IR 05000244/1992003
| ML17262A849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1992 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17262A848 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-92-03, 50-244-92-3, NUDOCS 9205190071 | |
| Download: ML17262A849 (84) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
'nspection Report 50-244/92-03 License: DPR-18 Facility:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)
Inspection:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
March 10 through'April 18, 1992 T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna E. C. Knutson, Resident Inspector, Ginna W. ~azaru hief, Reactor Projects Section 3B INSPECTION SCOPE H
Date Plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance/surveillance, security, engineering/
technical support, and safety, assessment/quality verification.
INSPECTION OVERVIEW
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G dp H
d b
Hd 'gp shutdown, and plant cooldown.
Mid-loop operations were approached deliberately and were completed without incident.
No significant operational problems occurred during reactor refueling.
Radiolo ical Control:
Hot particle contamination of a was detected and properly handled.
Airborne iodine concentration momentarily increased to slightly above the maximum permissible concentration on the containment operating floor during refueling due to inadvertent blockage of the cavity sweep fan suction.
Licensee response to both incidents was prompt and conservative.
Maintenance/Surveillance:
The A EDG was test-run without remote shutdown capability due to an oversight in development of an integrated EDG test program.
No challenges occurred during the period of operation, and the engine was promptly shut down locally when the problem was identified.
Corrective action was thorough.
En ineerin /Technical ii r:
Extensive inspection of steam generator (SG) U-tubes identified 226 defective tubes in the A SG and 186 defective tubes in the B SG.
Of these, a
total of 379 will be repaired by sleeving; in addition, 46 previously plugged tubes will be returned to service by sleevin ~
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TABLEOF CONTENTS OVERVIEW
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.......:...... '.;........;.......
1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707)
1.1 Operational Experiences..-...........................
1.2
~ Control ofOperations..............................
1.3 Control of Operations with Reduced Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Inventory (TI 2515/113)
1.4 Drill to Verify Abilityto Restore Containment Integrity (TI 2515/113)
.
2 2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS (71707)
2.1 Routine Observations 2.2 Hot Particle Personnel Contamination Event 2.3 iodine Activity Buildup in Containment due to Blocked Purge Fan Suction..................... ~....,.........
2
3 3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE(62703, 61726)
3.1
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Corrective Maintenance.......................
3.1.1 Vessel Cavity Seal Leak 3.1.2 Main Steam Isolation and Check Valve Maintenance
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3.2 Surveillance Observations....... '...............
4 4,
5 4.0 SECURITY (71707)
4. l Routine Observations
6 5.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT (71707)
5.1 Steam Generator U-Tube Eddy Current Inspections and Repairs 5.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-244/91-18-01) Control Room Audible Alarm at Reduced Inventory Level
6 6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707)
6.1 Periodic Reports 6.2 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
6.3 Pre-Outage Meeting
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7 7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE(71707)..........'.
7.1 Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection 7.2 Exit Meetings.........'.....:
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1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS, (71707)
1.1 Operational Experiences DETAILS The plant operated at approximately 97% power from the beginning of the inspection period until shutdown for the annual refueling outage on March 27, 1992.
No operationally significant events occurred either during operations at power or during the shutdown/
cooldown.
Cold shutdown conditions were established on March 28.
The reactor coolant system was drained to mid-loop on March 31 to support installation of steam generator nozzle dams.
On completion of this work, the RCS was refilled in coordination with preparations to remove the reactor vessel head.
The refueling cavity was flooded and the reactor vessel head was removed on April 3.
Refueling operations commenced on April 4 and were completed on April 8.
At'the conclusion of the inspection period, the plant remained in refueling shutdown.
The reactor vessel head was installed and tensioned, with RCS level properly maintained and RCS pressure at atmospheric.
1.2 Control of Operations Overall, the inspectors found the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power plant to be operated safely.
Control room'staffing was as required.
Operators exercised control over access to the control room.
Shift supervisors consistently maintained authority over activities and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.
The inspectors reviewed control room log books for activities and trends, observed recorder traces for abnormalities, assessed compliance with Technical Specifications, and verified equipment availability was consistent with the requirements for existing plant conditions.
During normal work hours and on backshifts, accessible areas of the'plant were toured.
No inadequacies were identified.
1.3 Control of Operations with Reduced Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory (TI 2515/113)
Steam generator nozzle dams allow the steam generator primary side to be maintained empty and av'ailable for maintenance independent of.reactor vessel water level.
Installation of these nozzle dams requires that reactor vessel water level be lowered to approximately the mid-loop level.
The poteritial for loss of core cooling capability is significant during such mid-loop operations due to reduced net positive suction head available to the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps; unavailability of redundant components due to outage maintenance is also a possible cause for loss of core cooling while in. the mid-loop condition.
I NRC Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," addressed equipment, operational, and administrative requirements to minimize the risks associated with mid-loop operations.
Implementation of these requirements at Ginna was examined in August 1991, and found to be satisfactory as documented in inspection report 91-18.
For the current outage, RGEcE implemented additional administrative controls during mid-loop conditions to restrict'operations at the power distribution substations which provide offsite power to Ginn e 0'
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This, along with maintenance scheduling to preclude the unavailability of necessary systems and components during mid-loop operations, demonstrated an excellent effort to maintain
" uninterrupted core cooling while operating at reduced RCS coolant inventory.
The inspector observed operations to establish RCS water level at mid-loop.
The procedure to establish mid-loop level was accomplished deliberately and was generally well controlled.
Operators were knowledgeable of expected indications as well as of symptoms of potential problems.
No significant deviations from expected system response occurred and no operational deficiencies were noted.
In summary, preparations for mid-loop operations were thorough and w'ere effectively implemented as evidenced by no operational problems.
1.4 Drillto Ver ify Abilityto Restore Containment Integrity (TI 2515/113)
Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," required establishing containment closure within two hours following a loss of RHR cooling.
This requirement is addressed by Operating Procedure 2.3.1A, "Containment Closure Capabilities in Two Hours During RCS Reduced Inventory Operation."
On April 1st, while at the mid-loop condition, a drill was conducted to test station response to a loss of RHR cooling and verify ability to,restore containment integrity.
In this drill, the operations department demonstrated the ability to reestablish containment integrity within approximately 10 minutes.
The inspector determined that preparations were adequate to meet the requirement of Generic Letter 88-17 in this area.
2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS (71707)
2.1
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Routine Observations The inspectors periodically contirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.
Through observations of ongoing activities and discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors concluded that radiological controls were conscientiously implemented.
No inadequacies were identified.
2.2 Hot Particle Personnel Contamination Event On April 4, a contractor employee alarmed the personnel contamination monitor at the exit to the containment.
Subsequently, a radiological controls technician surveyed the individual to identify the location and nature of the contamination.
A hot particle, invisible to the unaided eye, was found on the skin of the worker's right shoulder and removed using adhesive tape.
The particle was analyzed and found to contain about 0.88 microcuries of fission product activity. Through interviews with the worker and record review; the licensee determined that the particle was in contact with the individual's skin for about 152 minutes.
The resulting
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skin dose was conservatively calculated to be 11.74 Rem, with a beta emission of 2.2 microcurie-hours.
Upon determining that the individual had received a skin dose in excess of the quarterly regulatory limit of 7.5 Rem, licensee management initially notified the NRC Headquarters Operation Center at 11:20 P,M. on April 4th to provide preliminary information regarding the exposure and followed up this call with a second call at 12:00 P.M. on April 5th to provide additional information.
To establish the extent and location of other particles, the licensee surveyed areas of the reactor building and material that the worker had contacted.
Laundered and used protective
'clothing was also surveyed to determine ifthis clothing was the source of the contamination.
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No similar particles were found.
Additionally, the laundry radiation monitor was tested using the captured hot particle to determine ifthe monitor would detect the particle's presence During the trials, the monitor alarmed indicating that the protective clothing was not the source of the contamination.
RG&E has sent the particle to the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories for a complete characterization and for an independent dose assessment.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this incident and concluded that the follow-up actions were prompt and comprehensive, and that notifications to the NRC were made as required by 10 CFR 20.403(b).
In determining the regulatory action to be taken, the inspector referred to the guidance provided in NRC Information Notice (IN) 90-48,
"Enforcement Policy for Cases of Occupational Doses to the Skin from Radiation Emitted from Hot Particles."
IN 90-48 explains the use of enforcement discretion for cases that involve occupational exposure to the skin from hot particles until a new limitapplicable to such cases is established by revision of 10 CFR 20. In accordance with this policy, a notice of. vi'olation will not be issued when an individual receives a hot particle exposure that is equal to or less than the beta emission criterion of 75 microcurie-hours. Since a beta emission of 2.2 microcurie-hours was conservatively established, a notice of violation will not be Issued.
2.3 Iodine Activity Buildup in Containment due to Blocked Purge Fan Suction At approximately 6:00'M on April 7, health physics personnel determined from a routine airborne particulate sample that iodine concentration on the operating floor of containment had increased to 1.56 times the maximum 'permissible concentration (MPC) of 10 CFR Part 20.
Operations personnel took immediate action per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1-13, "Local Radiation Emergency," 'to evacuate the operating floor and limit access to passage only..
Investigation revealed the cause to be that the suction of the cavity sweep fan had been blocked by loose plastic sheeting material which was being used in construction of asbestos insulation removal containments.
The fan suction was cleared and the iodine concentration rapidly decreased to below MPC.
The local radiation emergency was terminated at
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approximately 6:40 AM, April 7.
No personnel exposure limits were exceeded and there were no personnel contaminations as a result of the incident.
The inspector, determined that the radiological control personnel responded promptly and appropriately.
3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE(62703, 61726)
3.1 Corrective Maintenance
'.1.1 Vessel Cavity Seal Leak On the morning of April 3, while fillingthe refueling canal in preparation for refueling operations, Control Room operators noted an increase in the frequency of automatic containment sump pumpdowns.
The frequency of pumpdowns translated to an inleakage rate of approximately seven gallons per minute.
Analysis of water from the sump revealed that its boron concentration was approximately that of the water in the refueling water storage tank, indicating that the reactor vessel cavity seal was leaking.
The refueling canal was pumped down for inspection of the reactor vessel cavity seal, which was new and being used for the first time during this outage.
The inspection revealed that the leakage was occurring at the seam where the ends of the seal joined, and was not actually a defect in the seal itself.
The responsible engineer stopped the leakage by application of a small amount of RTV sealing compound.
Filling of the refueling canal-resumed later on April 3 and no further seal leakage occurred.
3.1.2 Main Steam Isolation and Check Valve Maintenance The inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
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Work Order 9200242, Repack Valve 3518 per Maintenance Procedure M-37.21,
"Inspection and Maintenance of Main Steam Check Valves," revision 18, effective May 17, 1991.
Work Order 9200266, Repack Valve 3516 per Maintenance Procedure M-37.20,
"Inspection and Maintenance of Main Steam Isolation Valves 3516 or 3517," revision 23, effective April 4, 1991.
These activities were inspected in follow-up of a recent failure of main 'steam isolation valve 3517 to fully shut upon demand; details of this event are presented in inspection report 92-02.
The inspector observed no obvious material deficiencies in valves 3518 and 3516, although inspection was limited by the work scope to the area of the shaft packing.
A new contiguration ot packing material (conical cross-section, as opposed to the previously installed rectangular cross-section)
was installed under supervision of the packing manufacturer.
This new configuration was designed to reduce friction on the pivot shaft; packing friction was
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considered to have contributed to the aforementioned valve closure problem.
The inspector noted several minor procedural inconsistencies while observing the maintenance.
These items were adequately resolved through discussions with licensee management.
At the close of the inspection period, main steam isolation valve 3517 was being disassembled for inspection and refurbishment.
3.2 Surveillance Observations inspectors observed portions of surveillances to verify proper calibration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of work by qualified personnel, conformance to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), and correct system restoration following testing.
The following surveillance was observed:
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Refueling Shutdown Surveillance Procedure 2.3A, "A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Trip Testing," Revision 3, dated April 19, 1991, conducted on April 10-11,
'1992.
The licensee encountered a problem at the onset of testing, in that the diesel could not be shutdown remotely.
Despite extensive planning, this problem was an unforeseen result of attempting to combine several test procedures into an integrated EDG test program.
An electrical connector to the diesel governor had been left unconnected to support post-overhaul adjustment of the mechanical governor; however, it was required to be connected to transmit remote trip signals to the governor (the drawings did not provide sufficient detail), which in turn would accomplish engine shutdown by tripping the fuel racks.
As a result, management convened a meeting of all groups involved in the testing to discuss-corrective action and the direction of further testing.
Concerns were freely expressed and discussed either to resolution or establishment of a positive course of action.
As a result of this meeting, additional guidance was sought from the governor vendor, and another utility which had recently completed similar testing was contacted for comparison of procedures.'ll issues were resolved and testing resumed on April 11.
No additional significant problems were encountered.
The inspector considered that the licensee's approach to testing the A EDG, including actions
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to address problems encountered during testing, demonstrated strong emphasis on safe equipment operation.
To ensure overspeed protection from the onset of testing, the mechanical overspeed trip device had been tested prior to, and was not disturbed during, outage maintenance.
When the problem was encountered during testing, management encouraged expression of concerns and thoroughly addressed each concern prior to resumption of testing.
The inspector had no additional concerns in this matte '
4.0 SECURITY (71707)
4.1 Routine, Observations During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, protected area and vital area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged, for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT, (71707)
5.1 Steam Generator U-Tube Eddy Current Inspections and Repairs A significant portion of the critical path work scheduled for the refueling outage was steam generator (SG) U-tube inspections and repairs.
RG&E's SG inspection program was
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significantly more extensive than required by Technical Specifications and included a 100%
eddy current inspection in the tube sheet region of the hot leg U-tubes.
This inspection employed a motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) probe, which is more sensitive than previous inspection techniques.
As a result, the licensee anticipated identifying more defects than had historically been'the case; the worst case estimate was that 660 defects would be.
identified.
Upon completion of the SG eddy current inspection program, a total of 412 (226-A SG, 186-B SG) defects were identified. Of these, 379 (214-A SG, 165-B SG) will be repaired by sleeving.
In addition, 46 tubes (16-A SG, 30-B SG) which previously had been plugged were reexamined and found acceptable for repair by sleeving.
At the end of the inspection period, U-tube sleeving repairs were in progress.
5.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-244/91-18-01) Control Room Audible Alarm af Reduced Inventory Level This item remained open pending the installation of an audible alarm in the control room for low loop level conditions associated with reduced RCS inventory operations.
Prior to the start of the current outage, an audible alarm was installed and incorporated into the procedure for reduced RCS inventory opera'tions.
The inspector had no further concerns on this matter.
6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707)
6.1 Periodic Reports Periodic reports submitted by tlie licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed.
Inspectors verified that the reports contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.
The following reports were reviewed:,
Monthly Operating Reports for February 1992 and March 1992 No unacceptable conditions were identified.'.2 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
An LER submitted to the NRC was reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes were properly identified, and corrective actions'were appropriate.
The
.inspectors also assessed whether potential safety consequences were properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, and applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met.
The following LER was reviewed (Note: date indicated, is event date):
92-003 Feedwater Transient, Due To Loss of "A" Main Feedwater Pump, Causes Lo-'o Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip (February 29, 1992)
The inspector concluded that the LER was accurate and met regulatory requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.3 Pre-Outage Meeting A meeting was held on March 19 in the NRC Region I offices between RG&E and NRC management to discuss the scope of the 1992 annual refueling outage.
Attachment 1 to this report lists meeting attendees.
RG&E management discussed the outage schedule, planned maintenance activities, modifications to be completed, and licensing activities.
Handouts from the meeting are included as Attachment 2 to this report.
Initiation of a diagnostic inspection program for air operated valves was considered to be a positive licensee initiative. Development of a daily outage safety assessment checklist and a control room status board to list operable equipment (as opposed to previous practice of listing inoperable equipment) were also considered to be positive measures to increase reactor safety during the outage.
Overall, the licensee demonstrated good preparation and safety awareness in their refueling outage preparations.
7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE(71707)
7.1 Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection During this inspection period, deep backshift inspection were conducted on the following g
dates:
March 28, 29, 31, April 5, 11, and 1.2 Exit Meetings At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of inspections.
A motor operated valve (MOV) maintenance program team inspection (50-244/92-80) was conducted April 6-10, 1992, with an exit meeting held on April 10, 1992.
Mr. James Linville, Chief, Project Branch No. 3, was on site April 9-10, 1992, and attended the MOV exit meeting.
Other inspections conducted during this period included a security program inspection (50-244/92-04) and an inspection of the RG&E Inservice Inspection and Test (ISI/IST) Programs (50-244/92-06).
The exit meeting for inspection report 50-244/92-03 was held on April 21, 1992 with the following individuals attending:
Name Title Thomas Moslak Edward Knutson Joe Widay Thomas Marlow Terry Schuler Andy Harhay Fred Mis Alan Herman Senior Resident Inspector-NRC Resident Inspector-NRC Plant Manager-RG&E Superintendent, Ginna Production-RG&E Manager, Operations-RG&E Manager, HP & Chemistry-RG&E Health Physicist-RG&E Health Physicist-RG&E
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ATTACHMENT1 Meeting Attendance List RG&E/NRC Pre-Outage Briefing on March 19, 1992 Name OJ$
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Title R. Mecredy J. Widay P. Wilkens S. Adams P. Gorski S. Shankman J
~ Durr W. Lazarus H. Gray R. 'McBrearty D. Lew A. MacDougall A. Johnson E. Knutson RG&E RG&E RG&F RG&E RG&E NRC:Rl NRC: Rl NRC: RI NRC: RI NRC: RI NRC: Rl NRC: Rl NRC:NRR NRC:RI Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production Plant Manager, Ginna Manager, Nuclear Engineering Services Director, Outage Planning Manager', Mechanical Maintenance Deputy Director, DRP Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS Chief, RPS-38 Chief, Materials Section, DRS
, Reactor Engineer, DRS Project Engineer, DRP Reactor Engineer, RPS-3B Project Branch 3 Ginna Resident Inspector
I ATTACHMENT 2 GlNNA STATlON 1992 Q(JTAGE REV/EW March 19, 1992
1992 OlJTAGE REVlEW Agenda introduction a
outage overview a
maintenance activities a
modifications/technical support activities licensing issues other C
con.clusions R. C. Mecredy S. T. Adams P. Gorski P. C. Wilkens P. C. Wilkens J. A. Widay J. A. Widay
1991 Nuclear Performance esults December 1991 Performance Area Annual Goal YTD Goal Actual Capacity Factor, Equivalent Forced Outage Rate Unplanned Auto Scrams While Critical Fuel Reliability (x10-3 u Ci/gm)
I'ollective Rad Exposure (Person-rem)
Solid Radwaste (Cubic Feet)
Lost Time Accident Rate (Dept.
49)
Contamination Incidents Capital Budget w/AFDC 0&M Budget, Dept.
0&M Budget, Dept.
O&M Budget, Dept.
O&M Budget, Dept.
0&M Budget, Division 15
0+o 5.0 400 4000 160 5 057 7,266 6,470 39,908 5,704 59, 34)i 82.04 5.0 400 4000
.5 160 45, 057 7,266 6,470 39,908 5,704 59,348 84.45%
2.70
1.72 327.64 2180.2
261 36,513 6,933 6,081 39,679 5,018 57,711 Comments:
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1992 OUTAGE PRHHHNTATXON
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CURRENT OUTAGE SCHEDULE
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OUTAGE GOALS
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PERFORNANCE OBJECTIVEB
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PERFORMANCE INDICATORS BHUTDOMN INDUBTRY EVENT REVIEW
CURRENT 1992 OUTAGE SCHEDULE
DAY MGRESSIVE SCHEDULE B S/8 EDDY CURRENT/REPAIR ACTIVITIES Based Upon:
Last, Years Defect Population Last Years Sleeving Rate CRITICAL PATH OVERVIEM
'ihR GlNNA STAT!ON AIKO !99
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I O!SASSEtRBL" REAC'IOR I
3011AR92 ~
IAPR92 LOW LOOP LEVEL INTEGRITY i
28t1YAR92 27111 "2~
3011AR92-PLANT SHUIDOMN/COOLOOM't
I 6APYtn'G t1ANIPULAiOR INSTALLAT109t/EOOY CURRENT i
FUEL SHUFFLExt!ESET REACTOR HEAD I
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SG SLEKVINC/PLUGGING/CLEANUP BONL I
IRIIPR92~ 20APR92 A S/G WELD INSPECTIONS I
l6APR92 JOAPP907 REPORTED PROGRESS Si HFOULF LEGEND SCHEOULE BARS EVEN!'RI T I CAL A S/G
!NSULAT!ON REINSTALLATION I
27APR92 ~ 29APR92 LOW LOOP I.EVEL INTEGRIT I
29APR92 ~
2.'IAY92 FILL t VENT RCS/SAFEGUAROS TESTING
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'2HAY92 ~ It1AY92 RCS HEATUP/ESTB CHEtt/HYORO/ORAM BUBBLE
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ARAY92 ~
711AY92 I
CREV ICE. CLEANING I
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BttAY92 HEATUP TO 547 OEG/CRITICAL'TY TESTING
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9t1AY92 REACTOR STARTUP/PHYSICS TESTING/HEATUP SECONOARY I
911AY92~ 13IIIIY92 UNIT ON LINE/FLUX t1AP/PMR TO t00%
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j 992 OUTAGE GOALB
J 1'99 2 PHRPORNANCH OBDHCTXVHB
'OUTME CONTROL THROUGH OUTAGE PLANNING Planning Group Contains 3 Engineers and l Shift Supervisor, all with SRO Level of Knowledge Communication Enhanced through 2 Daily Status Meetings Containment Coordinators and Operators Used, to Track Important Activities INTEGRATE ALL OUTAGE ACTIVITIES (by system)
NANAGE OUTAGE RISK Outage Safety Assessment (N+1)
Single Failure Criteria Low Loop Level Operations a
c Equipment; Redundancy Operations Training Electrical Overview and Policy,
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MAXIMIZE INFORMATION EXCHANGE Status Board in the Control Room Plant Management
. ESD Meeting
GINNA OUTAGE SAFETY ASSESSMENT 'TTACHMENT 1
,1.
2.
3.
4.
REACTIVITY RCS temperature
<=200 deg F.
Fuel movemeat not in progress Number of boration paths avail (0-2)
> 2000 ppm Reacti vi ty Subtotal SUBTOTAL 0-1
3-4
CONDITION S(,URt RED
ORANGE YELLOW GREEN
CORE COOLING 5.
Number of S/G avail. for decay heat removal (0-2)
6.
Refueliag cavity flooded
> ~ 23ft 7.
No. of RHR traias available Core Cooling Subtotal SUBTOTAL
1
'2 3-5 CONDITION SCORE RED
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ORANGE YELLOW'
GREEN
8.
POSER AVAILABLE I
Number of iadependeat power sources
'vailable to A train (0-3)
Number of iadependent poaer sources available to B train (0-3)
Pox'er hvai lable Subtotal SUBTOTAL 0-1
3-4 5-6 CONDITION SCORE RED
ORANGE
YELLOW GREEN
CONTAINMENT 10. Refueling Iategrity (or CNMT Int) set 1 1, Closure capability in
< 2 hrs.
12. Fuel movemeat not in progress 13.
RCS not in loa loop level condition Contaiament Subtotal SUBTOTAL
1 23-4 CONDITION SCORE RED.
ORANGE YELLOW GREEN INVENTORY 14. Pressure level
> ~ 134 v/Rx Head oa 15.
Rx Cavity flooded
>
23 ft.
16.
Rx Vessel level
> = 84" 17..
Rx Vessel level
> ~ 64" 18, No. of RCS borated eater makeup paths available (0-4)
Inventory Subtotal SUBTOTAI 0-1
3-4 5-8 CONDITION SCORE RED
ORANGE
YELLOW
GREEN
OVERALL SAFETY CONDITION TOTAL SCORE Plant total:
Condition:
0-3 RED 4-8 ORANGE 9-1 2 YELLOW'3-1
GREEN
COLOR CODING FOR SAF%:TY ASSESSME&I'REEN
= FULLSAFETY SYSTEM CAPABILITY YELLOW = EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCYREDUCED OIUWGE REDUNDANCY(N + 1)
RED NO REDUNDANCY-TYPICALLYTECH SPEC VIOLATION OUTAGE PLANNINGGUIDANCE>>
WE WOULD NOT PLAN TO PUT THE PLANT IN A RED OR
- OIU&lGECONDITION OIUPTGE MAYBE UNAVOIDABLEAl'C) WOULD BE ALLOWED WITH PORC REVIEW PROVIDED WE HAVE AN APPROVED'ONTINOENCTPCPINIPEOCEOUEEE)EIOIMIMMIZE THE THEE IN THE CONDITION.
RED IS NOT ALLOWED
Pur~E 7g.AdW4l FW j
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.GINNA SIATION 199?
AlLO SUMtlARY BARI'.HART GINNh Sl AT ION 1992 AlLO SUtltIARY BARI:HART MARCM APRIL APRII.
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OFFS WER SYSTEM PROPOSED 'CAL SPECIFICATION UNCONTROLLED PARTlAL AC S1NGLE 1.1NE D1AGRAM 34,5 KV TRANSMISSION I.INE 767 13A K
N 76703 76702 34.5 KV TRANSLIISSIUN LINE 751 204 K
N 75113 75112 FOR DESCRIPTIVE PURPOSES ONLY 76701 128 TRANSFORMER 34,500-4 160V 75111 12A TRANSFORMER 34.500-4 160V 34.5 KV CIRCUIT 751
.52
t 2BX
+
12BY NC NO
12AY NC
12AX NO 4160Y BUS 128 4160Y BUS 12A
I 7SS NC
16SS NC
BTB-B NO
BTA-A NO
'I 4SS NC
IBSS NC TO 4160 VOI.T STATION SERVICE STATION SERVICE TRANSI'ORMER F17 TRANSFORM'ER / 16 4160-480V 4160-480V CLASS lE NC i52 480V BUS f16 NC '152
)17 I16 TO 4160 VOLT BUS I IA STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER /th 4160-480V CLASS 1E NC )52 480V BUS f14
)52 T'TATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER gt8 4160-480V NP i52 t)BT16-15 TO 480 VOLT~
BUS 15 CLASS 1E 480V BUS g1 7
'152
)EGIBI 52/183 MANUAL NC EMERGENCY NP %52 GENERATOR 18
/EGI82
)EGIA2 NO
NP 552 MANUAL 552 JBTt6-14 NO )8114-16 NO )
NO )
EGlAI, iJBT 14-13 Q TO 480 VOI.T BUS
'13 EMERGENCY CLASS 1 E GENERATOR IA 480V BUS f18
~ ADDRESSED IN PPOPOSCD TCCHNICAL SPECIFICATION NO )52
)BT17-18
GINNA STATION 1992 ELECTICAL OUTAGE BARCHART APRIL
W T
5
S S
9
W T
F
12 S
S
16 17 18 F
S 19 20 21 22 23 24 T
F 26 27 28 S
l1 T
RFACTOP I OOI ANI'YSTEM I OW I. OOP LEVE I
P DIFSEI GENERATOR OUTAGE B DIESEL GENERATOR OUTAGE-4 80 VOLT BUS
OUTAGE 4160 VOLT BUS 12A
11A OUI'AGE.
4160 VOLT BUS 12B b.
118 Oi REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOW LOOP
SUB TATION CONTROL POLICY 1 ~
Immediately preceding the low loop level condition, the Ginna Plant Shift Supervisor will notify
- Power Control.
Power Control will notify the ESD Coordinator during normal working hours and ESD field crews during non-normal working hours.
2.
The following restriction will be enforced during low loop level conditions.
A.
Station 13A B ~
1)
No vehicles or mobile equipment will be permitted off the roadways adjacent to 91202, 8X13A72, 6T13A72, 90812, 91102, No.
6 transformer or 115 KV Bus 2.
All crane or bucket work in these areas will be suspended.
2)
No work will be permitted on 91202, 8X13A72, 6T13A72, 90812, 91102 or No.
6 transformer and their associated equipment.
Station 204 C.
1)
No vehicles or mobile equipment will be permitted in the 'area bounded by
KV Bus 1,
No.
2 trans-former and the substation fence.,
All crane or bucket work in these areas will be suspended.
2)
No work will be permitted on 75102 or Circuit 751 regulator and their associated equipment.
Stations 13A, 42, 121, 122, 124, 204 1)
No relay or control work will be permitted on Circuits 751, 908, 911, 912, No.
6 transformer and 115 KV Bus 2 at Station 13A, or
KV Bus 2 at Station 204.
~
The Ginna Plant Shift Supervisor will notify Power Control when the low loop level condition has been terminated.
Power Control will notify the ESD Coordinator during normal working hours and ESD field crews during non-normal working hour OUTAGE PERFOE%iNCE INDlCATOR8
" ~>"'SAP8PF ~~'~ '"""'"-""
'ost Time Accidents Man-Rem Exposure Contami nati ons
=
Rad Waste Generation
'.2'992::
- .:-"'GOAli'
360 120
295. 8
305 188 900 CU.
'T/WK
- .::,: 1;992,.';;::;.;:;,",,:;,
- . BUSINESS:,',,:,'.
- .i'PM%!:GOAI'::".::::
330 (YR)
220 ( YR)
3K.CU FT (YR)
REDUCED Complete 904 of PMs Complete 904 of CMs Complete 90$ of Insp.
Minimize Rework 90$
90$
908 88%
768 974 1. 74 908 904 90$
3$
'I
~
~
~
~
3 or less LER's No NRC Significant Events
~
~
/
-
=
~
- .~:~::.:::j.gum'.:...:Xi@.gq@~rp::::~;~:.::::.:
0.
10
Complete 90$ Mod.
Work
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
- ".::::":::::.::":::;~~:::PPSiPMLTirTF.,::":~~:::":::::.;:::
904 99. 44 904 No. Startup Problems 30 Day'un (days)
30
0
- .':::::::::+~: CORPORATE:::>+::::::::::"::
t L
th (Days)
42. 9 49. 8
>
1992 Goal Excludes
'S/G Insulation RF/kav: outperf. ind
I'
ALL SHUTDOWN RELATED INDUBTRY DOCUMENTS FOR 1991-1992 REVIEWED NRC Information Notices'RC Generic Letters INPO Significant Event Reports INPO Operating E:~erience Reports INPO Good Practices LIFTING OF A FUEL A88EMBLY MITH THE UPPER INTERNALS [INDIAN POINT/ PALISADES]
Use Submarine Camera for Clearance
& Inspection New DiXXerential Neasurement Technicpze Use New Digital Readout for Internals Pick
~
OTHER SIGNIFICANT OUTAGE INDUSTRY EVENTS IEN 91&22 IEN 91W36 IEN 91~i.
IEN 91M)42 XEK 93M73 IEN 91&81 ZEK 9~13 Four Plant Outage Events Involving Loss of AC Power or Coolant Spills Nuclear Plant Staff Working H'ours Potential Problems with Freeze Seals Outage Events Involving Poor
"Coord iaation BeW~x Operations and Maintenance Loss of Shutdown Cooling During Disassembly of HP Safety Injection Check 'Valves Switchyard Problems that Contribute to Loss of Offsite Power Iaadequate C'ontrol Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plants
R,ED GINNA STATION NRC PRESENTATION
~
MARCH 19 i 1992 MAJOR MAINTENANCE o
Major Activities o
R.ED GINNA STATION NRC PRESENTATION MARCH 19'992 - KING OP PRUSSIA
%0RK ORDERS GROUP I&C Mechanical Pipefitters Electrical Atlantic MOVATS Total PREVENTIVE 343 114 151 100
28 CORRECTIVE
8 155
TOTAL 407 122 306 142
28 1039
- >95% are planned, ready to work.
- Similar scope to
~91 AI&O effor AZSO l64TOR ACTZVZTZES ZNSTRUMENT AND CONTROL 343 Preventive Maintenance Activities 64 Corrective Maintenance Activities 8 Zncore Thermocouples to be repaired.
Work performed on Reactor Vessel Head.
'ajor overhaul of 3 remaining Zncore Flux Map Detector Drive Units.
Turbine Trip Solenoids will be changed out with spares.
Solenoids to be inspected for signs of corrosion product AISO MAJOR ACTIVITIES ELECTRICAL 100 Preventive Maintenance Activities 42 Corrective Maintenance Activities 23 Major Motor Inspections Replacement of Battery Bank
~B~
due to minor.jar cover leakage.
480 volt Bus f15 inspection and cleaning.
Service Water Pump Motors for complete rewind and insulation upgrade to Class H.
I
. Diesel Generator
-
The Woodward Governor will be inspected and adjuste AISO ACTIVITIES ROTATING MECHANICAL
~A~ Component Cooling Water Pump.
~B~ Component Cooling Water Seal.
A/B Diesel, Generator Cooling Fans'ydrogen Seal Oil Unit Major Inspection on 3 pumps and motor; Control Rod Shroud Fan/Motor Overhaul.
~A'ervice Rater Pump Overhaul.
~B~ Circ Water Pump and Motor Overhaul.
A/B Diesel Generator Annual Inspection.
~B~ Circ Rater Pump and Motor Overhaul.
- Unit Pumps approx.
200,000 gallons/minute.
- Involves significant Crane to 'lift 'unit thru screenhouse roof.
Mobile crane capable of lifting 65 ton.
Pump and Motor will he shipped for contractor inspection and overhaul.
Safety related pumps will have major or minor maintenance performed.
20 Balance of Plant Components will have major or minor maintenance performe AI&0 MAJOR ACTIVITIES PIPE AND VALVE ACTIVITIES.
Pi e Sho 151 Preventive Maintenance Activities 155 Corrective Maintenance Activities Atlantic Valve 34 Valves Preventive Maintenance Activities ITI MOVATS 28 Valves Preventive Maintenance Activities AOV Diagnostic Testing to be performed using the Fisher Diagnostic System on 21 valves.
Pilot Program:
Diagnostic Refurbishment of valve and actuator Re-Diagnosis A and B Main Steam Isolation Valves and Check Valves will be repacked using EVSP.
Expandable Valve Stem Packing.
Conical Style packing, less stem friction.
Previously used in other plant valves.
Pre-Outage Radiography has identified small bore piping (3/4" Steam Drain lines) that will be upgraded with a more erosion resistant materia J'-
R.ED GZNNA STATION 1992 STEAM GENERATOR PRE-OUTAGE TUBE PLUGS AND SLEEVING STATUS Tubes Plugged 4 Tubes Plugged Tubes Sleeved 4 Tubes Sleeved
~II+ II g Q
186 5.74 325 9.97%
~nBn S
G 323 9,91%
941 28.874 TOTAL ~<A B<>
S G AVERAGE Plugged 509 = 7.81%
Sleeved 1266 = 19.424
r
1992 AISO EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION Eddy Current data acquisition will be performed using a SM-20, zero entry manipulator.
A full length, 20% random sample will be examined using Bobbin Coil.
(Tube end hot side to tube end cold side)
Previous indications
>
204 will be examined using Bobbin Coil examination technique.
100% of the open tubes (not sleeved or plugged) will be examined using Motorized Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC)
in the full crevice region.*
100% of B&W plugs will be examined using MRPC.
204 of each sleeve type will be examined using. Bobbin Coil examination technique.
- This MRPC Examination is intended to inspect for circumferential cracking in the expanded roll trarisition region.
Previously only a small number of tubes have been examined using this technology. It is anticipated that the defect population in the Steam Generators could increase as a result of this enhanced inspection.
A defect population that was originally projected at 331 repairs could increase to as high as 660 repairs (A and B Steam Generators).
In an effort to manage the number of defects and better control outage length, a Babock and Wilcox Tube Sheet Sleeve (TSS)
is being considered as a repair option.
The TSS is explosively welded in place and has been, used previously in the Ginna Steam Generator AISO ANTICIPATED S/G REPAXRB Obj'ective to maintain >>Status Quo>> plug level, return to power with the same number of operable tubes.
CE Mechanical plugs removed, full length Eddy Current performed, tube repaired with sleeving option.
Tube Repair - All techniques have been used previously in Ginna S/G to repair 8/G tubes.
27>> Rigid Sleeve 30>> Rigid Sleeve 27>> Curved Sleeve 20 3/4>> Tube Sheet Sleeve Tubes that require repair but are unable to be sleeved, will be removed from service using mechanical plugging technique.
tubes in the
>>A and B<<
S/G will be
>>staked>>
as a
result of further analysis from Westinghouse.
These tubes will be removed from service to mitigate con-sequences of a North Ana Hi cycle fatigue tube failure.
A stainless steel wire rope is inserted in the tube and a welded plug is installed at each tube en A M DIFI ATI N TE HNI AL P
~
TWENTY-ONE MODIFICATIONS I
MANYARE MINOR - SWITCH CHANGE, RELAY SETPOINTS, SINGLE PIPE SUPPORT
~
MOST SIGNIFICANTOUTAGE MODIFICATIONS CONTAINMENT.TEMPERATUIMMONITORING SG INSULATION SG BLOWDOWN VALVES ZEBRA MUSSEL CONTROL CCW CIRCUIT SEPARATION (EDSFI COMMITMENT)
CONTAINMENTFAN COOLER MOTOR COOLER
~
NON-MODIFICATIONACTIVITIES SG OPTICAL TEMPLATING MOVATS TESTING AND INSPECTION
IL
2 A EM DIFI ATI N /TE HNI AL P
~
NEW MODIFICATIONCONTRACTOR NPS ENERGY SYSTEMS HIRED 10/1/91 TRANSITION COMPLETE WITH PROCEDURES IN PLACE
~
1992 IS LOW MODIFICATIONYEAR EXPECT 20,000 CRAFT HOURS PREVIOUS YEARS HAVEBEEN 50,000 - 100,000 CRAFT HOURS
Pl 4,
LI ENSIN I
~
NO LICENSING ISSUES FOR START UP NEW HEAT UP AND COOL DOWN CURVES ISSUED SG TUBE REPAIR WITHBkW SLEEVES
~
NON-OUTAGE RELATED LICENSING ACTIVITIES REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 STATION BLACKOUT SERVICE WATER INSPECTION RCP BOWL RELIEF REQUEST
C
~
T
KEYS TO-SUCCESS 1992 REFUELING OUTAGE
~ ORGANIZATION
+'TRONG SAF ETY P ERSP ECTIVE
~
P ROJ ECT TEAM APP ROACH
~ INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS
~ WORKER SAFETY - INDUSTRIAL/RADIOLOGICAL
~ CONCLUSlONS
C f
i