IR 05000244/1992099
| ML17263A448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-92-99, NUDOCS 9311090040 | |
| Download: ML17263A448 (12) | |
Text
SALP REPORT - R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 50-244/92-99 I.
BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on September 22, 1993, to assess the nuclear safety performance of the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant for the period January 19, 1992, through September 11, 1993.
The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.6 (see NRC Administrative Letter 93-02).
Board members were Wayne D. Lanning (Board Chairman), Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region I (Rl); Charles L.
Miller, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC RI; Susan Frant
Shankman, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC RI; and Walter R. Butler, Director, Project Directorate I-3, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The Board developed this assessment for approval of the Region I Administrator.
The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC MD 8.6,
"Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance {SALP)."
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-OPERATIONS The operations area was rated Category 2 in the previous period.
Management demonstrated strong involvement in the resolution of operational concerns.
Operators responded well to plant challenges and, in some cases, averted reactor trips.
The Operations Department interacted well with other departments, ensuring expeditious root-cause analyses and corrective actions and effective training on plant modifications.
However, procedural inadequacies and deficiencies in assessing the effect of certain maintenance tasks on plant operations resulted in instances of weak control of plant activities, including an event in which engineered safeguards instrumentation was inadvertently disabled.
During this period, management exercised good oversight of plant operations.
The Plant Operation Review Committee met frequently and effectively contributed to the resolution of operational concerns.
The Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Board provided a high level of diversity and experience in the review of program effectiveness.
Management implemented several positive initiatives, including a procedure for complex and infrequent evolutions, an unannounced drill to test the ability to establish containment integrity du'ring mid-loop operations, and a work control center outside the control room during the refueling outage to reduce operator distractions.
Management performed good daily safety assessments during the refueling outages.
Support of staff rotations and frequent industry interactions enhanced the staff's experience and safety perspective.
The operators consistently responded well to plant transients and abnormal conditions,
including several transients initiated by secondary equipment problems.
Response was complicated by additional equipment problems such as the turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump oscillations and slow closure of a main steam isolation valve during a plant trip. Prompt, 93ii0'&040 931i03
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decisive response to plant transients prevented reactor trips on at least two occasions.
Several complex and infrequent evolutions, such as adjustment of the advanced digital feedwater control system while at power and three entries into reduced inventory conditions during refueling outage activities, were performed well.
The control of system configurations was weak as evidenced by several mispositioned valves.
Improper valve lineups resulted in the inadvertent water addition to the spent fuel pool, the inoperability of a reactor coolant system's leak detection system, and the inadvertent isolation of an instrument gage in the standby auxiliary feedwater system to conduct operability surveillances.
Although improvements were noted since the last SALP, some procedural inadequacies contributed to problems in the control of system configurations.
Management was not thorough and self-critical in response to the industry issue concerning falsification of logs by auxiliary operators.
Management's initial investigation was limited in
"scope to a sampling of operators and only certain aspects of logs.
Management did not recognize certain shortcomings in accountability for records and data recorded until subsequent reviews vPere performed in response to NRC questions.
These shortcomings have since been corrected through procedure revisions.
In summary, the management exercised good oversight of plant operations.
Operators were challenged by equipment problems in the balance of plant and responded well to plant transients and abnormal conditions.
However, weaknesses were evident in the control of system configuration and management response to a significant industry issue (falsification of logs).
The operations area is rated Category 2.
III.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-ENGINEERING In the previous SALP period, engineering was rated Category 2.
Engineering was effective in support of plant operations, evaluation of problems, and determination of root causes.
Modifications were well planned and exhibited good initiatives and safety perspectives.
Managen'ient dedicated considerable resources to improve engineering performance through staff additions.
The results of major NRC inspections were mixed with strengths observed in the engineering support of electrical distribution system and weaknesses in the engineering support of the service water system.
During this SALP period, engineering personnel demonstrated a strong safety perspective in support of site needs.
Management oversight was exceptional for major modification planning and installation, including containment recirculation fan coolers, pre-separator drain tanks, and the main generator voltage regulator replacement.
The conceptual planning for a complex temporary service water system modification that enabled system overhaul while ensuring its safety functions and the planning for steam generator replacements were examples of outstanding engineering leadershi Support of operations and maintenance was noteworthy, as evidenced by the methodical evaluations and conservative response to recent anomalous control rod motions, the corrective actions involving emergency diesel generator fuel oil.booster pump discharge pressure, and the detection of an obscure design deficiency in the safety injection cross-connect logic.
Excellent surveillance and testing program support and initiatives were apparent in motor-operated valve testing with improved diagnostic techniques, steam generator eddy current testing using equipment with enhanced degradation identifying capability, and an outstanding erosion/corrosion program that has included small bore piping and tanks.
However, there was one notable instance where two service water valves were failed for an undetermined time, and earlier failures of similar nonsafety-related valves did not initiate licensee actions to evaluate the operability of safety-related valves.
Engineering was very effective in performing safety assessments and analyses in support of problem resolutions.
The technical depth of the engineering staff was enhanced by hiring additional experienced engineers.
In addition, engineering programs were improved by initiatives of a short-form engineering work request to control engineering tasks of short duration, a computerized work tracking system to optimize the use of engineering staff, and a management effort that effectively reduced the engineering backlog.
Better control of vendor manuals and electrical design drawings significantly improved the configuration control.,
Licensing submittals were generally of good technical quality and contained appropriate information and calculations to support the request.
The inservice inspection and inservice testing program submittals were generally thorough and complete.
However, two relief requests for hydrostatic testing and'alternate Appendix J testing were needed on an urgent basis prior to restart and reflected inappropriate licensee planning.
Also, the Board review of Licensee Event Reports identified a large percent of the cause codes classified as "other" and noted that the licensee should evaluate the methodology used to determine these codes, Communications between corporate and site engineering were excellent.
Corporate engineers worked closely with site counterparts, and management regularly attended site meetings.
The biweekly telephone conference between the engineering manager and industry
'counterparts with two-loop Westinghouse plants was a positive initiative.
In summary, significant engineering improvements have been made this assessment period.
There was strong management oversight for major modifications planning and installation.
Communications between the corporate and site staffs were outstanding.
The engineering area is rated Category IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSISMAINTENANCE The maintenance program was rated as Category 1 in the last SALP period with several strengths being noted.
Significant improvement in procedures and diagnostic methods were cited as was a strong management commitment to maintenance activities and support.
Pia>>i material condition was well maintained and equipment aging concerns were being adequately.
addressed.
These strengths continued to be noted during the current SALP cycle.
In addition, Ginna exhibited an aggressive and well organized preventive maintenance program.
The licensee was proactive in its use of diverse technologies to improve steam generator eddy current inspection techniques, a radiographic inspection program for small diameter secondary piping, and sleeving in steam generator U-tubes to reclaim previously lost heat transfer area.
The licensee effectively used infrared thermography to identify a thermal hot spot in the emergency bus supply transformer.
Main steam isolation valve packing was improved to avoid repeated instances of sticking valve operation.
A proactive maintenance philosophy was evident in the decision to replace the steam generators during the 1996 refueling outage.
The strong commitment by station management to provide close oversight and support of major corrective maintenance activities also continued during this SALP cycle.
Management promoted a team-oriented approach to the repairs of condenser tube leaks, the replacement of the low pressure turbine rotor and the emergency bus transformer during a refueling outage.
The charter and use of an erosion/corrosion (E/C) task force to address the identification and resolution of issues of an E/C nature also were commendable.
However, equipment problems in the secondary side of the plant, in particular the feedwater system, continued to present unnecessary challenges to both safety systems and operators.
The station management continued to show a strong commitment to the assurance of quality in the maintenance area.
The high level of training received by maintenance technicians and E/C personnel was noteworthy.
Maintenance procedures were frequently reviewed, revised, and improved.
The initial phases of a reliability centered maintenance program were noted to be a good initiative.
The station management aggressively and effectively used a specialized root-cause determination program to investigate and correct several equipment failures such as the "D" service water pump motor failure, the main feedwater pump seal leakage, the "B" and "C" service water pump breaker failures and the failure of the diesel generator fuel oil regulating valve.
Maintenance management and senior technicians received training in human performance enhancement system and root cause analysis and applied it in the conduct of maintenance activitie ~
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An isolated lapse in the application of corrective actions occurred when two safety-related service water valves were found to have experienced stem-disk separation after the same condition was noted previously for non-safety related valves.
