IR 05000244/1992010

Insp Rept 50-244/92-10 on 920721-0908.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maintenance/Surveillance,Security,Emergency Preparedness & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification

ML17262B030
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/05/1992
From:	Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17262B029	List: IR 05000244/1992010 ML17262B028
References
50-244-92-10, NUDOCS 9210140097
Download: ML17262B030 (20)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Inspection Report 50-244/92-10 License: DPR-18 Facility:

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RGB')

Inspection:

Inspectors:

July 21 through September 8, 1992 T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna E. C. Knutson, Resident Inspector, Ginna

'pproved by:

W

. Lazarus, Chief, React ro~ects Section 3B INSPECTION SCOPE

~Ss ne Date Plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance/surveillance, security, emergency preparedness, and safety assessment/quality verification.

Deep backshift inspections were conducted on the following dates:

August 8, 23, and September 5 and 7 1992.

INSPECTION OVERVIEW yh pl p

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h 'y fh inspection period. Weaknesses were noted in the operations department procedure which governs auxiliary operator watchstanding.

There were no operational challenges during this inspection-period.

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Main enance/

urveillance:

A service water leak in the "D" containment recirculating fan cooler was satisfactorily repaired.

Troubleshooting of a power range nuclear instrument input to the axial flux difference alarm was thorough.

S~ecurit:

No significant discrepancies were identified during routine security checks.

mer enc Pre aredness:

Two emergency preparedness mini-drills were conducted without impacting plant operations.

afet A se sment/

ualit Verification: Adequate QA/QC involvement in scheduled surveillance activities was observed.

92101400'V7 921005 PDR ADOCK 05000244

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TABLEOF CONTENTS k

0VERVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.:

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1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707)............

1.1 Operational Experiences.............

1.2 Control of Operations'..............

1.3 Verification of Plant Records (TI 2515/115)

1.3.1 Auxiliary Operator Responsibilities 1.3.2 Fire Watch Verification

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3 2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS (71707)

2.1 Routine Observations 2.2 ALARASubcommittee Meeting.................

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3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE(62703, 61726)

3.1 Corrective Maintenance.. ~.... ~..............

3.1.1 Containment Recirculation Fan Cooling Water Leak 3.1.2 Power Range Nuclear Instrument Isolation Amplifier 3.2 Surveillance Observations.......,

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4.0 SECURITY (71707)

4.1 Routine Observatioris

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5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707)

5.1 Coordination of Mini-Drillswith Plant Operations.........

7 6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707, 90712, 92701, 40500)........................

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6.1 Quality Control Involvement in Surveillance Testing 6.2 Periodic Reports 6.3 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

6.4 Nuclear Safety Advisory Review Board (NSARB) Meeting 90713,

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7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE(71707, 30702, 94600)

7.1 NRC Regional Administrator Site Tour 7.2 Exit Meetings

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DETAILS 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707)

1.1 Operational Experiences The plant operated at approximately 98 percent power through the majority of the inspection period.

A controlled power reduction was initiated on August 23, 1992, in response to rising motor stator temperature on the "A" main feedwater pump.

This action was successful in stopping the temperature rise, and the power reduction was halted at about 92 percent.

Power escalation commenced about two hours later, after main feedwater pump room ventilation had been adjusted to compensate for high outside temperature.

Power was reduced to 60 percent on September 5, 1992, to support planned off-site transmission substation maintenance.

Full power operation was resumed on completion of this maintenance approximately six hours later. There were no other significant power changes and no operational challenges during the inspection period, 1.2 Control of Operations I

Overall, the inspectors found the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant to be operated safely.

Control room staffing was as required.

Operators exercised control over access to the control room.

Shift supervisors consistently maintained authority over activities and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.

Operators adhered to approved procedures and understood the reasons for lighted annunciators.

The inspectors reviewed control room log books for activities and trends, observed recorder traces for abnormalities, assessed compliance with Technical Specifications, and verified that equipment availability was consistent with the requirements for existing plant conditions.

During normal work hours and on backshifts, accessible areas of the plant were toured.

No inadequacies were identified.

1.3 Verification of Plant Records (TI 2515/115)

1.3.1 Auxiliary Operator Responsibilities In response to NRC concerns regarding non-licensed operator practices (Inspection Report 50-244/92-09), licensee management tasked the Quality Performance department with developing a formalized self-monitoring program.

To date, this program is still in the developmental stages and has not been fully implemented.

The inspector reviewed the proposed overview that the site Quality Assurance department willprovide. The inspector concluded that this program contains the essential elements for the licensee to independently evaluate whether data recorded by the operations, maintenance, and results/test departments are accurate and complete.

In summary, the self-monitoring program willspecify a sampling plan, compare vital area door entry records with recorded logs, provide for periodic, close observations of operators/technicians as activities are being performed, and include a formalized approach to resolving apparent discrepancies.

RG&E partially implemented the program in late August 1992, but due to the extensive nature of the data being reviewed, results are not expected until the end of Septembe 'l

Since results of this effort are not available, the inspector selected eight monitored vital areas, and determined whether all required room entries had been made during a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

The areas selected were the service water building, "A"and "B" diesel generator rooms, -"A"and "B" battery rooms, intermediate building (cold side), standby auxiliary feedwater pump building, and the auxiliary building.

The sampling period was spread out to encompass different shifts, individuals, and work days. The activities of21 of32 auxiliary operators (AOs) were examined.

Days selected were Monday, March 9, 1992; Tuesday, May 19, 1992; Thursday, June 25, 1992; and the holiday weekend of July 4 and 5, 1992.

Through. this review, the inspector concluded that primary and secondary Aos entered vital areas where data is logged twice during the normal eight hour shift and three times during the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> weekend shift, indicating that rounds were performed.

Due to flexibilitybuilt into the licensee's procedure specifying auxiliary operator responsibilities, and log keeping practices, the inspector could not conclude whether data were.

being conscientiously documented.

However, there were no indications of record falsification.

In performing this evaluation, the inspector conducted a detailed review of Operations Procedure 0-6, "Operations and Process Monitoring", which specifies auxiliary operator responsibilities, and accompanied non-licensed, primary and secondary auxiliary operators on their rounds.

Through this effort, the inspector determined that the procedure and AO practices contained shortcomings in establishing individual accountability for rounds performed and data recorded.

These shortcomings included:

Log sheets did not identify who recorded the data and were not readily traceable to the individual recording the data.

In addition, the inspector recognized that rounds can be interrupted for priority actions at the discretion of the shift supervisor and, as a result, the individual who started a round may not be the same individual completing it.

However, logs did not reflect such changes in AO assignments.

Time recorded on log sheets generally represented the generic four hour time period during which the round was performed, i,e0000, 0400, 0800, 1200, 1600, and 2000, and not the time,the round actually began nor the time data was recorded.

Attachment I to 0-6 contained a guide detailing the observations that AOs could make when performing their rounds.

As stated in the 0-6 procedure, it was riot intended that the AO perform each item in the list on every round, but to vary each round so that each item is routinely checked.

As such, there were no checklists or auditable mechanisms

'that could be used to assure that the items listed were checked with any regularity.

The inspector considered these shortcomings to have minor safety significance, since the responsibilities of the AOs do not directly address safety-related equipment operability or-technical specification requirements.

Licensee management acknowledged the shortcomings with administrative controls identified by the inspector, and have taken actions to improve accountability by revising relevant procedures.

The inspector will continue to evaluate the licensee response to this concern as an open item (50-244/92-10-01),

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1.3.2 Fire Watch Verification In response to NRC Information Notice 92-30, the licensee's Fire Protection Engineer verified that personnel performed required fire watches during April, May, and June of 1992.

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'ample population included all three shifts (day, evening, and midnight) and addressed fire watch coverage for different detection or suppression systems which were inoperable during that time period. This verification was done by comparing the applicable fire watch sign-in sheets that are required by site contingency procedure SC-3.15.17, "Technical Specification Firewatch Posting",

to the appropriate security door entry data.

The Fire Protection Engineer determined that all personnel stood their fire watches.

The inspector considered this evaluation to be thorough and responsive to the concerns addressed in the Information Notice.

2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS (71707)

2.1 Routine Observations The inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented,-

dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas, dosimeter readings were accurately, recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.

Through observations of ongoing activities and discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors concluded that radiological controls were conscientiously implemented.

No inadequacies were identified.

2.2 ALARASubcommittee Meeting The inspector attended the licensee's ALARAsubcommittee meeting on July 23, 1992.

The meeting was well attended and discussion was candid and productive.

Topics included implementation of a cobalt reduction program, evaluation of a reactor coolant system decontamination program, and lessons learned during the 1992 refueling outage to minimize future exposure and reduce rad waste volume.

The inspector concluded that the meeting represented a consolidated approach to addressing the ALARAconcept by the RGAE corporate engineering and site radiological control departments.

3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE(62703, 61726)

3;1 Corrective Maintenance 3.1.1 Containment Recirculation Fan Cooling Water Leak On August 13; 1992, operators observed an increase in automatic pumpdown frequency of the

"A". containment sump.

Subsequent containment entry identified the source of leakage to be a service water heat exchanger leak on the "D" containment recirculation fan cooler unit.

Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.c requires that the reactor shall not be taken above cold shutdown unless all four recirculation fan cooler units are operable; action statement 3.3.2.2.a allows one

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, recirculation fan cooler unit to be inoperable for a period of no more than seven days.

This action statement was entered on August 13, 1992, when service water to the "D" recirculating fan cooler was isolated to stop the leak.

Air cooling is accomplished by three sets of heat exchangers in each of the recirculating fan coolers.

These heat exchangers are served in parallel by common service water supply and discharge headers.

The leak in the "D" recirculating fan cooler was identified to be in the middle heat exchanger, from an elbow in one of the heat exchanger tubes.

Per engineering resolution to non-conformance report (NCR)92-350, ""D" Recirc Fan Cooler Tube Leak",

access ports were cut in the fan cooler plenum to provide access to each end of the leaking tube.

The tube was then cut, and the connections to the supply and return headers were plugged.

The initial repair attempt was unsuccessful, in that leakage occurred from one of the plugged tube ends.

A new plug was successfully brazed in place, and the "D" recirculating fan cooler was returned to service on August 18, 1992.

The inspector reviewed completed work order 9201647,

"Repair Leak on "D" Recirc Fan Cooler".

Work was accomplished per emergency maintenance (EM) procedure, EM-745,

"Repair of "D" Containment Fan Cooling Coils", as modified by permanent change notice (PCN)

92T-675 to incorporate the engineering resolution to NCR 92-350.

No deficiencies were noted.

The inspector assessed that repairs to the "D" containment recirculation fan cooler had been satisfactorily completed.

Engineering support was timely and thorough.

Good coordination between maintenance, operations, QA/QC, and health physics departments was evident in the timely completion of work. NRC notification of the service water leak in'containment was made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, with written follow-up within 14 days, as required by commitments to, NRC Bulletin No. 80-24, "Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment."

As long term corrective action, RGB'orporate engineering is evaluating an upgraded cooler design for future installation in all containment recirculation fans.

3.1.2 Power Range Nuclear Instrument Isolation AmpliTier Failure On. August 1, 1992, intermittent spurious alarms were received from annunciator E-26, "Power Range Channel Deviation +2%". The purpose of this alarm is to alert operators to differences in reactor radial power distribution, as would be caused, for example, by control rod misalignment; in itself, however, itperforms no safety function. By individually defeating inputs from the four power range nuclear instruments to the channel deviation comparator, operators determined that power.

range channel N-43 was the source of the spurious input.

Troubleshooting of channel N-43 commenced on August 18, 1992, under work order 9201610,

"Spurious Alarms On E-26 NIS 2% Deviation".

The problem was determined to be a malfunction of the isolation amplifier (NM305) between the channel N-43 summed (upper plus lower) detector output and the comparator circuit. When a constant voltage test signal was substituted for the detector output, the isolation amplifier functioned properly.

However, cyclic variation in detector output over time (corresponding to

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reactor power oscillations induced by*cyclic variations in feedwater flow) caused the isolation amplifier to produce an erroneously high constant output.

Replacing the defective isolation amplifier corrected the output voltage problem and eliminated the spurious alarms; however, the

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maintenance technicians noted that the replacement isolation amplifier output was slightly non-linear at the voltage corresponding to 98 percent reactor power. All required test points were otherwise within specification and the non-linearity was in the conservative direction.

The equipment vendor indicated that the installed replacement amplifier was an older model, and that installation of a refurbished newer model isolation amplifier would likely correct the problem.

As a result, work request 9221388 was generated to perform additional troubleshooting when a refurbished isolation amplifier becomes available.

Through observation of the maintenance, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of the work package, the inspector determined that actions to correct the problem with power range nuclear instrument channel N-43 were appropriate.

Troubleshooting was well executed and succeeded in promptly identifying a potentially elusive problem.

Technicians demonstrated a

thorough understanding of equipment operation by checking isolation amplifier output over a wider range than required by the test procedure, and initiated action to continue troubleshooting when a minor problem was thus discovered.

3.2 Surveillance Observations Inspectors observed portions of surveillances to verify proper calibration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of work by qualified personnel, conformance to LimitingConditions for Operation (LCOs), and correct system restoration following testing. The following surveillances were observed:

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Performance Test (PT)-12.2, "Emergency Diesel Generator IB," revision 71, dated April 17, 1992, procedure change notice (PCN) number 92T-679, dated August 19, 1992, observed on August 20, 1992.

The inspector noted leakage from the crankcase tap for the low pressure sensing line to PI-2650,

"Fuel Oil Secondary Differential Pressure".

Although the inspector considered the leak to be too small to have a significant effect on detector accuracy, the inspector was concerned that a differential pressure detector was particularly sensitive to leakage.

The inspector pointed out this deficiency to operators and a trouble card was generated.

The inspector noted that the scale for the governor speed setting was vibrating independent of the shaft (which is lockwired to prevent motion).

The inspector was concerned that this might indicate that the controlling mechanism (internal to the governor) was loose on the shaft.

The inspector pointed out this possible deficiency to the licensee.

Licensee investigation revealed that the speed scale was constructed to be able to be rotated independent of shaft motion, and that the resultant clearance allowed it to vibrate while the engine was rurining.

The inspector had no further concerns on this matte t

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During subsequent licensee review of the completed procedure, the on-shift head control operator noted that the final value of fuel oil pressure (recorded after one hour of operation at 2000 KW) was in the low alert range (33.5 psig, alert range:

33-34 psig).

An event report was generated in accordance with administrative procedure A-25.1, "Ginna Station Event Report", and the inspector was informed.

Immediate corrective action was to 1) increase the surveillance periodicity to biweekly (normally monthly), and 2) recalibrate the fuel oil discharge pressure gauge, PI-2856.

Gauge adjustment during calibration eliminated the problem before increased fr'equency surveillance was required.

Following licensee processing, the inspector reviewed the completed procedure and had no additional comments or concerns.

2.

PT-32A, "Reactor Trip Breaker Testing - "A"Train", revision 12, dated April 2, 1992, observed August 21, 1992.

The inspector identified no concerns during this testing.

Calibration Procedure (CP)-I-RPS Trip Test-5.10, "Reactor Protection System Trip Test/

Calibration for Channel I (Red) Bistable Alarms," Revision 3, dated April 5, 1992, observed on September 8, 1992..

After testing each bistable, the procedure allowed the bistable setpoint to be adjusted if necessary.

However, no specific guidance was provided'within the procedure on how the adjustment was to be made and what retesting was required.

