IR 05000219/1982009
| ML20054J663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1982 |
| From: | Cowgill C, John Thomas, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054J655 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-82-09, 50-219-82-9, NUDOCS 8206290397 | |
| Download: ML20054J663 (11) | |
Text
-
- -_
.
__
_
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-219/82-09 Docket No. 50-219 License No.DPR-16 Priority Category C
~-
Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conduct p April 6 - May 3,1982 Inspectors:
b (f)h@y f
,
- * * 9" owgill, Senior Resident Inspector
^
&1-7h,/fo I.
. Thomas, Resident Inspector date' signed date signed de bk1 Approved by: /
.
L! E. TripN Chief, Reactor Projects Section date signed 2A fnspection Summary: Inspection on April 6 - May 3,1982 (Report No. 50-219/82-09)
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />) including review of previous inspection findings, review of plant operations, log and record review, facility tours, surveillance observation, review of on site events, review of licensee action on TMI Action Plan items, review of Licensee Event Reports, and review of periodic and special reportr.
Results:
Violations: None B206290397 B20602 DR ADOCK 05000 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
,
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Barrett, Training P. Fiedler, Vice President and Director, Oyster Creek K. Fickeissen, Plant Engineering Director D. Gaines, Manager, Training E. Growney, Safety Review Manager M. Laggart, Supervisor, Oyster Creek Licensing J. Rigger, Security Supervisor W. Stewart, Plant Operations Manager J. Sullivan, Plant Operations Director D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance and operations personnel.
2.
Review of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (219/77-16-02) Review Irplementation of the Training Provisions of the Emergency Plan, and (Closed) Unresolved Item (219/77-16-04) Control of Emergency Data Fonns. Based on a comprehensive te.am audit of the licensee's emergency planning and preparedness, and observation of an extensive emergency preparedness exercise documented in NRC Reports 50-219/82-01 and 50-219/82-04, these items are satisfactorily resolved.
(Closed) Noncompliance (219/81-11-01) Electrical Jumpers 60, 75, and 14 Improperly Installed. The inspector verified that the specific cited deficiencies were corrected. Procedure 108, " Equipment Control" was modified by revision 28, dated October 10, 1981 to require quarterly physical verification of all active electrical jumpers, mechanical jumpers, and lifted leads. This requirement has been incorporated in the Master Surveillance Schedule.
(Closed) Noncompliance (219-81-17-01) Failure to Report an Unplanned Release Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The cause of this item was a lack of knowledge of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event was classified as a reportable occurrence as per Technical Specifications and Licensee Event Report 50-219/81-39/3L was submitted. To prevent recurrence, the licensee issued procedure 126, revision 0. December 3,1981, " Procedure for Notification of Station Events" which consolidates the various reporting requirements including 10 CFR 50.72 and Technical Specifications.
i
,
.-.
-
,
_ _ _ _
l
.
.
(Closed) Noncompliance (219/78-20-01) Failure to Spike and Leak Test Dosimeters in Emergency Equipment Kits. The Emergency Appraisal Team inspection (219/82-01) conducted an examination of the emergency equipment kits and found no major deficiencies.
In addition, Emergency Plan Administrative Procedure 5, revision 0, dated February 26,1981, " Emergency Equipment Inventory", establishes a mechanism for inventory, operational check, and calibration of emergency equipment.
3.
Review of Plant Operations 3.1 The inspector toured selected areas of the plant to examine compliance with Technical Specificiations and the licensee's administrative and operating procedures. Areas toured included the following:
--
Control Room
--
Turbine Building Augmented Off-Gas Building
--
New Rad-Waste Building
--
Cooling Water Intake and Dilution Plant Structure
--
Monitoring Change Areas
--
--
4160 Volt Switchgear, 460 Volt Switchgear, and Cable Spreading Rooms
--
Diesel Generator Building Battery Rooms
--
--
Maintenance Work Areas
--
Yard Areas 3.2 The following specific observations were made:
3.2.1 Through daily observation of Control Room instrumentation, annunciators, legs, and records the inspector verified compliance with applicable Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). Proper Control Room manning and implementation of Control Room access control requirements was verified. The inspector periodically observed shift turnovers to confirm that they were conducted in an orderly manner and that sufficient information was exchanged to insure the l
.
.
)
.
continuity of system status. The inspector questioned Control Room Operators and Shift Supervisors on evolutions in progress, instrument parameters, and alamed annunciators to detemine if they were aware of current plant conditions and that the reasons for abnomal indications and alamed conditions were understood and were being corrected if requi red. The inspector verified that evolutions in progress were being perfomed in accordadce with approved procedures.
3.2.2 Local plant instrumentation was selectively examined to verify that instruments necessary to support safe plant operations and fulfill technical specification limiting conditions for operation were in service and that acceptable correlation between channels existed.
Safety system actuation sensors were examined to insure that activities in the area did not impair system operability. Particular attention was given to the location of scaffolding and temporary hoses and extension cords.
3.2.3 Monitoring and Change Areas were observed to ensure that entrances to the radiation controlled area (RCA) were properly posted, personnel entering the RCA were wearing pmper dosimetry, and that personnel and materials leaving the RCA were properly monitored for radioactive contamination.
Monitoring instruments were observed to ensure that proper operational checks and calibrations had been perfomed. The inspector independently measured radiation levels at posted radiation and high radiation area boundaries to assure proper posting and barricading. Survey status boards were examined to ensure that posted information was current and accurate.
3.2.4 The inspector observed activities to verify that control point procedures were followed, that personnel complied
,
with the requirements of applicable radiation work pemits, and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the work areas.
3.2.5 Valves and components in safety related systems were i
observed to verify proper system alignment. Accessible major flow path valves in the Core Spray, Containment Spray, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic, and Isolation Condenser systems were examined for proper alignment by-j direct observation and by observation of remote position indicators. All breakers in the 4160 Volt and selected breakers in the 460 Volt and 125 Vdc electrical systems were examined for proper alignment.
t
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
Systems and components were examined for evidence of abnormal vibration and fluid leaks.
Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were visually examined for indications of mechanical interference or fluid leaks.
3.2.6 Equipment Control procedures were examined for proper implet.en-tation by verifying that tags were properly filled cut, posted, and removed as required, that jumpers were properly installed and removed, and that equipment control logs and records were complete.
During the conduct of inspection tours, the interiors of cabi-nets and control panels were examined for the presence of uncon-trolled jumpers, lifted leads, or tags. Tags found on systems and components were examined to verify that the component was in the condition specified on the tags and that tags were pro-perly filled out and authorized.
Equipment control logs were examined to verify that jumpering or tagging of system components did not remove redundant safety systems from service or violate technical specification limit-ing conditions for operation.
3.2.7 Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness, control of material to prevent fire hazards, maintenance of fire barriers, and storage and preservation of equipment were examined. The inspector noted a continuing improving trend in this area.
3.2.8 During daily entry and egress from the protected area, the in-spector verified that access controls were in accordance with the security plan and that security posts were properly manned.
During facility tours, the inspector verified that protected area gates were locked or guarded and that isolation zones were free of obstructions. The inspector examined vital area access points to verify that-they were properly locked or guarded and that access control was in accordance with the security plan.
On April 2, 1982 at about 3:00 p.m., the inspector noted that the control room door was open while a maintenance mechanic repaired the door knob. The contrp1 room was manned and the mechanic was present at the open door making unauthorized entry unlikely. This was not a breach of security require-ments in that the alarm was not deactivated and the security department responded, as required, to the alarm when the door remained open. However, the inspector discussed this incident with facility management who stated that steps would be taken to better coordinate maintenance with the security department to ensure the posting of guards in such cases.
j
.
.
..
.
_ _ _ _ _
J
.
.
3. 3 Acceptance criteria for the above areas include the current revisions of the following:
Technical Specifications
--
Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations
--
Procedure 108, Equipment Control
--
--
Procedure 115, Standing Order Contml Procedure 119, Housekeeping
--
Procedure 120, Fire Hazards
--
Procedure 122, Security Guidelines for Plant Personnel t
--
Pmcedure 903.2, Personnel Monitoring
--
--
Procedure 903.6, Personnel Regulations
--
Procedure 915.1, Restriction of Access into Radiation Control Areas Procedure 915.4, Contamination Control
--
Procedure 915.6, Radiation Work Pennit
--
Oyster Creek Physical Security Plan
--
--
Inspector judgment.
--
4.
Shift Logs and Operating Records 4.1 The inspector reviewed the current revisions of the following
.
plant procedures to determine the licensee established
'
requirements in this area in preparation for review of selected logs and records:
Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations;
--
Procedure 118, Equipment Control; and,
--
Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
--
,
'
The inspector had no questions in this area.
..
_
.
.
-7 4.2 Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room logs were filled out and signed;
--
Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
--
Log entries involving abnormal conditions provided
--
sufficient detail to communicate equipment status; Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and l
--
reviewed; Operating orders did rot conflict with Technical
--
Specification requirements; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance
--
with the procedures in 3.1 above.
4.3 The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated, and discussions with licensee personnel. Reviews were conducted on an intennittent selective basis:
Control Room Log, all entries;
--
Group Shift Supervisors Log, all entries;
--
Technical Specification Log;
--
Control Room Turnover Check List;
--
Reactor Building Tour Sheets;
--
Turbine Building Tour Sheets; l
--
Equipment Tagging Log;
--
Lifted Lead and Jumper Log;
--
Defeated Alarm Log;
--
Standing Orders;
--
Operational Memos and Directives.
--
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
L-
_
-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
_
______
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _
l
.
.
l l
5.
Surveillance Testino Selected completed surveillance tests were reviewed to verify that the tests were completed as scheduled, test results were reviewed by supervisory staff and forwarded for management review, and that appropriate corrective actions were initiated as required for identified deficiencies.
Portions of selected ongoing surveillance activities were observed to verify that approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, that test instrumentation was calibrated, and that redundant systems for components were available for service if required. Activities reviewed included the following:
--
Procedure 609.3.003, revision 18, March 22,1982, Isolation Condenser Auto Actuation Test, completed April 7,1982.
Procedure 651.4.001, revision ll, March 29, 1982, Standby Gas
--
Treatment System Test, completed April 10, 1982.
Procedure 619.3.011, revision 6, March 22,1982, Scram Discharge
--
Volume High Water Level Test, completed April 12, 1982.
Procedure 610.3.006, revision 10, February 11, 1982, Core Spray
--
Isolation Valve Actuation Test and Calibration, completed April 26,1982.
6.
Follow-up of On-Site Events 6.1 On April 2,1982, the reactor building service air system was depressurized and vented for performance of primary containment integrated leak testing.
Depressurization of the piping allowed backflow of water and sludge from the Reactor Water Cleanup System Filter Sludge Tank. The high activity of the sludge caused one Area Radiation Monitor to alarm on the reactor building 23 elevation.
Contact radiation readings up to 7 REM per hour were found on the affected piping. The Service Air System was isolated and tagged out of service to prevent any further spread of contamination. About 20 gallons of water and sludge were drained from the piping on the 23 elevation and the piping was flushed with clean water to reduce the radiation levels. On April 6,1982, the inspector perfonned an independent survey of the area and found no radiation levels above 60 millirem per hour on accessible service air piping. This event was reviewed on site by an NRC:R1 Health Physicist and will be documented in further detail in NRC report 50-219/82-11.
6.2 On April 12, 1982, the reactor scramed from about 15 per cent power when the inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's)
L
--
-
t
.
.
were inadvertently closed. During plant startup, a licensed reactor operator was clearing a drywell nitrogen system tagout in prepara-tion for switching the drywell control system and Tranversing Incore Probe (TIP) system purge from control air to control nitrogen. He was instructed to close the air supply to the TIP purge. He was unfamiliar with location of the valve and didn't know the valve's identification number. As a result, he erroneously closed valve V-6-166, the instrument air inlet to the drywell. The resulting loss of air to the inboard MSIV's caused the valves to drift closed and caused a reactor scram. The operator was using a valve lineup check off and the tagout sheet to conduct the lineup. The cause of the event was operator error due to unfamiliarity with location of the system valves. The licensee removed the operator from licensed duties pending his requalification of the systems involved.
The inspector reviewed the above event immediai.31y after its occur-rence including corrective actions and had no further questions.
7.
Licensee Action on NUREG 0660, NRC Action Plan Development as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident The NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has inspection responsibility for selected action plan items. These items have been broken down into num-bered descriptions (enclosure 1 to NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Items). Licensee letters containing comitments to the NRC were used as the basis for acceptability, along with NRC clarification letters and inspector judgement. The following items were reviewed.
7.1 Item II.B.4 Training to Mitigate Core Damage.
Licensees were required to implement a training program for Shift Technical Advisors and operating personnel on the use of installed systems to control and mitigate the consequences of accidents in which the core is severely damaged. Managers, Health Physics Tech-nicians, Chemistry Technicians, and Instrument and Controls Techni-cians were to receive training commensurate with their responsibili-ties.
The licensee developed a program which included about thirty hours of classroom contact time for all operation department personnel, operation department managers, and Shift Technical Advisors. Health Physics and Chemistry department personnel were required to attend selected portions of this program. The inspector reviewed the course outline and course handouts and verified that items required by the March 28, 1980 NRR letter were covered in detail. The inspec-tor reviewed selected lecture attendance sheets to verify that those required to attend had received the appropriate training.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
L
.
.
7.2 Item II.K.3.27 Coninon Reference Level.
Licensees were required to reference all reactor water level instruments to the same point, either the bottom of the vessel or the top of the active fuel, to prevent the confusion caused by various reference points.
In a letter to the NRC:NRR dated June 23, 1980, the licensee stated that all level indicators and recorders would have their faces altered to show two scales. One would show the present scale andthe other would show level above the top of the active fuel (ATAF).
During the next scheduled refueling outage (January 1983), the old scales would be eliminated and all affected procedures and logs would be revised to reflect the new scales. The interim period would be used as a familiarization period for the operators and to identify the procedures and logs to be revised.
The licensee has installed the dual faces on the control room indicators, has revised some of the affected procedures, and has scheduled the remainder of alterations for the 1983 refueling.
This item will remain open pending completion of all modifications, procedures changes, and operator training.
8.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
LERS submitted to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector detennined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed.
LER NO.
REPORT DATE SUBJECT 82-05/3L February 25, 1982 Trip of 1-1 Diesel Generator due to cooling system leaks 82-07/3L February 25, 1982 Main Steam Line High Flow Sensor setpoint out of specification 82-08/3L March 19,1982 Channel check of backup accident monitoring system was not performed 82-09/3L March 12,1982 Standby Gas Treatment System I failed surveillance test i
L
.
.
.
82-ll/3L March 10,1982 Three hydraulic snubbers failed during functional testing 82-13/3L March 29, 1982 Battery low voltage annunciator was lower than specified 9.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations: the report includes the information required to be reported to the NRC; planned corrective actions are adequate for resolution of identified problems; and that the reported information is valid. Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
--
February 1982 Monthly Operating Data Report 10. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings was presented at the conclusion of the inspection.
L