IR 05000255/1988023
| ML18054A409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A408 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-23, NUDOCS 8811080084 | |
| Download: ML18054A409 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/88023(DRP)
Docket No~ 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
September 8 through October 12, 1988 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson J. K. Heller Approved By: ~~
Reactor Projects Section 2A
_ Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20_
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Da e Inspection on September 8 through October 12, 1988 (Report No. 50-255/88023(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; and licensee event report Results:
The plant continued refueling and m~intenance operation Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie An unresolved item was identified relative to the completion of adequate post maintenance testing or operational testing before relying on a valve for an isolation boundar Strengths observed during this period include the continued strong management oversight of outage activities provided by the shift managers, and generally comprehensive corrective actions taken in response to emergent issue Weaknesses observed include the lack of post maintenance testing and equipment control which led to the inadvertent loss of spent fuel pool inventory, and inadequate loose parts and cleanliness controls which likely resulted in the fuel assembly lodging to the UGS and in minor fuel damag ~gR1 l 000004
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ADDCK 881024 05000255 PNU
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DETAILS Pe~sons Contacted Consumers Power Company ( CPCo) -
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administrator
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering-Supervisor
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- H. C. Tawney, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on October 12, 198 Other members -of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefly.
Operational Safety (71707) Routine Inspections The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspection. Control room indi-cators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applitabl~ plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting The inspector also observed refueling and fuel inspection activitie Tours were conducted in the turbine, containment and auxiliary buildings, and in the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee An ongoing review of licensee corrective action program items at the Deviation Report level was performe Many of the Corrective Action Board Reviews were attende Spurious Containment Isolations During Refueling On Sunday, September 11, 1988, four spurious actuations of the refueling containment high radiatio.n monitor resulted in containment isolation signals. The first occurred at 9:44 a.m. as a result of transporting a spent reactor cavity cleanup filter near a monitor which was set at 20 MR/HR above background (LER 88016).
The other three occurred between 4:35 p.m. and 4:58 p.m., apparently a result of electrical noise induced by the starting and stopping of a failed temporary submersible pump (LER 88017).
In all cases refueling activities were ceased, proper actuation verified, and radiation levels verified before rese Proper 10 CFR 50.72 notifications were mad The first was a result of personnel error, the others are being investigated by engineering while use of the submersible pump is suspende At 9:56 a.m., on September 27, 1988, a containment isolation occurred when instrument power links were opened in preparation for maintenance on safety related equipmen When the power links were removed, containment high radiation and high pressure logic was activate The system responded as designe The isolation appears to be the result of an error made when the clearance was prepare An LER is expected.*
At 1:05 p.m. on October 1, 1988, a containment isolation occurred -
during testing of a Facility Change (FC-760).
Engineering review had been performed specifically to identify any potential problems like thi It was found that all individuals involved had been misled by the drawing, which was correct, although confusin An LER is expected to be submitted, detailing corrective action The above containment isolations were reviewed for root cause and compared with several previous containment isolation Based on this review it appears that the containment isolations do not have related common cause This conclusion was discussed during the management exit on October 28, 198 The licensee had no additional plans to take broader actions in preventing further event Reactor Vessel Cleanliness and Loose Parts Control During reactor vessel inservice inspections in late September and early October, numerous loose parts and debris were found including several bolts, washers and other miscellaneous debri One bolt was known to have come from a Primary Coolant Pump which failed in 198 Other loose materials are suspected of being the cause of the fuel damage identified on five fuel pins and may have played a part in the fuel assembly sticking to the upper guide structur The licensee has vacuumed the vessel, imposed more strict controls and improved cleanliness in the area of the open reactor vesse Inspection verified a heightened awareness of cleanliness and loose parts control during fuel reloa *
