IA-97-451, Plant Issues Matrix

Plant Issues Matrix

ML20203J750
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle
Issue date:	12/09/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203J653	List: IA-97-451, Plant Issues Matrix ML20203J648 ML20203J722 ML20203J750
References
FOIA-97-451 NUDOCS 9712220077
Download: ML20203J750 (200)

Text

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, h .'3/97 NRC OPERATIONS The inspectors concluded that the removal PERSONNEL 97015 g o- of the Unit 1 system auxiliary transformer PERFORtW:CE from service on September 3, and the subsequent restoration on September 4, was well planned well and executed well.

Operations personnel conducted a -

thorough heightened level of awareness briefing; operated control room, switchgear room, and switchyard equipment safely; and fallowed applicable procedures.

8/26/97 SELF OPERATIONS The inspectors concluded that prompt OPERATOR 97015 IDENTIFIED actions were taken by operating person.iel PERFORMANCE in response to a failure of the 28 feedwater pump speed controller card on August 26.

The actions taken minimized the secondary plant transient. Operators promptly restored control rod bank position to within technical specification limits and stabilized plant conditions.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF DATE 8/20/97 LICENSEE OPERATIONS The 28 containment spray eductor drain INEFFECTIVE 97015 IDENTIFIED valve (2CS012B) was found closed as CORRECTIVE NRC required but unlocked on August 20. The ACTIONS l valve had been verified locked by two l CONCLUSION l

operators on August 12 and by two different operators on August 14. The l

l iiceMs root cause evaluation was unable to conclude why the valve became unlocked. The root cause evaluation also found that operators were not proper'y using the administrative controls for maintaining status oflocked valves and l that operators were not fo!!owing j administrative procedures to venfy the '

position of locked valves. The inspectors concluded, based on interviews, observations of the valve type and location, and information from the licensee that the probability of the valve becoming unlocked by itself was remote. The inspectors concluded that the administrative controls in place for locked valves was not followed by non-licensed operato~. Mispositioned components have been uiscussed in previous inspection reports. Incorrect verification of valve position has been a recurring problem. Corrective actions for training operators on valve position verification was performed in 1996 (see paragraph 08.1). The licensee has averaged about four mispositioned components per month for the last five months. The licensee's corrective actions for this problem have been ineffective. A violation was issued.

l . l PLANT 153UES MATRIX-BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8/15/97 NRC- MAINTENANCE The inspectors concluded that the MANAGEMENT 97015 preparation for and performance of the OVERSIGHT, maintenance activities on the 18 main C00RDINATIO steam isolation valve (MSIV) on August 15 N AND were exce!!ent. The maintenance activities PERSONNEL were well planned and executed. Th PERFORMANCE' different functional groirps demonstrated excellent team work in the perfonnance of the repairs. The work package was well written and contained sufficient detail for the scope of the work being performed.

Procedures and instructions were followed.

The maintenance activities appeared effective and no re-work was required.

The inspectors also concluded that the licensee demonstrated an excellent safety focus. For example, contingency plans for the unit shutdown were in place in the event that the MSIV could not be repaired and retumed to an operable status within the time allowed by the limiting condition for operation. Also, the licensee assigned a sufficient number of maintenance personnel to allow for the simultaneously repair of the o-ring and the sight glass; and pre-staged replacement parts, tools, and personnel in a effort to minimize the time that the plant was operated with the 18 MSIV inoperable.

n PLANT ISSUES HATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTIOK CAUSE REF 9/5/97 NRC MAltlTEllANCE The inspectors concluded that the receipt PERSONNEL 97015

.of new fuel on September 5 was properly PERFOR!%NCE conducted in a safe and expeditious manner. Plant personnel were knowledgeable of the applicable i procedures, their responsibilities, and the use of fuel movement equipment. Foreign material exclusion controls were in place as required and were followed by the personnel participating in the new fuel receipt. Inspection of the new fuel was thorough. Documentation and status boards were maintained as reqWed by '

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY -SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8/25/97 SELF MAINTENANCE The inspectors concluded that the POOR 97015 IDENTIFIED performance of the Unit 1 SAT deluge COMMUNICATI alarm test on August 25 was poorly ONS AND executed. The communications between FAILURE TO the supervising operator and the trainee FOLLOW A were not adequate to ensure the PROCEDURE supervising operator knew what actions the trainee was about to take. The supervising operator allow:d himself to become distracted and did not take adequate steps to ensure the procedure was followed correctly. The trainee oid not perform an adequate self-check and operated the wrong equipment, while the supervising operator was distracted, w.nich resulted in the fire protection system deluge of the 142-2 transformer. The potential consequence of this error was minimized because the supervising operator acted quickly to isolate the deluge system thus avoiding an unp?anned SAT trip. Loss of a SAT would have resulted in at least a partialloss of offsite power to Unit 1. The actual consequence of this error was that '

for a short time period (about a day) both Unit 1 SATs were removed from service to clean corrosion particles from the SAT insulation bushings. This issue was a non-cited violation.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE- ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE 'REF 7/96 ' LICENSEE FOR ENGINEERING The inspectors concluded that the lack of a LACK OF AN 97015

- THE EVENT procedure for post modification testing on APPROVED  % 019 the engineered safety feature switchgear PROCEDURE NRC FOR THE and miscellaneous electric equipment room ROOT CAUSE ventilation systems, in July 1996, resulted in a poorly conducted _ test which failed to .

identify that the modification had been -

installed improperly. In addition, the licensee's root cause investigation failed to identify that the test was performed without 4

a procedure. A violation was issued; 8/11-15/97 ' NRC OPERATIONS Facility control rcom operators LICENSE 97014 demonstrated good attentivene s to the REQUAL operating panels and were knowledgeable PROGRAM /

of plant conditions.

TRAINING All portions of the annual requalification examination were judged to be effective tools for determining operator weaknesses.

Licensed operator requalification programs were imp'emented in accordance with 10 j CFR Part 55 requirements.

Licensee controls to rcvise the licensed operator requalification training program were satisfactory.

5/31/97 LICENSEE OPERATIONS Operators failure to strictly follow PERSONNEL 97013 procedures resulted in a Unit 1 reactor FAILURE TO coolant system excess dilt tion event on FOLLO'd May 31,1997. This event had minor safe 1 yPROCEDURES' consequence and the licensee's root cause investigation was accurate, thorough, and self-critical. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE- ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 7/1- NRC OPERATIONS Plant procedure changes and 10 CFR 50.59 PERSONNEL 97013-8/11/97 safety evaluation screenirrgs and safety PERFORMANCE evaluations were performed in accordance with administrative procedures.

6/24/97 NRC MAINTENANCE The inspectors observed a surveillance PERSONNEL- .97013 test failure of the 18 essential serv:ce PERFORMANCE water pump on Jur.e 24,1997. The maintenance staff provided prompt suppori to identify the problem and recalibrate the pump discharge pressure instrumentation to restore the pump to operable status.

7/97 NRC MAINTENANCE A scheduled corrective maintenance PERSONNEL 97013 activity performed on a feedwater PERFORMANCE i

containment isolation valve and an emergent corrective maintenance activity TEAM WORK performed on a main steam isolation valve were well planned and executed and the personnel involved demonstrated excellent team work 7/97 NRC MAINTENANCE The material condition of the compo,nent PERSCNNEL 97013 cooling water system was satisfactory and ATIENTION '

the system was aligned as required by plart TO DETAIL '

procedures.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8/5/97 NRC ENGINEERING During the performance of a surveillance PERSONNEL 97013 tast on the 2A safety injection pump, the SYSTEM system engineer failed to question a lower ' KNOWLEDGE than expected pressure drop across the lubricating oil filter. The system engineer v:as not aware of the internal relief feature of the filter and did not l consider the possible relationship between the relief feature and the lower than expected pressure drop across the filter.

7/9/97 NRC ENGINEERING During the performance of a diesel PERSONNEL 97013 generator engine analysis test, the PERFORMANCE licensee was following work practices witil the potential to introduce foreign material into the running engine. The system eng:.7eer and mechanic were not aware of the potential problems presented by the handling of loose parts over an opening in the diesel generator's cylinder head.

7/1- NRC PLANT SUPPORT The control of portable radiation PERSONNEL 97013 8/11/97 RAD. PROT detectors was good. The detectors appearetERFORMANCE to be properly calibrated and in good condition.

7/27/97 NRC PLANT SUPPORT A primary alarm station operator did not PERSONNEL 97013 SECURITY give full attention to his assigned duties. ATTENTATIVE but was aware of the status of equipment g[SS and existing alarm conditions.

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1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE- REF 7/2-7/97 .NRC PLANT SUPPORT An unattended and energized welding PERSONNEL 97013-

. FIRE machine located outside the 2A diesel PROCEDURE PROTECTION / generater room was ideitified by the ADHERENCE MAINTENANCE inspectors. The failure to follow fire protection program procedures resulted in a potentially serious fire hazard and is an example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.g.

6/97- NRC OPERATIONS The inspectors concluded, based on the PERSONNEL 97009 documented observations in three PERFORMANCE inspection report periods, that during the most recent Unit 1 refueling outage (A1ROG) operations personnel demonstrated excellent command and control, communications, and safety focus. Of particular note was the augmentation of th 3 control room staff by two additional senior reactor operators (SROs). This was considered a strength and contributed to improved tapervision of outage evolutions. __

5/25/97 NRC OPERATIONS The preparation for and the execution of P % ONNEL 97009 the reactor startup from A1R06 was good 3r&RFORMANCE-demonstrated an excellent safety focus anil strong control room teamwork.

Communications in tha control room observed during the startup ws.ee excellent. ,

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PLANT ISSUES MKfRIX BRAIDWOOD

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DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE 'REF 6/9/97 'SELF OPERATIONS .On June 9, operators drained about 1900 ' INADEQUATE 97009 IDENTIFIED gallons of water onto the floor of the PROCEDURES ~

boric acid storage tank (BAST) room. The .AND M -

water spilled through a failed flood seal PERSONNEL ento the Unit 28 diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump making it inoperable. The PERFORMANCE inspectors concluded that the performance of operations department personnel in attempting to drain the Unit 1 BAST without understanding the correct way to drain the system was weak. Good practices such at ensuring the drain line was clear and verifying proper drain flow were not observed. Procedures to properly drain portions of the centrifugal charging (CV) system were improperly maintaineo resulting in a violation.

4THRU6/97 NRC' OPERATIONS Inspection Report 97005, Section 04.1, CORRECTIVE 97009 discussed the inspectors conclusion that . ACTIONS control room operator panel attentiveness was weak. Operations management issuec!

Special Operating Order SO-ST-OO81 to address this issue. . Based on several observations in April, May, and June of 1997, the inspectors concluded that licensee management was effect.ve in improving control board panel attentiveness. 1

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -

BRAIDWOOD DATE 'ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 6/97 NRC- OPERATIONS The inspectors observed a field supervisor SUPERVISION 97009 and several equipment operators complete AND assigned tasks. The field supervisor' OPERATOR provided the appropriate level of guidance PERFORMANCE and supervision and clearly communicated instructions to equipment operators. The equipment operators used approved procedures, used three-way communicatioris, performed self-checks, asked good questions, and expressed valid concerns.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

_ BRAIDWOOD i

DATE 10 BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF ',

l 5/97 NRC MAINTENANCE The licensee's safety focus during WORK 97009 refueling outage A1R06 was good as CONTROL &

demonstrated by the outage plan from a , CME .

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shutdown risk perspective, the pre-job preparation and execution for work on the 1C reactor coolant system cold leg stop valve 1RC8002C, and the preparation for and execution of fuel movements.

The licensee made significant progress in some areas. There were reductions in the powerblock non-outage corrective maintenance backlog and open operability evaluations during the refueling ottage.

However, the execution of some significan- :

maintenance and testing activities during the refueling outage was weak. Although the maintenance on the 1 A diesel generato '

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was performed well, during work on the 1E.

diesel generator, the inspectors identified two problems with foreign ,

material exclusion control and the '

licensee identified that the jacket water system was over pressurized. The inspectors also identified problems with test control during the performance of the safety injection and charging system check valve surveillance test.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD-

'DATE ID'BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 6/9/97 NRC MAINTENANCE The licensee *s post event response to the WORK 97009' Unit 1 BAST spill, such as. identifying the PLANNING scope of the problems, identifying the worl. NiD FP to be performed, and identifying required testing to verify operabi!ity, was well organized, timely, and demonstrated a gooit safety focus. However, the inspectors concluded that implementation of the fire protection program requirements to inspec1 plant fire seals was weak as evidenced by licensee identification that the fire seals between the BAST and the Uiut 2 diesel driven auxiliary feed water pump were not in the data base of fire seals to be inspected. The failure to properly maintain the CV system draining procedure was considered a violation of iechnical Specification 6.8.1.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD

'DATE- 'ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 6/97- NRC MAINTENANCE The inspectors concluded that the licensee MAINTENANCE 97009 failed to perform an adequate historical RULE review of post accident neutron monitor IMPLEMENTAT-(PANM) performance during the 3 years priorION to July 10,1996, that the performance of the PANM had not been effectively controlled throingh the performance of

, appropriate preventive maintenance, and

) that the Maintenance Rule was not correct y imp!emented fr- the PANM. These failures-resulted in the licensee's improper categorization of the PANM as falling unde 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), the failure to establish appropriate goals per 10 CFR '

50.65(a)(1), the failure to estebash a corrective action program, and the failure to monitor PANM performance against appropriate goals. ' A Notice of Violation was issued for these failures. ,

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

.BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE' REF-5/22/97 tJRC iMINTEfDRCE on May 22, during a ieview of TS CORRECTIVE 97009 surveillance requirements to vent the ACTION emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) pump casings and discharge piping high points outside of containment, the inspectors identified tnat TS 4.5.2.b.1 had not been performed as required. In fact, the Unit 1 and 2 chemical and volume control CV (an ECCS subsystem) purro casings, and the CV high point vents had never been vented during Modes 1,2, and 3; a time period that exceeded the TS limit of venting at least once per 31 days. This was considered an apparent violation of TS 4.5.2.b.1. Of particular concern was the fact that the licensee identified in February 1996 that the subject piping was not being vented in strict compliance with the TS and did not

_, s seek a TS change.

6/s NRC  !%INTENANCE Surveillanc tests observed during this PROCEDURE 97009 inspection period were performed in QUALITY &

accordance with procedures and all ADHERENCE acceptance criteria were met. Associated procedures were well written and ensured that TS and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) requirements were met.

Maintenance observed this period was performed in a safe manner using properly prepared work packages. Procedures, drawings, and out-of-service boundaries were appropriate for the scope of the work.

Personnel perforrr 5g the maintenance observed safety precautions, followed procedures, and performed self-checks.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATi ID BY SALP ,

DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF-10/4/96 LICENSEE MAINTENANCE On October 4,1996, the licensee identifiec ATTENTION 97009 that the instrument vent and drain valves TO DETAIL for pressure indicators 1(2)PI-929 were mirsing from surveillance test procedure 1(2)BwOS 6.1.1.a-1, " Unit One (Two)

Primary Containment integrity Verification of Isolation Devices Outside Containment,'

Revision 7E2 and commenced a review to determine what the surveillance requirements were on the valvers in question. The licensee concluded that these valves were not subject to TS sur reillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a. The inspectors referred this issue to the Office of Nuc

• ar Reactor Regulation *s (NRR) Technical Specifications Branch for review. Based on the results of the NRR review, the inspectors concluded that the subject valves should have been tested per TS 4.6.1.1.a and a Notice of Violation was issued.

5 & 6/97 SELF ENGINEERING System engineering performed a prompt CORRECTIVE 97009.

IDENTIFIED operability evaluation for the 18,2A, and ACTIONS AND NRC 2B charging pumps following the discovery of sealleakage in excess UFSAR assumed rates. Engineering support for corrective efforts was good.

5 & 6/97 NRC ENGINEERING The inspectors reviewed five recent PERSONNEL 97009-operability determinations and concluded PERFORMANCE that they were performed in a timely manner, were appropriately based on engineering analysis, were clear and logically presented, and were properly documented.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD -

DATE ID BY- '

SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 6/97 NRC PLANT SUPPORT The inspectors identified evidence of a PERSONNEL- 97009 RP coor radiation worker practice in the PERFORMANCE auxiliary building. Cigarette butts found in the auxiliary building ventilation system in!et plenum indicated that plant personnel smoked cigarettes in the radiologically controlled area at"some time in the past.

S/97 NRC PLANr SUPPORT The radiation protection (RP) zone MNAGEMENT- 97009 RP coverage technician provided good support & PERSONNEL' for plant personnel performing a seal PERF0PE NCE adjustment to the 2B charging pump. t 6/11/97 NRC PLANT SUPPORT Licensee performance in the Technical PERSONNEL 97009- ,

Ep support Center (TSC) during an emergency KNOWLEDGE & r planning drill on June 11 was good. PERFORMANCE Involved TSC staff were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and TSC staff i conduct was professional during the dril! ,

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and the cetpue session that followed.

6/24/97 NRC Plant Support NRC inspector identified that the Procedure 97011 radiation protection staff had not Adhereance taken procedural required actions when 1994, 1995. and 1996 annual waste stream analyses did not -

compare with current 10 CFR '

61.55(e)(8) radionuclide scaling factors.

6/24/97 NRC Plant Support Radioactive materi31 shipping and Program 97011

, radiological environmental monitoring programs were well controlled and implemented.

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• PLANT ISStlES MATRIX i BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF j 6/24/97- NRC Plant Support March 1997 audit of the radioactive Self 97011 waste processing and transportation ' Assessment programs was a thorough review of program' structure and procedural adequacy but did not effectively review program implementation.

6/24/97 NRC Plant Support NRC inspector identified problems Supervisory 97011 concerning information contained in Review the 1995 and 1996 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports.

4-5/97 NRC Maintenance The inservice inspection program Program. 97010 was implemented thoroughly and professionally.

4-5/97 NRC Maintenance The steam generator inspection Program 97010 program was aggressive. based on its use of the latest eddy current (ET) technology. and performance of in situ testing on tubes with indications.

4-5/97 NRC/ Licensee Maintenance The failure of prior ET inspections Industry 97010 to identify steam generator tube Knowledge indications during the previous outage was considered a non-cited violation. based on the knowledge level of the industry at that time and the extensive investigati]n and conservative corrective actions by

, thc licensee.  ;

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD-DATE l ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4-5/97 NRC Maintenance Reactor vessel weld examinations Program / 97010 were conservative using state-of_- Equipment /

the-art equipment and procedures. Procedures

'4-5/97 NRC Maintenance The use of a level III ET analyst Program /. 97010 to provide an additional oversight Management layer of ET data analysis and Oversight resolution was a noted improvement in the steam generator inspection program.

4/30/97 NRC Plart Support Licensee implemented effective Program 97008 radiological planning for the Unit I refueling outage which contributed to low overall station dose.

4/30/97 NRC Plant Support NRC inspector identified problems Personnel 97008 concerning the licensee *s Performance caiculations of radioactive ,

material intakes.

4/23&29/97 NRC Plant Support NRC inspector identified several Procedure '97008 examples of inadequate control of Adhereance/

contaminated vacuum cleaners in Corrective. -

radiological protected areas. Actions Corrective actions for previous licensee identified issues were ineffective.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD _

DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE- REF 4/17/97 NRC Plant Support NRC inspector identified an Procedure' 97008' unlocked door to the high integrity Adhereance/

container storage area in the Equipment Radwaste Building which was posted Condition.

as a Locked High Radiation Area.

4/13/97 Licensee Plant Support Licensee identified that Program 97008-radiological planning and dose estimates for Unit 1 Steam Generator gallery steel installation did not take into account the effect of other outage -

related work' activities and resulted in higher than anticipated dosc .ates in the applicable areas.

Licensee took appropriate actions to identify the problem and revise the work planning.

4/22. 23 & NRC Plant Support inattentive fire watch (sleeping) Failure to 97007 5/19/97 during welding activities. Fire Follow door block-d open w/no one in Procedures attendance and no PBI. Combustible material in auxiliary bldg. w/no one in attendence and no transient fire load permit. An NOV was issued.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE .ID BY SALP' DESCRIPTION CAUS( REF 4/28/97 NRC  ! aintenance M & The inspectors concluded that most Failure.to 97007 rngineering surveillances were properly Follow performed and met the testing Procedures requirements of the'UFSAR and TS.

However. the inspectors concluded that check valve surveillance testing on the SI-and CV systems was poorly controlled by the system engineers acting as the test directors. The inspectors observed two instances where acceptance

• criteria were exceeded without the ,

test director identifying a problem. and one instance of the test director failing to record required data. The inspectors also concluded that there was-a breakdown in communications between 1 maintenance and engineering that resulted in the use of the wrong I

, instrument range in flow calculations. An NOV was issued. 'I 5/97 NRC Maintenance The inspectors concluded that the Good 97007 preparatior, for and performance of Personnel fuel movements for re~oel outage Performance idR06 was good. Fuel handlers and supervisors were knowl dgeable of prccedures. equipment. and of their responsibilities.

-PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE l ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION l CAUSE- REF-4/21&25/97 NRC- Maintenance The. inspectors concluded that Persannel 97007 outage maintenance on the 1A Performance emergency diesel was performed well. However. on the IB e ergency. Failure.to diesel. the inspectors observed two Follow examples where FME control was lost Procr'iure and one example where the maximum jacket water pressure. allowed by the procedure. was exceeded. An NOV was issued.

4/18/97 NRC- Operations The inspectors identified that the- Personnel 97007 licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR Performance 50.59 safety evaluation prior to.

placing the Unit 2 motor driven feed pump discharge isolation valve out-of-service (005) open. .The valve had an. automatic closure function on a feedwater isolation signal. A NOV was issued. The inspectors also concluded that the communications within the operating department for this evolution were-poor.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE' REF 5/97 NRC- Operations The inspectors were concerned about Personnel 97007-the' closure of the Unit 1 Pei f9r37;ance containment. Although cleanliness was generally good, following the licensees closecut inspection the inspectors found a piece of foreign material laying on the flaor and debris in floor drains that were part of'a TS leakage detection system. The. inspectors were also concerned about standing water observed in the floor drains that was not questioned by licensee personnel.

5/97 NRC Operaticos The inspectors concluded that an Personnal 97007 augmented control room staff for Performance the outage unit improved the Management supervision.of evolutions and Oversight demonstrated a strong safety focus on shutdown operations. The inspectors also concluded.that the operating staff in the control room demonstrated excellent team t-fork and communications during most evolutions.

3/12/97 NRC Plant Support An unresolved item was identified Corrective 96016.

FP concerning the licensee *s interpretation - Actions to of the design basis for hot shorts in. Ngc motor-operated valve contral circuits that occur during a control room fire. Initiatives

I PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE'. REF 3/12/97 NRC Plant Support control of combustibles and material' Management 96016 FP condition of fire protection equipment . Oversight were good- Team Work 3/12/97 Licensee Plant Support The licensee identified, during Thermo-Lag Original 96016 FP resolution activities, that several Design and incorrect cable separation assumptions ConstruCliO could potentially result in the inabit y n to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions if a fire occurred in certain fire zones. (3/12/97). A Severity Level til violation with no Civil Penalty was issued on 10/2/97. Licensee corrective -

actions were effective and comprehensive.

3/12/97 Licensee Plant Support The licensee identified that the roll-up Original 96016 pp doors, separating various equipment rooms Constructio and the Turbine Building, were inoperable n and lack' -

and did not meet the 3-hour rated fire of barrier requirement. This condition existed since 1991 for Unit 1 and sinc Modi ficatio plant construction for Unit 2.(3/12/97). A ng Severity Level IV violation was issued on 10/2/97. Corrective action was prompt and effective once identified.

3/12/97 NRC Plant Support one violation of Technical Specification Inattention 96016 rp 6.8.1 was identified where the licensee ' to Detaj]

failed to properly fill out Hot Work r'ermits on numerous occasions.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE 'ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE 'REF-

'3/12/97 IJRC Plant Support Two weak. esses concerning fire brigade Management 96016 FP tram.ing were noted. The first weake,ess Oversight &

concerned the large number of personnel weak involved in each fPe drill which reduced C m nicati-individual participation in the drill. The on second weakness involved the lack of information exchanged during drill critiques.

3/12/97 IJRC Plant Support The inspectors identified weaknesses in lack of 96C16 FP the use of fire watch < s in lieu of Timely permanent corrective actions for fire Corrective barrier Impairments.

Action 3/12/97 f1RC Plant Support One unresolved item was identified Lack of- 96016 FP concerning the licensee's use of high Timely energy line break (HELB) watches to close C3rreClive the fire doors between Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings in case of an HELB in the Actions Turbine Building. Since 1991, a fire door was ineffective and corrective action was

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3/14/97 tJRC Plant Support Security performance was overall Per:onnel 97006

-Security good. Performance 3/14/97 NRC Plant Support Engineering support weak for design Personnel 97006

-Security and installation of defensive Performane positions and delay barriers. and Lacked organizatica and direction. Management Oversicht

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE l ID BY SALP l DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF i 2-4/97 72C Plant Inspectors identified that Rad. Personnel 97005 Support /RP Prot. support work was prompt. Performance efficient and appropriate for mod.

testing on aux. L1dg. ventalation testing. actions to reduce personnel exposure for a hot spot in the aux. bldg. floor drain tank pump room. and preparations for work on the IC RCS cold leg stop valve work.

3/7/97 fiRC Plant Inspectors found the EP effective Management 97004 Support /EP and improving Emergency response support and fdCilities. equipment. and supplies personnel were found in excellent condition: performance EP personnel demonstrated excellent .

knowledge; and manag went support was clearly a factor in the improvement in the past 2 years.

3/7/97 NRC Plant Audit team failed to evaluate and SCV Audit 97004 Support /EP document the adequacy of offsite Performance SOV Audit interface with the State of Illinois. fiOV was issued.

1 & 2/07 NRC Operations Inspectors observed shift turnovers Coerator 97002 and HLA meetings, concluded they Performance were well conducted and in compliance with governing procedures. ,

;  ; '  ! i i ,  !.

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-1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 1/97 fiRC Plant Implementation of zone coverage by Management 97002 Support / Rad RP Technicians in the auxiliary oversight Protection bldg. resulted in improved and Tea 1

- conditions, reduction in work.

contaminated areas. reduction of general clutter. and timely response by RP techs to abnormal conditions. .

3/10/97 **++********* ************** +*****+****

Branch 3 PPR Meeting 2/7/97 fiRC Plant Support Certain chemistry QC procedures and ! nadequate I 97003 PASS surveillance procedures were Procedure inadequate: (1) they did not contain acceptance criteria to determine the acceptability of surveillance esults and (2) they did not ensure the validity of high parity germanium detector calibrations (as recocoended by ReqGuide 1.33. Appendix A).

2/7/97 fiRC Plant Support Weaknesses in the analytical Inadequate 97'Fi3 ,

chemistry interlaboratory program Procedure were identified: (1) analytical results were not compared and reported in a timely manner and (2) the licensee did not always resolv3 analysis results which were not in '

agreement with progrca acceptance >

criteria. , 7 i

s- , m. n a +-, e' ~,-,

PLANT ISS'ES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 2/7/97 .NRC Plant Support Excellent primary and secondary Program 97003 systems water chemistry program.

During 19%. the concentrations of chloride and fluoride in the primary systems were maintained between 3-5 parts per billion.

Effective cantrol of chemical intrusions and secondary system additives. reduced the potential for system corrosion and decreased radiological source term. The licensee egerienced some circulating water intrusions in July 19% (unit 1) and February i

1996 (unit 2). wtiich corresponded to minor. short term increases in the concentrations of sodium and chloride in the steam cenerators.

PLANT ISSUE 5 MATRIX e

i BRAIDWOOD j DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 2/5/97 NRC Plant Support PASS maintenance items were not Program 97003 resolved in a timely manner. In June 1995. the licensee identified Equipment a problem with the containment air Malfunction I sampling panel (CASP) circuitry I

i which had sometimes resulted in the disablement of a radiation monitor.

'When the gas partitioner module was connected to the AC outlet within the CASP (as directed by procedure) or the light within the CASP panel was activated. radiation monitor '

IPR 11J (containment atmosphere) was disabled.

2/5/97 NRC Plant Support Chemistry PASS training was very Training 97003 '

interactive and the discussions  ;

were thorough. The trainer '

emphasized the potential radiological conditions of a PASS sample and the sample system.

2/4/97 NRC Plant Support Chemistry technicians demonstrated Personnel 97003 good analytical techniques and Perfon;1ance '

t knowledge of procedure requirements and references.

1 1

9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD L

1 DATE ID BY SALP  ! DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF  :

2/4/97 NRC Plant Support Chemistry technicians were Program 97003 verifying QC performance tests for laboratory instruments with an uncontrolled aid. The licensee did not perform a periodic review to ensure that the aid was consistent with the data base as required in I BwAP 550-25.

2/4/97 NRC Plant Support Statistical biases in fourth Progre a/ 97P03 quarter 1996 and fi.'st quarter 1997 Personnel chemistry instrument OC data were Performance not resolved in a timely manner.

I These biases potentially indicate j minor problems concerning the j instrument calibration or the t j calibration standard or an instrument operability problem.

2/3/97 NRC Plant Support Two aluminum (A1) standards were Personnel 97003 e

improperly labeled with respect to Performance the procedure required shelf-life.

4/97 NRC Maintenance Inspectors identified that the work Personnol/ 96021 package was not present at the work Procedure site for the 1C heater drain pump. Adhereance Also the foreman could not explain the purpose of the procedure steps.

)

1 4

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

BRAIDWOOD ID BY DATE SALP l DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF-12/31/96 fiRC Maintenance The inspectors observed that the Personnel / 96021 surveillance on the 2B RHR pump was Procedure perfomed in a competent and well Adequacy I

controlled manner. However the licensee failed to erfure that a required change to the surveillance procedure was made prior to use.

12/23/96 NRC Engineering Lack of complete understanding of Personnel  % 021 regulatory requirements: Perforrhance Understanding of the ASME code and Deficiency the applicable generic letter  ;

guidance was poor when a through  !

wall flaw was identified in the 1A 4

essential service water system in ,

that the train had not ben removed from service nor had any corrective action been taken.

l 12/19/96 NRC Operations Inspectors observed operators add Personnel 96021  ;

lubricating oil to the 2B Emergency Performance 1

Diesel Gonerater in violation of a i procdure. Operators were unaware of the procedures existence. +

12/9/96 f4RC Maintenance Inspectors identified several carts Procedure 96021 secured to safety-related Adhereance  !

equipment. This was also and i identified by the mspectors on Corrective

• 11/4/96. Actions a i l

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 12/5/96 Licensee Plant Support The alarm setpoints for the fuel Personnel LER.

handling incident radiation Performance 97003 monitors were not in accordance with Technical Specification Table 3.3-6 (i.e. 10 mrem /hr). The as found setpoints were 100 c en/nr (alert) and 2000 mrem /hr (high alarm). (97003) ,

! 12/1/96 Licensee Maintenance Two spent fuel assemblies were Procedure 96021 I 1 mispositioned in the spent fuel Adhereance

, pool.

11/18/96 NRC Operations During turbine ulve exercise. Personnel 96019 control room operators demonstrated Performance

poor performance in the following Deficiency

areas

• Reactivity control and i management.

l

• Alarming annunciator i response. and i

• Teamwork between NSO and shift engineer.

11/18/96 NRC Maintenance Failure to follow procedure: while Personnel 96019 installing manways and diaphragm Performance plate for Unit 1 IC Steam Deficiency Generator.

4

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 11/14/96 ' Licensee Engineering Questioning attitude

A system Team work /  % 019 engineer demonstrated a knowledge Skill level of expected system performance and a questioning attitude to detect electronic noise effecting vibration readings on a diesel oil transfer pump since the vibration measurements initially obtained met the acceptance criteria.

11/11/96 Licensee Engineering Through self assessment. system Personnel 96019 i engineer identified problems with Performance drawings from construction phase. Defic ency control and instrumentation l drawings depicted power leads to the control room dampers a hydromotors inaccurately.

11/6/96 ************* ************** ***********

Branch 3 PPR meeting.

10/25/96 Licensee Engineering The licensee's efforts to evaluate Teamwork / 96017 steam generator tube integrity by Skill level assessing growth rates for this tyce of cracks by historical eddy current data reviews / comparisons and in-situ pressure testing was indicative of an aggressive procram.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10/19/96 NRC Operations Several indicators of poor Personnel 96019 communication and operation Performance practices were evident during Deficiency drain-down evolution for mid-loop operation and cozzle dam installation.

. Blockage of the pressurizer manway vent pathway

. Creation of a loop seal on the reactor head vent pathway

. Exclusion of an additional drainage verification method ,

from the drain down procedure.

10/12/96 Licensee Operations Power-operated relief valve Inadequate 96018 Procedure 4

inadvertently lifted: when operators overfilled pressurizer Instruction during cooldown and depressurization of Unit 1.

10/12/96 Licensee Maintenance Performance of maintenance without Inadequate %019 i necessary documentation: Licensee Procedure personnel landed 125 VDC lead in Instruction reverse polarity on an i instantaneous prepositioning board for 18 Diesel Generator. t

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF .

10/04/96 Licensee Maintenance Two safety injection vent and drain Inadequate- 96014 valves and two LLRT connectors were Procedure not included in primary containment Instruction integrity verification surveillance procedure.

10/3/96 Licensee Engineering Questioning attitude by operators: Inadequate 96019 The licensee observed cooler than Procedu!e/

normal temperatures in the Unit 1 Instruction

essential switchgear room. An inadequate PMT failed to reveal that control relay contacts were

configured incorrectly.

09/30/96 NRC Engineering High number (14) of temporary Engineered  % 014 alterations installed in the plant Design for gr fater than 18 months: Deficiency however, good progress toward reduction of the total number of temporary alterations was made.

09/23/96 Licensee Maintenance Severe lube oil leakage from 1A Equipment 96014 motor-driven feedwater pump when Malfunction placed in operation following a lengthy idle period: identi fied when the licensee was performing ,

repairs to the IC turbine driven feedwater pump.

l 09/23/96 NRC Operations Frompt action by the Unit I reactor Other/NA 96014 operator prevented a significant plant transient: after a failure of the master feedwater pump controller.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BRAIDWOOD DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE- .

REF 09/11/96 Licensee Operations *a Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank room Personnel 96014 spry

• with water: non-licensed Perfomance oper, tors mispositioned valve while Deficiency perfoming surveillance.

09/11/96 l Licensee Operations Fuel pool cooling pump found turned Personnel off for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Fuel cool temp Perfomance went up 7 degrees (below alarm Deficiency setpoint) 09/10/96 NRC Operations Failure to use updated procedure: Inadequate 96014 while performiig monthly Procedure operability surveillance for Unit 1 Instruction diesel generator.

09/06/96 NRC Engineering Lack of complete understanding of Personnel 96019 regulatory requirements: A lack of Performance complete understanding of the 10 Deficiency CFR 50.59 requirements when returning the unit to service with the Unit I cold leg reactor coolant stop valve degraded without docurcelting a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation.

09/06/96 NRC Operations Unit 2 pre-surveillance essential

, Personnel 96012 service water to diesel jacket Perfomance

water cooling valve manipulation

Deficiency performed prior to the start of the diesel generator monthly surveillance.

l l

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10/21/97 ************ ************* Branch 3 PPR Meeting ************ ******

1 9/18/97 NRC Engineering The overall steam generator replacement Good Safety 97013 project demonstmted good ersneerin9 Focus ,

efforts focused on safety. The design i enhancements and material upgrades were significant improvements over the original steam generators (9/18/97).

9/18/97 flRC Engineering The safety evaluation provided detailed Thorough 97013 bases regarding the impact of the Safety l replacement steam generators on design Evaluation  ;

basis acodents (9/18/97).

9/18/97 NRC Engineering Inspectors identified that the safety Less than 97013 evaluation did not provide documentation rigorous Eng.

regarding the impact of the replacement effort.

steam generators on the residual heat 4

removal system's cooling performance and I on the containment sump and pH levels. A notice of violation was issued (9/18/97).

9/18/97 NRC Engineering The licensee replacement program met Comprehensive 97013 ASME Section XI requirements. The certmed and ,

design speofication was comprehensive and Technically i technically rigorous with respect to design, 1 Ricorous Eng.

fabrication and materiais of construction.

However, several minor weaknesses were effort t

[

4 identified in the Code reconoliation effort

{ (9/18/97).

1 1 9/18/97 NRC Engineering The engineenng change notices for the Good onsite 97013 i

~

modification were technica!!y accurate and - Eng. effort with one minor exception in accordance with

1. licensee administrative requirements (9/18/97).

e cs 4

s ,

l'

PLANT. ISSUES MATRIX BYRON

-f DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9/18/97 NRC Engineering inspectors identdied errors in the calcutations Lack of 97013 for the change in the reactor coolant system attention to volume and for the condensate storage tank detail minimum water volume. A notice of violabon was issued (9/18/07).

9/18/97 LICENSEE PLANT SUPPORT The licensee idenbfied, during Thermo-Lag ORIGltiAL 97019 FP resolution achvities, that several incorrect DESIGN AND i cable separation assumptions could CONSTRUCTION potentia!!y result in the inability to achieve I and maintain safe shutdown conditions if a  ;

postulated fire occurred in certain fire zones. '

' This is an apparent violation (Section F2.1).

A!! necessary mod:fications were completed.

The long-term corrective actions were ,

adequate and comprehensive. . Licensee was issued a choice letter on 10-i 1

/2/97. -

l 9/12/97 t'RC Plant The inspectors observed a worker who Personnel 97017 1

Support /RP entered a contamination area wrthout the Performance <

proper clothing. A NOV was issued.

9/12/97 licensee P1 ant Two examples were identified relating to Personnel 97017 Support /RP improper movement of radiological postmps Performance resulting in the failure to properly a post radiation area and HRA. This is of partcular concem because it is the third and fourth examples of posting events in the past 2 .

years and corrective actions taken to correct '

previous non-cited violations have not been effective or lasting. A NOV was issued

m. , - -. . -

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON

.u u w m DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9/12/97 NRC Plant The radiabon protecbon staff provded sound Program 97017 Support /RP radiological planning and effecbve oversight of the tubncabons of the incore detector cables. W.th the exception of irttial engsenng participation, the ALARA briefings provided workers with a c.vuvehensive discussion of work scope and radiological hazards. Workers demons +Ja'.ed good radiadon protecnon practices.

9/12/97 NRC P1 ant The inspectors concluded that the radiation Program 97017 Support /RP protection planning for the steam generator replacement project appeared to appropriately consider the radiological liabilites assocated with the project 9/12/97 NRC Plant The radiation protection staff maintained a program 97017 Support /RP sound quality control program for the whole body counters. The licensee performed calibrations in accordance with precedures.

9/12/97 NRC P1 ant The radiation protection staff property Program 97017 Support /Rp calibrated personnel contamination monitors (PCMs) in the Auxiliary Building and at the security exit points. However, the inspectors ident: fed some weaknesses in PCM calibration procedures.

7/25/- NRC Operations The inspectors noted a decline in the Personnel 97015 9/8/97 peratons department log keeping practices Performance as evidenced by the lack of safety injecbon Procedure accumulator level log entnes, poor daily Adherence order requirements, and missing log entnes from the official control room log.

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PLANT ISSUES HATRIX BYRON DArE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CMSE REF 7/28/97 firc Maintenance A breakdown in foreign material exdusen Procedure 9701.5 (FME) controls occurred during actmtes Adherence associated wdh maintenance in the spent fuel pool area. However, appropriate immediate action ard planned additional corrective actions were taken. The Comed corporate FME procedure continued to be a concem in that it dd not require stnngent FME controls. The failure to follow Byron fuel hand:ing procedure FH-31 was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.

7/25- fiRC Maintenance Material condition items found by the Attentic,to 97015 9/8/97 inspectors on the Unit 1 AF system were not Detail safety significant; however, the inspectors cuestioned why licensee system waikdowns failed to identify the same issues.

]E/94 & f;RC f4aintenance The inspectors conduded that the licensee Corrective 97015 g797 failed to take timely corrective actions to Actions revise Technical Specification Table 3.34 and procedure 18tS 3 2.1-021 when the Timeliness setpo nt for AF pump suction transfer from the condensate storage tank to SX changes was made in Deceric;er 199A A violation was issued with two examples of inappropriate corrective actions. .

8 & 9/97 t;RC Engineering The procedure to reduce the pressure Attention To 97015 between the ECCS check valves was we!! Detail prepared and executed. However, a missing safety evaluation, identified by the Inc # ete inspectors, demonstrated a need for Safety

! cortinued emphasis on safety evaluations.

Evaluation l

4

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX SYRON

-_ a s. ses _

DATE ID BY SALP DESCP.IPih1 CAUSE REF 8 & 9/97 fiRC Engineering The inspectors identdied that engmeerng Inadewate 97015 personnel failed to address the effects of Safety I

reactor coolant system check valve leakage Evaluation on potential residual heat removal system over pressurizaton.

7/25- fiRC Engineering Byron's desgn basis initiatue program. Corrective 97015 9/8/97 implemented in responso to the NRC's 10 Actions CFR 50.54(f) letter, was deariy defirw.d and Response to well staffed. ggt Initiatives 7/18/97 iiRC Plant Support There has been no discernable impact Program 97014 on the environment from plant optrations. Specific aspects of the REMP program. including material condition of air sampling equipment. I sample collection and contractor oversight were appropriately 1

implemented.

7/18/97 tiRC Plant Support The inspector identified that an 97014 apparent discrepancy between the actual and described locations of some of the thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) may have resulted in some environmental sectors not being monitored as required since 1989.

This is an unresolved item.

1

- -. - _ ,_ _,m.

~

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON

-DATE ID BY SALD ._

DESCRIPTION CA!JSE REF

, 7/18/97 fRC Plant Support The radiation monitoring system Program 97014 provided appropriate operability and reliability. The monitoring equipment was in good condition with the exception of the two steam jet air ejector monitors. These problems were being effectively resolved by the system engineer.

7/18/97 tEC olant Support The site quality verification (SQV) ScifAssessment 97014 SA0V audit for radiation monitors was thorough and provided good recommendations. A radiatica protection self assessment sbmed that they are identifying similar isst=s to SOV. However the radiological environmental monitoring program audit did not identify the discrepancy with several TLD locations.

6/13-7/24/97 NRC Operations Throughout this inspection period, the Personnel 97012 operations staff was knowledgeable of plant Performance I conditions, responded promptly and appropriately to alarms, and performed thorough turnovers.

7/7/97 NRC Operations The inspectors determined that the Personnel 97012 operations department conservatively Performance

" declared the fuel handling building filter plenums inoperable until a full operability Operability assessment could be completed by engineeri 1 Decision to address revised core peaking factors.

1

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX l BMW DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF I-5/97 NRC Operations The inspectors concluded that licensee Program 97012 management was aware of the amount of Management overtime worked in the operations department, controlled tiee overtime appropriately, and was working to reduce the number of hours required by hiring additional sta'!. Although a significant amount of overtime was worked from January through May 1997, there was no evidence that plant safety was compromised.

6/13-7/24/97 Licensce/NRC Operations Beginning in 1997, the licensee began to SAQV 97012 aggressively track and trend human Corrective performance events in the operations Action department. The inspectors noted that many work control trends had improved, witn undesirable trends identified and corrected much earlier than in previous years (Section 08.2). In addition, operations department management communicated human performe nce expectations when declining trenos were noted.

6/13-7/24/97 NRC Maintenance Routine maintenance and survei!!ance Program 97012 activities were well performed.

s

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF i

6/13-7/24/97 NRC Maintenance The inspectors identified that Technical Corrective 97012 Specification (TS) 3.4.3, " Pressurizer," did Actions not require two redundant groups of pressurizer heaters to be operable as specified in the Updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR). The licensee *s corrective action to administrative!y contro! the required TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) entry was considered adequate until the station's improved

. I technical specifications were approved by the NRC. -

6/13-7-24/97 Licensee /NRC Maintenance Maintenance field monitoring reports and SAQV 97012 t arveillances performed by the site quality verification (SQV) department were C.orougt and performance based. The SGV report products were beneficial in accurately assessing maintenance performance.

6/13-7/24/97 Licensee /NRC Engineering The inspectors considered the identification SelfAssessment 97012 of a potential unreviewed safety question Attn.-to-detail regarding the draf t UFSAR reanalysis that increased peaking factor limits, a strength in the performance of engineering reviews 6/13-7/24/97 NRC Engineering Activities observed by the inspectors to Program 97012 support the steam generator replacement project (SGRP) were well supervised. The mock-up containment wall structure for training workers provided an exceIIent opportunity for " lessons learned" and was considered a strength. The activities for

, the on-site transpo.t of the first Unit 1 replacement SG were well planned and executed.

t i

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4

6/30/97_ Licensee /NRC Plant Support Management attention to improve the prteessManagement 97012 RP radiation monitoring system resulted in an Attention improving trend in system performance.

7/15/97 NRC Plant Support The inspectors noted that during the SGRP 97012 Security replacement SG arrival on site the security Project Support ,

force was well coordinated and the searches were complete and thorough.

7/7/97 NRC Plant Support Security stafTunaware of requirement in the Procedure 97011

, Security security plan for a long time. Inadequate StafTknowledge 4

alarm system test and procedure, could not confirm detection probability of 9054 with a 9594 confidence, eg. 3-5 tests per zone rather than 30. A no response NOV was issued.

7/7/97 NRC Plant Support Procedure weaknesses noted pertaining to Procedures 97011 Security security event logging and exempting certain vehicles from being searched.

7/7/97 NRC Plant Support Reduced alarm assessment capability was Personnel 97011 Security caused by some alarm station operators Perfi>rmance

, actions.

7/7/97 NRC Plant Support Attainment of self-established security Program 9701i Security performance goals, which were monitored on Self-assessment

, SAQV a monthly basis, was a strength, and self-assessment etTorts were varied and effective.

1

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP ,

DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/27/97- NRC Operations The inspectors identified a missing support Configuration 97009 bracket on the 1B Si pump lube oil coole: Control which the licensee later determined tendered the 1B Si pump inoperable due to not meetin;}

proper seismic requirements. The inspectors considered the licensee *s operability assessment and corrective actions prompt ard appropriate.

b

l PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP JESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/27-6/5/97 Licensec/NRC Maintenance After the licensee identified in February Tech. Spec. 97009-1996 that the CV pump casings and discharDComgiliance piping high points were not vented as required by TS 4.5.2.b.1, they f ailed to recognize the need to be in strict compliancel with the TS. The inspectors determined thal the operability assessment performed by Byron engineering failed to recognize that TS requirements w2re not being met and a T3 change was needed. After identification by the NRC of this issue, the licensee appropriately began preparations and

• commenced reducing power prior to receiving relief from the TS shutdown requirements.

The failure to vent the CV system in accordance with the TS is an apparent violation .

The inspectorn concluded that the licensee had not vented one discharge piping high point for train 1B of the RH system. This is an apparent violation. Upon identification, the licensee took appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors considered RH heat exchanger and th- suction piping high points venting a good pic ' ice.

A Severity Level III viot w/CP issued for both examples on 10/4/97.

I PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF-5/27-6/5/97 Licensee /NRC Maintenance The licensee identified that TS required Failure to meet 97009 slave relay testing for 10 phase "A" Tech. Spec.

containment isolation valves had not been Requirements.

performed as required by the TS since mid-1991. The inspectors considered the licensee *s etfort in identifying additional missed TS surveillance requirements as being proactive. The inspectors

• independent review determined that t vo separate onsite reviews f ailed to identify that TS requirements were not met with the surveillance procedure revision alone. Two examples of an apparent violation were -

identified. Both exampics resulted in a Sev. I Lvi.111 viol. w/ CP issued 10/3/97.

5/15-20/97 NRC Maint-nance The inspectors identified that the Inadequate 97003 surveillance procedures used to vent the St Procedure pumps were inadequate in that they provide <

no direction to the operator as to proper valve line-up to ensure proper pump venting.

This is considered an apparent violation.

Numerous opportunities existed to identify this inadequate procedure in that opera

• ors routinely had to perf.vm extra unapproved steps in order to vent the SI system.

Severity Level IV viol. issued 10/3/967.

t I

1.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Y

BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/27-6/5/97 NRC Maintenance The inspectors concluded that past auxiliary., Surveillance 97009 feedwater (AF) pump surveillance testing wasTesting/ Data adequately documented and that problems w h 3c3 encountered during the tests appeared to have been identified and dispositioned in accordance with corrective action proceduren The Mspectors observed a number of documentation weaknesses in problem identification forms and operability 4

assessments as evidenced in the limited writter, information that supported operability assessment conclusions.

However, in all cases, followup questioning by the inspectors found that the responsible individuals had additional information to

! support the conclusion 5/3-31/97 NRC Operations Operator performance during two Unit 1 Personnel 97003 shutdowns and startups for bus duct cooling Performance repairs and the 1 A MSIV repair was l excellent.

5/2-6/12/97 NRC Operations The inspectors identilkd that from October Corrective 97008 17,1994, until April 29.1997. the corrective Actions actions to conditions adverse to quality that LER were identified in LER 454/94-014 were not 94014 performed. Specifically the Tech. Spec.

Interpretation hcd not been developed.

1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX '

BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/13/97 NRC Maintenance The inspectors identified that the 28 diesel Work Planning 97008 drisen AF pump was not tested under suitably controlled conditions. Specifically, a manual start of the diesel engine was performed (preconditioning) immediate'y prior to an ESF start. A NOV was issued.

4/13-29/97 NRC Engineering The inspectors identified that the temporary Design Control 97008 ,

alteration program was not adequate (an '

evaluation was not performed) to ensure design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design were implemented prior to connecting a strip chart recorder, a temporary system alteration, on the bus 211 battay charger for troubleshooting. A NOV was issued.

4/17/97 NRC Plant Support Based on inspection results, it was determined Personnel 97006 EP that the 1997 emergency response Perfbrmance organization's overall performance was good.

Simulated events were accurately diagnosed. Team Work proper mitigation actions were performed, and offsite agencies were notified in a timely manner.

i v

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4/17/97 NRC Plant Support Two EP exercise weaknesses were identified. Personnel 97006 EP/ Operations One: The Shift Engineer reviewed the plant Performance emergency action levels several times but focused on an explosion in the diesel generator crankcase and classified the event as an Unusual Event. The shift engineer classified the loss of all but one power supply to the Unit 1 ESF buses as an Unusual Event

• ratFer than an Alert. Two: Once the Alert was declared, the Shift Supervisor did not utilize the Acting Station Director procedure nor associated checklist.

3/14-5/1/97 NRC Operations The licensee's handling of the containment Personnel _ 97005 leak detection system was considered poor as performance exemplified by failure to control foreign

~

material intrusion into the drain system and attention to failure to take thorough aggressive followup i detail action on indications that the system was not functioning properly. The early leak detection of a small reactor coolant leak in containment was significantly compromised.

The only seismically qualified leak detection system at Byron was inoperable. This condition went unidentified by the licensee for over 5 months. Additionally, appropriate drain grates as described in the UFSAR had not been installed since plant construction.

Three violations were considered for escalated enforcement and issued as one sev.

Irl.IV NOV. ,

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF-3/14-5/1/97 NRC Operations Unit 2 Containment Drain System Clogged - hianagement . 97005 Due to Debris, was poor and marginally Oversight acceptable due to incomplete, inaccurate, and LER late information in LER. 97001-3/14 & NRC Operations Unit 2 shutdown and startup, excellent Team Work 97005 '

3/19/97 operator performance, judicious trouble shooting. evaluation and repairs.

3/14-5/1/97 NRC Plant Support Review of an unresolved item identified a Personnel Error 97f45 Security violation for the licensee *s failure to mark and protect a memorandum that contained Safeguards Information penaining to the vehicular barrier system. An NOV was issued.

4/15/97 NRC hiaintenance hiaintenance Rule (h1R) Inspection: Program hianagement . 97004 generally met the requirements of the Oversight and maintenance rule and industry guidance; Personnel however, this was only recently Performance accomplished.

4/15/97 Licensee /NRC SAQV The SQV audit of the h1R provided SelfAssessment 97004 significant insights into the h1R program and was considered a program strength. l

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF

• /15/97 NRC Operations MR inspection: Operators' knowledge was Personnel 97004 consistent with their responsibility for performance, impleraentation of the MR. There was no Training indication that the MR detracted from the operators' ability to safely operate the plant.

Using the work window matrix and the weekly on-line risk book helped operators monitor and limit the risk associated with taking equipment out-of-service.

4/15/97 NRC Maintenance MR Inspection: He licensee had not MR Program 97004 demonstrated that the performance or implementation condition of some SSCs within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 were being efTectively controlled: the basis for placing the AF system function, and the essential safety features and reactor protection actuation function, the emergency lighting system, and the fuel handling system, under the '

requirements of Section (a)(2) was inadequate and these functions and systems should have been monitored in accordance with Section (a)(1). A NOV was issued.

4/15/97 NRC Maintenance MR inspection: Expert panel composed of MR Program ' 97004 well-qualified, experienced personnel, used implementation the IPE to assess risk significance of SSCs.

Weaknesses in the approach included using an outdated IPE and inadequate documentation of the expert panels determinations.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4/15/97 NRC N1aintenance N1R inspection: The material condition of the Program 97004 plant systems examined was very good. With implementation a few minor exceptions, the systems appeared Team work, to be well managed and were free of hianagement corrosion, oil, water, steam leaks, and Oversight extraneous material.

3/31/97 NRC Plant Support I.icensee management was not effective in Corrective 96013 Licensee Fire Protection preventing repetitive freezing and loss of Actions equipment during cold weather. A NOV was issued.

3/31/97 1.icensee Plant Support inspectors concluded that the licensees Corrective 96013 l' Fire Protection corrective action to address the missed QC Actions hold points should be effective.

3/31/97 NRC Plant Support Although no loss of system oprability. the hianagement 96013' Fire Protection nicensees practice of allowing FP valves to Control I rr :n as-left for indefinite periods indicated i

a weakness in managements control of FP ,

sun eillances.  !

3/10/97 * * " * * * * * * * " *"*******"* *****"******

Branch 3 PPR meeting 3/7/97 NRC Plant Support inspectors found that training on the post Personnel 97003 accident sample system had not been Performance conducted as required on 6mo. intervals. Ilad been conducted annually.

3/5& 6/97 NRC Plant Support inspectors had to prompt chem.' techs. to Personnel 97003 prevent errors while sampling reactor coolant. Performance 3/5/97 NRC Plant Support inspectors fbund chem. techs. not following Personnel 97003 procedures by not evacuating a vial for a gas Performance sample.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY- SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3/97 Licensee Plant Support The chemistry staff was found to be tracking N/A 97003 the findings and taking appropriate actions to 1995 and 1996 SQV, corporate, and vendors audit findings.

3/97 Licensee plant Support in 1996, the ci.emistry line organization N/A- 97003 began a surveillance program to identify weaknesses in the chemistry program.

3/1/97 SelfRevealing Maintenance FME-Foreign Material Intrusion requires Personnel 97002 rework of two pumps. I A CS pump had Performance 3/8xl/4" particle in the shaft seal causing leakage during refill. IB CS pump post maint. test run had high temp. on the thrust bearing and dirty oil, resulting from a large chip (l"x3") of paint between the thr 2st >

bearing and the housing. Both pumps had to be reworked to eliminate the FM resulting in a delay in plant startup.

2/17/97 SelfRevealing Plant A radioactive waste operator transferred Personnel 97002 Support / Ops. water from one of the release tanks to the Performance and regen waste tank and over-filled the regen 97003 waste tank. The operator did not monitor tank level during the transfer, and the high lesel alami had been disabled by the receipt of the low level alarm. Consequently, the over-pressurization and deformation of the tank resulted in a spill of radioactive liquids to the floor drain system and in significant damage to the tank.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF ,

01/09/97 NRC Plant Support Maintaining water tight doors shut. Corrective 96012 Previous corrective actions to preclude Actions unattended open water tight doors were ineffective in keeping the doors closed.

01/97 NRC Operations SQV audits and assessments were positive Personnel _96012 contributors to oversight of station operations. Performance 12/96 NRC Plant Support The security plan did not accurately describe Other 96010 the location or correct description of the Vehicle Barrier System in all instances.

12/96 NRC Plant Support The Access Authorization Program was effectively implemented.

12/31/96 Self revealing Maintenance An operator demonstrated a good questioning Corrective 96012 attitude in the identification oflow flow in the Actions 1B essential service water pump room cooler.

Ilowever, the failure to properly use match marks to reassemble the cooler components could have been prevented by reasonable corrective action from other events.

12/30/96 NRC Engineering Modification w/out 10CFR50.59 Personnel 96012 evaluation. The inspectors identified that a Performance surveillance procedure for the Containment Floor Drain Leak Detection System (1RF008) was implemented to compensate for the loss of alarm function without declaring the system inoperable or performing a safety evaluation.

y n

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION' CAUSE REF 12/29/96 NRC Engineering Operators failed to identify the degraded Personnel %012 ~

condition of the containment floor drain leak ~ Perfomiace detection system when the alarm was locked .

in due to a secondary side steam leak. ,

'12!!7/96 Licensee Engineering The licensee identified and aggressively Other/NA 96009 pursued the motor control center spacer issue with Westinghouse. He operability assessment and corrective actions to install the spacers were timely and thorough.

I1/12/96 NRC Engineering Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Horaflex. The Personnel 96009 inspectors concluded that the licensees Performance submittal, regarding SFP Borallex degradation and the decision to ' checker board" the SFP wem not pursued in a timely manner until after discussions with the NRC.

10/21/96 Licensee Plant Support On four separate occasions in October Personnel 97003 1996, the licensee identified inadequate Performance radiological postings: either the high i radiation area posting or the contaminated area posting for the unit I volume control tank room was found to be on the valve aisle door. The licensee conducted a thorough investigation wiiich reported that 9 contract individual admitted to " finding" and replacing postings which had fallen and " moving" postings which he believed were incorrect.

I1/96 NRC Operations ne requalification training feedback system Other/NA 9601I was good.

l PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 11/96 NRC Operations The station auxiliary transformer switching Team Work 96009 and restoration operations were carefully Skill Level planned and professionally executed.

I1/6/96 " * " * * " * * * * " " * * * * * * * *

• Branch 3 PPR meeting * " " * " * * * *

• 10/7/96 NRC Plant Support A violation uns issued due to a fire door Personnel 96009 being impaired without a Barrier / Fire Performance Protection Systems Impairment Permit. Deficiency 8/95 - 10/96 NRC Operations A lack of formal controls to limit examination Other/NA 96011 material overlap was a weakness.

10/15/96 NRC Engineering System engineering failed to appreciate or Personnel 96009 understand the importance of the surveillance Perfomiance test with respect to SX system operability. Deficiency 10/15/96 NRC Engineering Inadequate corrective action to repair the Other/NA- 96009 trash racks since 1993 demonstrated a lack of knowledge of SX system design by the licensee and a willingness to operate with a degraded safety system.

10/15/96 Licensee Engineering The licensee identified errors in the ultimate Other/NA 96009 '

heat sink cooling tower basin makeup calculation. (It did not reflect the SX system design features since initial plant operation.)

The 1991-1992 design basis reconstitution failed to identify this error.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

• L BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10/15/96 Licensee Engineering The licensee identified that silt levels in the Other/NA 96009 SX cooling tower basir. did not meet the surveillance acceptance criteria. Based on the excessive silt found on 10/15/96, the licensee -

determined that the SX system was inoperable when the plant relied on the deep well pumps for makeup capability.

7/93 to Self Revealing Operations Operations failed to recognize the Corrective 96009 10/97 significance of the reduced operability of the Actions and SX system due to the degraded trash screens Personnel in the SX cooling tower basins. His was Performance even with the evidence of the damaged SX strainers caused by transported cooling tower fill material.

10/15/96 NRC Maintenance Surveillance test OBVS SX-5 contained Other/NA 96009 inadequate acceptance criteria to determine SX system operability.

10/96 NRC Operations Licensee validation of examination material Personnel 96301 lacked comprehensive review u evident by Performance errors detected during examination Deliciency administration.

10/96 Self-Revealed Operatior.s The applicants' effective use of- Team Work 96301 communications during dynamic scenarios Skill Level enhanced good teamwork.

10/9(3 NRC Plant Support ne Access Authorization Program and the Team Work 96010 Vehicle Barrier System were effectively Skill Level implemented.

PLANT ISSUES HATRIX BYRON DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE- REF 09/05/96 NRC Plant Suppon 10 CFR 20.1902(a) violation: A storage aro Inadequate 96008 in the Aux. building had rad levels in excess Procedure l

of 5 mrem /hr at greater than 30em that was Instruction not posted.

09/96 Self-Revealed Plant Support Licensee's control of Unit 2 outage dose was Team Work 96008-a strength. Skill Level 09/96 NRC Operations Teamwork between rad protection, chemistry. Team Work 96008 l Plant Support and operations staf f was effective in reducing Skill Level l source term in Unit 2.

08/96 NRC Operations Unit I auxiliary feedwater trains (2) Personnel 96006 inoperable: "A" train was inop due to a Performance j surveillance when the "B" train was made Deficiency inop due to the attachment of a strip chart l recorder I 1

o 0-

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09 & -97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE , REF 9/30!!997 Self-Rescaled Plant Support The licensee's immediate response to a Unit 1 intake incident was Personnel 97020 apprapriate and included the suspensien of all Unit 8 work, pending a Perfomunce resiew of work packages that involse radiological activities. The Deficiency licensee was in the process of conducting a comprehensise evaluation to determine the root cause of the incident, to assess uorker dose, and to determine the os erall adequacy of radiological contmis at tne station (Section RI.3).

9'25/1997 NRC Engineering No significant safety-related technical deficiencies were identifiul w lih Self-Critical 97003 the DEAG; however, during the period between Nosember 18,1996, through April 14,1997, implementation of the DEAG osersight activities u as not effectis e. Gradual improvements in the DEAG actisities and stafTing level hase been obsersed since late-April (Section E6.b).

9/15/1997 Licensee Plant Support Station management s. topped all planned work evolutions for Unit 1 Personnel 97020 because of degraded uork performa,ce rela'ed to poor 13dworker Performance practices (Section R7.2). Deficieng 9/l5/1997 NRC Engineering As a result of this inspection w e have determined taat, except for those inadequate 97003 actisities associated with the Dreslen Engineering Assurance Group Oversight (DEAG), the CAL commitments and corrective actions were completed and hase satisfied NRC requirements. In addition, those CAL activities that iemained on-gois.g were determined to satisfy the intent of the CAL. The inspectors' obsersations indicated that initial DEAG impiementation was not effectise as an osersight organization. Although recent changes have demonstrated some improvement in this area, due to the w eaknesses obsers ed, we have decided that the CAL will remain open until effective DEAG performance has been demonstrated.

// -

.3 M

l' age i of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-N-97 Dresden DATE ID IW SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8/28/1997 NRC Plant Support The transportation program was technically sound, and the April 1,1997, Other/NA 97015 revision to the NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations were implemented and incorporated into station procedures.

Training was completed for personnel involved in shipping t.edioactis e material, and radioactis e material shipments review ed by the inspectors were appropriately classi6ed and documented. Scaling factors were determined and used in accordance with NRC guidance (Section RI.2).

97015 8/28/1997 NRC Plant Support The material condition of the radwaste systems and the radwaste storage Other/NA 97015 areas was good. Sun cillances and inventories of stored materials were performed as required. Significant radwaste has been shipped durmg the past y ear reducing backlog. 97015 S/28/1997 NRC Plant Supcott Appropriate radiological controls were deseloped for the Unit i Inadequate 97015 underground tank sludge remosal project and were implemented for Unit Os ersight

! SAFSTOR decommissionin3 work 97015 8/27/1997 NRC Maintenance The operations staff continued to address material condition problems, Equipment 97013 including some which caused unplanned outage time for Technical Malfunction Speci0 cations-related equipment. The material conditior. of the feedwater sy stem and associated supporting systems caused problems that resulted in ses eral rapid load dscreases, limited reactor pow er, and contributed to a reactor pressure vessel lesel transient on Unit 2. Errors made by maintenance and operations personnel complicated the respoases to material condition problems. 97013 CL 8,2 //1997 Licensee Engineering Data used to track the performance indica:or of" Engineering Requests" Inadequate 97013 and " Temporary Alterations" was potentially unreliable and were not Oversight always an accurate indicator of performance. The licensee modified the way the data was tracked to make it a more reliable indicator of performance. (Section E8.1) 97013 Page 2 of 57

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09er-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF

8,27/1997 NRC Maintenance The maintenance w ork packages tes iew ed by the inspectors were Other3A 97013 completed in accordance with procedures. Nesenheless, inadequate performance of maintenance and degraded material condition caused abnormal sy stem alignments and component malfunctions in the condensate and feedwater system that challenged the operations staff.

(Section M2.1) 97013 8/27/1997 NRC Plant Support Ihere were no formal controls os er the w arning flags (on radiation inadequate 97013 suncy forms) that the radiation protection statTused tc indicate '

Osersight radiological conditions had changed. This resuhed in confusion about why a flag was hung and caused the licensee to re-suney an area.

(Section R4.1) 97013 8/22/1997 NRC Plant Support in summary, the emergency response actis ities obsen ed during this insolved 97014 inspection uere effectively implemented. Simulated events were Management accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation actions w ere performed, and ofTsite agencies were notiGed in a timely manner. Inte facility transfers of command and control of esent response w cre orderly and timely.

Control Room Simulator crew performance was professional and demonstrated efTectise response to the emergency conditions.

Communications by the crew were crisp and efficient. The Technical Support Center performance was marked by strong command and control by the Station Director. The Operations Support Center statT performance exhibited some minor problems w ith facility briefings and the plant public address system. The Corporate Emergency Operations Facility personnel demonstrated good knowledge of their emergency duties and pros ided a smooth transfer of command and control to the facility. 97014 8'21/1997 Licensee Operations The licensee did not impleraent adequate correctise actions for a January Personnel 97013 1997 error in applying a Technical Specification limiting condition for Performance operation (LCO). As a result, a similar esent occurred on August 21 Deficiency 1997, when licensed control room operators missed a requiref entry into a Technical Specification LCO action statement. This was considered an example of a siolation for inadequate corrective action. (Section 04.3) 97013 l' age $ of $7

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-D*-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8 6/1997 NRC Plant Support Security personnel performed poorly in the verification ofinformation, inadequate 97013 communications, and execution associated with a shcher order for a Osersight perceised threat. Many station personnel either chose not to obey an order from the control room to stay in&xirs or did not hear the order.

De licensee performed poorly in response to a perceis ed threat from a toxic gas release. He insestigation into the cause of the event was ueak because it did not address all of the obsen ed deficiencies. (Section S4.1) 97013 8!3/1997 Licensee Maintenance On August 3,in an attempt to allesiate repeated draining and flashing of Personnel 97012 the 3D2 high pressure heater high les el switch (3-3541-55B) reference Performance leg. the licensee attempted to install a temporary alteration (Reference Deficiency Temp Alt Ill-11-97 and WR#970082873). The temporary alteration instructed maintenance personnel to connect the reference leg downstream of an existing condensing pot. Acceptance criteria were not satisfied during the post installation tent. De licensee discovered that the reference leg had been connected to the wrong pipe. Results of inspector interviews of maintenance and engineering personnel suggest workers became confused due to labeling problems during installation.

• His demonstrated poor work practices since DAP 05-03 " Control of Temporary System Alterations" stated that uhile performing a temporary alteration, if field conditions are difTerent from those shown in a work package, then stop and contact the preparer.

7/28/1997 Self-Resealed Operations feedwater Transient Results in Manual Reactor Scram Due to Operating Personnel - LER 237'97-010-00 Team Knowledge Weakness and Operator Weakness While Performing Performance Manual Level Control Deficiency .

Cause: Personnel error (didn't use all indications).

7/28/1997 Self-Revealed Operations Opcrator error w hile controlling reactor s essel w ater les el resulted in a Personnel 97013-manual reactor trip. He primary root cause of the kns of reactor sessel Performance level control was an inability of the operating crew to use feedwater Deficiency Pow, steam flow, and reactor sessel level together to stabilize the reactor. Contributing causes included the material condition of the reactor feedwater pump recirculation vahe and the feedwater control system. (Section 04.4) 97013 I' age 7 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-Dx-W Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF.  ;

7/28/1997 Self-Reveatrd Operations ne inability of the NSO to control feedwater flow manually (Section ' OtherSA 97016 OI.I.c), the procedures used to start the RFP and respond to the RPV lesel changes (Section 03.1.c), the naterial condition of the 2B RFP RV (Section M2.1.b) and three et mt control of the FWCS (Section O2.1.c) were contributing causes. An additional contributing cause to the es ent was the lack of substantial information regarding FWCS operating characterhtics prosided to the operators during continuing operator training. (Section 05.1.c) 97016 7/28/1997 Self-Revealed Operations The licensee respotise to the esent was good. The prompt imestigation Personnel 97016 team formed by the licensee performed a thorough review of the esent Performance and of the contributing factors to determine the preliminary root causes. Deficiency Management resiew of the prompt investigation team's findings was also thorough and challenging. (Section OI.I.c) The root cause of this event was the failure of the NSO to correctly assess the condition of the FWCS (Section 01.1.c). 97016 7/28!!997 Self-Res ealed Engineering he degraded condition of the three element control of the FWCS Equipment 97016 contributed to the event. (Section 02.1.c) The Unit 2 FWCS only could Malfunction be used in single-eiement control. It could not be determined if this would hase prevented the RPV water lesel from exceeding a fise inch change in water lesel. (Section E2.1.c) 97016 7/26/1997 Self-Revealed Maintenance ne cause for the failure of the RFP RV (recirculation vahe) was a loose Equipment 97016-connection on a terminal board. Maintenance performed during recent Malfunction outages did not appear to hase contributed to the failure. He licensee was unable to locate any record of maintenance that imoh ed the terminal board connection. (Section M2.1.c) 97016 7/l.1/1997 NRC Engineering The inspectors found that the licensee had adequately documented Teamwork / Skill 97012 changes to the Undt I facility as required in 10 CFR 50.59. Furthermore, Level Dresden Decommissioning Procedure DDP 10 appropriately addresses the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(6) regarding decommissioning activities. He inspectors concluded that the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 program at Unit I was thorough and wellimplemented. 97012 Page 8 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-&e-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF  ;

7T1997 NRC Engineering except for those actisities associated with the Dresden Engineering Teamwork / Skill 97008 Assurance Group (DEAG), the CAL commitments and correctise actions Lesel were campleted and hase satisfied NRC requirements. In addition, thme CAL actisities that remained on-going were determined to satisfy the intent of the CAL The inspectors

• obsenations mdicated sk.t initial DEAG implementation was not effectise as an osersight organization.

Although recent changes hase demonstrated son e improsement in this area, due to the w eaknesses obsened, we has e decided that the CAL will remain open until etrectne DEAG performance has been demonstrated.

97003 CL 6/19'1997 Self-Resealed Maintenance On June 19. the licensee declared the Unit 3 high pressure coolant Personeel LER 249/97003; 97013 injection system inoperable due to turbine stop salve above rest drain Performece sahe leakage. The licensee issued Licensee Esent Report (LER) S0- Deficiency 24937-003 to document this esent. the licensee identified tf at one vahe was binding and not seating propctly and that another salve had improper seat loading. The licensee also identified seseral examples of poor performance by niaintenance persennel. (Section M4.1) 97013 6!!9/1997 Licensee Maintenance Unit 3 IIPCI system declared inoperable during sunciP mce test due to Engineering'De Draft 97012 steam leakage througin the llPCI turbine abose seat drain valves. sign Deliciency 6/19':997 Licensee Operations The IIPCI system failed its startup tests. Operations did not shut down Equipment Dr# 97012 the unit, but instead entered a 14-day LCO. This was different than - Malfunction pre.iously observed startups with IIPCI system problems. The recently upgraded technical specifications removed specific guidance about how to respond to a llPCI system failure during startup.

6!!6/1997 1.icensee Operations llPCI system fails low pressure startup test. Cooling water dp did not Equipment Drail 97012 met procedure acceptance criteria. MalfuncWon 6/l3/1997 Licensee Plant Support (Units 2 & 3) Unauthorized non-malevolent entry into the protected Other/NA LER stillin drafi area.

6'6/ N Licensee Maintenance Unit 2 liigh Pressure Coolant Injection (IIPCI) system declared EngineerinWDe LER 237/97013; 97012 inoperable during a suncillance test due to excessive cycling of the sign Deficiency gland seal leakoff pump.

l' age 9 of $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Ac-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII' TION 'CAUSE REF 5'30/1997 NRC Operations As a result of eperation not monitoring condensate-storage tark Inadequate IR 97009 adequately, ilPCI w as temporarily declared inoperable until engineering Procedure / Instr determined that a procedure w as in error. uction 5/30'1997 NRC Engineering The inspector identified a generic concem w ith the licensee's procedure mdequate IR 97009 (URl) process that could potentially allow procedure and work request changes Oversight to bypass required reuew3.

5/30/1997 NRC Operations for acti cities obsersed, the operating stalT rerformed four stanups and Teamwork / Skill IR 97009 three 55utdowns in ccordance with precedures during this period. Crew Level briefs and heightened level of tw are briefs were inform.:tn e, contingency actions w ere discussed, and peer checks were performed.

5/30!!997 Licensee Opstions lhe licensee's site quality serification organization completed a review . Inadequate IR 97009 of the i sitial license training and determined that the testing was not Oversight consistent with NRC standards.

5/27/1997 NRC Operations The boric acid and boras staged for use during execution of Dresden inadequate IR 97009 emergency operating p.ocedures were in poor material condition. Osersight 5.23/1997 Self Resea'cd Plant Support A self rescaling event occurred wh:re two workers could not exit from a Inadequate 97010 posted and controlkd high radiat on area (IIRA) becaun a contract i

Osersight radiation protection technician (RPT) failed to ensure all workers were out of the 11RA before locking the door allowing egress. The dose rates in the room in which there was no egress were less than one mrem per W r.

S/23/1997 Self-Rescaled Plant Support Some poor radiation work practices were observed early in the outage. Personnel 97010 ins olving poor frisking techniques. failure to wear assigned dosimetry in Performance the designated k, cation, and failure to implement required FME Deficiency controls. Corrective actions and better oversight of radiological work actisities during the remainder of the outage impros ed worker performance.

5/23/1997 NRC Plant Support With the exception of some discrepancies noted with the calibration and Teamwork / Skill 97010 test resuhs of alpha monitoring equipment, the oserall calibration and Level test program for alpha monitoring, the whole body frisker the whole body counter and tool monitoring equipment was well implemented.

Page 10 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W*c-97 Dresden

.DATE ID fly SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5'23/1997 NRC Plant Support Although the os erall RP training program was w ell implemented, a Personnel 97010-minor s ictation was issued for the failure to follow a training Performance procedure related to initial training on a new instrument. Deficiency 5/23/1997 NRC Plant Support Refueling outage dose (D3R14) was well contro!!ed (about 150 person- Teamwork / Skill 97010 rem). Personal dose from rework, which wes significant during Lesel previous ounges, was reduced. The stations improved work process program was iristrumental in implementing more effective improved planning, scheduling and work control. He radiation protection

" greeter" program used to enforce station requirements was effective.

Conservative actions were taken for all uork where the potential for alpha airborne contamination was possible.

5/20'1997 Self-Roealed Maintenance On May 20, the Unit 3 turbine tripped after the MSDT emergency valve Personnel 97012 failed opened ne supply air line to the 3B MSDT emergency level Performance control transmitter was disconnected. De licensee concluded that the Deficiency technician who had earlier perfonned work on the htSDT failed to connect the air line from the regulator to the emergency level transmitter IR 97012).

"**"""* A string of feedwater heater tripped, and the operators rapidly reduced Equipment ' 97009 5/19/1997 Self-Revealed power from Malfunction 100 *. power to 100MWe.

"*"""" """""* Unit 2 Startup " " " " * " 97009 5/16/1997 5/16/1997 Licensee Maintenance PreconJitioning of Unit 3125 sott de Alternate 54ttery prior to service Personnel LER 249 97-006 test. Performance -

Deliciency 5/12/1997 NRC Maintenance The outage control center (OCC) functioned adequately and was Teamwork / Skill IR 97007 providing the sersaces expected from it. Personnel stafling the OCC Level understood their positions and objectives, and uere generally supporting the outage adequately.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-lar-91 Dresden DATE ID By SALP DESCRIPTIDN CAUSE REF 4f30/1997 Other Operations Potential to By pass Containment Pressure Suppression Due to Engineerint/De LER 237/97-011-00 Inadequate Safety Evaluation and Resiew of Procedures. Cause: . sign Deficiency Procedural resiew and correctise actions. Ops and engineering both did not address this in a timely manner.

4'24/1997 NRC Plant Support Radiation workers were obsened failing to follow DAP 12-35 with Personnel IR 97007 regard to the use of TLDs and EDs. Speci6cally, on at least sis Performance occasions radworkers were observed insertir.g TLDs and EDs into Deficiency protectise clothing pocket without regard to the Beta window.

4'23/1997 NRC Maintenance Test performers failed to serify the correct revision of Dresden Personnel IR 97007 Instrument Procedure (DIP) 0700-06. "LPRM Pre-Installation Insulation Performance Resistance and Ilreakdown Voltage Acceptance Checks," was utiliicd Deficitncy prior to actual work. The surveillance used Resision 2 of DIP 0700-06 when the current sersion was Resision 3.

4 02/1997 NRC Maintenance The licensee failed to perform a modified performance test on the Unit 3 Inadequate IR 97007 20 VDC battery in the "as found" condition. Prior to the test, correctis e Procedure / Instr maintenance, which included replacement of a cell, replacement ofinter- uction tier cables, replacement of post seals. and cleaning of the cell to ceil connections was performed. In addition. prior to the test, a 222-hour equalizing charge was placed on the battery.

4/22/1997 NRC Maintenance Maintenance technicians uere obsened performing welding actisities on Inadequate IR 979007 the '"3B" heat exchanger monel stud plate without the minimum work Procedure / Instr package information required by DAP 15-06. uction 4/22/1997 NRC Maintenance Maintenance technicians welding on Low Pressure Cooling Personnel IR 97007 injection Containment Cooling Ileat Exchanger "3B" monel stub plate Performance failed to serify interpass temperature as required by the wcid data sheet Deficiency and Weld Procedure NSWP-W-01. Welding was conducted without a iemperature stick or pyrometer in the work area to verify interpass temperature.

4/18/1997 NRC Maintenance L hanges to an emergency diesel generator suncillance were incorrect Inadequate -97006 and improperly made. Oversight l' age 1,1of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-lar-'7 Dresden DATE IDflY SALP DESCRII710N CAUSE REF 4/18/1997 NRC Operations The inspectors idertified no formal guidance for monitoring oil lesels in inadequate 97009 condensate / condensate-booster pump bearings. Procedure / Instr uction 4/18/1997 'NRC Engineering After the issue was identified at a different Comed station, engbeering's Personnel 97006 approach to determining the extent and efrects of a potential contact Performance failure problem on 4-LV Merlin-Gerin breakers was thorough and Deficiency technically sound. Iloweser the system engineer missed a prior opportunity to identify the problem with the auxiliary switch when a indicator flag on one 4-LV breaker was identified to be incorrectly in its mid-position 4/I8/1997 NRC Maintenance in lieu of DAP 07-27, which requi es independent serification be Personnel IR 97007 performed on all lifted leads insniving technical specification or safety- Performance related equipment, a "second checL* w as performed during the Deficiency performance of Dresden Instrument Suneillance (DIS) 1600-14

" Reactor fluilding Vent Stack flow Monitor Functicnal Test," Rev. I Step I.8.c.

4/l8/1997 NRC Operations For those activities _ bsened. .he inspectors concluded that the operating Teamwork / Skill 97006 crews performed major evolutions, such as the two unit shutdow ns, in a Lesel controlled manner. The crews anticipated the plant responses to various evolutions and tests.

4/1811997 NRC Plant Support Sta: ion security personnel assigned to monitor the auxiliary electric Teamwork / Skill 97006 equipment room fire and security doors and to act as fire watches were Level knowledgeable of their duties.

4'17/1997 NRC Maintenance A cognizant supen isor (test director) changed DES 8300-20, based on a Personnel iR 97007 corporate engineering recommendation (DOC No. DG-97-000513, dated Performance April 14,1997) that the "as found" requirement be wais ed. Deleting the Deficiency "as found" prerequisite u as an intent change, and the cognizant supervisor did not terminate the procedure or perform a permanent change in accordance with station procedure and revision processing.

nige 15 of $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX OSaw97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION 4 CAUSE REF 4/17/1997 NRC Maintenance Inadequate FME controls, required by DAP 03-23, were identified when inadequate .97007 electrical mainte. nce technicians failed to replace the valve cover for Osersight Motor Operated Valse 3-220-3 for about two and one-half hours afler leaving the work area. The vahe's limit switch and electrical connections were left unprotected.

4/17/1997 NRC Maintenance inadequate FME controls, required by DAP 03-23, w ere identified in the Personnel IR 97007 -

main steam isolation valve (MSIV) X-room. Excessive amounts of Performance protective clothing rubber shoe cos ers, plastic protective clothing, rags Deficiency and rubber gloves were laying around in the area uncontrolled.

4/17/19 " NRC Maintenance An instrument maintenance department technician obtained an Personnel IR 97007 unauthorized safety key from an IMD Ley lockerand not from the shifl . Performance superviwr. Deficncy 4/I6/1997 1.icensee Maintenar.ce Unit 2 welds on containment penetration supporting "B" low press::re Engineering /De 97007 coolant injection (LPCI) found outside of Updated Final Safety Analysis sign Deficiency Report (UFSAR) allow able stress limits resulting in LPCI system inoperability.

4/I6/1997 Licensee Operations Source Rane* Wnitor Surveillance performed at incorrect frequency. Inadequate . LER 237 97-009 Procedure / Instr uction Page 16 of 57

L PLANT ISSUES MATRIXi 09-Ar-97!

> .: /

( '

F -

Dresden a

p

~DATE i ' ID BY hic SALP_ DESCRIPTION REF

[.nf[ i CAUSE.. h:.

s

'f/IS/1997 L 'NRCl ' Engineering lHe licensee's implementation of the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) - Other/NA Draft 96008 r No. Rill-96-016 dated November 21,' 1996 was generally good. ne .

' following w eaknesses were obsened- +

Numerous editorial errors (e.g., spelling, typographical problems, minor - '

inaccuracies, etc.) w ere identified in most of the documents reviewed by i ,

, the inspectors, Although no significant technical errors were identified.

' Pil's generated by engit ering during reviews of 12 risk significan: -

sys'. ems and PIFs generated by DAEG activities were lost.

Numerous deficiencies identified by recent Comed audits were not " .

I obsened for similar problems by the Nuclear Utilities Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) audit process at the same . .

architecuengineering facilities. De "Special" audits performed by ,

i Comed are not cutomatically provided to NUPIC.  !

i 4/14/1997 NRC Engineering Since mid-April, gradual improvement in DEAG activities had been . Teamwork / Skill : <

Draft 97008 ' ,

observed, such as,1) initiation of DEAG weekly meetings; 2) , . Level - ,

improvements in the DEAG desktop procedure and review sheets; 3)

DEAG's identification of the documents developed by engineering (e.g., .,

' calculations, setpoint changes, etc.); 4) theincrease in the number of PIFs " ~

Eenerated; and 5) addition ofpersonnel.

4/14/1997 N82C Maintenance DIS 1600-03

• Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Relicf Va.ve Trip Un;t Personnel. 'lR 97007 i Calibration 2," Rev. 8. tcL perfbrmers failed to turn off the po ver supply . Performance to the tesi modules as directed by the procedure to secure the e piipment < Deficiency .

in a safe state. >

4/13/1997 NRC . Maintenance inadequate FME controls, required by DAP 03-23; were identified inadequate .. IR 97007 "

' during a plant tour, when old and new contial rod drive _ scram solenoid - Oversight .

pilot valves were observed in an unspecified Fr@ Zone area in Unit 2. . t The new valves were intended to be installed in Unit 3. He valves were not fully proter *ed at the pipe ends to prevent dirt and debris from ,

• entering and degrading the valves. "

n l' age 17 of 57 '

k

. . . . ;_ _x___ _~s . . . . . - _ - - . . _

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M-Dx-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4 10'1997 Self-Revealed Unit 2 forced outage due to ausilary ctmtact su itch problems =ith 4 kV Equipment 97006 (Ref. LER 249 97-breakers. Malfunction 005) uno""=

3 09/1997 **"**"n. Una 3 was shut down to emnmence pland debg ege. ~~~ MM i

3 2971997 Self-Rescaled Engineermg isolation Condenser spurious Group V isolation due to steam flash in EngineermgDe LER 249 97-004 condensate retum line due to design installatkm denciency. sign Deficiency 32'/1997- ' irensee Opera:ims Licensed Operators fail to Perfonn Techmcal Speci6catkm LCO Persmnel LER 249 97-002-00 Requirement Suneillance Due to Progran matic Failure to Task Performance Methak>kigy and lluman Error. DeSciencs

• A power sunei!!ance was mw performed while the U 3 EDG was j

? kelated inoperable. .

i 3 02/1997 Licensee Operations Licensed Operator failed to perfonn Tech Spee LCO required Penornel LER 249 97-002 j surwibance (DOS 0040-09. Unit 3 Operating Ptm er Sources and Performance l Distributkm) due to programmatic failure and human error. De6ciency 1

3!!9/1997 Licensee Operatkms A non-licensed operator who was operatmg the emergency diesel Teamwork 3 kill 97006 [

generator (EDGi demonstrated esce!!cnt attention-to-detail and a Lesel questioning attitude and presented a trip of the EDG.

3r3:1997 N"C 1%nt Support liigh radiation and high contamination area worker briefings were Teamworiskil! 90016 thorough. Personnel working in the radiation protection area had a good Lesel understanding of radiation u ork permit requiremem 30!!997 NRC Engineering The resiew of seseral open oper.bihty es aluatior.4 for both units Other:NA 96016 indicated that the esatuations, equipment status, and schedule to restore the sy stems or compenents to fully operable status appeared reasonable. I 2/26/1997 Licensee Engineering Unit 2 LPCI recirculation loop line break detection of 900 psig reactor InatLquate LER 237 97-007 permissive setpoint set outside of design basis limit due t7 personnel Procedure 1nstr error. uction 2/26'1997 Licensee Operation SRO Absent from Main Control Romn Due to Loss of Focus on Inter Personnel LER 237!V7-G500. O f ,

Duties Perfernance Caum Personnel error (didn't keep duties in minds. Deficiency  ;

l'ayy th7 f Y

I PLANT ISSUES MATRIX NC Dresdert DATE IDI!Y SALP DESCRIPTION cat;5E REF 20F1997 1.icensee Operations Unit 3 unit supeniwr left the conhes of the control rooni fiw 6 minutes Perwmnet IR 97004 (Reference LLR

= bile workiny on loop select logic probk-nt The Umt 2 unit supenbor Performance 249 97 4)6) me j the absenc and recalled the indnidual to the control romi. Deficiency 2/13/1997 Licensee Lngineering LPCI kxy select logic was set noncomen atis e (900 ss. 940) due to inadequate !R 97004 prtwedural error. Thi< item was identifed as part of the I I ?! 96 CAL Procedure-1mtr actums. actkm 2lIO!!997 1.icensee Plant Support Actual tampermg with scci.rty equipment Security guard site access Perwone; ENS 31759 authoniation ooAed. Performance Deficiency 2 941997 Licensee Ntaintenance Transposed cabbratk.n data resulted in resersal oflow Nw trip and reset Personnel IR 9M4 setpoints tm the IIPCI km floa suitch. Performance Deficiency 2 9'I997 Licensee htaintenance Unit 3 IIPCI low Nw setpoint calibration found outside Tech Spec limit Persmnet LER 249 974)I due to inattentkm to detail during the recording and resiew of Proious Performance cahbration data. Deficiency 281997 Licensee Operatiom Channel Checks for AT% 5 Lesci & Pressure Instruments Pertmned at Inadequate LER 23797-004-00 Incorrect Freqtrency Due to Persmnet Error During Procedure Resiew Procedure 1mtr C3cle. An inadequate procedure due to perwmnel errors in preparatkm uctkm and toiew.

2/8/1997 NRC Operations folkm ing a mispositioned (one notch in ss, one notch out) control rod Comenarise IR 97004 issue operations management did an assosment and concluded that the Daision control rod mkpositioning when siewed with other recent esents indicated a decfinc in operstkms perfiwmance. Alanagement did not increase pow er (=hich was down fi r a ctmdensate demincra!irer sen ice unit problem) tmtil the correctise actkms were started.

2/5/1997 Licensee Ntaintenance Licemee determined that Unit 3 indkated total core flow was Perxmnci AtR 3-97-0015 significantly below actual. Perfonnance Deficiency 1/30'1997 NRC Plant Support A siolation involsing a failure to properly limit personnel access inadegnie IR 97002 authoritation to a sital area was identified by the impector. Osersight l' age 29 r.f F

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ovar#

Dresden DATE D BY SALP DESCRII410N CAUSE REF

!!3fr1997 Liensee Plant Support A non-eited siolatkm imohed a failure to termma:e a security badge b a TeamwaLSkill IR 97002 timely manner =as identified by the licensee. Thrs failure demomtrated Lesel ueak coordination betw een cerperate and site security.

IGO!!997 NRC Plant Support Security force members sho med a gww! working knowledge of security TeamworL3 kill IR 9'TK)2 requirements and team work between different organizational lescis Lesel within the security orga'izatkm.

I/30'1997 NRC Plant Support Securny intruskm equipment was obsened to be working as designed. TeamworL5 kill IR 97002 A good working relationship eMsted between the security organization Loel and maintenance gneps.

I/29'1997 NRC Operations Opentors were attendant to the panels, knowledgeable of the reasons for Teamwork $kift 97004 ht annuncim. and reare of actisities in the plant. Lesel

• ""*""* *""""" Unit 3 recctor crnical after forced outage. '"""""

I /2'r1997 1/29/1997 NRC Operations The startup of Unit 3 was perfimned safely with most communicatkms TeamworLSkill 9N)04 and command ar d control being good Lesel i/27/1997 Licensee Engineering Soeral piping systems found outside code allow abies per NRC GL 96- EngineermgT)e ENS 31670

06. sign Deficiency 1/27/1997 Licensee Engineering Unit 2 containment penetrations outside design bais due to anal) sis of Enginectmg1)e LER 237 97-003 ,

thermally induced post-accident over-presswizatkm. sign Deficiency

, 1/24/1997 NRC Operations Operators were attendant to the panels, and knowledgeable of the Teammork$ kill IR 96016 (draft) reasons for ht annunciators. and aware ofplant actiiiees. Loct l t f201997 NRC Engineering Self assessments in the MOV area pro ided good sect:nical findings and TeamworL5 kill 96015 were beneficial in improsing the MOV program floweser.the tracking Loci of correctis e actions, was not formalized unti! after the MOV self- I assessment.

1/20/1997 NRC E.rgineering Knowledge of MOV site engineering team was good, as = as corporate TeamsorL5Lill 96015 interfa:es. Lesel

$ e

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Sh#

Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF I!!7/1997 Licensee Wintenance I&C technician emmeously set the setpoint for the Unit 2 45'. reactor Personnel ENS 31617 power by pass for the load rejectturbine trip scram signal Performance nonamsenatisely at a pressure corresponding to apprmimately 50". Deficiency power. EUsted for approdmately 4 days, I/15/1997 NRC Engineering Records for a safety-related change to the suppresskm chamber. Inadequate IR 97003 imoising the instalbtion (in 1984) of a drain down pump.did not Osersight include a written safety es atuathm to prmide the basis for the determination that the installatkm of the drain pump did not involve an unresiewed safety questkm. l Il15/1997 NRC Engineering The impow identified a pump installed in the Unit 2 torus basement inadequate IR 97003; NOV that lacked nstallatkm documentatkm and for whoch an installation Osersight safety esaluation had not been performed.10 CFR 50.59 siolation iswed I/15/1997 NRC Engineering The inspector considered the rmplementation of the ASME code. Section Self-Critical IR 97003 XI. Class MC requirements in containment coating impettkm procedures, to be a positise step tow ard maintaining the tnrus and containment material conddkm.

!!!$/1997 NRC Engineering The inspector was smable to determine appropriate correctis e actions for Other.NA IR 97003; ORI torus pitting (pitting repairs and or pi: ting characteristion) had been performed as assumed in the boundmg enginectmg calculations.

]

I/15/1997 NRC Maintenance Control room s entilarion project personnel completed significant repairs Teamwork $ kill 96016 with good coordmation between the s entilation group and other plant Lesel personnel.

i 1.?/1997 Licensee Engineering A resiew of the resiew of the UFSAR and Conas ButTalo electncal Engineering 1)e LER 97-001-01 penetraion assembly sendor manuals determined that there were two sign Deficiency Primary Containment twndaries on Unit 2 and Unit 3 which had never been challenged by a Ty pe B Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) 1/9/1997 1.icensee Maintenance Unit 2 Turbmc First Stage Pressure Scram Bypass Switches adjusted Personnel LER 237 97-002 outside Technical Specification limits. Performance Deficiency Page:I of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W- h 97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF li1997 Licensee Engineering Primary containment electrical penetratkms neser sutjected to type B Inadequate LER 2379700I kwal leak rate test due to breakdown of malificatkm process. Both units Osersight affected.

12'20!I996 Licensee Engineermg ECCS sy stems may be suseptible to NPSil problen.s due to suctxm Erigineering De ENS Call 31495 (Ref.

strainer design being based on an incorrect head loss s alue. Design was sign Denciency LER 237 96-022) based on I foot drop across strainers. new cales show a 5.5 foot drep.

Licenwe op es al was operable but degraded. Operators =ill throttle back flow if casitation is obsersed, sufrecient flow will be asailable.

Licensee to submrt an emergency TS change to take credit for 2 psi containment oserpressure and limit torus and (CCSW) sersice water temp. to 75 F to ensure adequate NPSI1. Long term a new analysis will l be done and torus and sersice water restored to 05 F. LER 23796022 12/19/1996 NRC Maintenance The licensee failed to do post-modi 6 cation testing on the Unit 2/3 main Inas.4. equate 96014 control room IIVAC system. Oversight 12/13/1996 NRC Plant Support An assembly drill was successfully run. T:amwork/ Skill IR 96016 (draf0 Level 12/13/1996 NRC Maintenance Repair of the reactor recirculatim pump motor was completed Teamwork' Skill 96016 successfully in a wett controlled manner. Lesel 12/9'1996 Licensee Plant Support Failure to declare refuel floor radiation monitor inoperabie and take Inadequate LER 23796021 technical speci6 cations required action due to inadequate 10 CFR 5039 Procedure 1nstr safety esaluation. A design issues uovisheet was not used as intended uction because the procedure failed to require it.

12/6/1996 NRC Operations NRC identined houskeeping and pnklem identification weakness in Personnel IR 96014 Unit 3 LP heater bay. Performance De6ciency 12/6/1996 NRC Engineering Inspector resiew of two temporary afterations identified some problems Personnel IR 960:4 w ith implementation and technical esaluations. This is an unresolsed Performance.

item. DeSciency 12/6/19 % NRC Maintenance Significant repair work on the 3B reactor recirculatkm pump motor was in olved IR 96014 well esecuted and managed. Management l' age 22 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-Dx-W Presden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 1I!27/1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance Unit 2 IIPC1 m as declared inoperable due to water in the oil. Water Personnel IR 06014 leaks were found in the tube oil cooler, and a rag uas discoscred in the Performance cooler w ater tm which blocked significant portions of the cooler tube Deficiencv openings. Licensee suspected the rag was present smce constuction.

Reference ENS 31300. LER 23796018 I IC6'1996 Self-Revealed Plant Support Computer accounting system failed at the beginning of the plant Equipment IR 06014 assembly drill causing confusion. A thorough dri!! critique identified Malfunction deficiencies and correctise actions.

I l'25/1996 NRC Engineering During res iew of the EDG test sahe ejection, the inspectors noted that Personnel IR 96014; VIO .

the sy stem engineer failed to incaporre a!! sendor data into the sendor Performance equipment technical informatkm program. Deficiency i10 4'1996 Licenwe Maintenance Stop work order w as issued in response to the prccurement and uw of Personnel IR 96014 non-safety-related parts. The was partia!!y in response to the 3 A CRD Performance purnp isolation sahe which had a pinhole Icak. Deficiency I!!2I/1996 Licensee Maintenance Stop w erk order issued due to contractors not adhereing to facility safe Personnel IR 46014 work practices. The stop uork was of short duration. Performance Deficiency iI/2!!!996 NRC Operations Operators used a consen atise approach to esaluate a turbine control Consenathe 96016 s ahe which was stuck closed. The plant operations resicw committee Decision performed a thorough resiew of the turbine contro! vahe test plan.

It/15/1996 Self-Rescaled Plant Support Unit I Diesel Drisen Fire P.smp failed surereillance. The cause was a Equipment IR 96014 closing of the fuel supply solenoid sahe that ocurred when a power lead Malfunction to the vahe sibrated oft. The inspectors subsequently identified that the local diesel fuel storage tank level float w as not working correctly. The inspectors also requested information about the lesel sw itches calibrations and the licensee determined that the switches were not in the calibration program.