Station management acted aggressively, following the discovery, to ensure that all other valves subject to the same failure were evaluated.
IJ In summary, the strengths noted in the previous SALP report continued to be displayed., A quality-oriented maintenance environment existed at Ginna, and improvements to maintenance a'ctivities continued to be aggressively pursued.
Continued management attention is needed to reduce the number of equipment problems in the balance of plant to reduce the challenges to both safety systems and operators.
The maintenance area is rated as Category 1.
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSISPLANT SUPPORT This functional area is new, representing a significant change from previous SALPs.
The plant support functional area covers all activities related to plant support functions, including radiological controls, emergency preparedness, security, chemistry, fire protection, and housekeeping controls.
Security and emergency preparedness areas were rated previously as superior, Category 1,
but a declining trend was noted in emergency preparedness due to procedural and training weaknesses.
Those ratings were based on excellent management support, significant commitment to program upgrades, and effective training.
The area of radiological controls was rat d previously as Category 2 with strengths in the reduction of personnel exposures and controls to minimize radiological waste.
However, several weaknesses were noted in the radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP).
f During the current SALP period, the licensee's performance in radiological controls was considered good with some notable concerns.
Strengths included the excellent personnel exposure control during steam generator repairs and the effective quality assurance during respiratory protection quality surveillance review.
In addition, the licensee had undertaken a
good initiative to revise all station radiation protection and chemistry procedures, in a new, and improved format, over the next 3 years.
However, the licensee did not begin to revise its core radiation controls procedures and initiate health physics staff training in preparation for implementing the new requirement of 10 CFR Part 20 on January 1, 1994, until late in the assessment period.
Another area of weakness identified during the SALP period was that the licensee's ALARA program, which is almost 5 years old, was still under development in some areas.
Of concern in this program was the use of dose rate rather than dose as the basis for determining shielding requirements, a practice that can result in higher personnel exposure In response to concerns during the previous SALP period, a qualified environmental technician was assigned the responsibility for REMP and this resulted in program improvement.
However, continued weaknesses were evident in-the evaluation of data and report results, preparation of duplicate and spiked samples, and identification of potential weaknesses in n>easurement techniques.
Therefore, the NRC concerns 'expressed in the last SALP about the quality control program for REMP and the environmental laboratory persisted.
The effectiveness of the emergency preparedness program was evidenced by good exercise performance, especially in control room command and control and in communications in the emergency operations facility. Further, the licensee continued excellent relationships with offsite organizations such as State and county authorities. The licensee enhanced its siren system with excellent results noted in the annual activation test performed in April 1993
~
The licensee promptly remediated a delay in notifying the NRC during an exercise.
Likewise, the licensee effectively addressed concerns expressed in the last SALP, which resulted in the declining trend, by providing additional training to control room operators in assessing potential dose consequences and by making administrative changes to allow better implementation of the emergency plan.
The security systems, particularly the security computer and the perimeter intrusion detection and assessment systems, were nearing the end of a significant upgrade program at the end of the current assessment period.
The upgrade program represented a substantial management commitment to an effective and high quality nuclear plant security program.
A security simulator was used to train central alarm station and secondary alarm station operators to ensure a smooth transition to the new systems.
In addition, excellent program management was demonstrated when effective compensatory measures were promptly established for those portions of the plant perimeter that were adversely affected by a severe storm in March 1993.
Repairs to the affected systems also were quickly completed.
The licensee continued to maintain good fire protection standards, as indicated by a well-trained fire brigade and a good "open-flame" permit program.
However, there were two incidents involving grinding operations which indicated weak fire protection practices.
The licensee recognized the need to improve housekeeping and the material condition of the plant.
Special paints were being applied and improved lighting was being installed in an effort to identify debi)itated plant areas.
However, housekeeping on the secondary side of the plant appeared neglected because areas used to store equipment were untidy, and erected, but unused, scaffolding was evident in several locations.
In summary, the licensee's efforts resulted in good plant support with superior performance in the security program as a notable highlight. The emergency preparedness drill performance continued to improve and the licensee continued to demonstrate excellent rapport with offsite organizations.
Areas for improved performance were noted in the radiological controls, environmental monitoring, housekeeping, and fire protection programs.
The plant support area is rated as Category