IR 05000237/1985008
| ML17195A793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1985 |
| From: | Hawkins F, Michelle Moser NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17195A790 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-85-08, 50-237-85-8, 50-249-85-07, 50-249-85-7, NUDOCS 8505140361 | |
| Download: ML17195A793 (7) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-237/85008(DRS); 50-249/85007(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3 Inspection At:
Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
March 6-8, 11-14' 18-22, 26-28, April 4' 5' 9-11, 15' 18, 1985 ln1 11n~~
s-/~ /' Inspector:
M. M. Moser J~--12_
Date Approved By:
- -/ 6 I b r
- ;
F. C. Hawkins, Chief Quality Assurance Programs Section Daiei Inspection Summary Inspection on March 6-8, 11-14, 18-22, 26-28, April 4, 5, 9-11, 15, 18, 1985 (Report No. 50-237/85008(DRS); 50-249/85007(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced inspection by one regional inspector of the maintenance progra The inspection involved a total of 174 inspector-hours onsite and 24 inspector-hours of in-office procedure revie Results:
One violation was identified in one area (failure to follow procedures with regard to QC hold points and completion of work request forms -
Paragraph 2.c.(1)).
1 850508 9505140n3bocK 0 ~000237 PDR A
PDR G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company D. Scott, Station Manager
- J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent
- R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- M. Luoma, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- P. Markezich, Administrative Staff Assistant
- R. Rickman, Quality Assurance Engineer W. Ahrens, Quality Assurance Engineer J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services T. Ciesla, Operating Assistant Superintendent T. Josefik, Outage Coordinator J. Doyle, Quality Control Supervisor J. Bell, Maintenance Assistant Staff Engineer R. Meadows, Maintenance Master Mechanic L. Sebby, Maintenance Master Electrician W. Hildy, Maintenance Master Instrument Mechanic USNRC
- F. *T. *C. Hawkins, Chief, Quality Assurance Programs Section Tongue, Senior Resident Inspector Anderson, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on April 18, 198 The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspectio.
Maintenance Program Review Methodology This report documents the first in a series of augmented inspections to assess the SALP maintenance function/area which was assigned a Category 3 rating during the last SALP reporting perio The inspection series is structured to ensure that the Dresden maintenance program and its implementation are completely and accurately assesse To that end, specific inspection attributes have been selected to provide insight into (1) program adequacy, (2) program awareness, (3) adequacy of program implementation, and (4) the extent and effectiveness of management involvement.
This report identifies strengths and weaknesses within the mainte-nance progra Weaknesses which violate regulatory requirements are addressed within the scope of the NRC enforcement polic Weaknesses which do not violate requirements are dealt with in light of their relative significance and impact on the assessment's conclusion When completed, the inspection series will collectively represent a total assessment of maintenance performanc Each report will present a summary of conclusions, and as necessary, provide a diagnosis of problem area Inspection Details This inspection consisted of interviews with plant personnel; review of administrative and maintenance procedures, documents, and records; review of selected work requests; and observation of maintenance activities during a portion of the Unit 2 refueling outag Documents Reviewed (1)
DAP 4-1, "Maintenance Department Organization, II Revision (2)
DAP 4-2, "Preventive Maintenance Program, II Revision (3)
DAP 4-3, "Equipment History and Trending, II Revision (4)
DAP 7-6, "Equipment Lubrication Program," Revision (5)
DAP 2-3, "Operation and Control of the Central and Satellite Files," Revision 18 (6)
DAP 2-10, "Control of Vendor Equipment Technical Information," Revision 0
(7)
DAP 11-2, "General Surveillance Program," Revision 9 (8)
DAP 11-3, "Required Surveillance," Revision 2 (9)
DAP 15-1, "Work Request," Revision 14 (10) DAP 14-1, "Technical Staff Organization," Revision 5
0 (11) DMP 040-13, "Vibration Monitoring Program," Revision 0 (12) DMP 100-1, "Vibration Monitoring Program for Equipment Surveillance," Revision 0
(13) DMP 100-2, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 1 (14) DIP 2100-1, "Dresden Instrument Department Test and Measurement Equipment Control," Revision 0
(15) DMP 2100-1, "Calibration of Micrometers," Revision 2 (16) DMP 200-12, "Separator Installation," Revision 1 (17) DMP 200-14, "Dryer Installation," Revision 1 (18) DMP 200-18, "Reactor Head Installation," Revision 2 (19) DMP 200-34, "Maintenance Work Over the Reactor Core," Revision 0 (20) TJM, "Total Job Management," CECo Manual (undated, uncontrolled)
(21) Numerous Work Request Packages Findings (1)
An extensive review of work request packages completed within the past year, noted a significant number (approximately 25%)
which were incorrectly complete (a)
Required entries on the work request form had not been made as specified by Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 15-1 ("Work Requests") Revision 1 (b)
A detailed description of the problem that was to be corrected was not provided on the work request form as required by DAP 15- (c)
Changes to signatures were made on the work request form using white-out correction fluid rather than lining out and initialing as required by CECo Quality Assurance Manual Q.P. No. 17-5 (d)
The quality control hold point required by DAP 15-1 for verification of cleanliness, exclusion of foreign material and closure of pressure retaining safety-related systems was not provided in either the reactor head installation procedure (DMP 200-18) or in the closed work request packag These failures to follow procedures as required by CECo Quality Assurance Manual Q.R. No. 5 are considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion (237/85-08-01; 249/85-07-01)
(2)
Dresden Maintenance Procedure (DMP) 2100-1, Revision 2, describes the procedure for calibrating I.D. micrometers using calibrated O.D. micrometer This method of calibration is permitted by CECo QA Manual only when it is impractical to use gage blocks for micrometer calibratio In discussions with the licensee, it was noted that I.D. micrometer calibration was possible using gage blocks to ensure a 4:1 accuracy rati The licensee considered this calibration method, but instead elected to no longer calibrate I.D. micrometers and to drop them from the list of calibrated instrument The licensee has proposed that I.D.
measurements on safety-related equipment will be made in the future by using a calibrated O.D. micrometer to measure the setting taken with the uncalibrated I.D. micromete Pending review of the revision to DMP 2100-1 and deletion of I.D. micrometers from the calibrated instrument list, this item is considered ope (237/85-08-02; 247/85-07-02)
(3)
While reviewing completed work request packages, the inspector noted that because of a large processing backlog, many of them were being stored in two rooms near the single facility storage vaul The two rooms did not meet the requirements of ANSI 45. (1974) for storage of QA record The licensee immediately took action to reduce the backlog and move the remaining work request packages into the vaul The licensee is also moving ahead with long range plans to enlarge the vault to provide additional storage capacit This item is considered open pending further review of the work request package backlo (237/85-08-03; 247/85-07-03)
(4)
Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 15-1 identifies a list of 8 types of mandatory quality control -hold points and 14 types of optional quality control witness points which are to be added to the work request package during the quality control revie Among the optional quality control witness points are fastener torquing and reactor head stud tensionin A sample of work requests which specified torquing and stud tensioning, indicated that the optional quality control witness points were not being routinely performe In addition, one of the work request packages was found to have three calculation errors on the reactor head stud tensioning sequence data sheet One of the three errors resulted in an unnecessary additional tensioning sequenc These two examples raise concern about the ability of Quality Control to support maintenance activities during periods when the work load is very hig This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection and is considered to be an unresolved ite (237/85-08-04; 247/85:07-04)
(5)
Interviews with the maintenance craft personnel found that some of them were not aware that maintenance procedures were required to be at the job sit Pending verification that procedures are used at the job site, this matter is considered to be unresolve (237/85-08-05; 247/85-07-05).
- *
Conclusions/Recommendations The inspector found that the maintenance program is generally adequate and that recent improvements in its administration will be of further benefit when fully implemente Based on the inspection findings, interviews, and observations, the implementation of the maintenance program needs further improvemen Consideration should be given to the following recommendations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Based on unresolved item No. 237/85-08-04; 247/85-07-04, interviews, and the ratio of QC inspectors to craft personnel, there appears to be a need for additional inspectors during periods when the workload is very high, such as outages and refuelin A review of all 1984 Deviation Reports (DVR) revealed that the I
reduction of maintenance personnel errors should continue to be given management attentio The maintenance work request backlog, compared to other sites, is somewhat higher than the average, and continuing efforts should be made to reduce i There was a noted lack of appreciation the quality control department's rol found at supervisory/managerial level cooperation and the teamwork concept be especially important that management be quality control and quality assuranc for and recognition of This attitude was also It is suggested that reemphasized, and it is fully supportive of both (5)
For craft personnel, job satisfaction and feeling responsible for a job can be increased by better work planning and scheduling to permit working a job through to completio Concerning responsibility, management should reemphasize to craft personnel that they are accountable for their work (i.e., personnel errors)
and that a large measure of the success in minimizing personnel errors rests with the (6)
The CECo Production Training Center should consider separating the nuclear specific instruction program from the fossil fuel related instruction, rather than having them together in the same classroom as is currently don This would increase instruction efficiency and eliminate possible confusio (7)
A notable observation was the importance and influence that the first line supervisor has on the trade personne Selection and supervisory training of new first line supervisors by management should be done with the utmost care.
The above items were discussed with the licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) on April 18, 1985, and summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspectio The inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar