 a tag out was issued for work on VUH-950 and VUH-951 which are ventilation heater The tag out was executed for V-950 and V-951 which are ventilation fan The error was identified during verification of the tagging and no work was done on energized equipmen This was a repeat of an identical tagging error which occurred ea~lier in the year and was reviewed as Deviation Report 88-06 Ineffective communications and/or training appear to be the caus Licensee corrective action will be tracked as an open item (255/88027-03(DRP).
Two unresolved items, one open item, and no violations or deviations were identifie * Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other worker Effluent releases were routinely checked, including examination of on-line recorder traces and proper operation of automatic monitoring equipmen Independent surveys were performed in various radiologically controlled area A minor door posting discrepancy and an example of water overflowing from the CCW pump room drain was identified to Radiation Protection personne The NRC inspection expressed concern regarding the resolved inoperability of the floor drains to the licensee at the management exi Incidences of personnel contaminations has dropped to 46 for the month of December while a steam generator outage was in progres The incident rate was 7.3 contaminations/1000 entries(c/ke), compared to the yearly average of 13.2 c/k A 1989 goal of 200 contaminations will require a contamination rate of 2.0 c/k No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was p~rformed as applicabl The following activities were inspected: d. Investigate/repair spurious high/low temperature alarms for the boric acid critical heat trace circuit (W.O. 24900032)
Clean, lube and test breaker 152-109 (W.O. 24806293)
Replace wiring for TI-1476 (W.O. 24706806)
Perform personnel airlock interlock P.M. (W.O. 24806969)
Repair P-lA casing vent leak (W. 0. 2.4900004)
Nfr violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie 'J Surveillance (61726, 71711)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration -0f the affected compbnents were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected: Special Test-191 11Startup Physics Test Program 11 *
(1) During performance of T-191 a number of procedure 11 review
criteria were not me In* all cases the review criteria was more conservative than the Technical Specification limit and in no case was the Technical Specification limit not me Deviation Report D-PAL-88-244 documented the specific finding The inspector met with reactor physics personnel and discussed corrective actions completed and planne *
Reciprocal boron worths measured below 2 percent power fell lower than predicte The measured values were determined to be acceptable, however, an historic review indicated previous similar instances of measured values being lower than predicte The licensee is pursuing a root-cause evaluation with their vendor (ANF) to establish whether there is a bias somewhere i~ the assumptions or ca lcul at i an *
Fuel assembly power in some locations varied by greater than 10-percent from predicted power with total reactor power less than 30-percent; and varied by greater tha percent from predicted power with total reactor power at 40 to 50-percen The raw incore detector data appeared to support that no tilt was presen A subsequent evaluation by the vendor determined that erroneous conversion factors C'W-pri mes 11 ) had been supplied to the licensee, such that raw incore detector data was not correctly converted into assembly power values in all case The correct W-primes were utilized in a recalculation and all resultant assembly power values (measured) were close to predictio The licensee plans a followup technical audit of the vendor's*
programmatic controls, as this is not the first instance of a technical erro '.I No (2) A second Deviation Report (D-PAL-88-248) was also discussed as it likewise related to startup physics testin This Deviation Report documented that delta-T power did not properly 11track
with nuclear instrument (NI) power and heat-balance (calorimetric) power during power ascensio Because the delta-T power development function feeds protective reactor trip circuitry, the potential could exist for trip setpoints to be in erro The licensee 1s investigation showed the derived slope of the delta-T/power line was incorrec This had resulted from the use of conservative core flow values derived from the safety analysi Actual core flow values, derived empirically, should have been use With actual core flow DW0-1 SH0-1 MI-1 MI-5 va 1 ues, de 1 ta-T power behaved exactly* as.expected and 11 tracked
the other measures of reactor power closel A longer term action item has been assigned to review the design input verification proces The reactor trip circuitry inputs involved were newly installed as a facility design change, and it appears the erroneous assumptions used in the derivation of the delta-T power line were not independently reviewed and verifie A check has been made to assure other design inputs from the involved engineer did receive a proper verification revie Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc NI Power Range, Rod Drop Alarms and Delta Flu Containment High Pressure Initiation Circui violations, deviations, unresolved, or open items were identifie Fire Protection (71707, 64704)
Fire protection program activities, including fire prevention and other activities associated with maintaining capability for early detection and suppression of postulated fires, were examine Plant cleanliness, with a focus on control of combustibles and on maintaining continuous ready access to fire fighting equipment ~nd materials, was included in the items evaluate *
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Security (71707)
Routine facility security measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant areas, and tours of the Secondary and Central Alarm station were conducte The activities of the professional security
force in maintaining facility security protection were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force member No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Reportable Events 92720)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of record The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplishe (Closed) LER 255/88012:
August 8, 1988, steam generator tube lea No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
NRC Com liance Bulletins, Notices and Generic Letters (92703,71707, 25588, 25017 The inspector reviewed the NRC communications listed below and verified that: the licensee has received the correspondence; the correspondence was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written response was submitted if required; and, plant-specific actions were taken as described in the licensee 1s respons (Closed) TI-2500/17: Heat shrinkable tubing (Raychem) inspection and followup review was documented under followup on Information Notice 85-53 in Report 255/86031, page 1 In addition, the following documentation was reviewed in accordance with TI inspection guidance:
0
Licensee records which document the training and qualification of the installers and QC inspector The licensee stated that currently all electrical repairmen are qualified to Rayche Maintenance Procedure MSE-E-5, 11 Installation of Raychem Heat Shrinkable Insulation 11 provides for the appropriate hold points for QC inspections. It specifies that the installers must have been trained in the installation of Raychem tubin It further states that the splice kit or material to be used is specified on the Work Order or the -Palisades Periodic Activity Control and not left up to the craft doing the installatio Maintenance Procedure MSE-E-2, 11 Electrical Wire and Cable Splicing Methods 11 provides appropriate instructions for preparing the cables for splicin *
0 Quality Assurance Department Procedure 2.4, 11Certification to Perform QA Tasks 11, requires that QC inspectors receive the appropriate training to accomplish their task Quality Assurance Department Procedure 10.3, 11Qualification and Certification of QC Inspectors 11, requires that QC electrical inspectors be trained in the appropriate tasks. to inspect Raychem splice Plant Quality Assurance/Quality Control reviews resulted in two findings related to the adequacy of installation procedures for conductors with braided jackets (D-QP-87-28,88-03).
Procedure MSE-E-5, 11 Installation of Raychem Heat Shrinkable Insulation, 11 was modified appropriatel Subsequent inspection experience has identified no contradictions to this acceptable information and respons No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Unresolved* Items Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraphs 3b and 3.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which will involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.
-
1 Management Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on January 12, 1989, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition, the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar