IR 05000219/1982016
| ML20055B613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1982 |
| From: | Cowgill C, John Thomas, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055B603 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-82-16, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-03, IEB-81-1, IEB-81-2, IEB-81-3, NUDOCS 8207220552 | |
| Download: ML20055B613 (10) | |
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U.S. NUC!. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-219/82-16 Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR.-16 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
CPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkw&y Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Facility Name:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection at:
Inspection conducted:
May 4 - June 1, 1982 Inspectors:
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enior Resident Inspector
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J.'1.omTaResident Inspector date signed 77/M Approved by:
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L. E.,Titpp, p_hjef, Reactorgvojects date signed h
Section 2A Inspection Summary: May 4 - June 1,1982 (Report No. 50-219/82-16)
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br />) including review of l
previous inspection findings, review of plant operations, log and record review, l
facility tours, surveillance observation, review of licensee action on IE Bulletins and review of periodic and special reports.
Results:
Violations: None.
e207220552 820708 PDR ADOCK 05000219 G
PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contscted J. Carroll, Director, Plant Operations B. Cooper, Outage Manager P. Fiedler, Vice President and Director, Oyster Creeh K. Fickeissen, Plant Engineering Director M. Laggart, Supervisor, Oyster Creek Licensing J. Rigger, Security Supervisor W. Stewart, Plant Operations Manager J. Sullivan, Plant Operations Director D. Turner, Padiological Controls Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance and operations personnel.
2.
R view of Previous Inspection Findinos (Closed) Noncompliance (219/81-16-01) An individual entered a high radiation area with no positive means of controlling exposure.
Through attendance at the licensee's General Employee Training classes and by review of the licensee's lesson plans, the inspector determined that employees are given adequate instructions on the procedural requirements for entering high radiation areas. By frequent observation of activities throughout the plant, the inspector determined that procedural requirements are being adhered to by personnel entering high radiation areas.
(Closed) Noncompliance (219/82-02-01) Procedures are inappropriate to the circumstances in that they don't ensure that environmental suitability of electrical enclosure is restored.
Procedure 105, " Conduct of Maintenance",
revision 15, April 8,1982, now includes a statement in paragraph 5.3.4.6 requiring that if work involves opening of electrical conduits, panels, or enclosures that the opening be closed with the seal in good condition upon completion.
Procedure 116, " Surveillance Test Program Schedule and Review of Test Results", revision 9, April 8,1982, now requires a signed statement on surveillance completion forms certifying that any electrical junction boxes or panels opened during the surveillance are properly closed with the seal in good condition.
(Closed) Noncompliance (219/82-02-02)
Violation of vital area access control procedures, and (Closed) Noncompliance (219/82-02-03)
Violation of vital area key control provisions of the Physical Security Plan.
Through direct observation of vital area access controls, the inspector verified that the corrective actions stated in the licensee's response letter to the NRC:R1 dated June 2,1982, have been satisfactorily implemente.
3.
Review of Plant Operations 3.1 The inspector toured selected areas of the plant to examine
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compliance with Technical Specifications and the licensee's administrative and operating procedures. Areas toured included the following:
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Control Room Turoine Building
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Augmented Off-Gas Building
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New Rad-Waste Building
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Cooling Water Intake and Oilution Plant Structure Monitoring Change Areas
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4160 Volt Switchgear, 460 Volt Switchgear, and Cable Spreading Rooms Diesel Generator Building
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Battery Rooms
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Maintenance Work Areas
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Yard Areas 3.2 The following specific observations were rade:
3.2.1 The inspector verified compliance with applicable Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO)
by daily observation of Control Room instrumentation, annunciators, logs, and records.
Implementation of Control Room access control requirements and proper control room manning was verified. The inspector periodically observed shift turnovers to confirm that they were conducted in an orderly manner and that sufficient infomation was exchanged to insure the continuity of system status. The inspector questioned Control Room Operators and Shift Supervisors on evolutions in progress, instrument parameters, and alarmed annunciators to determine if they were aware of current plant conditions and that the reasons for abnomal indications and alamed conditions were understood and were
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being corrected if required. The inspector verified that evolutions in progress were being performed in accordance with approved procedures.
On May 27,1932, the 1-2 Auxiliary Flash Tank drain pump failed to pump at its full capacity of about 300 gpm. This caused frequent automatic cycling of the 1-1 drain pump, a 2000 gpm pump. To prevent damage to the motor from frequent on/off cycling of the large pump, the licensee elected to operate the pump manually only as frequently as necessary to prevent overflow of the flash tank. The control
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switch is a spring return to "AUT0" switch, so the control
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room operators wedged a roll of chart recorder paper against the switch to hold it in the "0FF" position. The inspector expressed concern to the supervisory staff that this was an unacceptable practice. The supervisory staff felt that since this.as not a safety related system, that this sort of
" jury-rig" was acceptable.
The inspector discussed this situ 6 tion with senior plant management who concurred that if allowed to continue it could eventually become routine practice that could easily spread to safety related systems.
Plant manager ent directed that the paper roll be removed and that any siu11ar practices be stopped. A suitable temporary control circuit change was made in accordance with the equipment control procedures to provide acceptable manual pump operation.
3.2.2 The inspector verified that local plant instrumentation necessary to support safe plant operation and fulfill technical specification requirements were in service.
Selected instruments were visually checked for on-scale indication in the expected range, prc,er correlation between channels, and proper root vc ive alignment.
Safety system actuation sensors were examined to insure
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that activities in the area did not impair system operability.
t 3.2.3 Monitoring and Change Areas were observed to ensure that entrances to the radiation controlled area (RCA) were properly posted, personnel entering the RCA were wearing proper dosimetry, and that personnel and raterials leaving I.
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the RCA were properly monitored for radioactive contamination.
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Monitoring instruments were observed to ensure that proper operational checks and calibrations had been performed.
Survey status boards were examined to ensure that posted information was current and accurate.
Posted extended Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) were reviewed for accuracy.
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3.2.4 The inspector observed activities to verify that control point procedures were followed, that personnel complied with the requirements of applicable RWP's, and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the work areas.
The inspector made independent radiation measurements to confirm the accuracy of the licensee's postings.
3.2.5 Valves and components in safety related systems were observed to verify proper system alignment. Accessible major flow path valves in the Core Spray, Containment Spray, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic, and Isolation Condenser systems were examined for pmper alignment by direct observattor and by observation of remote position indicators. All breakers in 4160 Volt and selected breakers in the 460 Volt and 125 Vdc electrical systems were examined for proper alignment.
Systems and components were examined for evidence of abnomal vibration and fluid leaks. Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were visually examined for indications of mechanical interference or fluid leaks.
3.2.6 Equipr'nt Control procedures were examined for proper implemeir.tfon by verifying that tags were properly filled out, posted, and removed as required, that jumpers were properly installed and removed, and that equipment control logs and records were complete.
During the conduct of inspection tours, the interiors of cabinets and control panels ware examined for the presence of uncontrolled jumpers, lifted leads, or tags. Tags found on systems and components were examined to verify that the component was in the condition specified on the tags and that tags were properly filled out and authorized.
Equipment control logs were examined to verify that jumpering or tagging of system components did not remove redundant safety systems from service or violate technical specification limiting conditions for operation.
The following equipment control activities were independently verified by the inspector:
Electrical Jumper 82-52 installed May 6,1982: jumpers
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25, 26, 54, and 68 installed to jumper out open themo-couples on control rod drives 26-23, 46-15, 22-35, and 1 6-31.
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Lifted lead check off 82-58 dated May 28, 1982:
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leads lifted to prevent automatic start of 1-1 Auxiliary Flash Tank drain pump.
Lifted lead sheet 82-57 cleared on May 26, 1982:
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leads 1F-ll22 and 1F-1119 reinstalled on TB PP-12 and TB PP-23.
3.2.7 Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness, control of material to prevent fire hazards, maintenance of fire barriers, and storage and preservation of equipment were examined.
Particular attention was given to areas where radioactively contaminated trash was likely to accumulate to insure that no radiological hazards were created and to verify that proper radiological controls were implemented when removing contaminated debris.
3.2.8 During daily entry and egress from the protected area, the inspector verified that access controls were in accordance with the security plan and that security posts were properly manned.
During facility tours, the inspector verified that protected area gates were locked or guarded and that isolation zones were free of obstructions. The inspector examined vital area access points to verify that they were properly locked or guarded and that access control was in accordance with the security plan.
3.3 Acceptance criteria for the above areas include the current revisiens of the following:
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Technical Specifications Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations
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Procedure 108, Equipment Control Procedure 115, Standing Order Control
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Procedure 119, Housekeeping Procedure 120, Fire Hazards
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Procedure 122, Security Guidelines for Plant Personnel Procedure 903.2, Personnel Monitoring
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Procedure 903.6, Personnel Regulations
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Procedure 915.1, Restriction of Access into Radiation Control Areas
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Procedure 915.4, Contamination Control Procedure 915.6, Radiation Work Permit
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Oyster Creek Physical Security Plan
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Inspector judgment.
4.
Shift Loas and Operating Records 4.1 The inspector reviewed the current revisions of the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for review of selected logs and records:
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Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations; Procedure 118, Equipment Control; and,
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Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
The inspector had no questions in this area.
4.2 Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room logs were filled out and signed;
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Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
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Log entries involving abnormal conditions provided sufficient detail to communicate equipment status;
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Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and reviewed;
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Operating orders did not conflict with Technical
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Specification requirements; and, j
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Logs and records were maintair.ed in accordance with the
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procedures in 3.1 above.
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4.3 The review included the following plant shift logs and operating iecords as indicated, and discussions with licensee personnel.
Reviews were conducted on an intermittent selective basis:
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Control Room Log, all entries;
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Group Shift Supervisors Log, all entries; Technical Specification Log;
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Control Room Turnover Check List:
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Reactor Building Tour Sheets;
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Turbine Building Tour Sheets;
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Equipment Tagging Log;
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Lifted Lead and Jumper Log; Defeated Alarm Log;
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Standing Orders; Operational Memos and Directives.
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On May 10,1982, the inspector noted a Control Room Log entry that reactor low level scram sensor RE05B had been removed from service for calibration at 3:50 P.M. A log entry at 4:26 P.M. indicated that reactor low level scram sensor RE05A had been returned to service. This implied that the A and B sensors had been out of service simultaneously in violation of technical specifications. The inspector discussed this with the operator, shift supervisor, and the technician who performed the calibration and found that only the B sensor had been out of service. The second log entry was in error and was corrected after the inspector identified the discrepancy. The inspector discussed this with the plant operations director and expressed concern that the operators and supervisors had not themselves questioned the apparent removal of redundant sensors from service simultaneously. He concurred with the inspecto/s concern and stated that this would be addressed in discussions with the operating staf,
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5.
Surveillance Testing Selected completed surveillance tests were reviewed to verify that the tests were completed as scheduled, test results were reviewed by supervisory staff and forwarded for management review, and that appropriate corrective actions were initiated as required for identified deficiencies.
Portions of selected ongoing surveillance activities were observed to verify that approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, that test instrumentation was calibrated, and that redundant systems Activities reviewed for components were available for service if required.
included the following:
Procedure 612.4.001, revision 6, October 27, 1981, Liquid Poison
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Pump Operability Test, completed May 12, 1982.'
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Procedure 620.4.004, revision 6, April 13,1981, Source Range Monitor Test and Calibration, completed May 14, 1982.
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Procedure 617.4.002, revision 2, September 11, 1979, CRD Exercise and Stall Flow Test, completed May 16, 1982.
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Procedure 607.4.003, revision 3, April 19,1982, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump Inservice Test, completed May 21, 1982.
Procedure 604.3.009, revision 4, July 29,1981, Oxygen Analyzer
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Calibration, completed May 27, 1982.
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Licensee Action on IE Bulletins Licensee actions concerning the following IE Bulletins were reviewed by the inspector to verify that: the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate on-site management; a review for applicability was performed; informationdiscussed in the licensee's reply was accurate; corrective action taken was as described in the reply; and the reply was within the time period described in the bulletin.
IEB 81-02 and IEB 81-02 Supplement 1: Failure of Gate Type Valves to
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Close Against Differential Pressure.
By review of the licensee's responses dated May 14 and November 11, 1981, and discussions with cognizant plant personnel, the inspector detennined that no W-EMD
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manufactured motor operated gate valves are installed at the facility.
One valve, a 10-inch W-EMD, was located in stock as a spare. The Quality Assurance Department has placed a ' hold' on the valves use pending its replacement with an acceptable valve or resolution of the closure problem.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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IEB 81-03: Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Asiatic Clams and Mussels. The only plant system with potential for fouling by the ' subject organisms is the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system. The system was inspected and no significant fouling was found. Base line ESW flow measurements were taken for comparison with the flows measured during periodic In Service Testing. These flow meausrements will provide a suitable method for detecting fouling in the future.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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IEB 82-01: Alteration of Radiographs of Welds in Piping Subsystems, and IEB 82-02: Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants, were reviewed and determined to be not applicable to Oyster Creek.
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Review of Periodic and Special Reports-Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations: the report includes the information required to be reported to the NRC; planned corrective actions are adequate for resolution of identified problems; and that the reported information is valid. Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
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March 1982 Monthly Operating Data Report 8.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings was presented at the conclusion of the inspection.