IR 05000249/1985031
| ML17195B035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1985 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Milbrot W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17195B034 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-249-85-31, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8512020509 | |
| Download: ML17195B035 (5) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-249/8503l(DRS)
Docket No. 50-249 License No. DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At:
Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
November 7, 8 and 12, 1985 Inspector:
W. Milbrot ~' ~~~~
Approved By:
Operational Section Inspection Summary II -
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/l-Z..7-$5 Date Inspection on November 7, 8 and 12, 1985 (Re_p.Qrt No. 50-249/85031(DRS)
Areas Inspected: Special unannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, refueling preparations, refueling activities, spent fuel pool activities and licensee actions regarding IE Bulletin 84-0 The inspection involved a total of 27 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including six inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie,,
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. Scott, Station Superintendent
- D. Adam, Compliance Administrator
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent
- T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent for Operations
- J. Wi 11 i ams, Senior Qua 1 ity Assurance Inspector
- W. Ahrens, Quality Assurance Inspector J. Kotowski, Unit 3 Operating Engineer John Schrage, Health Physicist NRC Representatives S. Stasek, Resident Inspector E. Hare, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspectio *Denotes personnel attending the November 12, 1985 exit meeting.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (237/84024-l(DRS)):
Valve positions noted on valve line-up check lists were in positions other than that specified by the procedure with no explanation given on the check list as to the reason for the difference. A review of recently completed check lists verified that personnel conducting valve line-ups were following the requirements of Procedure OAP 9-1, Revisinn 12, Station Procedure When a valve was verified to be in a position other than the 11desired position" the actual position was entered on the check list with an appropriate entry to support the differenc.
Refue 1 i ng Prepara:t ions The inspector reviewed procedures and surveillances covering the testing and operational check out of refueling equipment and systems that are required to support the fuel loading effort to assure that the applicable Technical Specifications have been me The inspector verified that equipment and systems to be used during core alterations were checked for proper operation and verified complete within the time required by review of the following documents: DOS 700-1, Revision 1, SRM Inoperable Rod Block Test DOS 700-2, Revision 1, IRM Downscale Rod Block Functional Test DOS 700-3, Revision 3, SRM Detector Position Rod Block Functional Test
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- DOS 700-4, Revision 2, IRM Detector Position Rod Block Functional Te~t DOS 700-6, Revision 2, SRM Functional Test Prior to Core Alternations DOS 800-1, Revision 5, Refueling Interlock Checks DOS 7500-2, Revision 5, Moisture Removal from the Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Absorbers DIS 1700-7, Revision 8, Reactor Building Ventilation and Refueling Floor Radiation Monitor Functional Test DIS 1800-1, Revision 3, Refueling Floor Main Crane ARM Interlocks DIS 1800-2, Revision 4, ARM Calibration - Units 2 and 3 No violations or deviations were identifie The inspector witnessed portions of removing fuel assemblies from the core and placing them in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) following the sequence given in the Nuclear Material Transfer Checklist (NMTC).
This included installing Blade Guides and Dummy Fuel assemblies to assure that Control Rods were adequately supported as fuel assemblies were remove The Fuel Handlers on the Refueling Bridge maintained continuous communication with the Unit Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) in the Control Room (CR).
As each move was completed the Unit NSO signed and dated the NMTC and kept the CR status board curren Movement of core components was handled safely and in accordance with the requirements of approved procedure Good housekeeping and radiological controls were practiced by personnel working in the refueling are The area was roped off and posted with radiological control signs and also signs to alert personnel to remove or secure any loose items on their clothing that could fall into the open pool. A caution sign noting the maximum load size that can be moved over spent fuel was posted on each side of the SFP to remind personnel of the requiremen During core alterations the licensee secured access to the drywell upper levels (third level and above) to reduce the potential for personnel being exposed to high levels of radiation should a spent fuel assembly be dropped while in transit. The access was secured by chaining off the two ladders leading from the second level to the third level and placing a sign over the chains to alert personnel not to enter the are The secured access points were located approximately six feet above the second deck leve The inspecto~ made an inspection of the area with licensee personnel during fuel movement and noted that temporary scaffolding had been installed between the second and third deck level just above the location of the secured access point The scaffolding extended completely around the drywell and not only partly concealed the two restricted access
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barriers, but provided a ready access to the ladders leading to the third deck level as personnel could easily climb onto the temporary scaffolding at most any point around the drywel The licensee was not aware that the temporary scaffolding provided an alternate unrestricted route to the drywell third level are The licensee moved the two secured access points to a location just above the temporary scaffolding. The licensee is also considering posting a sign at the entrance to the drywell to alert personnel of access restrictions to the upper drywell area during periods of core alterations that involve the movement of used fuel assemblie Portable radiation monitoring instruments were available on the refueling floor and in current calibration. Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) for the refueling floor and reactor building ventilation were verified operable during fuel handlin The ARM for the New Fuel Storage Vault (NFSV) was reading downscale (below low set point) and tagged OOS with a yellow caution tag dated July 17, 198 Work Request No. D47195 issued September 9, 1985 was issued to correct the proble The licensee stated that action on the Work Request is pending access to the NFS New fuel has been loaded in the NFSV since March 1985, and is not scheduled for placement into the core until some time early in 198 Dresden FSAR, Paragraph No. 10.1.2.1, New Fuel Storage Vault states that an ARM is to be located in the vaul The inspector recognizes that there are other ARM's located in the area; however, the inspector has a concern that an ARM located in the NFSV to serve as a criticality detector would be allowed to be OOS for an extended period of tim Resolution of this item will be tracked as an open item (24-9-85031-0l(DRS)) pending action by the licensee to provide timely maintenance to critical radiation monitoring equipmen Several shifts of core alterations were observed by the inspecto Personnel operating the Refueling Bridge and grapple completed the required training. Manning of fuel handling operations was adequate and shift turnovers were documented in the Fuel Handling Foreman's log boo Refueling checks important to core alterations were completed using the Units Operator Daily Surveillance Log, Appendix A, Revision 1 These checks included fuel pool level, fuel pool temperature, and SRM-IRM operability check No violations of deviations were identifie.
Follow-up on IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal As a result of Haddam Neck reactor cavity drain down event of August 21, 1984, the licensee has evaluated the potential for and consequences of a reactor cavity seal failure at Dresde Information regarding this review is covered in previous Inspection Reports (10/85-07(DRP);
237/85-17(DRP); 249/85-15(DRP)).
Dresden uses a steel bellows in lieu of a pneumatic rubber ring to provide a seal between the reactor vessel and refueling cavity, and therefore some of the concerns reported in the bulletin are not applicabl....
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During the inspection a review was conducted to determine if other potential mechanisms for loss of water from the refueling pool exis These potential leakage paths include manway covers, cavity drain lines, reactor vessel level instrumentation, reactor vessel head spray and vent lines and hydrogen monitoring lines. Procedures are in place to verify that all covers and flanges are properly gasketed and bolted and valve line-ups are correct prior to flooding up the refueling cavity. After flooding the cavity to approximately two feet above the reactor vessel flange, an inspection is conducted in the drywell area to verify that there is no leakage from the cavity area or bellows seal as covered in Procedure DOP 1900-3, Revision 6, 11Reactor Cavity -- Dryer Separator Storage Pit Fill and Operations of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System During Refueling.
During core alterations only one fuel assembly is in movement at a time using the Refueling Bridge and grappl Should loss of water be detected, there would be ample time to either place the assembly in the core or SF Additional time for mitigation would be available based on a combined make-up rate of 5000 gallons/minute from the RHR system and 4900 gallons/minute from core spray pump Also, the location of the bottom of the SFP Weir Gate opening will retain approximately ten feet of water above the top of fuel stored in the fuel storage rack It was determined that none of the potential-leak paths noted above would lead to a catastrophic failure resulting in uncovering fue No violations or deviations were identifie.
Q2en Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on November 12, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to items discussed in the report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
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