IR 05000255/1988018
| ML18054A383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A382 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-18, NUDOCS 8810140160 | |
| Download: ML18054A383 (8) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report N /8~018(DRP)
.*....
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site; Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
August 11 through September 7, 1988 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson Approved By:
B. C. Jorgensen J. K. Heller
~/..0 dLf~/J?./'
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 SEP 2 8 1988 Date Ins ection on Au ust 11 throu h Se tember 7, 1988 Re art No. 50-255/88018 DRP))
reas Inspecte : Routine, unannounce inspection y resi ent inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; and radiological protectio Results:
The plant continued refueling and maintenance operation Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Several weaknesses were identified during this inspectio An unresolved item was identified*concerning the operability of the control room ventilation system. This event revealed* a weakness in the planning of work whicb opened electrical penetrations in the control room, potentially jeopardizing the operability of the syste Procedural deficiencies were identified in surveillance tests which had deleterious effects. Physical security and radiological situations discussed in this report indicate less than adequate attention to detai The licensee displayed strengths in two area The successful licensing of ten operators is considered a positive reflection on the quality of the training program for licensed operator The most significant operational event, a fuel assembly stuck to the upper guide structure, was successfully recovered after a well thought.out plan was methodically execute PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
- * * DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- D. P. Hoffman, Vice President-Nuclear Operations
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
- R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administrator D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director
- R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- H. C. Tawney, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- E. Feury, Nuclear Training
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on September 7, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl Operational Safety (71707) Routine Inspections The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting The inspector also observed some new fuel receipt activitie Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and in the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee **
-* An ongoing review of licensee corrective action program items at the Deviation Report level was performe Many of the Corrective Action Board Reviews were attende Inadvertent Reactor Trip While in cold shutdown on August 15, 1988 with the reactor trip system reset for uncoupling control rods, a reactor trip signal was inadvertently generated at 2:05 A technician was working in the reactor protection system (RPS) Matrix Test to resolve problems that had resulted in a previous inadvertent reactor tri The activity should have resulted in only a single channel trip. It was determined that a dual function switch had been replaced reversed, such that instead of a seal out and actuation signal sequence, that an actuation and then seal out function occurre Because the plant was in a shutdown condition with all rods on the bottom, no rod motion occurre The licensee reported the event to the NRC at 2:28 p.m.,
however, a licensee event report will not be submitted to the NRC because no rod motion was involve Spurious Containment Isolation Durihg the operations to recover a fuel bundle the right channel refueling radiation monitor was bumped on both September 3 and September 5, 1988, causing a containment isolation signal and actuation. All features functioned as designed and radiation levels were found to be norma Timely four hour 10 CFR 50.72 reports were mad Licensee corrective actions will be to provide a shield for the monitors and investigate procurement of less jolt sensitive instrument Fuel Assembly Stuck Into Upper Guide Structure On September 3, 1988, licensee personnel observed a fuel assembly stuck in the Upper Guide Structure (UGS) as it was being lifted from the reactor in preparation for refuelin The plant had been shut down since August 8, 1988, for refueling and maintenanc The stuck fuel assembly was from the periphery of the reactor cor The area above the reactor had been flooded for refueling and the water provided adequate radiation shieldin The licensee conservatively declared an Unusual Event under its emergency plan at 11:03 a.m. (EDT) on September Containment integrity was enhanced by closing the personnel hatch and equipment hatc Region III (Chicago) established continuous telephone contact with the site and the Headquarters Operations Center from the Region III Offic As the event continued, after the assembly was secured so*
it could not fall, the NRC oversight was maintained by periodic telephone report The licensee's activities were monitored onsite
by the Palisades Senior Resident Inspector, assisted by the two resident inspectors from the nearby D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Statio Region III led a briefing for the Commissioners at 7:45 on September 3, 198 The bottom of the fuel assembly was about 18 inches above the top of the reactor cor By 10 p.m. on September 3 a series of cables had been installed to restrain the fuel assembly should it become unstuck from the Upper Guide Structure ~nd fal Worst case scenario evaluation by the licensee determined that if it fell, the offsite impact would be mino On September 4 the licensee prepared to free the fuel assembl Special tools were fabricated and tested, recovery procedures were preparad and approved, and*training was conducte *On September 5 a cable was lowered through the UGS and connected to the top of the fuel assembl The assembly was then loosened from the structure and lowered to rest in a nearly*vertical position on the top of the reactor core and leaning against the side of the Reactor vessel. It was then secured in place to prevent further movemen The UGS was then moved to it's stand. After a delay caused by problems with the fuel transfer system, the assembly was moved to the ttansfer system using the polar crane, a hoist and a fuel handling tool on September 7, 198 The assembly was then transferred to the Spent Fuel Pool and store No damage to the fuel assembly was identified on initial inspection Additional inspections are being assisted by the fuel vende The cause of the event has not been determined. Similar instances of a fuel assembly being stuck in the UGS occurred at two other plants, one domestic and on~ foreig In both cases, ho_wever, the assembly dropped on top of the reactor core and damaged the assembl The licensee notified the Headquarters Operations Center of this event at 11:10 a.m. (EST) on September 3, 198 Control Room Ventilation System During the performance of refueling outage test R0-28 Control Room/TSC Ventilation on August 21, 1988, it was determined that a positive one eighth inch water pressure could not be maintained
.during emergency mode operation as specified. A pressure of 0.02 inches was obtained by testing on August 2 Subsequent testing after temporarily closing numerous electrical penetrations with plastic and duct tape was successful in obtaining the one eighth inch pressure on August 2 After reviews determined that a significant number of the penetrations had been opened on June 21, 1988 for asbestos removal work, a four hour report was mad~
to the NRC on August 23, 198 Subsequent analysis of the Control Room Ventilation System performance during a fuel handling accident, concluded that the system was capable of performing its design function (limiting control room dose to less than 5 REM).