Through discussions with licensee management, the inspector determined that such adjustments were adequately addressed in the technicians'raining.

4.0 SECURITY, (71707)

4.1 Routine Observations During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, protected area and vital area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.

No unacceptable conditions were identified. The inspectors did note several occurrences in which security personnel could have been more proactive in parcel search and personnel access control.

These were isolated instances, were discussed with licensee management, and did not represent a programmatic concer.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707)

5.1 Coordination of Mini-Drillswith Plant Operations The licensee conducted two emergency preparedness (EP) mini-drills during the inspection period. The purpose of these drills was to test and further develop procedures for integrating the plant simulator into EP drills, in preparation for the annual EP exercise scheduled for October 8, 1992.

'The inspector verified that use of plant computer assets during the conduct of these drills did not,adversely impact the conduct of actual plant operations.

6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITYVERIFICATION(71707, 90712, 90713, 92701, 40500)

6.1 Quality Control Involvement in Surveillance Testing As discussed in section 3.2 of this report, the inspector observed RPS channel 1 bistable trip testing, performed by the Results and Test (R&T) department, on September 8, 1992.

Although the'procedure required that the Quality Assurance/Quality Control,(QA/QC) department be informed prior to the start of testing, no QA/QC involvement was observed during testing.

The inspector was concerned that this might be indicative of a programmatic weakness and, as a result, conducted a review to determine the level of QA/QC involvement in scheduled maintenance.

Quality Control Report (QCR) 92-0668 indicated that RPS channel 4 bistable trip testing had been observed by the Quality Control department on May 13, 1992.

Since then, two additional QCRs had been completed on R&Tdepartment scheduled maintenance.

The inspector

,considered this to be indicative of adequate QA/QC involvement in preventive inaintenance.

In interviews with licensee personnel, the inspector questioned how maintenance activities were selected for QC department surveillance.

The current practice is that QC involvement is'based largely on inspector availability, activity safety significance, and providing coverage for areas which have repetitive problems.

While past involvement has been adequate, this method of allocating QC r'esources to cover scheduled maintenance does not-ensure that'all maintenance areas are periodically being examined.

The inspector was informed that a more formalized surveillance tracking system is being developed.

This program will be reviewed in a future inspection.

6.2 Periodic Reports Periodic reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed.

Inspectors verified that the reports contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.

The following reports

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Monthly. Operating Report for July 1992

Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for January - June 1992 No unacceptable conditions were identified.

6.3 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The licensee provided additional information related to an event occurring on January 5, 1992.

LER 92-001, Revision 2, "Failure of Containment Radiation Monitor Causing Containment Ventilation Isolation" was reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes were properly identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.

The inspectors also assessed whether potential safety consequences were properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, and applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met.

The update to LER 92-001 was found to be accurate.

6.4 Nuclear Safety Advisory Review Board (NSARB) Meeting discussed with sufficient depth for the NSARB to ass 7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE(71707, 30702, 94600)

The inspector attended the NSARB meeting on July 30, 1992.

Topics included review of proposed technical specification changes, generic letter responses, LERs, NRC inspection findings, and quality assurance audit status.

The inspector concluded that topics were candidly ess safety significance.

7.1 NRC Regional Administrator Site Tour Mr. Thomas T. Martin, NRC Region I Regional Administrator, met with the licensee at the Ginna site on July 29, 1992.

Activities included discussions with senior RG&E management, in-plant review of operations and plant material condition, and a tour of the training facilities including the plant simulator.

7.2 Exit Meetings At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of inspections.

The exit meeting for inspection 92-11 (erosion/corrosion monitoring program inspection, conducted August 10-14, 1992) was held by Mr. R. A. McBrearty on August 14, 1992.

The exit for inspection 92-12 (engineering/technical support inspection, conducted August 17-21, 1992) was held by Mr. H.

I. Gregg on August 21, 1992. The exit meeting for this inspection 92-10 was held on September 11, 1992.