I IIR/1996 NRC Engineering Deficiency 96201-28. Failure to implement commitments to GL 83-28 Inadequate ISI '

and GL 90-03. This issue has been cited. Osersight Page 23 cf F ,

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX. vo-tw 97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF II/8!!996 NRC Engineering Deficiency 96201-19 Failure to test the Umt 2.125 Vdc battery at the *""*""* IS!; LER 23796019

. speci6ed amperage s alue is contrary to the requirements of procedure DES 8300-28. The failure to demonstrate performance of an acceptable sen ice test of the Unti 2. 250 Vdc battery is contrary to the eyeu enents of TS 4.9.A3.

I1/8/1996 NRC Operations Centrol room operators preperly controlled operational actisities, such as Teamwork' Ski!! ISI j suneillance tests, strictly followed procedures in most circunstances. Lesel and communicated effectisely.

1I/8!!996 NRC Engineering Deficiency %201-2 L The failure to perform a prompt operability Personnel ist determination for CRilVAC within the time speci6ed by DAP 07-31. Performance Subsequent ditferntial pressure measurements of the surrounding area DeGciency showed that 1/8 iug was not maintained.

I!!8/1996 NRC Plant Support The 1996 esposure goal of 440 person-r:m m a= the low est esposure goal TeamworL3 kill ISI established at Dresden Station. As of Nosember 7.1996, the station Lesel accrued 376 Rem.

1Ir8/1996 NRC Plant Support From January 1.1996 through Nosember I1.1996,the licensee reduced involved ISI the number of het spots from 84 to 42 and planned to reduce this number Managernent to about 20 by the end of the Unit 31997 refueling outage.

I I78'1996 NRC Maintenance PIFs wcre not written when required after the results of the oil sznple PersonncI ISI exceed the acceptance crneria; or uhen the Unit 3 ECCS kcm fill pump Performance discharge check vahe failed open during post-maintenance testing. De6ciency i I f8/1996 NRC Engineering Deficiency 96201-13. ISI identified numerous cumples of the failure to EngineeringDe ISI perform safety evaluations per 10CFR 50.59. Eumples inchale sign Deficiency I) potential USQ regarding CCSW Gow and 20 psid during a LOCA,2) a 50.59 esaluatkm w as not performed to change the alignment of seseral lIPCI salves positions. 3) Inadequate 50.59 for changing IIPCI isolation setpoints. 4) Failure to properly evaluate the llPCI steam trap replacement uith an orifice.5) Failure to perform safety evaluations for

, installed temporary alteratkms.

l' age 24 of $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W -t w o Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF i1101996 NRC Engineermg ne team's resiew of the DBD. FSAR. and ECCS calculations showed EngineeringDe ISI that the licensee did not hase net positise suction head asailable sign Deficiency calculations that reficcted the licensed plant configuration. The team's resicw of the existing ca!culations, ahich prosided some informa: ion about NPS11. showed a number of errors in the design control of assumptkms and inputs I I/8'I996 NRC Plant Support Deficiency %201-06. Contaminated stanchkm found in uncontrolled inadequate 151 area Failure to maintain control of radioactis e material contraq to the Osersight requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802 11/3'1996 NRC Maintenance Deficiency %201-20. The procedures used to test the control rotwn inadequate ISI IIVAC sy stem and boundaries were not epp wie to circumstances. Procedure 1nstr contrary to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendis B.Cnterkm V. uctkm II:8'1996 NRC Engineering Deficisocy 96201-22. The ISI identified numerous examples of the Enginectmg'De 151; CAL failure to translate the design into drawings. specificatkms, and sign Deficiency procedures, contran to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. Appemlis B.

Cnterion Ill. CAL issued. Examples included omisske of electrical loads in the 125 VDC battery sizing calculatkm, cable lengths and resistances incorrect, nonconsersatise 250 VDC batten sizing calcutlion (it did not accurately determine battery duty cycle loading).

I1:8'1996 NRC Plant Support Deficiency %201-03. Failure to specify a masimum stay time on a Inadequate . ISI radiatkm work permit and maintain locked high radiation area doors Osersight locked contrary to TS 6.12.2 and 10 CFR 20.1601 11/8/1996 NRC All Multiple Deficiency 96201-I-1. De ISI identified numerous examples of the ISI failure to implement correctis e actkms contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendis B.Criterim XVI. Dese examples include the failure to address longstanding IST issues (SWSOPI valse deficiencies identified by NRC in 1993). CREV deficiencies, and SBLC VAT vulnerabihties closed with no action.

l' age 25 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-R e-'7 Dresder:

DATE ID BY SA DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 1178/!996 NRC Engineering The ISI team identified that the licensee w as unable to maintain the EngineermgVe ISI design basis of the containment cooling senice water 53 stem under sign Dc6ciency certain conditions, and identiGed significant w eaknesses in the licensee s control of design basis calculations, mcluding a number of errors and nonconsenatise design assumptions LER 23796020 II!8!!996 Other Mainamance Testing weaknesses resulted in the failure to detect degraded sy stems and inadequate ISI components. Isgstanding programmatic problems = ith the in senice Osersight test (IST) program u ere not comprehensisely addressed from 1987 to 19%. Relief saise serpoints difTered significantly in some cases, from design pressures established for safety-related systems. Or patunities to address the IST program deGciencies, early in 1996.were om promptly recognized and esaluated. The licensee and ISI team k!cntified additional testing concerns insolving the 125 Vdc batteries. and the 250Vdc ba:teries and sentilation systems.

I1/8/1996 NRC Maintenance Two limit switches were not reworked and the PMTs were not Personnel Ist reperformed contrary to the work instructions, work to repair the Performance electrical cabinet for the 2/3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) fan was Deficiency not performed IAW the work instructions.

I1/813996 NRC Plant Support Deficiency %201-02. Failure to survey the work area (Unit 2 hotwell, Personnel ISI Unit 3 reactor buikling oserhead) and assess the potential readioksical Performance hazards wcre contrary to the requirements of the radiation work permit Deficiency and 10 CFR 20.1501.

II/8/1996 NRC Operations Osera!!, operator performance was a notew orthy strength. Teamwo-L/ Skill nSt imel i1/8/1996 NRC Plant Support Deficiency %201-05. The ISI identified that some licensee uorkers Personnel ISI w ere not an are of the radiological conditions in their work areas and that Performance these work areas w ere not restored to prework conditions after DeGeiency completing the w ork.

1%ge:6of $7

PLANT ISSUE.S MATRIX OW 'T Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRii" TION CAUSE REF 10 06/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance A manual reactor trip was initiated in restmse to the loss of the 3B Equipment IR 96014 Reactor Recirculation Pump. Licensee took plant to cold shutdoun Malfunction during troubleshooting. Cause was ground ort "C" phase of pump motor stator due to insulatkm breakdown. Root cause appeared to be a wire labeling strap that was foand in stator windings and damaged the insulation. Material probably entered motor in 1990-1991 when the endbell was remmed for maintxnce.

i 10 06'I996 Self-Rescaled Operathms The plant response to the loss of a single reactor recirculation pump was Equipment IR 96014 '

in accordance with espectations and plant design. The control room Malfunctkm ,

operators followed procedures and conducted an orderly sh,rtdown.

In:18f1996 Licensee Engineering From January 1995 through May 1995. Unit 3 primary containment Teamwork: Skill IR 96013; App Vio Icalage w as greater than 0 6 La due to leakage past the inboard and Lesel i outboard MSL drain primary containment isolation sahes. The root cause w as attnbuted to poor maintenance imtructions for sshe assembly and lack of licensee esperience w ith Anchor Dartmg double disk gate sahes Reference tER 24995007 10'18:1996 NRC Plant Support the contaminated material control program has imprmed since April Inadequate IR 96013 1995. Ilowescr. correctise actions such as minimiring the number of Oversight "outside" RPAs and efTectisely centrolling all outside RPAs hase mx been fully implemented. Con.inued imprmement in the control of contaminated material was needed.

10'l8/1996 NRC Operations The facility was operated in a safe manner with good communication. Personnel IR 96013 Minor discrepancies continue to occur and attention to detail type issues Performance were obsersed. Deficiency 10!!8/1996 NRC Engineering Design engineering response to isolation condemer supg. and Teamwork $ kill IR 96013 feedwater anchor issues was goal. Lesel 10/17/1996 NRC Engineering I) Lack of 125 VDC and 250 VDC breaker to breaker coordination for Engineering'De IR 96012; 2 URis nonsafety related loads. 2) Dresden's actions to address cable ampacity sign Deficiency ,

concerns hase been slow in resohing this issue.

I Page 27 of 5" i

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec 97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAL 3E REF 10!!7/1996 NRC Engineering 10 CfR Part 50. Appendis B. Criterkm V. siolation issued for Personnel IR 96012; NOV inadequate maintenance procedure for 4kV Iwakers. Inpsectors found Performance th.a a more thorough OPEX program resiew ofindustry initiatises may Deficiency hase identified the hardened grease issue before Dresden's 3 A LPCI pump breaker failed.

10'I7/1996 NRC Engmeering "Ik4 Shorts' Apparent Violation. Ludequate IR 46012; APP VIO Oserright 10'15/1996 Self-Rescaled Plant Support Poor job and OOS planning resulted in minor ikwling and the estension inadegaste IR 96013 of the east fire main out-of-sersice boundary. The planners did not take Procedure 1netr in to account t!.: fact that slipjomt piping w as installed on the pation of uctkm the system that u as being worked on. After the OOS was hung and the intended section of piping removed. the slip joint upstream of the isolation point gase way and resuhed in the flooding.

10'IS '1996 Self-Rescaled Engineering U-2'3 EDG Ventilation Fan Power Supply Breaker inoperable. Fire in a Equipment IR 96013 breaker control power transformer on the U-2 side of the ahemate power Malfunction '

supply breaker for the " swing" EDG sentilaton fan. 7 day LCO. U-3 side of EDG ixe affected. Weak initial root cause esatuation resulted in additional troubleshooting. The esent demonstrated the licensee's difficulity in identifying root causes of equipment failures. LER 24996016 10 3/1996 Licensee Engineering Sy stem Engineering k>und that the control room could not be pressurized Engineering'De IR 96014; App Vio to tw required pressure with re=pect to adjacent areas. Lkith units sign Defwiency entered a 14 day administratise LCO. System declared " operable but degraded on 1021. Licensee continued to repair icaks. Inoperability of Control Room iIVAC being considered for escalated enforcement.

Additional references ENS 31109; LER 23796017; ISt

[gf* . df 3

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 08-ar#

Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10 8/1996 Licensee Engineering RWCU System for Both Units Outside Design Basis. Licenze EnginecrmgI)e ENS 3Ii15 determined that if the pressure reducing sahe (PRV) faiicd open. and sign Deikiency the high preswre isolatkm instrumentaron hwh failed. the dow nstream low pressure prpmg uould be om p uwdied. If the PRV failed open. it would drop a mavimum of 900 psig (as designedL in order to asoid oserpressurizing the downstream ptpmg (w ith a ccuou ud i. ment failure) the PRV would need about 950 psig drty. Licensee isolated RWCU on both units and installed a mechanical gag (temp alt.) on the PRV for each unit. RWCU was returned to senice_

The RWCU system did net satisfy the current licensing requirements for systems that had a direct imerface with the reactoc coolant syvem skice a single pressure sw stch was used to initiate the isolathm of both the inboard and outbcard containment isolaten valses.

10 31996 Licenste Maintenance U-3 IIPCI sy stem declared inoperable due to a high area temperature Equipment ENS 31083;IR 96013 reading during a sun eillance and idemification of a 11PCI oil sprem Malfunctim problem. One of four instruments was readmg abose licensee administratise limits (of 120 deg. F).

During U-3 IIPCI test, the Vd: aus oil pump found off. The "high oil pressure shut-off' pressure switch had been reset to about 75 psig_ in 9'06 (w as about 86 psig). Pressure from shaft dris en oil pump w as about 75 psig, so aus pump tripped due to high pressur~ as espected LER 24996015 Durmg U-3 IIPCI test, the Vdc emergency oil pump would net start.

Breaker problem.

9/30/1996 Licensee Operations Material deficiencies included service water strainers backwash functim inadequate WJ13 in manual instead of automatic mode (an operator uork aroundL and an 1%cedure' Instr inadequate traseling screen w ash nozzle spray pattern a!!owing for some uction fish carry-oser imo senice water system.

IDge :9 ef $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-ae97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 930:1996 NRC Mainterme The inspector noted that DOS 6600-01. Diesel Generater Surseillance Inadequate W413 Tests. senGed that the compressors start at 220 psig. not 250 psig as lhedurelnstr indicated by the UFSAR. The licensee indicated that the UFSAR would uctkm be resised to read that the recch er pressure was maintained greater than or equal to 220 psig.

930!!996 Special NRC Independent inspectkm Team begins first 2 w eek onsite Special NRC Inspectiott i inspectkm. Interim esit 10 II 96. Back onsite 1023 with interim exit i1:3% Public Esit planned for 12/1296 at the Dresden site.

92rl096 Seif-Rescaled Operations U-213 Power Reduction Due to Shad * (fish) Run. Licensee reduced Conservatis e IR 96013;OPEN power on both units due to high D P on sersice water strainers. Strainers Decision were fouled due to a fish run. Power was reduced to asoki equipment high temperatures. No temperature increases wcre identified. No problems with circulating water or main condenser sacumm. Last fish run on !02;%

9 27/1996 NRC Maintenance lhe inspectors resicw ed the past and current data tables for action Other NA 96013 requests ( ARs) and work requests (WRs) both for outage and non-outage, planned and correctise back! cgs. Each time this has been done the true backlog picture gets a little clearer. This latest recaling may establish a better standard fc. categorizing backky items, and was to match the Comed sites better.

9,26/1996 Licensee Maintenance ~Ihe plant entered a 7 day LCO actie i statemen: w hen U-2 IIPC! was Equipment ENS Call (31061);OPEN declared inoperable due to the pump discharge temperature esceeding Malfunction 150F. The cause of the increaw is being investigated. In the past, this has been due to discharge check s she leakage.

l' age 30 of $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX N -"

Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CALSE REF 9 25/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance lhe 3 A CP9 pump inboard sea! eshibrted leakage. The 3 A CRD pump Personnel 96013 discharge s ahe (3-301-1 A) wouki not prmide an isolation boundary and Perfamance a decision w as made to replace the non-safety rehte 1 sahe. One week Def.ciency after the repairs. a pin-hole leak appeared in the tWy of the replaced sahe. Ihe initial correctise actions was to establesh a freeze-scal Imundary to allow for sahe replacement. This failed and tne hcensee decided to encapsulate the entire discharge sahe. The encapsul-im sessel allowed cemtinued facility operation. Sesen PIFs were written to document the breakdowns in engineering mairitenance, work control, procurement, and quality control for the original replacement.

920't w6 NRC Operatitms Unit 3 NRC drywell closcout found some minor debris, broken hanger. Perwnnel 96013 inappropriately cmcred condensing pots. The licensee resobed all Performance issues. Deficiency 9/10'1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance U-3 Group I isolation Due to Falling Object Bumping Main Steam Line Personnel ENS Call (30989);IR Flow Instrument. While hoisting equipment through an open lloor plug Performar.cc 96013 OPEN in the reactor building (in one of the LPCI Core Spray comer rooms) a Deficiency stanchion, that w as support a safety barrier rope, fell through the opening. The stanchion struck the high steam flow instrument lines and a Group I isolation occured All sahes operated as designed.

9 9 1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 Control Rod J-13 Fully Scramed During Surseillance Testing. U-2 Equipment ENS Ca!!(30934) Ol'EN w as at about 84 percent power during main steam line radiation monitor Malfunctim I/2 scram functional testing. While testing RPS channel A. control rod J-13 fully inserted into the core from position 43. Power dropped to abou+

EI percent. The licensee stated that no thermal tunits uetc esceeded.

Scram solenoid pilot vahes replaced and rod tested satisfactorily. Small amount ;9 grams) of foreign material found in diaphram. Licensee considers this an isolated es ent.

l' age 31 of F

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX fN-are Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9 7/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance Time Delay Relays for U-3 Lo-Lo I esel ATWS Signal Failed to Trip Equipment ENS Call (30978) O:D within Required TS Tolerance. TNee of four time delay rel.tys failed the Malfunctim suneitlance The relays wcre replaced. The licensee concluded that U-2 w as not subject to the same failure. U-2 relay 5 tested about 1 ycar ago During the trouble s!w.-xing, after the time delay setpoint was adjusted, the relays would not consistently trip within the required tolerance The root cause imestigatkm was continuing.

9'l/1996 NRC Engineering U-3 EDG fuel oil transfer pump discharge guage eser-ranged. Third inadequate IR 06013 time in presious 8 months. The guage does not hase a safety related Osersight function. Further indication of hcense's problems in idnetifying and resching root causes.

8'30'1996 NRC Maintenance A siolation was issued for failure to follow procedural requirements in Personnel IR 96009 NOV calculating specific grasity for the Unit 3.125 Vdc battery performance Performance test. This w as amxher example of calculation errors during a 125 VJc Deficicacy battery test.

8'30'1996 Licensee Maintenance A nim-cited s solation was identified for conducting suncillance test of inadequate IR 96009 NCY secondary containment leakage in greater than 5 mph wind.. Procedurelinstr uctkm 8'30!!996 NRC Operatkms A siolation was identified for Electrical Hus 33-1 underseltage special Inadequate IR 96009 NOV test procedure which was not properly reuewed. Osersight 8'30/1996 NRC Operations A siolation was issued for failing to meet Umt 3 emergency diesel Inadequate IR 96009 NOV generator eperability requirements. Osenight 8!30!!996 Licenwe Maint-nance AtI work was stopped for concerns about worker safety when a Consenatise IR 96009 potentially lethal shc(L I om a 4LV source w as detected. The work Decision stoppage for personnel safety was a conwnatise response.

8#30'1996 NRC Engineering Followup to AIT Inspection Report 50-249 96008 identified one inadequate IR 96006cNCV example of failure to take effectis e correctise actions for past equipment Procedueellastr failures and one non-cited siolatkm fW minor procedural deficiencies. uction rage 320f57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX N'T Dresden

[

DATE ID BY SALF DESCRIITION CAUSE REF 800C996 Licensee Engmeering A ntm-cited siolatkm was identiGed for a mm-confwming conditkm EngmeeringDe IR 96009 NCY regarding the reactor prrwectise system scram pilot solenoid vahe sign Deficiency indrating lights.

8 30!1996 NRC Op-ratkms A procedure " posted in the plant was identified as not being the latest Inad:quate iR 960041FI resiskm. Continued impector folkm up of this conditkm is planned. Procedure 1mtr uctkm 8'30'1996 NRC Plant support Ctmtinued problems wcre obserseJ regarding Radiation Protectkm Personne! IR 96009 NOV Technician (RPT) perfamance. During movements of radioactise Performance waue. workers receised unplanned mtales of radmactise material due in De6ciency part to the poor performance of the RPT assigned to the job. One Colatkm was identified as a result of this oolution.

8S 0!!996 NRC Engineering further es atuatkm oflicemee's use of compression fittings fnwn v - ous Engineering De IR 96000 URI s endors is w arranted after sescral examples of mised compresskm sign Defick-ncy fittings w re discoscred in the facility.

• • • • • • • • • • • *********** U-2 STAR 'UP. Mmor pmblems during startup included two ctmtrol * * " * " " "

82 Pl996 IR96009 rods declart 3 inperable due to sticking (i c. requured high drise presure to mos e A Ill'Cl pump oischarge temp rature h;gh due to check sahe leakage (repe.t problem L and turt>ine trip during EllC oil trip test due to failed fuse.

827r 996 i Licensee Engineeriag ..rner Room Suppmt Steel Anchor Bolts Missing Smce Onginal Other-NA R1 Obscrastkm.ONiN Constructkm. Anchor bolts not installed on ma'm suppmt bem in each cithe rooms as designed. A bolt head was " tack welded' to the " comer angle." Purpose of bol s was to restrain lateral rmnement. Licemee repairing the connectkms.

823!!996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance Unespected Opening of Two LPCI Mmimun Flow Vahes While Filling Icadequate LER 50-2499641I:CNS 3A ilX . Root cause w as failed check s ahe in keep 611 system. Vahes Procedure 1nstr Call (30916) wcre reopened within 3 to 5 minutes. octkm j 8122/1996 NRC Mainteaance Syskm engineers were not censistently presidmg early schedule inputs inadequate IR 96006 to the work planning proces This frequently resulted in schedule Osersight changes prior to begining work.

Page33 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Nr#

Dresden DATE ID BY MLP DESCRIPTION < CAUSE REF s'19/1996 Licensee Engineering Accident Anafysis for RWCU llELB Outside Containment. De concern Enginecrmg De RI Obsersatim; OPEN is that Part 100 dose hmits may be esceeded dur'ng worst case sign Defwiency conditkms (i e. I-131 dow equisalent at masimum TS limit). Dresden and Quad Cities do %t hase automatic isolation of RWCU on roont temperatures or fksw. only km reactor sessel lesci and high drywell pressure. Licensee *s compensatory actkms included deseloping administratise procedures to manually isolate RWCU if kul area temperatures escceded 150 deg. F = ith~m 10 minutes.

8vi996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance 120 Vac Electrical Shock During Maintenance on Bus 23. Maintenance Personnel RI Obsersatsort: OPEN personnel not wearing proper protectise safety equipment. Cause was Performance espectatums not clearly understood to serify that termmals were de- Defwiency energized prior to cleaning and maintenance actisities and to wear proper safety equipment. Tagwt =as correct.

851946 Licensee Engineering Through-Wa!! Leak on inlet Nor21e of U-3 A-RWCU Loop. B-NRilX. Equipment OPEN Leak identified during asbestos removal project of U-3 RWCU syvem. Malfunctim Licensee later identified indications on U-3 B-RWCU Loop. B-NRilX.

but no leak. Probtable cause is IGSCC. Licensee plans to perform weld overlay ASME Code repairs on leak.

8 8'1946 1 icensee Maintenance foreign Material Discoscred in 2A SDC Loop. During inspection of 2A Equipment OPLW SDC pump discharge check sa!ve. licensee determined that sescral Malfunctum pieces of the sahe were missing. Also identified debris in prping near the sahe. Licensee performing a kmse parts analysis fir U-2 operation.

U-2 recinulatum system is not in sersice. On 8"20. licensee identifed hinge pin and kxk u asher missing from 23 SDC pump discharge check sahe.

l 4,

1 e

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 00-ar#

Dresdtn DATE ID BY SAtP DESCRIFT10N CAUSE REF 87/1996 NRC Operations inadequate Administraise Controls in Liccused Operator inadecuate IR 96009%OV Requahfication Program Stahiple cumples(5) of SROs being Procedure 1nstr remmed from reuuahlication propam and later remstated without NRC uctam notificatkm Licensee required to amma.d indhidual license if person

=as remmed from pregram. An cumple would be fcr a rotatkm to INPO. NRC identified one cumple and licensee resicwed records and identified remainder. All SROs had recched apprcpriate refred.cr training and completed re-acth atkm warches pnor to performing hcensed SCO duties.

8 &1906 SelF-Rescaled Engireering Containment Coe:mg Sersice Water (CCSW) Flow Througts 3 A LPCI Engineering De ENS Ca!!; OPEN iteat Eschange Not Achiese Required ik.a of 7000 gru with 2 CCSW sign Deficiency pumps. ( USFAF Section 6.2.1.3.2) Actual mas 6000 ppm. Also,the 3 A CCSW pump packing merheated during test. U-2 and U-3B LPCI IIXs all greater than 7000 GMP ikvm =ith 2 CCSW pumps. Licensee cicaned tubes and adjusted 11X outlet flow control salse_ f~ low sest E23 resulted in 6T!5 gpm. ENS caII retracted 8.25 Licensee determined that since one train of LPC1 was capable of 7000 gpm flow (3B IIX) and was opeiab'e when 3 A train failed. ti-3 was within design basi <. NRC resiewing the esaluatum.

7/30'1996 Licensce Mai itenance Electrornatic R lief Valses 3-0203-3B and E pressure suitches found out Other%A LER 50-249%010 of tolerance due to setpoi.it drift.

7/25/1996 Self-Res caled Ntaintenance Electrical Shock During Maintenance on Bus 34 (a 4KV safety bus). Personnel IR 96009 During inspection of Bus 34, system engine ering received minor Performance i electrical shock due to not following electncal safety procedures and DefKiency using proper safety equipment. Tagout of t ts was correct. Licensee stopped a!! onsi'.e work due to concerns w rth personal safety.

7/23/1996 Licensee Maintenan.e Degraded Secur ty Barrier from U-2 Ileater Bay (Protected Area) to inadecuate LER 50-237M)3 Radwastc Tank Area (Vital Area). Maintenance remmed the sc-wity Osenight barrier to inspect the pipe timnel between the two areas. Work package had step to inform Security prior to remming the barner Secunty was not informed when barrier was remmed Appropriate compensatory measures wcre taken.

I'sv 33 of 37 -

i PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-D w-;'

Dresden DAT E ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 7 03/1996 Self-Rescaled Mai stenance Electrical Mairitenance Wrtaout Proper Work Package or Equipment Inadequate IR 46009 Results in small Fire Electrical maintenance personnel remosing air Osersight conditioning compressor from senice buikling roof using mrch_ Not hase work package, r.ompressor not depressu@ed, and no fee estinguisher. Small oil fire occured with monor inparies to persormet Work control process failed and poor personnel performance.

7/23/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance U-3 450 VAC Circuit Breaker Failed to Remotely Ckne on Fira Equipment IR 96006URI Attempt Cause appeared to be stitTgrease on roller latch bearing. Malfuractkm Sescral of this type of breaker (GE nxxiel AK-75) hLl been merhauled by GE when the "F%9 trip circuit modification was performed. This breaker had rx4 had the modificatkm. Identified w ben licensee w as re-energireing Bus 33-1 (after cubicle & breaker merhaII). Last PM was 1994 This issue is related to the 4kV breaker problems.

7/23/1996 Licensee Engineering Petential leak Path ro By pass Contianment (Post Accident) and Poternial Engie De LER 50-237.95021-32 increaw in P.ut 100 Dme Rates. Licensee was re-esaluating IN Cfb78 sign Deficiency and octermined a gwential backleakage path fnmi reactor recirculation seals through CRD system to IICUs. Preliminary esatuation indu:ated that the Control Room Dose Limits. Part 50. App A. Genera! Design Critera 19 may be escceded. Licensee plans to modify the pnecdures to isolate this potential Ik-w path by reducing the resomse inmi 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 lxmts 7120'1996 Licensee Operatkms U-2!3 EDG Gisen Manual Start Signal in Error During Special Test. Personnel LER 50-237Wil2 During a special test of U-2'3 EDG. operator inadsertantly mosed the Performance control suitch to the Start positkm sice the Auto positkm as required by Deficwncy the procedure. The EDG had been running unloaded in the cocidown c)cle when the error occured. The EDG remained unloaded and was suqsequently placed back in the coldown cycm There war no apparent damage t< the EDG or control circuit.

l' age 36 of 5~

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 0*Dw-DT Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRit" TION CAUSE REF 7/15/1996 Licensee Operations U-3 and U-23 EDGs Out of Senice at the Same Time. U-2:3 EDG was Inaiequate LER 50-24996-009;IR inoperable to bus 33-1 during 4KV switchgear maintenance (begining on Osersight 96009 603 9% The U-3 EDG =as taken out of senice for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to perform routine monthly enabliity suncillance while U-23 EDG was std!

moperable. TS 3.9.D requires that one EDG re.nain operable with the plant in cold shutdos n. Cauw was unanticipated mcrease on J KV breakerwork scope.

7/12/1996 NRC Engin- a ring Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buikling Ventilatkm does not meet the flow Enginecrmg De IR 96M)6 URI requirements m the UFSAR. sign Defacency 7'12/1996 Licensee Operatkms Special Report Concerning inoperable Recombmers was issued. Other N A 1R 96M16 lFi 7/12!!996 NRC Plant Support Weaknesses noted in liRSS suneillar ce procedure regardmg acceptarrx Inadequate IR 460061F1 criteria and actkms to be taken if a suneiPiance test fails. Procedure 1nstr tKtion 7/12/1996 NRC Plant Support Licensee failed to take morthly tritium sampks on Unit 1 Main Chimney Personnel IR 96006h0V and the Units 2/3 Main Chimney and Reactor Buildmg Vent Stack Performance between Jcly 1995 and May 1996. NOV ror siolating TS 41A.2 (Umt Deficiency I) and TS 4 8 I IUnits 2 and 3).

7/12/1996 NRC Plant Support Psy chokyical esaluation of on-site contractor employces and site hired Personnel IR 96rX)6NCV bcensee employces was not performed in accordance vith precedure. Perftenance NCV for failure to follow procedure. Deficiency 7/12/1996 NRC Engineering SDC pump rr wn electrical penetratkms exceeded the temperature limits CegineeringDe IR 96006URI specifred in the UFSAR. sign Defsiency 7T1906 Self-Rescaled Plant Support Internal Contamination of 2 Contract Per.,onnel Working in Rafwaste inadequate iR 96009"NOV Stock Bay. Licensee was performing cleanup of material ia radwaste Oversight stock bay. During a " slow time" the Ecenwe decided to do some additional cleanup in the area Persmnel opened a couple of bags of material that were not coscred by the originaljob RWP. Not sure if the bags w-re properly marked as contammated material. Perum el not use pnper RP controls or monitoring when (Tening bags..

l' age 37 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Wacd

. Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 7/1/89u6 Licen.*e Operations PessOle Operator License Eum Compro:- ise. Licensee found cop,es of Other%A RI Otw.cnatice NRC cum m training btnkhng copier. Eum was 'mder security agttement and should hase been under lock and Aey. Of and RIII ULS sondu~ing imesti .-tion.

6 2 8'1996 Self-Re aled Engineering Lass of U-2 Annunicators for 8 minnes due to a fault on Line 1207. Equipment IR 9600F!F1

% ben power restond. ~kss of annunicator power

• alarm for control Malfunctkm

] board 902-t ud 8.02-7 remained Unit 2 m as shutdown at the inne.

6'2I/1996 Licensee operations failure to Perform TS Suncilknce on Nuclear instruments Duri !g U-3 Penennel LER 50-24'L%-M)7 f Shutdown During the powcr descension, the t* nit Supenisor (US) q Perfon sance infermed Instrument Ma:ntenanc.- department of shu down. The US did Deficiency not direct the IM staff to preform the surwir.ances t' tat wcre required during a plant shutdown. Recent SRM a .d IRM calibrations had been perfwmned satisfactorily on o 5%

601/1996 Self-Rescaled Operatio is U-3 Isolatio Condenss Group V Iwlation Vahes Automaticly Closed Equipment IR 96006. LER 50-doe to spurious ,ignal. Root cause unkonwn Iwlation occured during Malfunction 249 W.003 re-alignment of nstem during normal U-3 shutdown.

6'20'1996 Licensee Engineering U-3 Sl!UT DOwX The unit was shut down due to licensee's concerns Consenatise IR 46006 with relaibility of 4KV safety related breakers. Decision 6'11996 U-3 Sy nchronized to the Grid. " * " * " "

• 6'Ii!1996 Sc!f-Revealed Maintenance 3A LPCI Pump Breaker Not Open on First Attempt. Pump running for inadequate IR 06006 URI torus cooling. Breaker not epen on first two attempts from control Procedure' instr room. Trip solenoid had been energe ted Opened on third attempt. uction Cause for the specifk breaker failure was the trip latch roller bearmg was binding due to hardened grease. Generic cause was inadequate maintenance of 4LV breakers.

" * " * " " * ""*""" DRESDEN UNIT 3 ST ARTUP " * * * * " * * * * * " " * " *

• 6/10!!996 i 6'7/1996 Licensee Plant Support Licensee failed to take required senice water grab sample while the Personnel IR 96MWNCV.1.ER 50-senice water radiatien monitor uas inoperable. Performance 23796001 Defkiency i

rage Pi <f F

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX o*-ar-9' Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII* TION cal'SE REI' 6/1/1996 Licensee Operations Licensee delayed U-3 startup until the U-2 feedwster cmtrol system Consen athe IR 96006 imestigation had concluded that there w cre no cmcerns on U-3. Decision 53I/1996 Self-Rescaled Engmeermg U-2 Manual Scram During Feedaater Contmi System Tes:ing. %"hile EngmeermgDe .R C600630V; LER 50-modifying the logic on the new ~Baile>~ Feedwter Control system (i e. sign Deficiency 237/96004 to make a change to a gain calculatkm) the 2B FRV unespectedly ck> sed. Operators manually tripped reactor when sessellesel dropped below predetermined point. A siolatkm for fadure to folkm procedures was issued i

• "*""*" """""* U-2 STARTUP. """""* " * * " " * "

SC8'1996 5/23/1996 NRC Piam Support A contractor employce was authorized unescorted access to the fxility inadequate IR 960011FI based on presious access. The inspector concluded that a full Procedure Instr i background check was required in accordance with the secuesty plan. uctkm 5/25/1996 Self-Rocated Engineering U-2 SIIUTD0%X The unit was shutdown to repair feedwater control Equipment IR 96006 e

sys:em power supply. The failed power supply was identified during 3- Malfunction element level ctmtrol testing.

505!!996 NRC Plant Support inadequate RP Records. The licensee failed to Leep adequate records Personnel IR 96004'NOV and information important to the safe and elTectise decommissioning of Performance the facility, particularly w ith regard to spills and the spread of DeGciency contaminatkm in and around the facility. NOV for failure t- follow 10 CFR 50.75(g).

5/23/1996 NRC Plant Support inadequate Radiokyical Suncys. Soeral items in the radioactise waste Personnel IR 96u. /NOV tank rooms and infrequemly accessed high radiation areas in the Performance radioactise uaste building wcre not identiGed on the sun ey map for Deliciency entry; therefore, no sun ey information w as available for them NOV for failure to perform suncys to identify radiokyical hazards incident to w orLers.

525/1996 NRC Plant Support Security equipment maintenance bacLiog appears excessive. Inadequate IR 96(XWift Osersight l' age 39 of $~

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-De87 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5 01/1996 NRC Operations Loose Fibrous Material in U-3 Drywell. The inspectors identified loose inadequate IR 96004"NOV fibrous insulation in tN: U-3 drywell w hich had been insta!!cd as a Osersight temporary heat shield as early as 1986. Station procedures required following Reg Guide 1.33. Revision 2. Appendis A which recommends the removal of all kmse fibrous insulation from the drywcII. The insulation was rernosed. NOV for failure to follow procedures.

5/20/1996 Self-Revealed Engineering U-3 Reactor Scram Sigr.at While Shutdown Due to Trip of 3B Reactor Equipment LER 50-249 96006 Protection System MG. A thermal merload in the 3B RPS MG drive Malfunction motor I.ad tripped resulting in the loss of RPS Bus A a full scram, and the auto start of the A SBGT train with the associated reactor building isolation. The cause was detrmined to tw high ambient temperature and less than optimum design application of the thermal merload relay and heater.

$!!8/1996 Self-Res caled Maintenance Unit 3 Diesel Generator Auto-Start Due fo Electrical Maintenance Personnel IR 960043CV; LER 50-Department Personnel Error. Eiectrical maintenance department contr .t Performance 249 96005 personnel took continuity readings on the w rong terminal poirts for Bus Deficiency 34 main feed breaker. These contacts are connected to the DG auto-start circuitry. The U-3 EDG ran successfully, and no equiprr.ent damage result-d. NCV for failure to fo!!ow procedure.

5/13/1996 Self-Rescaled Engineering 3B Feedwater Regulating Vahe Failure, Reactor 1 rip, and Emergency Equipment IR 96008; LER 50-Core Cooling System Actuatkm. Reactor sessel lesel transient due to Ntalfunctkm 249 % 004 FRV vahe stem separation.11PCI injection and Group I (MSIVs) isolatkm. Two Gp. I vahes automatically retW due to faiLd relays when Gp. I signal w r.s reset. Augmented Insp,:ctim Team u as dispatched. NOV for insJequate correcthe actions for failed relays and NCV for inadequate operating proc-dures in IR 96009.

5'6/1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance 2B SFP Pump Tripped Due to liig*: D P in Dernin-fi'.-r Cause w as inlet Equipment RI Observation AOV not epening when required. Concerns with SFP nstem were Malfunction l pres iously identified in as URI 50-237,249' 9'O14-01 and closed in IR i 96002.

Page 40 of $7

Pl. ANT ISSUES MATRIX OS-arm Dresden DATE !D BY S Al.P DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/I!!996 Licensee Operations U-3 System Checklists. Licensee began a detailed resiew an.1 maikdown inso!ved IR 96004NOV of U-3 system checkhsts. 10 person team. Part of currectise actiorts hianagement from NRC identified problems =ith U-2 checkhsts. NOV $0-237;,249 96004-0I 4 26/1996 Self-Rescaled Alaintenance U-2 IIPCI Inoperable.11PCI was inoperable due to a leak in the main Inadequate LER 50 237M407-00 steam suppi> drain line. The drain line goes to the main conden Osers;ght Cause ofleak was How accelerated corrosion. Ilistory ofleaks ir. .his line (U-3 also) since 1950s.

4 22/1996 Licensee hiaintenance failure to folkm hiaintenance Work Procedures A body-to-bonnet leak Personnel IR 96004 NOV was repaired as a minor w ork item on feedw ster check vahe 2-770-623. Performance Atinor work is permitted only or. compments which do not compromise Deficiency 5

the AN1SE or 151 pressure wndary and which h.ne little potential for personnel injury. This sal e was under full reactor fe-d pressure. NOV 50-237049 96004-031) w as issued for failure to follow procedure.

U-2 RESTART. """""*

4 20'1996 * " * " " "

• 4/18/1996 Self-Res caled Staintenance UNIT 2 SilUTDOWN. The unit was shutdown because ofinability to Equipment LER 50-237/96002 meet allowed LCO inne for IIPCI system testmg Unit 2 IIPCI discharge Atalfunction line wookt cool to less than 150 F as required by procedure due to leakage past the 2-230 s-7 check =ah c.

4/17/1996 NRC Plant Support Chemical Agent Canisters ( A Response Weapon) Inoperable. Sisty-sis Equipment IR 90004 WOV percent of chemical agent canisters issued to the station secunty force Atalfunction w ere impble. The security plan requires that all canisters be operable. A 5iolation (NOV 50-237.249 96044-10) was issuco for failure to follow the security plan.

4/17/1996 Licensee Operations improper Interpretation of15 Suneillance Intenal. Licensee personnel Personnel IR 96004/NCV inappropriately applied a 25 percent " grace penod to a service water Performance grab sample frequency. The grab sample w as required as part of a TS Deficiency action statement for an inoperable sen ice w ater radiation tronitor; therefore, a NCV (50-237.249 9600444) w as issued for violating TS 3.2.F.3.

" * " " " " " " * * " * " U-2 RESTART FRON1 D2RI4. ..a....u. ...........

4!I5/1996 I' age 41 of 37

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M a r-9' Drenlen DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4/10/1996 Self-Rescaled Plant Suppmt low Lesel intake During Mamtenance. One rad:ation worker recched a Personnel IR 96004M)V low les ei intake of radioactise material during U-2 drywc!I basement Performance cleaning. The roet cause was determined to be poor radiation protection Deficiency technician coserage. A siolarion (NOV 50-237.249 WOO 4-03A) was issued for failure to perform surseys to determine the radioksical hazards incident to u orkers.

4!!0/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance APRM Circuit Card Maintenance. Licensee canabilized resistors that Inadequate IR W404 w cre thought to be spares to replace fai!cd resisitors on the same APRM Procedurefinstr card. The resisters were in fact in use and the result was in a larger than uction j espected APRM gain change. The root cause was determined to be a problem with the sendor drawing which had been incorporated into the surseillance procedure. This item uas considered an additkmd example of electrical draw ing dereiencies (U R150-237;249 95015-07).

4'4!1996 Licensee Operatkms U-2 Recirculation Loops Cross-Tie Vahe. The 2 inch sahe in the inadequate IR 96004%OV equalizing piping was found about 10*6 open during checklist resiew in Procedure-Instr response to NRC finding. License requires that sahe is shut. Unit 2 was uctkm not in operatkm at the time; howeser, had the licensee not re-performed the sy stem checklist, a license siolation could hase occurred This was one of the findings that led to a NOV for Inadequate Correcthe Actions for dergiencies in system check' hts.

(50-237.249 96004-01) 3/31/1996 Licensce Plant Support Radwaste Supersisor Tested Posithe for Alcohol During "for-cause* Personnel ENS CA!1(3021I)

FFD testing. Indhidual was denied unescorted site access pendmg Perfmmance res iew - 'Jeficiency 3129'1996 NRC Maintenance Skill of the craft wcaLnesses has resulted in numerous examples of .' ersonnel IR 96002 slowed wak completion and potential for personnel injury. Assessment ?erformaxe of skill of the craft w ill be ongoing. Deficiency 3'29'1996 NRC Engineering Untimely Resoultion of Operability Esaluations. No engineering Engineert,gT)e IR %002xRI proposal has been submitted to date in order to resche t*w tack of the sign Dermiency automatic purge mode for control room s entilation as described in the UFSAR. URI 237249 96002-07 was is~aed to track this des iatkm.

Page 42of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-D* C Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3 09'1996 Licensee Engineermg Numerous hcensee-identified UFSAR discrepancies remain to be Enginecrmg De IR 96001URI resobed. These items uere drscosered through the licen3 e's 1993 sign Deficiency UFSA R rebasciming effort. URI 50-237.249 96002-08 mill track these issues.

3 09'1996 Self-Rescaled Mamtenance inadequate Correctne Action on 4kV 3reakers. Numerous linkage Perw.ne- IR 96002 NOV problems in 4LV breakers and pow root cause analyses hase been Performance reported dating back to 1939 A NOV (50-237249 96002-06A) was Deficiency issued for failure to take prompt correcthe actions.

3 09'1996 Licensee Maintenance The rn hed peak loading of the duty cycle was not reficcted in the OtherNA W O4 battery senice tests performed during outages in 1995-1996 (Unit 2) and 1994 (Unit 3 A and the tes:ing was inconshtent wich the design peak loadmg.

3 09/1996 NRC Engineering UFSAR Dniations. Dniations were noted for locked closed Engineering De IR 96002 URI conationment holation sahes. desel fuel oit tank os-rflow. ACAD Mgn Deficiency system, toxic gas analvrer, and IIPCI dedicated suctiors. The resolutim of these desiations will be tracked under URI $0-237.24996002-11.

309'1996 NRC Plant Support Emergency Lighting. An inspector rn sew of emerm irght Persormel IR 96002/NOV and IFl suseill-nces performed since 1994 indicated that the licensee failed to Performance follow procedure when performing the 8-hour dncharge test. There Deficiency wcre 26 cumples in 1994 and 21 eumples in 1995. A NOV (50-237;249 96002-05B) w as issued for failure to follow procedu e.

Addstional preblems =ith the emergency lights were noted and will be tracked under IFl 50-237.249-96002-10.

3 09'1996 NRC Plant Sapport PVC usage in the plant was not well controlled. Specifically, no 10 CFR Inadetiuate In 9t>002URI 50.59 e aluation w as done to address the increased PVC loading in the Procedure 1nstr Fire llazards Analysis. Resolution of this hsue will be tracked under uction URI $0-237.249 96002-09 3 07/1996 Self-Resealed Operations Inadsertent M nual Scram While in Refuel Mode During Planned Personnel IR 96002; LER 50-Periodic Sunciliance Testing Due to Iluman Error. While performing a Performance 237?96006 planned instrument calibration on the drywc!! high pressure scram and Deficiency contamment holation sw itches, the operator reflexisely manually scrammed the u,it when an espected half-scram was recched.

1%ge 43 of 57 i

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX O*ar#

Dresder DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTIO*1 CAUSE REF 3 0 6/1996 SM\1 SCREENING MEETING " * " " " "

3 25/1996 Licensee Maintenance One EhlD pemmnel receised uptake during *ork on U-2 drywcil sump """""*

RI Obsen:rion pump motor. EMD personnel net wait for RPs to take air sample.

3/l8!!996 Self-Rescaled Mamtenance U-2'3 diesel fire pump inoperable due to engine ecolant leak identified """""*

RI Obsesvation during weakly maintenance run. (Operable 3-21) 3/15/1996 Self-Res caled Operations incorrect Operator Aid results in reactor lesel prtalem. Operators using 1 adequate IR 96002 an incorrect operator aid caused a: snespected three inch drop in reacter Procedure Instr sessel w ater les el due to instrument errtw not reflected on the aid. The uction aid has been correced.

3!!5!!996 NRC Operations Diwrepancies wcre identified in the Unit 2 Drywell during "close-out" Inadequate IR 96002.URI walldoun. Examples included missing screws fiwm EQ ciectrical boxes. Osersight MOV cos ers not secured, and miscellaneous debris. This issue is unresched pending resicw of the licensee's correctise actions. (URI 50-237 96002-01).

3!!$!!996 NRC Maintenance Diwrepancies were identifitJ in the Unis 2 Dry well during "close-out" Inadequare IR 96002.URI wa!Ldown. Exampics included missing screw s form EQ electrical boses, Oversight MOV covers not secured, and miscellaneous debris This issue is unresch ed pending resiew of the licensee's correctise actions. (URI 50-227.96002-0I).

3/15/1996 NRC Operations Improper control of feedwater heater controllers. The contral roorn Personnel IR 96002 operators wcre staginging mechanical ~ jams" to keep the feedwater Perfwmance heater sw itches in the pull-to-stop position if a kns of feedw ater heaters Deficiency wcre to occur. The use of ~ jams" was w allowed by station procedures, and the " jams' wcre removed 'rtwn the control roorn.

3/12/1996 NRC Engineering Unit 2 refuel outage uas estended again to implement structural steel Inadeqt ? IR 55015'URI modifications to LPCI corner rooms. The licensee initially identified the Os ersight failure to meet Code requirements in early 1994 but, did not p!an on doing work until NRC questioned timeliness of correctise actiorn IDge 44 of $7 i

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M4Ar-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3'7/i946 Self-Rescaled Engine. Ng U-20 diesel Gre pump inoperable due to cold wcather. When low area EngmeermgI)e RI Obsenation temperature alarm annunciates. *emperature stready bekm operable sign DeGeiency serpoint. Wdificatkm earlier in 3 ear changed area temperature required for operability. Alarm setpoint not changed.

3!7/1996 Self-Res caled Operathms U-2'3 diesel fire pump inoperable due to cok! w eather. When low area EngineeringT)e RI Obsenation  ;

temperature alarm annunciates, temperature already beirm operable sign Deficiency setpoint. AtodiGcation cariier in year changed area tem wrature required for operability. Alarm setpoint not changed.

3/5/19 % Licensee N1aintenance U-311PCI inoperable. Eng. determined that during 11PCI startup.the Equipment LER 50-249%-002 main steam ime drain sahe leak had potential to becos.x wor c. Leak i _'functum was asso:iated w ith 2.27% IIPCI leak. Restored next day.

3/4/1996 Licensee Opentions ACAD compressor inoperable. IdentiGed at stay 9 of a 7 day Person.sel RI Obsenafkm administrathe (DATR) LCO. Not TS or 19 CFR 50.44. Addrtional Performance ACAD issues are discussed in IR 96002 (IFI 50-237;249 %002-04). Deficiency 3'4/1996 Self-Revealed Alaintenance 2A CCSW pump packing leak. Equipment RI Obwnation

%1alfunction 3'4!!996 Licensee Alaintenance Escessise oil fotmd in U-2 EDG air bos after pknned maintenance. Inadequate RI Obwn ation Also. SRI identiGed multiple minor material deft iencies after Procedure 1nstr mairwetance. uctkw 3/3/1996 Licensee Operations Licensed operator signed a routine APRA1 sune Snce as comp2 ete and Personnel RI Obsenatkm satisfactory when 6 of 8 channels wcre abose limits. Performance Defkiency 3/3/1996 Self-Res caled hiaintenance 2C condensate and booster pump 4kV breaker not close Breaker noi P rsonri RI Observation properly " racked in." Addrtional 4kV breaker problems are being Performance tracked under NOV $0-237;249 %002-06A. Deficiency l' age 45 of $7

PLANT ISSUES M ATRIX 094 w-97 Dresden DATE ID BY ' LP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3'3/1996 Self-Reseakd i,taintenance , e. gn .. sterial(rag) found in 2A CCSW pump. Foreign material in the Inadequate IR 96002/NOV s; stem has been a recurring problem w ah CCSW dating back to late Osersight 1994; therefore, a siolation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendis B. Criterion XVI was issued (NOV 50-237;249 96002-06B). The rag in the CCSW system was due to poor FME control during maintenarice on the 2/3 diesel fire pump which shares the same suction loy as all of the CCSW pumps.

3/3/1996 NRC Operations Multiple problems found on ~ completed U-2 startup checklists Other:NA IR 960WNOV includmg some independently serified salves found out of position.

(Discussed in IR 96002.) The licensee's initial resiew and corrective actions were ineffectise; therefore, a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendis B, Criterion XVI w as issued (NOV 50-237;249 96004-01).

The licensee's second resiew had broader scope.

3/3!!996 Self-Res ealed Operations 2C condensate and booster pump 4kV breaker not close. Breaker not Fersonnel RI Observation properly " racked in." Additional 4kV Sreaker problems are r- ing Performance tracked under NOV 50-237;249'96006-06A. Deficiency 3/3/1996 NRC Operations Discrepancies between UFSAR and kicked vahe program. (Discussed it. Other/NA IR 96004/NOV IR 96002.) The licensee failed to adequately implement the statkm's locked vahe program resulting in seseral plant configuration problems.

Numerous Corrective Action Requests, PIFs, and siolations hase presiously been issued; therefore, a s iolation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendis B, Criterion XVI was issued (NOV 50-237;249:96004-02).

7he licensee has res iewed the kwked s ah e issue along u ith the station checklist issue in order to identify and correct deficiencies.

2/29/1996 Licensee Engineering Non-ensironmentally qualified cornectors on U-2 post-accident Inadequate RI Observation radiation monitor in drywell. Checking U-3 & Quad Cities. Additional Procedure / Instr U-2 dry w ell concems ar- being tracked under URI 50-237,96002-01. uction 2/29/1996 1.icensee Maintenance Both trains ofcontrol room sentilation degraued. A-train fan motor [] B- Equipment RI Observation train does not has e backup cooling water supply. Malfunction l

! 2/29/1996 Licensee Operations Incorrect cation resin added to tank in radwaste system. Wrong resin Personnel R1 Observation l was delivered. Performance Deficiency .

l' age 46 of $7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W- & c-97 Dresden DATE ID IW SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 2/28'1996 Licensee Maintenance Problem with U-3 reactor recirculation MG set sentilation dampers. The Equipment RI Observation resulting high temperature required about 35'. rapid load drop. Malfunction 2/27/1996 Self-Resealed Maintenance U-2 RWCU system leak (about 100 gat hr) into reactor building drain Equipment RI Observation tank. Leak was past an isolation sahe. Malfunction 2/27/1996 Licensee Maintenance Pin-hole size leak in U-3 IIPCI drain line to condenser. Found during Equipment RI Observation rounds. Malfunction 2'27/1996 Licensee Operations New work request added to esisting out-of-senice tacout. Isolation inadequate RI Obsenation boundaries were inadequate for new work. Procedure / Instr uction 2/27/1996 Self-Resealed Engineering U-2 SDC system tripped. Apparently due to spurious high temperature Equipment RI Obsenation signal from a reactor recirculatiori loop thermo-couple (T/C).  ? . atutetion 2'26/1996 Licensee Plant Support inadequate compensatory actions after security intrusion detection Pcnencel ENS CallilR 96002 Open system became inoperable due to weather. Supeniwr's error. *%fe; ice benciency 2/25/1996 Licensee Operations Latch on fire door found taped over. 7 ersonael RI Obsenation

'erformance Deficiency _

2/25f1996 Licensee Operations configuration control problems (tagging) during integrated leak rau Personnel RI Observation testing (ILRT) Performance Deficiency 2/24/1996 Self-Res ealed Engineering U-2 SDC system tripped Cause was apparently due to spurious high Equipment RI Observation temperature signal from a reactor recirculation loop the mo-ccuple Malfunction (T,C). Repeat problem.

2/24/1996 Licenset Operations Multiple self-check errors found in performance of Unit 3 CRD Personnel RI Obsene. ion accumulator OOS tagout. Performance Deficiency

(%ge 47 of 37

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09&c-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUFS REF 2/11/1996 Licensee Maintenance Mechanic used a hardened steel center punch to remose a gasket from Personnel RI Obsen ation the U-2 reactor sessel flange. Gasket had already been remosed. A one Performance inch gouge was put in flange. A licensee QC inspector uas present when Deficiency the mechanic used the punch.

2/10/1996 Self-Revealed Operations Ausiliary operator inadsertently started U-3 EDG during routine kical Personnd IR 95015; LER 50-control panel lamp check. Operator failed to u;ilize self-chetking in the Performance 249/96001 perfbrmance of his duties. Deficiency 2/8/1996 Licensee Maintenance Safety bus fuse configuratL,n OOS problems. Continuing esampics of Personnel RI Obsenation problems. No details. Performance Deficiency 2'6119 % NRC Operations Work Authorized When Vahe Was Not in Required Position. Personnel IR 95015/NOV Maintenance had been authorized to begin for a LPCI vahe even though Performance the actual vahe pesitiuon did not match the pesition identified on the Deficiency OOS card on conro; room switch. Esample of a Violation for failure to follow Work Request procedure (50-23724995015-02C).

2/5/1996 Self-Resealed Operations Well water system freering problems due to estreme cold weather. Plant Engineering'De RI Obsv.

operations were etfected due to inability to make more water combined sign Deficiency with low CST lesel.

2/211996 %If-Res ealed Operations U-2 EDG Tripped on 1:ngine liigh Temperature due to Slow Response Personnel IR 95015 by Non-licensed Operator. Output breaker not close during test. EDG Performance running unloaded without cooling water. Operator not trip the EDG Deficiency prior to the high temperature trip. This was contrary to management's espectation.

2/2/1996 Self-Resealed Maintenance Loss of ventilation on U-3 recirculation motor generator (MG) sets when Equipment IR 95015 both operating fans tripped. Reactor power was rapidly reduced to about Malfunction 60 percent. Damper linkage contributed to the failure.

2/2/1996 Self-Res caled Operations Proper Operator Respone to Loss of Ventilation on 8)-3 Recircula: ion Teamwork / Skill IR 95015 Motor Generator Sets. Reactor power was rapidly reduced to about 60 Lesel percent.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-De-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF I/18!!996 NRC Operations U@3 EDG Air-Lock Door (Secondary Containment) Ajaron Atuttiple Personnel IR 95015 Occaskms. Dmr ajar on multiple ocasions. RP personnel stationed at a Performance desk near door wetc aware that door was open. RP personnel had not Deficiency taken actions to close door. This occured twice within a 30 minute period. These were additonal examples of personnel lising with poor material conditions.

1/1 g!!996 NRC Alaintenance Seseral 4kV Breakers Found Unrestrained. Seseral breakers that had Personnel IR 95015%OV been removed from cubilces were found unrestrained. Electrical Performance maintenance personel stated that the problem uould be corrected. Two Deficiency days later, sescial of the breakers were found unrestrained again.

Eumple of a Violation for failure to follow procedures (50-237:24995015-02E).

1/17'1996 NRC Engineering Unauthorized Atodification in U-3 Torus Catwalk Area. Ventilation inadequate IR 95015.NCV ducting was supported by temporay rigging (cable) which had been in Procedure / Instr place since 9/92. Work request had originally been to repair the uction permanent supports for the ventilation ducting. The work request was closed in 12/92. Since work request w as closed and rigging was not controlled under any plant procedures, this was considiered a modificaton to the plant. NCV for inadequate procedures (50-237;249'95015-04). This cumple demonstrated a continued weakness in licensee's ability to implemment system walkdowns.

I/16'1996 1.icensee N1aintenance Early identification of Oserheated U-3 Alain Generator Exciter Brushes. Teamwork / Skill IR 95015 Electrical maintenance personnel identified heat related discok> ration of Level brushes. The early identification allowed for the replacement of the brushes on-line proir to a significant problem occuring.

1/16/1996 Self. Resealed N1aintenance U-2/3 Diesel Fire Pump Cracked Discharge Flange. lhis was identified Equipment RI Observation during modification testing. Another example on ;mor material Nialfunction condition.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX (*Ne-97 Dresden DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF l

8!!/1095 Licen<,ee Plant Support Shipped contaminated material (RWCU piping) ofTsite above DOT Personnel IR 9501lilR 95010 limits. Contaminated circuit breaker shipped ofTsite to non-licensed Performance facility. Deficiency 5/283 995 Self-Rescaled hiaintenance inboard and outboard A15L drain primary containment isolation sahes: Personnel 50-249/96013-01 VIO Failure to maintain primary containment leakage less than or equal 0.6 Performance I.a fr>m at least January 1995 to N1ay 28.1995. with the U-3 reactor Deficiency critic.il, is an Apparent Violation. The cause for the inboard valve leakage was low spots on the salve's seat due to poor alignment (i.e., fit up) of the disk to scat. The root cause appeared to be poor maintenance instructions for vahe assembly and tack oflicensee experience with Anchor Darling double disk gate salves. The cause for the outboard sahe leakage was the vahe disk's lower wedge aas miss;ng and the stem w as bent. The licensee determined that the failure mechanism of the outboard s alve w as excessive thrust applied during manual handw heel operation during Unit 3 refueling outage 13. The root cause was attributed to an inadequate design modification review in June 1994 that failed to identify that low torque salues (about 33 fl-Ibs) would damage the vahe during normal handwheel operation. A contributing cause was informal controls for manual handw heel operation of motor operated valves.

1%ge 57 of 57

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-De-'7 LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REI 10/30 97 NRC Engineering Inspectors noted that programmatic impros ements to the corrective 06er'NA DRAFT IR 97016 action process included establishment of a Root Cause Team and Corrective Action Review Board. Some improsement has occurred in the acceptance rate of root cause ins estigations and correctise actions brought to the Corrective Action Resiew Board.

9/19 97 NRC Maintenance Inspectors obsened good maintenance work practices invohing Other/NA DRAFTIR 97012 radiation exposure practices, foreign material exclusion controls, and management osersight during work on the I A residual heat removal heat exchanger service water outlet vahe and tl e scram solenoid pilot vahe diaphragm replacement.

9/17c97 NRC Maintenance inspectors identified numerous material condition deficiencies in the inadequate DRAFT IR 97012 Unit I drywell such as potential uncontrolled abandoncd equipment, Oversight missing and loose pipe supports, two dry w eli spray nozzles located t'chind cable tr:ys, numerous pull and junction box cowrs uith loose or missing screws. many containment lights without protective cosers, and a ladder with no safety rail installed at the top. (Similar deficiencies had been identified during an April 10,1997 inspection ) Senior licensee management had not entered the drywell in the pres ious 8 months and recently completed system functional performance reviews had failed to identify these conditions.

9/5N7 NRC Operations The licensee had assigned a licensed operator to the defueled unit (most inadequate DRAFT IR 97012 systems shutdown and no significant work scheduled) under the Oversight direction of a nuclear statica operator to reactivate his reactor operator license.

9 4'97 Licensee Operations The licensee missed a prior opportunity to address the issue of placing Inadequate IR 97015 proper focus on Technical Specification compliance in the work Osersight planning process. Proper focus could have prevented the inability to comply with a Technical Specification action statement on 9/497.

Related concerns raised by operators in January 1997 were classified and addressed as the failure to meet existing schedules rather than as a planning concern.

l' age 1 of 23

Q;,

.i

, PLANT ISSUES MATRIX . 09-Dee-9F LaSalle ,

' D,

~

DATE 4't - gr 3 -

ID BY , .SALP DESCRIPTION

. - d. t ,CAUSE J}.; ,. 9

REF y ,

- 9/4/97 .NRC Operations Inspectors determined that overall the liigh Imensity Training Program _ Other/NA. L IR 97014i ,

J was effective in identifying and correcting operator performance . "

deficiencies. Elements to its efTectiveness included: a demanding ) '

I '

training schedule and productive use of training time, well-identified t training needs, challenging simulator t.xercises, efTective methods for

. providing feedback to the operators about their p-rformance in the simulator, an appropriate remediation program, high standards for measuring crew performance in the simulator, senior management ...

involvement in the training, and a positive attitude displayed by the <

crews and instructors.

, - 9/4/97 ~NRC Engineering The licensee's operability evaluation for an EDG surveillance failure to T Personnel I ist 97015 .

meet rated frequency within a specified time period was not thorough. - Performance

.%e licensee considered the EDG operable based upon data from the ' Defici ncy..

" local frequency meter versus the control room meter (which slawed -

unacceptable results) and independent indication from voltage and diesel #

speed reponse. Although known by the licensee to apply to the local frequency meter, the operabihty evaluation did not consider a ten second warm-up period for the meter that was specified by the vendor.

.9/4/97 Self-Revealed Onerations ne licensee was unable to comply with the applicable Technical Non-' . IR 97015  :

Specification action statement (establish secondary containment) ' . Conservative .

o following failure of the 1 A EDG during a surveillance which along with Decision the existing plaat configuration (other equipment inoperable for various -

maintenance and moditication reasons) caused all emergency core. <

cooling system trains to be inoperable. The licensee had focused on shutdown risk (since some of this equipment was available but not operable) at the expense of compliance with Technical Specification

reqmrements.

9/4/97 -NRC Operations Written examinations in the licensee's liigh Intensity Training Program : Other/NA - IR'97014 i

. for operators were of marginal quality, learning objectives were not ' ,

i being reviewed during simulator training, and critical tasks were not 1 l consistently addressing simulator trammg.

I r

l' age 2 of 23 l

_. - ,_ _. . .. 4 _ _ _ _ . . _ _ , . _ . . -,

~

1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-&c-97 LaSalle DATE IDliy SALP DESCRIPTION l CAUSE REF  !

8/27/97 Licensee Engineering While per forming a review of the high energy line break analysis for a Engineering'De DRAFT IR 97012 modification to the reactor water cleanyp system, engineers identified sign DeDeiency that based upon primary containment isolation valve closure time peak temperature w as higher than that determined in the previous analy sis and that ensironmental qualification of equipment in the area might be affected.

806N7 Licensee **"*"****

ne licensee completed first line supenisor assessments in an effort to Other/NA DRAFT IR 97012 evaluate and improve human performance and was taking action to reassign some personnel in acrordance with the results.

8/22N7 Licensee Engineering While performing calculations to support revisions to leak detection EngineeringT)e DRAFT IR 97012 isolation setpoints for the reactor w ater cleanup sy stem for a sign Deficiency modification, engineering personnel determined that the existing isolatian trip setpoint for leak detection area temperature and difTerential temperature would have occurred at a leakage above that considered in the design basis. Specifically, associated calculations had relied upon a 65 percent steam flash rate that may not have been limiting in all cases.

8/15N7 NRC Operations The licensee had not adequately communicated corrective actions to inadequate DRAFT IR 97012 operating shift personnel w hich required two individuals to be present Oversight for entering energized cabinets. The licensee had used less formal methods of communication (memorandum and electronic mail) verus more formal methods (special operating orders or daily orders) and as a result a shift manager and associated crew were not aware of this expectation.

8/l3N7 Licensee Operations he licensee declared the 1 A residual heat remos al service water process PersonncI DRAFT IR 97012 radiation monitor inoperable w hen it was de-energized in support of Performance draining the line but, contrary to an administrative procedure, failed to Deficiency track the inoperability in the degraded equipment log _

l' age 3 af 23

m 2.-

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX $ N'T. ! -

- LaSalle .

's DATE- ID BY .SALP' n.

q DESCRIPTION - p. REF

.(-CAUSE 14 - .

8/13/97 NRC. Operations Operations personnel approach to Technical Specification Non- ' DRAFT IR 97012  :

implementation was non-conservative and contrary to plant managment ' Conservative ~^

expectations when they failed to immediately begin performing a Decision L limiting condition for operations action statement (monitoring .

. t suppression chamber level locally every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) upon learning that .

~J suppression chamber water level instrumentation would not be returned ~

to an operable status uithin the 7 days allow ed outage time. Until  ;

questioned by the inspectors, their intent was to wait until the allowed v outage time had expired before performing the associated action .

statement, i i L 8/8/97 'NRC Operations . '!he corrective action program manager appropriately determined and . Other/NA IR 97011 : {

j initiated tighter administrative controls to address excessive use of -

~

l department managers delegating subordinates to apprese closute and exter siens to corrective action items.

8/8'97 NRC Operations While several operator work arounds had been identified by the licensee, . Inadequate 'IR 97011

, . inspectors concluded that, based upon additional operator work arounds Oversight  ;

j ' identified by tl e in pectors, continued improvement in this areas was .

needed. These additional examples included an air leak on scram j solenoid pilot valves and actuation of the EDG penthouse fire alarm  ! .

annunciator during EDG testing. .;

a-4 8/8/97 Licensec Operations l_ Jihe licensee generated several problem identification forms regarding Personnel . IR 9701I

out-of-service problems including bus drop outages affecting work in- Performance j i progress, all affected equipment not identified as part of an out-of- Deficiency -- !

service, and wrong equipment identified to be affected by an out-of-service.

7/29/97 NRC Operations Operators failed to complete the procedure steps in the high pressure Personnel _ IR 9701I core spray inservice test in sequence as required by administrative . . Performance procedure. Operators marked a step "NA" for placing the IB EDG Deficiency cooling water pump control switch in the normal-after-stop position without following the procedure change process.

i i

Page.1of23'

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX #Dece LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 7/28M7 Licensee Maintenance Monthly source checks on four process radiation monitors (residual heat Personnel IR 9701I removal senice w ater process radiation monitors) were not performed at Performance the frequency prescribed in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. The Deficiency operations department surveillance coordinator had inappropriately entered a partial surveillance as a completed surveillance into the computer scheduling program.

7/26S7 Licensee Operations Operations personnel inadvertantly drained 9,000 gallons of water from . Inadequate IR 97011 the cycled condensate tank to the turbine building sump while clearing Oversight an out-of-service on the condensate system. The esent was caused by a valve that hari" 7 placed in the proper as-left position after maintenance wccmber 1996.

7/23/97 Self-Rescaled Engineering The licensee 'ad not identified interim compensatory measures for Personnel IR 97011; LER 37387029 know n leaking scram solenoid pilot valves to ensure that a full scram Performance would not occur while conducting testing that would generate half Deficiency scrams. As a result, a reactor scram signal due to I.igh scram disharge s olume lesel was generated during main steam isolation actuation logic sy stem functional testing, when the air leaks and degraded diaphragms allowed water to leak through scram valses to the scram discharge volume.

7/18/97 Licensee Maintenance Testing of the i A residual heat removal pump was not performed at the Personnel IR 97v1I; LER 373S7028 required increased testing interval after it was found to be in the alert Performance range due to low differential pressure. A clerk failed to route the Deficiency surveillance test results to the inservice test engineer for review, so that the test engineer was not aware of the need to increase the testing frequency.

7/17/97 NRC Engineering Following licensee identification of a broken fuel pin that had been inadequate IR 9701I; LER 374S7001 placed intact into the Unit 2 spent fuel pool in 1990, the inspectors Procedure /Instru identified that the special nuclear material inventory procedure failed to ction provide adequate acceptance criteria including pin placement and length that would have identitied the broken fuel pin earlier. The nuclear material custodian and fuel handlers had not previously identified or questioned an 18 inch discrepancy in length of the the fuel pins.

l' age 5 of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Da#

LaSalle DATE 4 ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION  ;; CAUSE REF l 7/17/97 Licensee Engineering A fuel pin canister had been inappropnately stored in the Unit 2 spent Personnel IR 97011; LER 374'97001 fuel pool since 1990 in a location that made it more susceptible to being Performance damaged. Deficiency 7/16.97 NRC "***"**"

Contrary to the intentions of plant management presanbed in an internal Inadequate DRAIT IR 97012 memoradum, some open items in the licensee's corrective ection program Osersight had not been screened against the mstart criteria.

7/15 97 Licensee Operations After completing a work reqecst, mechanical maintenance personnel InaJequate IR 9701I released the associated work request to operations personnel for final out- Oversight of-service clearance, although r,ther outstanding work existed on the equipment. De electronic work control system w as not capable of w arning that other work requests remained open for an out-of-service.

7/15/97 Licensee Maintenance During a system funct ional resiew of the reactor manual control system Inadequate LER 373/97026 (RMCS), the licensee identified inadequacies in the surveillance Procedurerinstru procedures for channel functional tests of the refueling interlocks and crion -

other rod blocks. No test uas perfonned to ensure that ooth channels of the RMCS fur ctioned independently ofont another and rod block procedures did not attemot to withdraw a rod to verify the rod would not withdraw.

7/I097 NRC Engineering ne licensee's initial assessment and 50.72 notification regarding Pers mnel IR 97011; LER 373 97027 operability of safety-related equipment in the control room due to nearby Performance unanchored equipment were not thorough. The licensee initially stated Deficiency j that a 1991 evaluation for unsecured equipment bounded the existing condition. Iloweser. the inspectors identified that the existing condition was not bounded since the unsecured equipment was loca:ed in approved locatior,s, contrary to assumpiions in the 1991 evaluation. He licensee's event screening commitee had revieval this issue but failed to identi@

this discrepancy. In addition, the liccasee's 50.72 notification indicated that equipment that could be damaged by the unanchored equipm :nt was not required in the existing mode of operation, but this statement co;.Ilicted with conclusions in the licensee's written operability assessment.

l' age 6 of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-Dx-97 LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 7/10/97 NRC Operatiors After concerm were brought to thei attention on two occasions (July 10 Non- IR 97011 and Julv 24,1997), operations management failed to perform a timely Consenatise f

evaluation o unanchored equipment in the control room and auxiliary Decision afectrical equipment room for operability of nearby safety-related equipment.

7/8/97 NRC Operations The licensee's correctise actions for deficienciee in the diesel generatar inadequate IR 9701I manual backwash procedure in response to a Janurary 1997 violation Oversight u ere not effective in that the licensee did not ensure the manual backwash function could be performed. He licensee had rendered the automatic bxkwash function for the 1 A EDG inoperable for ele:trical bus maintenance, but continued to conside- the I A EDG operable based upon the belief a manual backwash prescribed in the procedure could be performed. 110w es er, stmctural interferences with the cooling water strainer handle presented manual backwash capability. In addition, licensee personnel had initiated four work requests for the handle problem between OctoSer 1996 and February 1997 but the work had not been completed and operations and eng;ineering personnel did not recognize the afTect on operability.

6/29N7 Self-Revealed Engineering While attempting to respond to a seismic monitoring system alarm, the inadequate IR 9701I licensee determined that annunciator and system operating procedures Procedure /Instru did not reflect recent modi 5 cations to the system. He modification had ction already been completed and the system retumed to senice the day prior to the esent. Training had also 7ot been conducted on the modification as t'ie design change coordinator 3ad incorrectly marked on the associated design change package atmchment that training had teen completed.

6/27/97 NRC Plant Support Radio!ogical housekeeping and radworker performance were observed to Other/NA IR 97010 be acceptable in the Units 1 and 2 turbine e.nd reactor buildings.

Inspectors obmed an example of poor communication of radiological hazards to workers involving ladder survey tags which w ere faded or hard to read. The licenset. was efTectively addressing contamination control concerns identified with the overhead s entilation units.

l' age 7of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dx "

LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIITION

[ CAUSE REF N27M7 NRC Plant Support ne radiological emironmental monitoring program was well Other;NA IR 97010 implemented.

627/97 NRC Plant Support The licensee's solid radwaste and transportation program was inadequate IR 97010 implemented consistent with regulatory requirements. Ilowever, several Procedure /Instru problems were iderrificd with accuracy of shipping procedures, ction tracking 1ogging of shipments and RP review of shipping packages.

Shipping procedures in several instances listed the incorrect regulatory reference or the guidace was wrong or confusing. De licensee did not designate in writing those individuals responsible for safe packaging, transfer, and transport of radwaste. De licensee had not yet received a receipt notification from the burial site for several shipments sent 12-18 days earlier. He licensee was not aware these shipments were approaching the 20 day requirement for licensee investigation and NRC notification. Inspectors ider.tified seseral errors in shipping papers such as reference to an incorrect shipping cask number.

6.27/97 NRC Pi.;nt Support inspectors observed several problems with the iicensee's material storage Personnel IR 97010 program which, collectively, indicated w eaknesses in the communication Performance of radiological hazards to workers and in the control of radioactive Deficiency material. Management expectations for these concerns were not clearly communicated in station procedures. Inspectors observed numerous faded (but still legible) rad;oactive material labels and postings, old (not applicab'e) labels that were not remosed, and inconsistent information (such as dose or contamination levels, date surveyed, and item description) on the labels. Here was no formal ownership or tracking of the number and location of radioacative material storage areas or of the items being stored.

6/27/97 NRC Plant Support The licensee's inspection ofinfregisntly entered radwaste tank rooms Other/NA '

IR 97010 identified no ongoing leakage or corrusion concerns and was done using appropriate ALARA controls.