A more extensive analysis is to be' performed to evaluate the system 1 s capability of dealing with the Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) during plant operatio Additional scenarios are being evaluated which are outside the original design basis, but considered credible such as a primary coolant l~ak outside containment with failed fuel and a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel are Both of these scenarios rely upon manual operator action to shift the ventilation system from normal to emergency mod The latter scenario was found to be acceptable with operator action at ten minutes after the event by the above mentioned completed analysi Completion of the MHA analysis is targeted for November, 198 Current Technical Specifications (TS) are based on a previous system which was replaced in response to TMI Item III.D.3.4 in 198 The test on August 21 measured a 0~02 inch pressur The analysis for the shutdown mode concluded that the value of the positive pressure was not a significant factor in meeting design requirement Since the reanalysis for operation has not been completed, no conclusion can be made regarding the safety significance of not meeting the one eighth inch pressure requiremen The licensee notified the NRC of their intent to revise their pending TS submittal to reflect the results of their revised analysis by letter on August 30, 198 Completion of the operation mode analysis is needed to determine whether enforcement action is appropriate or no The potential violation of the operability requirements of the Control Room Ventilation System (imposed by order) is considered an Unresolved Item (255/88014-0l(DRP)). Ten Operators Licensed During recently completed testing of operator license candidates, seven Senior Reactor Operators and three Reactor Operators passed the tests and will receive license The successful completion of all candidates in all three phases of testing, testifies to the comprehensiveness of the Palisades training progra No other violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance (62703)
The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Emergency lighting installation in Control Room (24804791,FC 760) Opening/closing of Equipment Hatch (24805531)
5 Upper Guide Structure lift (24801778) Modifications to UGS for Core Cooling Instrumentation (24802763)
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance (61726) The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected:
R0-11 R0-12 ED-01,02 R0-30 RM-73 DW0-1 SH0-1 CHR Isolation Tes CHP Spray System Tes Battery Performance Test (Service Test).
Refueling CHR Monitor Function Tes Surveillance test of Mechanical Snubbers in Containmen Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc Snubber Failure As a result of attempting to hand stroke mechanical snubber SNB-69 on the outlet live of the 118 11 Safety Injection Tank (SIT), the licensee determined that the snubber appeared to be locked u The snubber was sent to Wylie Laboratory where it also failed under load testing due to locku As a result of the failure the scape was expanded to include four additional similar snubber A notification was made under 10 CFR 50.72 since the SIT line would not have been properly restrained during design basis event Add~tional followup will be conducted ~f the expected LE Procedure Deficiencies On Friday, August 26, 1988, the licensee declared type B leakrate testing a failure (0.6LA) after two steam generator secondary manways were calculated to have excessive leakag A four hour report was mad On August 27, 1988, a technical review of the test determined that a calculational error had been made and the tests were not failures. A corr~ction factor had been incorrectly calc~late During the performance of R0-12 on August 29, 1988, several procedural weaknesses were identified in establishing required system configuration, outlinfng precautions and expected result These weaknesses resulted in operating the B charging pump incorrectly, which ran isolated for three minutes and required repair to a relief valve prior to being relied upon as a boric acid flowpat Safety Injection Check Valves As a result of performing test R0-65 on the Hot Leg Inj~ction flowpath on August 31, 1988, there appears to be some performance related problems with one or more of three check valves (CK-3408,3409, 3410).
Flow and pressure characteristics of the system during testing with one valve 1 s internals removed indicated that it was not fully opening, although physical inspection could not identify any. proble The licensee is also investigatirig a possible problem with a motor operated valv The check valve manufacturer, Kerotest, was contacted and was not aware of any similar problem The investigation has not proceeded far enough to identify whether 10 CFR 21 or 10 CFR 50.73 reports would be require This issue will be tracked as an Open Item (255/88018-02 (DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identifie.. *. Phys i ca 1 Security (71881)
The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations throughout the protect~d and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities including proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipmen Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit I 11 umi nation was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circui~ Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observe The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie Two situations where vital area barriers were potentially degraded were discovered by the security forc After conferring with the NRC on the first situation which was reported on August 23, 1988; the potential degradation was not considered credible and the 1-hour report was retracte The second situation went undetected for about a day before compensatory measures were take This event was reported promptly after discovery on September 1, 198 The plant Weekly Bulletin dated August 31, 1988, contained a caution in this regard, but had not yet been fully circulate Both the above situations were a result of inadequat contractor oversight and trainin No violations or deviations were iqentifie.
Radiological Protection (71709)
The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning_
radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:
verification of radiation levels and proper posting;
accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) progra lmplementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were,
observe Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe Anti-contamination clothing which was not properly laundered and surveyed, resulted in a number of personnel contaminations during the last mont Licensee investigation determined that: exceptionally highly contaminated laundry was not segregated or treated with special care; frisking of the clothing was inadequate due to either the use of an older model clothing frisker, or the contamination and increase in background on the Automated Laundry Frisker (ALF); and that better procedures and training are needed for laundry processing (some machines may have been overloaded).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item is discussed in Paragraph 4.
Unresolved Item An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a
. deviation, or a violatio One unresolved item, disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2~. Management Interview A management interview was conducted on September 7, 1988, upon conclusion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes.as proprietar