IR 05000255/1988002
| ML18054A274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1988 |
| From: | Foster J, Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A272 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-02, 50-255-88-2, NUDOCS 8803140306 | |
| Download: ML18054A274 (14) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/88002(DRSS)
Docket No.
50~155 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Madison Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
February 16-18, 1988 ( \\
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Jame§l'P. Patterson Inspectors:
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Approved By:
iam Snell, Chief~
ergency Preparedness Section.
Inspection Summary License.No. DPR-6
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f'*;*,., < c<.1 i.i-Date Daty fag'
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Inspection on February 16-18, 1988 (Report No. 50-255/88002(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, inspection of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 1 s emergency exercise involving observations by three NRC representatives of key.
functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection was conducted by two NRC inspectors and one consultant.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies, or tieviations were identified as a result bf* this inspection.
G803140:30.'.::.
PDF:
1;DOC!<
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- 1.
2.
DETAILS Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson~ Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Faci li-ty (EOF)
J. Foster, Control Room, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Post Accidental Sampling Monitor (PASM)
G. Stoetzel, TSC and EOF, Dose Assessment and Health Physics Activities Consumers Power Company (CPCo) Personnel
- F. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations D. Hoffman, Plant General Manager, Palisades R. Rice, Operations Manager
.
R. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager 0. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager W. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager T. Anderson, Shift Supervisor B. Bauer, Shift Supervisor R. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director P. Loomis, Emergency Planning Administrator, Corporate T. Katarsky, Senior Nuclear Emergency Planner Corporate D. Fugere, Emergency Planner Corporate K. Penrod, Emergency Planner Corporate M. Hobe, Emergency Planning Coordinator (Big Rock Point Plant)
J. Brunet, Senior Emergency Planning Coordinator (Palisades)
M. Dawson, Senior Health Physics Technician, Emergency Planning R. Doan, Sr., EDF Adrni ni strator J. Hager, Chemistry Lab Supervisor D. Malone, Nuclear.Licensing Analyst J. Cole, Facilities Operations Supervisor L. Kenaga, Health Physicist (Palisades)
A. Clark, TSC Health Physics Controller G. Ellis, Radiation Protection Supervisor M. Savage, Public Affairs Director (Palisades)
T. Hollowell, Reactor Engineer J.
Dearth,
Lead Controller, Maintenance Support Center (MSC) - OSC R. Beeker, Auditor, Nuclear Assurance Department D. Anderson, Senior Quality Assurance Consultant, Nuclear Assurance Department All names listed above except the one designed by an asterisk attended the exercise exit meeting on February 18, 1988.
General An exercise of the Palisades Plant Site Emergency Plan (SEP) and the Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIPs) was conducted on February 17, 1988.
The exercise tested the response of the licensee to a hypothetical
- accident scenario, resulting.in ~.major relea~e of fadioactive material to the ~nvironment.
An attachment to this report describes the scope*ahd objectives ~nd provides a sequence of events of the exercise scenario.
This was an unannounced off-hours exercise with partial participation by the State of Michigan and the counties of Van Buren, Allegan, and Berrien.
3.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10* CFR, Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan and associated implementing procedures..
b.
Coordination The licensee 1 s response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If these events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public health and safety.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and.critiqued.this exercise along with four NRC observers.
d.
Criti gue The licensee held a critique at the South Haven Conference* Center,
- South Haven, Michigan on.February 18, 1988.
The NRC.critique was also held there on the same day.
Personnel who attended this joint meeting are listed in Section 1.
4.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items a.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-255/86015-01.
This item resulted from the licensee 1 s inability to adequately demonstrate the capability for emergency personnel to respond within the 30 minute or 60 minute guidelines of NUREG-0654 when contacted at home on off-hours.
The licensee committed to perform an additional call-in drill before.
July 1, 1987, with a second drill to be* conducted within 90 days of the first.
These two drills were conducted successfully within the requested time frames.
In addition, a shift augmentation response was demonstrated as part of this off-hours, unannounced emergency exercise.
This shift augmentation response was satisfactory although conducted under adverse weather conditions (snow-packed roads with patches of fog).
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-255/86019-01.
This 1986 emergency exercise item resulted from limited interaction and integration between the Plant Security and Operations Support Group and the Site Emergency
- 5.
. Director (SEO) in the TSC durin~ this simulated emergency.
Since.
then, through practice drill~ ~nd demonst~ation in this exercise, the security staff and the. Control Room/TSC have integrated well with a coordinated effort needed in an emergency.
This item is closed.
Control Room a.
Control Room personnel demonstrated excellent responses to both the initial security event and the s.ubsequent stem generator tube rupture with radiological release.
"L b.
During the security event, security procedures were correctly followed, emergency classification of the event as an Alert was conservative and accurate, and a proper decision not to shut down the plant (there was no threat made to plant operations) was made by the Shift Supervisor (Site Emergency Director).
Notifications were made in a timely fashion, per the applicable procedure.
During the security event, 1 i censee personne 1 expressed con*cern and verified that Security Guards did not carry loaded shotguns around the plant for drill purposes.
During the steam generator tube rupture the following procedures were appropriately utilized; standard post trip action checklist (prior to tube rupture), emergency operating procedures (Excess Steam Demand Event EOP 6.0), event diagnostic diagram, and Emergency Plan implementing procedures.
When the Duty and Call Superintendent arrived to assume the duties of Site Emergency Director (SEO) from the Shift Supervisor, he received a thorough turnover briefing and let several minutes pass to assure that he understood the overall situation before assuming his duties.
This was considered prudent.
To enhance the realism of the exercise (the exercise Control Room lacks instrumentation) the licensee utilized a tape recorder to provide the sound of 11 escaping steam
- It was ob.served that the Shift Supervisor/Site Emergency Director did not review the accountability documentation when it was provided to him by a Security Guard.
He was advised that the accountability procedure had been completed within 24 minutes, wi.th only two people missing.
The two missing people were identified in approximately 10 minutes.
This was viewed as a minor oversight.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
TSC shift augmentation began following the initial Alert.
The inspector observed the operation of the automatic dialer system used to contact emergency response personnel to report to the TSC or OSC, using a recorded message.
The system, used for the first time in an annual exercise, functioned as designed and exhibited a marked improvement over earlier 11 call-in 11 systems using individuals to
-*
make_the calls.
This demonstration, plus pri.or NRC requested drills s i nee July 1987, confirmed. the capabi*l i ty.of the ne'I{ system to* get sufficient numbers of responders for both. the 30- minute goal and the 60 minute goal as stipulated in Procedure EI-2.2 and the Site *
The SEO declared the TSC activated and operational at 0308, based on assurances that communications and security coverage were ready.
i:-hese-were his main concerns at th.at tim.e._ Other support group~
were activated as sufficient persohne l were *present.
Briefings by the SEO to the TSC staff and caucuses held with TSC support group leaders were frequent and meaningful.
There was a somewhat excessive delay in seeking out a revised emergency classification using the EAL tables.
This was to identify which EAL was correct for the Main Steam Line Code safety *valve being in the stuck open position following a reactor trip about 0312.
At 0342 the SEO updated the TSC staff to announce that this condition was identified as an 11Alert.
Another declaration was not made to the off-site agencies, since the plant was already in the Alert stage from the Security event earlier.
An update of events to the State, local agencies, and the NRC should have been made at that time.
Good deliberations and examples of objectivity were demonstrated by the support staff interacting with the SEU before the General Emergency was declared.
Advice was sought from the Health Physics Group Leader on the proper Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to recommend to the off-site agencies.
The SEO contacted the State at 0402 with a complete PAR to go with the General Emergency Declaration.
Also, he made an announcement to evacuate all nonessential personnel and pregnant women via the normal plant access route.
He first conferred with his Health Physics Group Leader before making the announcement, to get assurance that the plume was not going in the di re ct ion of til-e evacuation route. These actions were we 11 demonstrated.
The first off-site monitoring team was dispatched at 0414.
Their radiation readings were sent back to the TSC via the OSC by 0425.
The Health Physics Group Leader instructed the OSC to activate the first field team at 0330.
To be prepared for a fast breaking release sequence as in this scenario, the.field teams should be automatically activated with all required equipment operable in a standby mode at the Alert level.
The decision-makers had to wait approximately 30 minutes to get confirmatory readings of the release from the field teams.
Habitability checks were being performed in the TSC at adequate intervals.
Dose assessment values were calculated by the Health Physics Group based on *a dose projection through a Main Steam Line Dump Valve as described in Procedure EPIP 6.2, as determined from steam line monitor RIA-2323 and RIA-2324.
This flow rate is much greater than that for the Code safety valve.
Thus, the dose
c.
. assessment values were much higher as calculated.than they would have been if based on the flow rate thrbugh the stuck open Cod~
safety valves.
The source of this error (resulting in much higher calculated radiation levels) was not identified until late in the-exercise.
The basic cause appeared to be one of nomenclature and misidentification of which valves were involved.
Dose estimates, thus obtained, were back calculated for the off-site field teams
readjngs.
T~ese in turn resulted in unusually high radiation levels bein~ report~d at 1.6 miles and at.3.3 miles.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
The Site Emergency Director, when confronted with a sec.ond emergency event in the same category as an earlier one, should provide a notification update to State, county agencies, and the NRC Duty Officer describing the app 1icab1 e. EAL, while avoiding a second formal emergency classification.
- The Site Emergency Director and his technical support staff should take positive steps to assure that the Health Physics Support Group has clear, concise information on the source of the radiation release.
This will permit them to calculate an accurate value, based on best available information.
Operations Support Center and Maintenance Support Center The Operations Support Center (OSC) and Maintenance Support Center (MSC) were orderly and well organized.
Both facilities were staffed at approximately 0205 hours0.00237 days <br />0.0569 hours <br />3.38955e-4 weeks <br />7.80025e-5 months <br />.
Noise levels were acceptable throughout the exercise.
Status boards were utilized to track on-site and off-site radioldgical monitoring teams, on-site task teams (equipment repair or maintenance), major events and lead personnel.
Status board OSC-1 appeared to be mislocated and unutilized, but an 11 ad hoc 11 status board with the same information was established.
Good communications between the OSC, MSC, TSC and EOF were evident.
Priorities were assigned for the various equipment repair and maintenance teams, based on the perceived need for the action to mitigate the accident sequence.
A contamination control step-off pad was established and personnel were questioned as to whether they had 11 fri s ked 11 themse 1 ves.
At various points, concern for contamination control and radiation dose reduction were properly demonstrated.
d.
Post Accident Sampling Monitor (PASM)
During the steam generator tube rupture event, a sample from the Post Accident Sampling Monitor (PASM) system was requested.
A three-man technician team from the Operations Support Center (OSC) was dispatched to obtain and analyze the PASM sample.
.Init_ial dispatch of the team from the OSC was somewhat delayed due to discussfons related to the.radiological habitability of the area of the PASM panel, and the likely radiation dose to the PASM team.
An informal As Low As Reas~nably Achievable (ALARA) review was discussed.
Some time would have been saved if the team had been given turn-back or stop work dosages and tmmediately dispatched.
The team was ~quipped with full anti-contamination clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
From observation and discussion, it was evident that the team had little prioF experience in operating the PASM panel while wearing this equipment.
The SCBA units lacked communication devices, but no difficultfes in communication were observed.
This was partially due to the fact that there was no communication with the PASM team via radio (where communications problems normally arise when wearing SCBA).
The tea~ carefully followed the PASM sampling procedure, with one individual reading the procedure and verifying steps, while the other performed the various manipulations.
Good health physics support was provided by the assigned radiation technician.
The time from sample request to sample results availability (in the TSC) was approximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
This is beyond the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> goal for such actions, but was considered as acceptable.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Training for PASM team members should include drills wearing full anti-contamination clothing ans SCBA.
- Communication devices should be provided for the SCBA provided for the PASM team.
e.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF activation was delayed due to the nature of the emergency scenario (EOF activates normally at Site Arei Emergency) which was still in the Alert stage and under control of the TSC, until 0558.
At that time the EOF took command and control.
Prior to the official takeover, the Emergency Director (ED) had a general caucus with his support group leaders.
There was a good discussion and* exchange of information and opinions between the ED and his support group leaders at that time.
At 0515, prior to activation, the status boards were current and the plot trends of reactor pressure level vs. primary coolant system pressure were posted on the trending status board.
The EOF Off-site Monitoring Teams Status Board indicated at 0500, that most field team readings were at 1.6 miles and 3.3 miles from the plant.
As radiation levels increased, no apparent effort was identified to dispatch either of the teams out to greater distances from the plant to get a better understanding of the plume and
- radiation levels.
In genera], radiat1on readings provided t6 th~
off-site teams were consistent*with the scenario; however; ori a few occasions the field team controllers provided erroneous data (which later proved to be due to an atithmetic error of a factor of 10).
At 0613 dose calculations projected values of> lR total dose out to 17 miles due to erroneous field data plus an estimated three hour release time.
The Health Physics Group Leader was concerned about the magnitude of exposure rates at a!ld bey_ond 10.miles.
While questioning.
these levels, the philosophy of the Health Physics Support Group Leader seemed to be that the emergency responders had to act with the best data available, and to recommend more preventative actions to protect the population beyond the 10 mile EPZ.
The Chief Controller interceded at 0633 to prevent any PARS being assessed beyond 10 miles, which would conflict with the State of Michigan's emergency evacuation plans for Allegan County.
A two hour release duration value was recommended to the participants at that time.
The-exercise participants weren 1t allowed to use a release duration that would be consistent with the scenario.
A three hour release duration did result in a PAR beyond 10 miles, as identified previously.
PASM results were received by telephone by the Reactor Physics Group.
Although later it was determined that these results were transferred by documentation to the EOF, it was not readily apparent to the NRC inspector.
Such vital information should have been transferred without delay by written message as soon as it was available, with copies to the Emergency Director and each of his EOF Support Group; Leaders.
One scenario discrepancy that kept reappearing in discussions in bnth the TSC and the EOF, was the absence or Iodine in the composition of the released fission gases.
The unrealistic composition of the fi~sion gases was identified in the pre-exercise meeting as being generated to simplify evacuation/sheltering recommendations by the State of Michigan for Allegan County.
The Chief Controller later clarified this by stating that it had been the consensus of the licensee's scenario developers to eliminate iodine entirely.
Following the various licensee critiques after the exercise it was decided to include iodine in any fission gas releases fer future exercises.
Both the-TSC and EOF technical staff had problems in accepting a no iodine release.
Recovery and re-entry were well demonstrated.in this exercise.
The initial request by the interim ED was for each support group leader.
to develop a list of proposed measures by priority which should be implemented as part of the recovery/re-entry activities.
The SEO from the TSC plus his three key support group leaders (operations, maintenance, and health physics) were invited to participate at the EOF in those discussions.
When these three individuals arrived, a joint meeting was held which also included input from the Emergency
Service Officer oJ the EOF management s.taff.
This discussion considered many aspects besides _ope.rations, such as logistics, added manpower, coordination with off-site agencies and radiation hazards still remaining in the plant.
The exercise terminated at approximately 0915.
Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:
.
.
Those responsible for dispatching off-site monitoring teams, whether from the OSC or EOF, should utilize and evaluate dose assessment information and related radiation levels to better direct the teams out to further distances from the licensee 1 s protected area.
6.
Exit Interview The inspection team held an exit interview the day after the exercise on February 18-, 1988, with the 1 i cense representatives denoted in Sect ion 1.
The NRC team leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection and indicated that no probable exercise weaknesses were identified at that time.
The inspectors also discussed the probable content of the report to determine if the licensee considered that any of the information should be proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information should be proprietary.
Attachment:
Palisades Exercise Scope and Objectives and Sequence of Events
1. 0, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 SCOPE PALEX 88 is designed to meet. ex.ercise requirements specified in.