- Spent Fuel Water Loss While aligning a Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) pump, approx~mately 5,400 gallons of SFP water was transferred to the east and west safeguards room After receiving a sump level alarm in the west safeguards room, the original valve lineup was restored and fuel movement in the SFP was suspende The plant was in the refueling mode with the core off loaded to the SFP for extensive safeguards valve wor A review of tagging boundaries identified a single manual valve was the isolation between SFP cooling and the valve wor The valve had bound slightly off its closed seat resulting in the flow pat This was not evident to operators who positioned and verified the valve positio SFP water flowing out the disassembled valves in the safeguards rooms resulted in extensive contamination, especjally in the west room where surveys found levels up to 200 mrad per 100 square c The SFP level dropped about a foot during this even It is noted that SFP cooling pump suction would be lost at a level of two feet below the skimmers, leaving more than adequate fuel shieldin Licensee evaluation.identified two primary problem First, the tagging for work in progress did not adequately tag the boundarie The valve, MV-SFP-126, was tagged closed with two red tags, but three other activities should have included this valv Corrective action is planned to review the event with operations department personnel, emphasizing valve position verification and *enhancements to the tagging procedure The second and primary cause of the event was the incorrect assembly of the valve and inadequate testing after inspection and repacking the valve on September 20, 198 Although the workers were knowledgable and experienced, one of the two valve discs was rotated 180 degrees upon final assembl This was not identified on the post maintenance test because the valve was stroked only three or four turns and not to the fully closed positio The workmen felt that their doing the work from ladders in respirators may have contributed to the error. Corrective actions planned include changing the maintenance policy to require a more complete stroke of the valve, and incorporating the lessons learned into training. *
NRC review of the original work order identified additional concern Work order SFP 24700708 completed on September 20 documented a blue check as satisfactory, yet final assembly was incorrec No testing was completed by maintenance or operations and the operability determination had not been made for the valve before the valve was relied upon as the isolation boundary for numerous work activitie The adequacy of post maintenance testing and the use of untested equipment for isolation boundaries will recieve additional NRC review (Unresolved Item 255/880023-01 (DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance (62703)
The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Repair and adjustmerit to relief valve RV-3162 (LPSI) (ESS 24803727) Repair of MV-SFP-126 (ESS 24806078) Reg. Guide 1.97 transmitter work (FC-786) In core instrument disposal Ultrasonic testing of spent fuel assemblies Breaker Maintenance (Auxiliary Building Addition Sump Pump P-99B)
(SPS-24805121) Cracking of CRD Seal Housings During dye penetrant testing of six Control Rod Drive (CRD) seal housings on September 21, 1988, five were found to have crack indications that exceeded the ASME acceptance criteria. These housings are essentially tubes which are a portion of the pressure boundary in the CRD Examinations in 1986 had concluded that the cracking was limited to a lot of three CRDs which were replace These six were examined as part of the 1986 corrective action The licensee expanded the testing to include all 48 housings (45 installed and 3 spares). A total of eleven were found to have crack indication One was sent to the vendor for destructive examination and of the remaining ten, nine were repaired by polishing to remove the indication The remaining housing will be a spare and will be weld repaire Combustion Engineering identified transgranular stress corrosion cracking as the corrosion mechanism, but have not yet identified the contaminan No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance (61726)
The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: R0-32-14 Local Leakrate Test of CCW Penetration #14 R0-32-15 Local Leakrate Test of CCW Penetration #15
- DW0-1 SH0-1 R0-16 Daily Control ~oom Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillance..
Ver-ification of the Boric Acid Tank low level switch (A Tank)
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
6. The following reports of non-routine events were reviewed by the inspectors. Based on this review it was determined that the events were of minor safety significance, did not represent program deficiencies, were properly reported, and were properly compensated fri These reports are closed:
255/88014:
255/88016:
255/88017:
Unresolved Item Two containment isolations result from physical contact with the monito '
Containment isolation during filter remova Three containment isolations results from electrical nois An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a*
deviation, or a violatio One unresolved item, disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph Management Interview (30703)
A management interview was conducted on October 12, 1988, upon concl~sion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar