IR 05000255/1988017

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Insp Rept 50-255/88-17 on 880707-0810.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previous Insp Findings, Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance,Physical Security, Radiological Protection,Lers & Info Notice Followup
ML18053A529
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/19/1988
From: Burgess B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18053A528 List:
References
50-255-88-17, IEIN-87-028, IEIN-87-28, NUDOCS 8808300091
Download: ML18053A529 (6)


Text

L U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I II Report No. 50-255/88017(DRP)

Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:

Consumers Power Company 2J2 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:

Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:

July 7 through August 10, 1988 Inspectors:

E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson

~~

Approved By:

B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Date Inspection on July 7 through August 10, 1988 (Report No. 50-255/88017(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; licensee event reports; and information notice followu Surranary: The unit's power was reduced to 95% to allow operation until the September refueling outag A steam generator tube leak resulted in plant shutdown on August 8, 1988, and early commencement of the refueling outag The licensee continued exhibiting strong management in the timely shutdown of the plant, organization of the ensuing outage and in the program improvements in the fitness for duty are None of the findings or observations made during this period indicate a change in the performance tren Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie One open item concerning air system testing was identified.

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L DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Comeant (CPCo)

  • D. P. Hoffman, Vice President-Nuclear Operations
  • G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
  • W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
  • R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
  • R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
  • D. w. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
  • C. s. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
  • R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administrator
  • D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
  • R. E. Mccaleb, Quality Assurance Director
  • R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
  • Denotes those present at the Management Interview on August 11, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefly..

Followue of Previous Inseection Findings (92701 and 92702}

(Closed) Deen Item 255/86018-02(DRP):

Generic implications of the inaccurate weight and resolution of the specific seismic concerns for High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump discharge valve M0-300 While performing maintenance on MOV-3007 it was discovered that the valve, operator, and related piping had existed in an overstressed condition since original design and revie A docket submittal to NRR has since been approved allowing the application of ASME B&PV code section III, code case N-411, and new response spectra for seismic events at Palisades, for stress analysis of the HPSI piping concern The overstressed conditions of the HPSI piping and other similar piping configurations were attributed to overly conservative seismic design criteria, and have been shown not to exis.

No violations or deviations were identified.

  • Operati ona 1 Safety (71707) Routine Inspections b *

The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspection. Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting The inspector also observed some new fuel receipt activitie Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and in the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirements. A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee An ongoing review of licensee corrective action program items at the Deviation Report level was performe Steam Generator Tube Leak At 1:10 p.m. on August 8, 1988, the licensee declared an unusual event and commenced a plant shutdown as a result of a steam generator tube lea Leakage had been identified on August 4, and had trended upward at an irregular rate since that dat Early on August 8, a disparity developed between chemistry analysis and radiation monitor estimates of the leak rate. A faulty sample apparatus was subsequently identified and repaired and the leakage was measured at 0.31 gallons per minute (gpm), which is in excess of the 0.3 gpm Technical Specification (TS) limi An unusual event was declared since the leak rate may have been at 0.3 gpm for the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> At the same time a primary coolant system (PCS)

leak rate calculation confirmed the unidentified leakage to be at 0.3 gp Hot shutdown was reached at 9:43 p.m., August After calculations determined the leak rate had been reduced to 0.07 gpm, the unusual event was terminated at 10:13 a.m. on August 9, 198 Cold shutdown was reached at 4:05 a.m., on August 10, 1988. Subsequent evaluation by the licensee estimated that a primary to secondary leak rate of 0.3 gpm had existed for about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, which is less than the TS limit of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Therefore, no violation occurred and a LER is not require Because of the difficulty in reliably determining the leak rate, the licensee is investigating the development of an alternate means of calculating the primary to secondary leak rat As a result of the shutdown and checks performed during the shutdown, the licensee identified three equipment problems which have been flagged for resolution prior to startu The turbine did not trip remotely from the operator's panel, Service Water Pump P7A tripped for unexplained reasons, and a check valve in the gravity feed Boric Acid flow path stuck shut. A deviation report was initiated for each of these problems and will be reviewed by the Plant Review Committee and the Resident Inspector prior to startu No other violations or deviations were identifie.

Maintenance (62703)

The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Diesel generator jacket water high temperature switch calibration (EPS 24804625). Fire water jockey pump motor rebuild (FPS 24803121).

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: Q0-20 In Service Test of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump M0-7A2 Diesel Generator Surveillance Tes MI-39 Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Logic Tes DW0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillanc SH0-1 Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations or deviations were identifie.

Physical Security (71881)

The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations throughout the protected and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities including proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipmen Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit Illumination was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observe The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie The Fitness for Duty program is being improved by the implementation of initial access testing of contractors for illegal drug use on August 15, 198 They will continue to be subject to the licensee 1 s random testing thereafte No violations or deviations were identifie.

Radiological Protection (71709)

The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas i-ncluding: verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) progra Implementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were observe Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The licensee was caught somewhat short of technicians for work coverage with the four week early start of the outage. This somewhat limited the amount of work which could be conducted early in the outag Appropriate coverage was verified to be scheduled for ongoing wor Management continued to apply pressure to work groups to improve their rad worker practices and reduce the spread of contaminatio No violations or deviations were identifie.

Licensee Event Reports (92700)

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether: reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplishe (Closed) LER 255/88010:

A discrepancy was found in the maximum hypothetical accident (FSAR Section 14.22) offsite dose consequences as a result of bypassing the modification process in 198 The LER submitted on July 11, 1988 accurately describes the licensee's investigation, analysis and corrective action Further discussion is documented in Report 50-255/88016(DRP) Paragraph 3 (Closed) LER 255/88011:

The single failure criteria was found to not be met for all instrument AC bus alignment This event is discussed in Report 50-255/88016(DRP) Paragraph 3 The corrective actions are being tracked by Open Item 50-255/88016-02(DRP).

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Information Notices (71710)

The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following Information Notices in order to verify receipt, appropriate review, distribution, and timely corrective action (Closed) IN 87-28 and IN 87-28 Supplement 1:

"Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors".

The IN was reviewed by the Plant Safety Engineering (PSE) group which performed a thorough evaluation of the plant air systems per NUREG-1275 Vol. The recommendations were specifically addressed with generally adequate responses, the exception being NRC Recommendation # The evaluator group stated that a gradual bleeddown test is not necessary based on the criteria that the operators, per ONP 7.1, "Loss of Instrument Air", are to manually trip the plant when the pressure falls to 50 PSIG, thus eliminating power operation without compressed air and assuring plant cooldown with all valves in their failed positions. It was also stated that erratic valve operation is expected to begin at 50 PSl The reasoning for not doing the gradual or sudden air pressure loss test appears to include the assumption that the valves will position to their fail safe positions and remain ther Resolution of this concern will be tracked as an Open Item (255/88017-0l(DRP)).

1 Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Open items are discussed in Paragraphs 8 and.

Management Interview A management interview was conducted on August 11, 1988, upon conclusion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar