IR 05000219/1982029
| ML20028F146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1983 |
| From: | Cowgill C, John Thomas, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028F141 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-82-29, NUDOCS 8301310185 | |
| Download: ML20028F146 (15) | |
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DCS Nos.: 50219-820828 50219-821116 50219-820910 502.19-821116 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50219-820930 50219-821118 50219-821022 50219-821120.
50219-821105
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Region I 50219-821115 50219-821214 50219-821215 50219-821218 Report No.
50-219/82-29 50219-821221 Docket No.
50-219 Category C
License No. DPR-16 Priority
Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey
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Inspection conducted:
Novereber 12 - December 31, 1982 N
N b.b Inspectors:
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nior Resident Inspector date signed d.'Thonds[ Resident Inspector dath signed date signed Approved by:
. [. MD 8[4[73
'dath signed L". E. Tr#hp, Chief. Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary: Inspection on November 12 - December 31,1982 (Report No. 50-219/82-29)
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors ( 234 hours0.00271 days <br />0.065 hours <br />3.869048e-4 weeks <br />8.9037e-5 months <br />) including review of plant operations, plant tours, log and record review, surveillance observations, comittee activities, physical security, radiation protection, review of action on previously identified items, on-site event review, inoffice and on-site review of
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I licensee event reports, periodic and special report review.
RESULTS: Violations: Two (Failure to conduct proper shift turnover, Detail 3.2.1, Failure to have adequate procedures for the Rod Worth Minimizer, Detail 7.2).
8301310185 830118 PDR ADOCK 05000219 G
PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted T. Brownridge, Maintenance and Construction M. Budaj, Manager, Programs and Controls P. Fiedler, Vice-President and Director, Oyster Creek E. Growney, Safety Review Manager M. Laggart, Manager, Oyster Creek Licensing J. Maloney, Manager of Maintenance R. Mc Keon, Manager, Plant Operations W. Smith, Plant Engineering Director J. Sullivan, Plant Operations Director D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection.
2.
Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (82-20-01)
Failure to Follow Equipment Control Procedures:
This violation was a result of an individual supervisor's failure to adhere to administrative procedures. The inspector reviewed the critique of this
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event conducted by licensee management and the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation dated October 25, 1982. The inspector verified that the supervisor involved has received remedial instruction on the requirements of administrative procedures relating to equipment and procedural centrols and has been advised of the licensee's policy of verbatim compliance with written procedures. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Violation (82-20-02)
Inadequate Drywell Clearance Procedures Resulted in two Individuals Being Locked in a High Radiation Area: Procedure 902.6,
" General Orywell Clearance and Closure", has been revised to strengthen the administrative controls on opening and closing the drywell airlock door.
Revision 13 of the procedure dated August 19, 1982, requires that a public address announcement be made of the intent to close the drywell.
Prior to closing the door, the security guard at the control point must verify that all personnel have picked up their security I.D. cards and logged out on the vital area access log; the health physics technician rust verify that all personnel have picked up their Daily Exposure and Access Control cards and logged out on the drywell access radiological control log. Both individuals must sign a drywell closure data sheet after the verifications have been made. The inspectors had no further questions on this item.
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3.
Plant Operations Review 3.1 Shift Logs and Operating Records Shift Logs and Operating Records were reviewed to verify that they were properly completed and signed and had received proper supervisory reviews.
.he inspector verified that entries involving abnomal conditions provided sufficient details to comunicate equipment status and followup actions. Logs were compared to equipment control records to verify that equipment removed from or returned to service was properly noted in operating logs when required. Operating memos and orders were reviewed to insure that they did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements. The logs and records were compared to the requirements of Procedure 106, " Conduct of Operations", and Procedure 108, " Equipment Control". The following were reviewed:
Control Room and Group Shift Supervisor's Loos, all entries;
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Technical Specification Log;
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Control Room. and Shift Supervisor's Turnover Check List;
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Reactor Log;
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Shutdown Log;
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Reactor Building and Turbine Building Tour Sheets;
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Equipment Status Log;
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Standing Orders;
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Operational Memos and Directives.
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No unacceptable conditions were noted.
3.2 Facility Tours The inspectors frequently toured the following areas:
Control Room (daily)
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Reactor Building (all levels)
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Turbine Building (all nomally accessible areas)
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Augmented Off-Gas Building
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New Rad-Waste Building
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Cocling Water Intake and Dilution Plant Structure
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Monitoring Change Area
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4160 Volt Switchgear, 460 Volt Switchgear, and Cable Spreading
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Rooms Diesel Generator Building
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Battery Rooms
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Maintenance Work Areas
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Yard Areas (including Protected Area Perimeter)
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The following were observed:
3.2.1 During daily control room tours, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k).
Technical Specifications, and the licensee's conduct of operations procedure were met. Selected control room instrumentation was verified to be operable and indicated parameters within normal expected limits.
Recorders were examined for evidence of abnonral or unexplained transients. Plant stack radiaticn recorder traces were examir.ed for evidence of abnormal or unplanned releases of radioactive gases. The inspectors verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's), including ECCS availability and containment integrity by examinina switch positions and breaker and valve position indications in the control room. Portions of shift turnovers were observed for adequacy.
About 8:00 a.m. November 16, 1982, the inspectors noted that the number 2 Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) ball valve, a normally closed containment isolation valve, was open while the TIP was secured in its shield. Neither the control room operators nor the shift supervisors knew that the va!ye was open. Further review determined that the valve's control switch was in 'he
'open' rather than ' closed' position so the valve did not shut when the TIP was withdrawn into the shield. The automatic contain-ment isolation function of the valve was fully operational, so no Technical Specification violation occurred involving contain-ment isolation functions. The inspectors. expressed concern about the operator's and supervisor's lack of awareness of the valve's abnormal position. The inspectors found
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that the control room turnover checklist indicated that the valve was shut although it had been left open by the offgoing 12:00 a.m.
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i to 8:00 a.m. shift. Also, as of 9:00 a.m., only one of the two
control room operators had signed the control room turnover check-
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list, and neither the Group Shift Supervisor nor the Group Operat-ing Supervisor had reviewed and signed the checklist.
Failure to con-duct an adequate shift turnover is a violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1 and licensee Procedure 106 (219/82-29-01).
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i 3.2.2 Selected alamed annunciators were discussed with control room l
operators and supervisors to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was
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being taken. The operators were knowledgeable of alarm status
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and plant conditions, i
3.2.3 Systems and components were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and abnomal vibration. The calculated identified and unidentified ieak rates into primary containment were reviewed. Selected
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pipe hangers and seismic restraints were visually examined for indications of mechanical interference or fluid leaks. No
unacceptable conditions were identified.
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3.2.4 The inspector verified operability of selected safety equipment by in-plant checks of valve positioning, control of locked valves, power supply availability and breaker positioning.
Selected major components were visually inspected for leakage,
proper lubrication, operating air supply. and general conditions.
Systems checked included the 4160 and 460 volt electrical
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distribution system, Core Spray System, Containment Spray System,
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Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Standby Liquid Control System, and Standby Gas Treatment System.
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Equipment Control procedures were examined for proper implementation by verifying that tags were properly filled out, posted, and i
removed as required, that jumpers were properly installed and removed, and that equipment control logs and records were complete.
Selected active tagouts were independently verified by the inspectors. Selected cleared tagouts were reviewed to detemine that system alignments had been properly restored and safety systems returned to service had been properly tested. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
3.2.5 The inspector examined plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness, control of material to prevent fire hazards, maintenance of fire barriers, storage and maintenance of fire fighting equipment, and radiological housekeeping. On November 30, 1982, the inspector observed an exercise of the plant fire brigade. A fire was simulated by setting off a smoke bomb in an office trailer within the protected area. The fire brigade's response was adequate and no unaccept3 ale conditions were identified.
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4.
Radiation Protection
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During entry to and exit from radiation controlled areas (RCA), the inspector verified that proper warning signs were posted, personnel entering were wearing proper dosimetry, that personnel and materials leaving were properly monitored for radioactive contamination and that monitoring instruments were functional and in calibration.
Posted extended Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) and survey status boards were reviewed to verify that they were current and accurate. The inspector observed activities in the RCA to verify that personnal complied with the requirements of applicable RWP's and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the area. The inspector periodically perforned independent surveys to confirm the accuracy of the licensee's postings. Particular attention was given to radiological controls on refueling floor activities which included removal, packaging, and shipment of waste from the spent fuel pool, preparation of the fuel pool for fuel rack modifications, and cleaning and decontamination of the equipment storage cavity No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
Physical Security During daily entry and egress from the protected area, the inspector verified that access controls were in accordance with the security plan and that security posts were properly manned.
During facility tours, the inspector verified that protected area gates were locked or guarded and that isolation zones were free of obstructions. The inspector examined vital area access points to verify that they were properly locked or guarded and that access control was in accordance with the security plan.
Vehicles onsite were periodically observed to verify proper controls. t i unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed surveillance to verify that testing had been properly approved by shift supervision, control room operators were knowledgeable of testing in progress, approved procedures were being used, redundant systems or components were available for service as required, test instrumentation was calibrated, work was performed by qualified personnel, aad test acceptance criteria were met. Completed documentation was also reviewed. Parts of the following tests were observed:
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Procedure 619.3.011, revision 6, March 22,1982, " Scram Discharge
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Water Level Test", completed November 23, 1982.
Procedure 609.4.001, revision 8, March 22,1982, " Isolation Condenser
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Valve Operability Test", completed December 17, 1982.
Precedure 619.3.006, revision 10, January 12,1982, " Reactor Triple
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Low Water Level Test and Calibration", completed December 18, 1982.
Pmcedure 621.4.007, revision 4, December 3,1980, " Air Ejector Offgas
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Radiation Monitor Front Panel Test", completed December 22, 1982.
Procedure 619.3.005, revision 7, September 7,1982, "High Flow in the
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Main Steam Line Test and Calibration", completed December 30,1982.
7.
Followup of Onsite Events 7.1 At 9:45 a.m. on November 16, 1982, while the reactor was operating at about 50 percent power, the water level in the fuel pool skimer surge tank decreased rapidly. The skimer surge tank low level, fuel pool low level, and skimer surge tank low-low level alarms annunciated in the control room within five minutes. The fuel pool level dropped to the top of the skimer weirs, the skimer surge tank emptied, and the fuel pool pumps tripped. No increased radiation levels were noted on the refueling floor, however, the floor was evacuated as a precaution.
Operators isolated and bypassed the filter demineralizer section of the
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fuel pool system and began refilline, the skimer surge tank from the condensate transfer system. By 10:30 a.m., the system had been
refilled, the alams cleared, and the fuel pool cooling system returned to service with the filter demineralizer bypassed. The licensee verified the rystem valve alignment and later returned the filter demineralizer section to service. About 8000 gallons of water was drained from the fuel pool system during this event. A water inventory check showed that the water was transferred to the condensate storage tank. The flow path and cause of the transfer is undetermined, but will be investigated during a plant shutdown scheduled for February 12, 1983. The licensee's investigation will include examination of valves in the fuel pool system drain paths to determine if misoperation or inadvertent operation occurred.
This item is unresolved pending further investigation (219/82-29-02).
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7.2 About 6:58 a.m. on December 14, 1982, the reactor scramed from High Neutron flux in the intermediate range. No abnomal releases or ECCS actuations occurred. Licensee made proper notifications.
The inspector reviewed recorder charts and log entries, and discussed the event with station personnel. During startup with reactor power at the point of adding heat, reactor operators were withdrawing control rods to begin plant heatup. While withdrawing control rod 06-31 from notch 4 to notch 6, a shorter than nomal reactor period resulted. The reactor operator immediately inserted the control rod to 00. A scram signal occurred on one Reactor Protection Channel. About 14 seconds later, a scram signal actuated on the other Reactor Protection Channel and t:'e reactor scrammed when the operator ranged one Intemediate Range Mnitor in the wrong direction.
Review of strip charts showed the shortesi, reactor period to be about 20 seconds.
During this review, the inspector noted that the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)
had been bypassed during part of the reactor startup.
Further review identified that the RWM had been bypassed because the rod sequence existing in the RWM was not the same as the written sequence given to the operators by the Station Reactor Engineers for that startup. A sequence had been entered and verified on September 27, 1982. However, after plant shutdown on December 10, 1982, extensive RWM testing was conducted and on completion a sequence was entered but not verified.
Reactor Engineering personnel did not verify the sequence because they belie *,ed that it was the same sequence entered on September 27, 1982. Actually, the sequence entered was an earlier out-of-date sequence. The inspector reviewed Station Startup procedures and procedure 1001.5, Rod Worth Minimizer Sequence, revision 2, January 8,1981. These procedures did not require verification of sequence loaded prior to reactor startup.
Procedure 1001.5 additionally required verification only if a new sequence was entered. No control of sequence tapes was required and the inspector noted that additional tapes were routinely made and given to
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I instrument maintenance personnel. The failure to have adequate procedural I
controls to insure proper rod withdrawal sequences entered in the Rod Worth Minimizer during reactor startup in accordance with technical specification 6.8.1 and regulatory guide 1.33 is a violation (219/82-29-03).
7.3 About 6:50 a.m. on December 15, 1982, the reactor wa'; manually scrammed l
when significant abnomal piping vibration was observed on the 'A'
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feedwater system during a plant startup. No abnormal releases occurred
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and ne safety system actuations were required nor occurred as a result of the scram. The licensee declared an unusual event and made the required notifications. The unusual event was teminated about 8:05 a.m.
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At the time of the scram, reactor water level was being maintained using the 'C' feedwater string by throttling the string outlet isolation valve.
The ' A' and 'B' feedwater strings were isolated because of known valve leakage. Both isolated feedwater strings were open through the feed pump minimum flow return lines to the main condenser which was at 22" mercury vacuum. The 'C' feed pump had been started about 6:17 a.m. to feed the reactor as reacter pressure increased. The low pressure feedwater heater in the isolated 'A' feed string was aligned to receive heating steam from the low pressure turbine thirteenth stage extraction line. With the turbine off-line, there would have been no extraction steam flow.
However, excess steam is rejected to the extraction line by the turbine steam seal regulator. When turbine seals were established, the rejected seal steam caused enough heating in the low pressure heater to cause boiling, since the heater string was under vacuum. As feedwater pressure increased, leakage of cold feedwater back through the 'A'
string isolation valve and the 'A' feed regulating valve mixed with the hot steam / water mixture causing significant water hamer in the piping between the low pressure and intermedi.C pressure heaters in the 'A'
string.
Prior to restart of the plant, the licensee perfomed a visual inspection and stress analysis of all affected piping, magnetic particle inspection of the highly stressed piping welds and pipe hangers, perfomed a complete valve lineup check of the feed system, and perfomed two independent event analyses. One cracked hanger weld was found and repaired. Plant startup procedures 201.1, " Approach to Critical" and 201.2, " Plant Heatup to Hot Standby", were revised to insure that the idle feedwater strings are maintained pressurized by the-condensate pump discharge to prevent recurrence.
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The inspectors observed selected portions of the piping inspection, ettended planning, status, and plant operations review committee meetings and reviewed the sequence and analysis of the event. The inspectors expressed concern about the nurrber of leaking feedwater isolation and control valves which were a major contributor to this event. Licensee representatives said that these valves were scheduled for inspection and repair during the next refueling outage.
Additional infomation is contained in paragraph 7.4.
7.4 The reactor scrammed from about 6 percent power on low water level at about 6:30 p.m. December 18, 1982, while putting the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system in service.
During a plant startup on December 18, the licensee experienced pressure fluctuations in the RWCU system due to oscillations of the inlet pressure regulating valve. The fluctuations had caused three trips of the system isolation valves during the day.
Following the third trip of the system, the operator attempted to fill the system by throttling open the inlet valve, V-16-14.
Reactor water level
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was being manually controlled by running 'C' reactor feed pump with the minimum flow return valve open, the feed string outlet valve closed, and periodically jogging the outlet valve oper to feed the reactor. This was necessary because of leakage through the feed regulating valve; and the feed string isolation valves. When the RWCU system inlet v31ve was opened, the feed string outlet valve was shut. The sudden increase in outflow from the reactor without an available feed path caused a drop in reactor water level and a reactor scram. All systems responded normally during the scram and no safety system actuations were required.nor occurred as a result of the scram.
Contributing factors to this event include malfunction of:the RWCU system pressure regulating valve, and excessive. valve leakage in the feedwater system necessitating isolating the feedwater strings during low power operation.
Excessive valve leakage was also noted as a
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contributing factor to the event discussed in section 7.3 of this report.
As stated in section 7.3, the licensee has planned an extensive valve overhaul program for the refueling outage scheduled to begin in February 1983. The inspectors will review the program in future inspections (219/82-29-04).
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7.5 On December 21, 1982, an operator mistakenly started a containment spray (CS) pump aligned to the drywell and sprayed about 2000 gallons of water into the drywell through the spray headers. The operator was attempting to align the system to run the 'C' CS pump to operate in a test mode to obtain a torus water sample for chemical analysis. He erroneously aligned CS system I in a test mode and started the 'C' pump which is in CS system II. The pump ran for about 30 seconds injecting water into the drywell before the error was discovered and the pump tripped. The licensee began a normal reactor shutdown to allow a drywell inspection.
Of concern was the thermal stresses that may have been induced in hot uninsulated piping inside the drywell when the colder water was sprayed.
Also, there was concern for the effects of the chemically treated torus water on the stainless steel piping and electrical insulation in the drywell. The torus water contained about 800 ppm chromates and 3 ppm chloride. The shutdown was terminated after about a 100 megawatt electric power reduction when consultation between the licensee's technical functions division and General Electric determined that the l
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tcrus water would have no corrosive affects on the piping or electrical insulation, and that the temperature of the piping and water would not have caused hamful themal stresses. The inspectors discussed this event with members of NRC:NRR and NRC:IE who detemined that the licensee's actions were appropriate. However, prior to increasing power back to the pre-event level, the licensee perfomed a series of system checks which included fuM closure test of the main steam isolation valves, operability check of the reactor water sample isolation valve, isolation condenser valve operability test, electrical continuity checks of the electromatic relief valves, and electrical checks of the safety /
relief valve accoustic monitors and drywa" ump pumps. No abnomal conditions were detected by the system checks.
Review of this event detemined that it was caused by operator error resulting from inattention to the evolution being perfomed.
The procedure requires that the CS mode select switch be placed in " dynamic test II" which opens the CS system II test discharge valve and defeats the opening logic circuit for the system II drywell injection valve. Then, starting of the 'C' pump would recirculate torus water. The operator performing the evolution turned the switch to " dynamic test I" and started the 'C'
pump.
This aligned the valves in system I for test but caused system II to inject water into the drywell. The operator has been removed from licensed duties pending further evaluation by licensee
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management. The licensee stated that the Plant Operations Review
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Comittee (PORC) and the Independent Safety Review Gmup (ISRG)
would review this event to determine if furthar corrective action is warranted. The inspectors reviewed the procedures involved and detemined that although the procedures did not contribute to the operator error in this event, there is a lack of clarity on how to perfom the sampling evolution.
Chemistry procedure 803.17, revision 3, June 13,1975, " Torus Suppression Chamber" states that to obtain a water sample, the
'C' CS pump must be started in accordance with procedure 310.3.4. Procedure 310, revision 14, November 1,1982, " Containment Spray System", paragraph 3.4 is a procedure for manual startup of a pump in either CS system and in turn refers the operator to a previous paragraph of the same procedures.
The lack of clarity can lead to confusion of an operator who may not have perfomed the evolution before. The licensee stated that the procedures would be reviewed and revised as necessary. The revisions in a future inspection (219/82-29-05)gs and the procedure inspectors will review the PORC and ISRG findin
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8.
ReviewofLicenseeEventReports(LER'Q-
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8.1 In-Office Review The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to NRC:R1 to verify that the details were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description and corrective action adequacy. The inspector determined whether further information was required, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
LER SUBJECT
- 82-45/3L Operating in a degraded made when one emergency service water pump was inoperable.
- 82-51/3L Degradation of Waste Surge tank caused unmonitored radicactive liquid release to soil.
- 82-52/1P and IT Radioactive liquid release made without taking all required samples.
82-53/3L Operation with less than 4 recirculation pumps for about 3 minutes.
82-54/3L Operation with failed in shield limit switch for number 3 Transversing incore probe machine, The failed shield limit switch was repaired.
82-55/lP and IT Stack gas pump inoperable for about 10 minutes.
- 82-56/IP and IT Stack gas recorders inoperable when 24 VDC battery charger tripped.
82-57/3L One Isolation Condenser inoperable due to failed component in valve control circuit. The failed component was repaired.
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8.2 For those LER's selected for on-site followup, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by facility procedures, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The LER's selected for on-site followup are denoted by an asterisk (*) in detail 8.1 above. The following specific observations were made and discussed with licensee management.
82-45/3L: Corrective actions included inspection of all emergency
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service water impeller clearances and revising maintenance
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procedure 708.1.002 to clarify instructions for setting impeller clearances. The inspector reviewed procedure 708.1.002, ESW pump Disassembly, Inspection, Bearing Replacement and Reassembly, Revision 3, November 11, 1982 and confirmed that all inspections had been performed.
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82-51/3L: This event was previously discussed in NRC inspection report l
(50-219/82-22). The inspectors will continue to follow licensee actions as a result of the tank leak.
i 82-52/1P and 1T: On August 28, 1982, licensee made a radioactive liquid release to the environment. This release. was made at a time when the radioactive waste discharge monitor was out of service, whicil is allowed by technical specifications,1f two independent samples are taken. For the release, licensee obtained the proper sample before the release but the wrong tank was sampled during the release. Licensee identified the inadequacy during a followup review.
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The sample taken on the proper tank showed all radio nuclides present within release limits and a review of-other releases made August 22 to August 28 showed similar radioactive concentrations.
Licensee corrective action includes procedural revisions requiring additional controls when sampling during releases and counseling personnel involved. Additional. licensee investigation is in progress.
The failure to take and analyze radioactive liquid releases is a violation. However, it was identified and reported as
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required, there have been no similar violations, and corrective actions are planned.
In accordance with NRC enforcement policy, no notice of violation is issued. The inspectors will review completed corrective actions (219/82-29-06).
82-56/1P and 1T: On November 20, 1982, recorders for the stack gas monitoring system, located in the control room, failed when 24 volt DC power degraded. The cause was an open breaker on the A2 battery charger. The breaker was reclosed and recorder perfonnance returned to normal.
On November 19,1982, the 24 volt battery was charged. The increase in battery voltage from the charger caused the A2 output breaker for the battery to trip and annunciate in the control room. The condition was misinterpreted by both operating shift and instrument control personnel as being an expected condition of the charge.
Approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later, battery voltage degraded and caused the malfunction of the stack gas recorder. Operating shift personnel did not recognize the voltage degradation because the alarm for that condition is common to the high voltage alarm already annunciated. Licensee and inspector review identified the following additional problems :
The amp meter on the A2 battery panel in the cable
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spreading room had failed, giving a false 8 amp reading when there was 0 current; The procedure referred to by the preventive maintenance
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checklist used to conduct the battery charge was for the main station battery; Communication between instrument and operating personnel
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regarding battery charges needed improvement, and; The high voltage trip on the A2 breaker had drifted and was
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reset to the proper value.
Licensee has initiated procedure changes to require checking of alarm conditions on battery charges. Additionally, the event is being evaluated by Operating Experience, Assessment and Implementation Comittee and is being routed to all operations and instrument / electrical maintenance personnel for required reading. The inspector will review completed corrective actions in a future inspection.(219/82-29-07).
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9.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Tect.::ical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations: the report includes the information required to be reported to the NRC; planned corrective actions are adequate for resolution of identified problems; and that the reported information is valid. Within the scope of the above, the follow (ng periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
October 1982 Monthly Operating Report
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November 1982 Monthly Operating Report
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10 CFR 50.59(b) Annual Report for 1980 and 1981 dated
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November 5,1982.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.1.
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Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope.and findings. A summary of findings was presented to senior facility management at the conclusion of the inspection.
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