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.Fe.
It wi11 postu*late *events which would require activation of major _portions* of the site, emergency plan *and*
, response by Van Buren, *Allegan and Be.rriert Counties and the State of
Michigan *. The exercise will be unannounced in support of state and local exercise objectives.. The Joint Public Information Center will be.
activated.
1.2. OBJECTIVES The exercise.will demonstrate each item listed under the following categories:
1.
Assessment and Classification a.
Recognition of_ emergency conditions b.. Timely classif:i,cation of. emergency conditions* in accordance with emergency action levels 2.
Communication.
a.. Initial. notificaticin within specified time-constraints (state and *
local -* 15 minutes, NRC ~ * 1 I:tour)
b.
Subsequent* notification in accordance. with procedu-re (state*,
local, NRC)
c.
Notification and coordination with other organizations; as.
required (other utilities, contractors, fire. or medical service.s)
~d. Provision of accurate and timely information to_support news release* activity 3.
Radiological Assessment and Control a.
Calculation of dose projection based on sampTe results or-monitor
. readings b.
Performance of in-plant and.offsite field surveys c.
Collection and analysis of a post-accident primary coolant sample d.
Trending of radiological data e.
Formulation of appropriate protective action recommendations f.
Contamination and exposure control MI1086-0006B-TP11-TP12 1.1
......
I __ _
4. -Eme_rge.D.cy Re~ponse Facilitfei : -
a..
Activation,. staffing and operation a.t approp.riate classifications and within* specified. time constraints b.. Adequacy of. emergency equipment** arid. supp ti.es-c.
Adequacy of *emergen:~y communica'tioii sys-tems*
d.. Access-control 5..
Emergency Management._
b.
Assembly and accountability within approxiinately-30 mfnut:es c..
Coordination with. State of-Michigan emergency response organization*
d..
Mitigation of operational and radiological conditions e.. Mobilization of emergency teams.
6.
Reentry and Recovery_
- a*.
Assessment of damage: and.formulation*. of recovery plan.. -
b.
Identification of constraints, requirements. and organization to implement the plan:
7.
Exercise Control a.
Provision for.maximum free play b.
Accurate assessment of player performance MI1086-0006B-TP11-TP12 1.2
. ' :*-
,*....
- --*
- Time.
_.
- Actual
- (Scenario)
a1aa c-aa3a)
a13a (aaaa)
a135 coaa5)
a14o caa1a)
'al45 caa15)
a21a
- (aa4a)
'a215 cao45)
a3aa.
ca13a)
a3a2 (a132)
a310 ca14a)
a315 (al45)
PALEX 88.
Sequence of Events Event Initial conditions - Normal full power Equipment out of service:
Auxiliary Feed Pump. P-BC, **Low Pressure Safety InJection Pump* (LPSI) P-67A, and the: Failed Fuel Monitor
.Alarms:
None PCS leak rate as of a1aa yesterday:
a.as gpm unidentified, a. 1136 gpm id'entified, 0. 1636 gpm total Further historical data will be provided by the controller if'
reques.ted.
CAS/SAS receives alarm on the Bay Roof Door..
CAS dispatches officer to investigate.
Security Officer arrives at alarming door and is taken hostage outside the vital area.
He is then taken to the AO Pit (auxiliary operators briefing/break. room) located at the north end of. the turbine deck.. His captor orders out any AOs there at* the time and takes over the room.
Kidnapper calls the Control Room from the.AO Pit, describes the situation and makes demands.
SS ass.umes SED duties and classifies an "Alert"* based on.
"adversaries conunandeering a nonvi tal area. ii*
Negotiator arrives.
Negotiator clears security and arrives at the scene.
Discussion ensues.
Electrohydraulic fluid line bursts, resulting in the turbine generator control valves closing..
An automatic reactor trip occurs when the high pressurizer pres-sure set point is. exceeded.
Following the trip, one of the "A" steam generator safety valves sticks open.
Kidnapper releases his hostage and surrenders.
Kidnapper is removed from the site in the custody of local law enforcement officers.
Another "Alert" is classified based on an unisolable main steam line break and notifications made.
When operators attempt to increase auxiliary feedwater flow, they will find they have no control of FIC-a727 from the Control Room.
RP1287-aa44A-TP12
>
Time Actual (Scenari~).
0325 (0155)
0340 (0210}
0345_-
(0215)
-0350 ('.'-0220)
0355*
(0225).
~0415
. (-0245)
-0633 (-0503)
0750 (0620)
0755 (0625)
1050.
-0955 (-0825)
PALEX 88.
Sequence of Events Event Operators isolate "A" steam generator (S/G), and shortly there-after, the faulty safety valve fails wide open.
Auxiliary oper-ator is manually controlling auxiliary feed flow and is in com-munication with Control Room for directions on how to* throttle'
it.
"A" S/G is empty.* Operators stop two primary coolant pumps,. and start dropping Primary Coolant System (PCS) pressure.
NOTE: *When operators first attempt. to_ establi,sh cool down. *using_
CV-0511, they find it will not open; An approximate 260 gpm steam generator tube rupture occurs in the
"A" S/G as indicated by the- "A" main.steam. line radiation monitor HIGH. alarin energizing; this is followed by SIS actuation.
P.~67B Low Pressure* Safety Injection Pump fails to start..
SED classifies a "General Emergency" based on.a loss of "2 out of 3. fission product barriers." Commences making notifications.
Operators have reestablished cooldown and are dropping PCS pres--
sure to reduce* the leak rate; they also block and. reset safety
. injection.
NOTE:
When SIAS initially two primary coolant pumps*.
res.tart "B"- and "C" PCPs.
and try to establish a 75° occurred,: they stopped the.- remaining..
Now that sr has been reset, they They also stop both boric acid pumps per hour cooldown rate.
"B" S/G main steam line radiation monitor alert alarm energizes.. *
Operators isolate letdown..
P-67A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump* returned to service and tested Plant is on shutdown cooling - cooldown continues..
Time jumps. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 55.. minutes to condition. where the PCS has been cooled and depressurized to a point where the release*
has become. negligible.
Management enters the recovery mode.
Exercise ends.
Recovery adequately demonstrated.
RP1287-0044A-TP12
INITIAL CONDITIONS DRILL OVER WHEN RECOVERY ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATED S.S. LEARNS GUARD HAS BEEN TAKEN HOSTAGE - "ALERT" IS CLASSIFIED E.H. FLUID LINE BURSTS AND T/G CONTROL VALVES CLOSE HOSTAGE RELEASED AND KIDNAPPER SURRENDERS
- A" SIG ISOLATED-RELIEF VALVE FAILS WIDE OPEN TUBE RUPTURE IN* A* S/G OCCURS l260 aom) - FUEL FAILURE EV!DENT I
RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS- "GENERAL EMERGENCY" CLASSIFIED
- B* S/G MAIN STEAM LINE RAD MONITOR ALARMS
"E" BUS IS RECOVERED - COOLING TOWER PUMPS OFF P-67A IS FIXED AND OPERABLE PCS DEPRESSURIZED-RELEASE STOPPED - ENTER RECOVERY MODE --
PROMPT JUMP AHEAD IN TIME I
I I
I I
I I
I I
...
0 I
0
0
- o
1
1
!
5
7
9
1
0
0
0
!
0
0
0
0
0
- O
PLANT ON SID COOLING
..
..
LOW TEMP. OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION ARMED OPERATORS ESTABLISH A 75° F/Hr. CID RATE CV- 0511 WON'T OPEN
..
S.l.A.S. RECEIVED AND P-67B L.P.S.I. FAILS TO START
..
"A" S/G EMPTY
"A" SIG RELIEF STUCK OPEN - OPERATORS CAN'T CONTROL CV - 0727 "ALERT" CLASSIFIED AGAIN AU TOMA TIC REACTOR AND T/G TRIP NEGOTIATOR ONSITE - DIALOGUE ENSUES WITH KIDNAPPER
'
SECURITY RECEIVES VITAL AREA DOOR ALARM