PQ e 8 of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec-97 LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP , DESCRIITION CAUSE REF 6'27N7 NRC Plant Support De licensee's ALARA planning and radiological controls for the spent OtherNA 1R 97010 fuel pool cleanup project w ere effectise. A significant skin exposure from a hot particle contamination occurring during thejob wa well characterized by the licensee. Appropriate controls were used for items stored in the fuel pool. -

6'27N7 NRC Plant Support Overall, radiation exposure for routine radwaste processing and shipping Other/NA IR 97010 activities was low and was consistent with the work performed.

Radiological controls and contractor os ersight of observed radwaste activities were good.

6/27N7 NRC Plant Support The licensee's audit of the radwasta transportation program was Inadequate IR 97010 technically sound and did not identify any significant shipping issues. Oversight iIowever, several of the deficiencies identified by the inspector were recurrent and shoald have bem addressed by corrective actions taken to resolve the audit finomgs. For example. some errors identified by the inspectors involved procedures that had been revised based on the audit findings.

6/2737 NRC Engineering The licensee was implementing actions to address temporary alterations, Other/NA IR 97007 including specific plans for each temporary s.heration, on schedule in accordance with the Restart Action Plan, llowever, the i.ispectors .

identified some aspects of the applicable administrative procede e which w ere not appropriate and three unauthorized temporary alterations involving emergency diesel generators, fuel pool cooling pumps, and service water system piping. De procedure did not clearly identify when some attachments were expected to be completed. He logic employ ed in the procedure for ensuring conduct of a safety evaluation when appropriate was flawed. De three identified unauthorized temporary alterations were s!! minor. >

l' age 9 of 13

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX.. i 09-Dec 9D -

.LaSalle ,

DATE J ID BY '

'SALP W L

o DESCRIPTION  ! CAUSE- "

4REFJ n -r 6'27/97 Licensee Maintenance . Seseral work scheduling problems existed including preceding tasks not Personnel IR 97007 '

being kept with the primary task w hen the primary task was rescheduled, Performance support activities remaining on the schedule after tt.c task had isen -. Deficiency cance:ed, activities scheduled to be accomplished during an outage not .

reschednlea when the outage was rescheduled, and clearing of an out-of-senice scheduled w hen the equipment was not ready to be returned to "

service.

6/27/97 NRC Maintenance While imprmements in the scheduling and completion of maintenance' Inadequate i IR 97007. -

activities have been noted, schedule development and implementation . Oversight continued to challenge plant personnel. The Outage Schedule Group had responsiblity for schedule maintenance so scope additions and changes -

were controlled by one organisation to allow greater schedule stability.

Daily schedule meetings and updates presented at the plan-of-the-day 'I meeting promoted schedule importance and adherence. Ilowever, the - '

licensee did not schedule adequate time for developmcat of 00S instructions and the associated walkdowrs The lack of time to perform ' l an OOS instruction waikdown prior to implementation was a contributor j to a 6/21/97 unit auxiliary transformer trip. Opera ions department personnel were not always prepared to implement the schedule. During - If a scheduled decrease k vessel level, the level decreased to the low end of '

I the desired range because an administrative OOS instruction necessary to implement actions required to maintain sessel lesel had not been . .

prepared.

6/26/97 NRC Maintenance - The licensee failed to specify in the work requert and perform adequate Inadequate IR 97007  ;

post-maintenance testing (timed start) following replacement of a!! four Procedure /instru - 1 air start motors on the 0 EDG. The licensee had based the decision not to ction ' l perform a timed start of the EDG on a 1990 Technical Specification ,

' clarification for w hSh the licensee could not provide technical .!

. justification. Techr.ical Specification clarification reviews previously 'l i . performed by the licensee in late 1996 in response to NRC concerns had 1 not identified and addressed this problem.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Moxa ~

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. lD BY SALP

, .DATE li d. . DESCRIPTION [ CAUSE :j REF. j

6/26:97 Licensee Maintenance During the system functional peformance review of the reactor Inadequate : LER 373/97023 :

protection system, the licensee indentified inadequacies in the Procedure /Instru

~

surveillance procedure for channel functional tests of the turbine ction .; -

stop' control valve trip logic and main steam isolation vahe trip legic. '

The procedure did not test the reactor protection contacts associated with .

various reactor protection trip logic at power lesels less than 30 percent 6/21/97 Self-Revealed . Operations Licensed operators failed to esatuate the effects of taking fuses out-of- Personnel - L IR 97007 -

service (OOS) on the main pow er transformer (M PT), resulting in an ~ Performance ,.

unexpected trip of the Unit I unit auxiliary transformer (l'AT). Power to Deficiency  ;

Unit I equipment was momentarily lost while the electrical busses automatically re-aligned to the station auxiliary transformer. Licensed i

operators responsible for generation of the OOS instruction failed to recognize that the UAT was being powered from the MPT and, as a result, failed to identify that removal of the metering-pot fuses would '

cause the UAT to trip. Licensed operators responsible for approvel of the OOS instruction were focused on safety of personnel conducting the '

planned maintenance and failed to adequately consider the consequences .

of the OOS instruction on plant equipment. The license wrote the OOS instruction within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the planned work and dia not walk it down before implementation.

6/20/97 NRC Engineering The licensee *s investigation report regarding residual heat removal - Inadequate - ' IR 97008

. service water keep-fill system post-modification testing problen s failed Oversight  ;

. to clearly identify that Technical Specification requirements regarding ' i overtime approval were not met and failed to identify issues regarding roles and responsibilities of a backshift engineer.

6/18/97 Licensee Operations Control room personnel demonstrated a nonconservative approach by NonL IR 97007 '!

commencing a radwaste discharge before questions conceming the - Conservative ' -

operability oflake blowdown flow instrumentation were resolved. ( An ' Decision . ' l L 8000 gpm discrepancy existed between the lake blowdown flow '

indication and calculated lake blowdown flow using remote valve - '

position.) Control room personnel did not discuss the issue to the depth -

necessary for comprehensive analysis and did not include the shift manager in discussions. '

3 e .t Page 1i of 23 t 4

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PLANT ISSUES i./ATRIXJ -

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..p T. DATE' ID BY. .{y .SALP; i DESCRIPTION .REF.

., 3 j CAUSE-j,[ .j ' d 16/13N7: NRC Operations - Operations shift management weited 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to declare a residual heat Non-' . IR 97007; LER 373s7025 removal pump inoperable for the low pmssure coolant injection mode Conservative and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for the shutdown cooling mode, while pursuing the .

Decision calibration accuracy of test instrumentation as the possible cause of the pump's failure to meet surseillance test acceptance criteria. Licensee :

administrative procedures and guidance in NUREG-14tr7/ Guidelines ,

for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants" dictated that the pump be declared inoperable immediately and licensee acticas were not a ,

T conservative approach to safety system operability.

i 6'l3/97 NRC- Plant Support Security alarm station operators used appropriate procedures for Other/NA ~ IR 97009 -

, assessing and responding to alarms.

6/13/97 NRC Plant Support The picture quality of some security surveillance devices was minimally . Equipment . - IR 97009 effective. . Malfunction 6/13/97 .NRC' . Plant Support ne protected area intrusion system was functional, effective and well Other/NA . . IR 97009. '

maintained.

-?

. 6/13/97 NRC Plant Support ne security program was weli implemented and security force personnel . Other/NA IR 97009 - i errors were low. Security force members were knowledgeable of -

assigned post duties. l

.. 6/13/97 NRC Plant Support A portion of the perimeter lighting was not maintained in an effective Equipment -- IR 97009 -

I' condition and this affected the surveillance capability. Here were Malfunction i numerous, recurrent problems with perimeter lighting that resulted in a  !

contimsing need to perform compensatory measures during the previous -

-l

, 3 months. Efforts to correct this probb were not timely,  !

6/12/97 ' Licensee Maintenance During a system functional review of the reactor manual control system !nadequate - = LER 373/97024 :

(RMCS), the licensee identified inadequacies in the post maintenance - ' Procedure /Instru

, testing of transponder card replacements and inadequacies in the control . ction .

rod drive scram accumulator instrumentation calibration. In addition, a surveillance procedure required a control room annunciator to be '

i defeated before testing although Techaical Specifications required the '

I annunciator to be tested. d Page 12 of 23

i. . _ , . a - _ . _. _ . - _ . _ . _ - _ __. .. _ . _ . _ _

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX - Wh" LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII" TION CAUSE ko REF 6/747 NRC Operations Plant personnel had not identified and corrected several examples of Personnel IR 97007 equipment labeling deficiencies identified by the inspectors in the "B" Performance control rod drive pump room, despite several cpportunities to do so. Deficiency Examples included several identification tags missing from CRD components, two of these tags found lying on the floor, outer-service (OOS) tags attached to vahes that did not has e equipment identification labels although licensee administrative requirements would have the operator ensure the equipment was properly labeled before attaching the OOS card, and an OOS card that had become detached from a valve rolled and pushed between the packing gland followcr and the salve body. Plant personnel had not fully implemented licenseee management expectat. s regarding the placing of OOS cards.

6'6'97 NRC Plant Support Contrary to an administratise procedure, several tygon tubes attached to Personnel IR 97007 the Unit I feedwater heaters had not been marked with stickers to Performance indicate that the contents were potentially contaminated. The licensee Deficiency subsequently w alked down the reactor and *ptbine buildings and identified seseral additional instance? . samarked tygon tubing.

Through interviews witi. plant perw NI, the inspectors identified a lack of knowledge of the requirement for labeling of tygon tubing used on contaminated systems.

5/21/97 Licensee Maintenance improper changes to the plant work schedule resulted in Technical Personnel IR 97007 Specification (TS) suncillance testing for the O EDG monthly run being Performance scheduled beyond the maximum TS-allowed completion date. Outage Deficien:y scheduling planners had inappropriately bundled the surveillance test with work scheduled for an EDG outage that was beyond the crnical due date of the suncillance. The licensee caught and corrected the error before a TS violation resulted.

5/16/97 NRC Engineering Concems regarding a fire in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) Other/NA IR 97004 corridor potentially rendering all adjacent EDGs inoperable, identified by the NRC in 1996, were adequately resolved by the licensee by identifying an attemate safe shrtdown path.

Page 13 of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX . 09-h97 ~

LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 5/16/97 NRC Engineering Inspectors determined that the licensee's response to the failure of Other/NA 1R 97004;IR 97008; LER suneillance test acceptance criteria to account for uw efTects oflake 373c96020 toel (ditTerence betw een lake lesci during testing and the design basis take loel), identified by the NRC in 1996, was adequate. Specifically, the licensee included a resiew of all applicable surveillance pror edures in the System Functional Perfonnance Review program and generated a computer model to establish appropriate flow acceptance criteria.

5/16.97 NRC Engineering The potential for residual heat removal sen ice water system OtherHA IR 97004/ IR 97008 waterhammer, identified by the NRC in 1996, was addressed by the licensee with a planned keep-fill modification for division 2 and calculations for division I which showed acceptable stresses resulting from a waterhammer. (Although similar cancerns had been known to the licensee since 1990, the licensee had failed to adequately address the issue us.til identification by the NRC.) He calculations remained under NRC review.

5/16,97 NRC Maintenance The surveillance procedure for residual heat removal (RllR) and RilR Inadequate IR 97004;IR 97003; LER r rvice water pump and valve inservice testir.,;did not contain Procedure /Instru 373/96020 prerequisites which required that three service water pumps be ction operating. Ilowever, lice.isce calculations had concluded that as long as three service water pumps were operating, no correction to the surveillance test acceptance criteria would be necessary to account for suction pressure efTects since the flow rate and friction losses in the suction piping and core standby cooling system intake tunnel would be greater than design conditions.

5/16:97 NRC Engineering The licensee adequately addressed NRC concerns identified in 1996 Other/NA IR 97004 involving the failure of preoperational testing invc!ving ECCS room cooler flow measurement to incorporate the effects of residual heat removal service water system operation. Licensee calculations and additional evalur.tions showed that all core standby coolina sy stem waponents would receive adequare flow.

Page !4 of 23

f I' # .

.c PLANT ISSUES MATRIX- o*&o9F LaSalle

+ + -

SATE SALP

.;- -; ' ID BY'. j. DESCRIPTION . 3{ CAUSE - y> REF

], .

5/1497 NRC Plant Support Contrary to a radiation protectico procedure, plastic or' cloth had not - '

Personnel IR 97007 been installed on floor grating within a contaminated area to prevent the Performance spread of centamination to a non-contaminated area. An RP technician, L Deficiency

' unfamiliar with this requirement, had removed shield blan6 ets in the reactor building n hich had covered the grating'over a clean area of the reactor building basement. The clean area had been'used for containment tendon inspection and torquing. ..

5/1297 Licensee Engineering During a system functional review, the licensee identified issues that EngineeringDe - . LER 37387021

, reduced the plant's capability for timely leak detection in the reactor - sign Deficiency :

coolant pressure boundary, thereby reducing the time to place the plant in a safe condition prior to further degradation of the pressure boundary. Contrary to the description in the UFSAR, there are undrainable areas of the drywell floor which would result in a delay in detection of un;dentified leakage.' In addition, the recurring failure of .  ;

electronic level indication results in the leak detection system s.ot meeting its design basis requirementsi The unreliability of the sump ;

level instrumentation is caused by the improper application of a .

capacitance probe in water of poor quality. Shortly after the start of an operating cycle, contaminants in the water afTect the probe in a manner that produces false high readings. >

5s.97 NRC- """*""

Inspectors noted that the overall rate of personnel errors had decreased, ' Other/NA IR 97006 - t ahhough procedural adherence issues continued to tre a concem.

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Page 15 of 23

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PLAWT ISSUES MATRIX 09-D* 97 LaSalle

.DATE ID BY SALP ,

DESCRIPTION CAUSE j REF 5/9/97 NRC Maintenance The licensee, in two instances, pc-formed deficient investigations of Equipment IR 97006 failed equipment, resulting in subsequent equipment failure. An Malfunction auxiliary relay for the O EDG fuel oil transfer pump did not transfer from the primary power supply to the alternate power supply w hen the primary supply was de-energized. Manipulation of the relay (actuation by licensee p rsonnel) during the initial investigation hindered the identiikation of as-found conditions that could aid in root cause analysis. After finding no problems, the licensee left the relay in service for seven days before replacing it, and upon removal found significant -

relay damage. Electrical maintenance personnel adjusted a pow er feed breaker trip setting for a temporary power supply for a motor operated vah e, stating in the work documentation that "the extra run of temp cable was probably increasing current and caused the trip." The breaker failed to operate again two weeks later w hen the vahe w as cycled.

5.9/97 Licensee Operations A reactor operator and ses eral senior reactor cperators had performed Personael IR 97006; LER 373.97022 licensed duties with inactive licenses at various times during late 1996 Performance and early 1997 due to the licensee's misinterpretation of w hat constitutes De0ciency

" performing functions of an operator or senior operator" in maintaining an active license. In one instance, the licensee failed to maintain the Technical Specification-required minimum control room stafTing level due to this problem.

4/3097 Licensee Engineering During a system functional review, the licensee identified a concern with Engineering /De LER 373/97015 the manual override logic associated with the residual heat removal sign Deficiency (RilR) test retum valve. If the operator was throttling the valve open (helding the switch in the open position), and a simultaneous ECCS actuation occurred, the manual override logic would be activated and the valve would not automatically close.

4/29N7 NRC Maintenance During residuil heat removal service water keep-fill system modification inadequate IR 97002 testing, the licensee demonstrated poor test scheduling and preparation, Oversight -

weak coordination of resources, improper use and approval ofovettime, unclear backshift engineer expectations, and inadequate communications.

Page 16 of 23

. e PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09 & c-97 LaSa'_le DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAL"5E REF 40497 NRC Operatioas The training department instruction controllmg operator cumination inadequate Exam Report 97303 secunty pided sescral kwq,iate escedocs to the dermitkm of Procedure / ins %

inschement in training

• These excepteis included operation of the ctkm simulator provided that the person dk! not select the training content or participate in the critique for the simulator traming; eva!uating p rformance on the simulator prm ided the person does not select the esaluation content and is not insehed in the remediation ofcan6 dates; and preparation and administratkm of the certifcation exam prmided the persen is not invohed in the remediation ofcandidates I i

404,97 Licena Operations Three instances occurred imehing operator licensing eummation Personnel Eum Report 97303 security problems. An c'ectncal maintenance mstructor that h:=d not Performance signed the NRC cumination secunty agreement was present in the cepy Deficiency room while the cuminations were being copied. Three pages were i '

missing from a copy of the written examinarke given to a astructor to salidate. One of the applicants noted that the same procedure checkout card he had used to check out a procedure in the Production Training Center also indicated that three cuminatkm validation team members Fad checked out the procedure concerning personal rz:diation monitoring. Fearing the spi-w ofexamination compromise, he destrmed the card but later reported the irmident to his supersisor.

ar23:97 NRC Engineering The licensee completed a work package and associated modification in Persormel IR 970%

1990 m ithout returning a fire barner to an acceptable staw (three small Perfonnance open penetrations left in the interior block walls of the Unit I disiskm I Dermiency 125 volt battery ;oom.) A system eny with knowledge of the fire barrier impainnent in early 1997, assumed that the condition of the fire barrier had beec evaluated as acceptable during the modifmation installation without senfying that this assumption w as correct. As a result. the licensee did not tcke agvornate actions to address the impairment until the impairment u as later identified by 1:4 kquim 40397 Licensee " " " * " "

The licensee announced a delay in planned restart until Spring 1998. OtherWA PN 3-97-038 The delay was attril ad to a reduced budget allocation. As a result.the licensee reduced the number of employed contractors and de *.nitized the organizational structure (which they hadjust unitized the previous month.)

l' age 17of 23 3 r

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ' hvT LaSaHe DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 422/97 Licensee Maintenance During a system functional resiew, the licensee identified that the Inadequate LER 37397020 calibration and functional test procedures for the recirculation flow Procedure'instru converters did not senry merlap to the averace power range moniter ction channels and demenstrate operability of the flow reference signal low salue gate to the aserage power range moniter channels.

422/97 Licensee Maintenance Durmg a sy stem functional resiew, the licensee identified that calibration inadequate LER 37397019 procedu es for the post-LOCA hydrogen analyzers dM not implement Procedure 1nstru design basis requirements. The analy zers are only calibrated up to 4 ction ,

percent span (full scale is 10 percent) w hile the UFSAR requires calibration to 10 percent. Emergency operating procedure actions also rely on the ability to accurately read abme 4 percent span.

4,2197 NRC Operations Control room personnel mere not adequately cogniz:wfequipmerd snd . ersonnel IR 97006 testing status. Specifically, operators incorrectly assumed that a residaa! Performance heat removal pump low discharge pressure alarm was caused tn a low Deficiency pressure condrien created during performance of a3 operating suneillance test and did not identify the actual cause which was activities associated with an instrument suncillance test being conducted concurrently until prompted by the inspectors. The Unit Suirenisor did not thoroughly review the surveillance tests to ensure that conct.rrent performance of the teus would not im alidate either test. and the riuclear Station Operator was not aware that an insTument surseillance test was being performed at the same time as the operational surveillance test.

4.2197 Licensee Plant Support The hcensee declared the fire protection carbon dioside suppression Other/NA LER 37397018 systems protecting the 0 and I A EDG rooms inope able after the fire

' protection group during a fire damper inspection identified that electncal leads to two fire dampers could have interferred with their closure. This condition had existed since original construction.

4/1697 Licensee Maintenance Surveillance testing obtained data for esMual heat remmal suppression In=1 equate LER 37397017 pool spray line flow rate from recorders which were not included in the Procedure 1nstru instrument loop calibration. crion Page 18 of 23

. o PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-M7 LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII" TION CAUSE REF 4/I5 97 Licera Engineerirg During a sy stem functional resicw the licensee identified that the EngineeringT)e LER 373 97014 manual drywell suppression pool s acuum breaker isolation valves were sign Defciency not being testing in accordance with Appendis J requirements. The sahe packing is on the opposite side of the sahe disc and is not exposed to pressure during sacuum breaker line pressurization. Therefore, the packing had neser been locally tested.

4/I497 Licensee Maintenance During a system functional res iew, the licensee determined that the inadequate LER 37397016 inoperable and bypass functions of the rod block monitor (RBM) were Proceduceinstru not adquately tested. In addstion, deficiencies in the adequacy of RBM crion channel calibrations existed.

4714.97 NRC Operatens The NRC issued a CAL supplement to include specific commitments by OtherNA CAL RIII 9M08B the licensee to address human performance problems in operations, material condition issues affecting startup, and defkiencies in engineering support to operations that hase been identified by the NRC and the licensee.

4rl 1:97 NRC Plant Support inspectors identified that contrary to a radiation protection procedure. Personnel IR 97006 contamination aress under the 2A moisture seperator rehester that Performamx estended over floor grating w ere not cmcred to present curitaminated Deficiency material from passing through the grating. The licenm subsequently installe.1 plastic mer the grating but approismately two aeeks later while observing nork in the area the impectors identified that a 3 square foot area of grating w as not covered. Through intersiews with sescral radiation protectkm techricians. the inspectors iderrified a broader lack of knowledge regarding this administratise requirement.

4/10.97 NRC Maintenance lhe inspectors identifier.i sescral material condition .nf housekeeping Personnel IR 97006 deficiencies in the Unit I primary containment including potemially Performance broken pipe supports and hangers, temporary alterations of plant Deficiency equipment not identified as such, paint coating on a pxtion of the containment wait and floor seperating from the steel cmtainment liner, and seseral light fixtures with missing or broken bulbs l' age 19 of 23

• O PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Nr#

LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIITION CAUSE REF 4'10:97 Licenwe Maintenance During a sy stem functional review, the hcensee identified that the inadequare LER 37397012 surseillance procedure for main steam safety relief s ahes did not verify Procedure 1nstru that the low 4ow setpoint function did not interfere with the operation of ction the safety relief valves or the automatic depressurization system.

4997 Self-Rescaled Maintenance Follow ing failure of a Klockner-Mocifer relay for the primary Equipment IR 97006 containment chilled water pump in 1994 due to crystal formation on the Malfunction contacts, planned licensee correctise actions included resiskm of EQ procedures to inspect these type relays for coil deteriwation. A subsequent failed similar relay on 4997 for the control circuit for the 0 EDG fuel transfer pump showed similar but more extensise ,

deterior tion. This second failed relay for some reason had not been entered into the EQ program and inspected. The licensee identified 800 similar safety-related relays that may be susceptible and w s ins estiga:ing the extent of the problem and correctise r ms.

4/397 Licensee Operations A significant number oflicensed SROs and ROs and operating crews Personnel IR 97014; PN 3-97-030 failed licensee mid-term performance esaluations in the licensee's high Performance intensity training program. As a result, the licensee drorped some Deficiency operators

• licenses and provided short or long term remediation for '

others. The licensee identified deficiencies in procedural adherence and usage, coergency plan classifications and reporting, command and control, and communications. A large number of the perfamance deficiencies were self-identified by the crews. indicating that the high performance standards hase been etTectisely communicated to the operators.

f* axe 20 of 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec-0 LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 43/97 Licensee Engineermg De design engineering structural supenisor made an incorrect Personnel IR 97006 assumption with regard to an operability conclusion following inspeca Performance questions concerning mounting (mi.: sing bolts) of a core standby cooling Deficiency system sentilation control panel. Specifically, the design engineering structural supenisor had informed the shift manager that the upper portion of the panel was attached to the wall by tuo anchors located inside the panet. Although these anchors had been sisua!!y veriSed to exist, they wcre not reflected on sendor drawings. De design engineering structural supenisor had mistakenly assumed that outstanding field change requests =ould show anchors which was not the case, and therefore seismic qualification was not assured.

4!1'97 Licensee Maintimance Electricians failed to follow the formal resiew and approval process in Personnel IR 97006 accordance with administrathe procedure requirements a hen they Performance changed the sequence of steps for a relay Logic test. De change resulted De6ciency in receipt of an unespected plant response. a relay de-energized instead o1 remaining energized, during subsecuent aaneillance conduct.

3,2997 NRC Operations Contrary to an operating procedure. control room operators failed to Persormel IR 970%

notify radiation protecten department personnel of the need to perform a Performance radiation suney due to possible changes in radiological conditions De6ciency following reallignment of the shutdown cooling system.

3,21/97 NRC Wintenance EDG testing in accordance uith a maintenance procedure was delay ed inadequate IR 47003 m hen operators identified that the procedure had not been revised to Procedure 1nstru re' lect changes in the operating s.aneillance procedure and becat.se of ction equipment nomenclature deficiencies.

3/21!97 NRC Plant Support inspectors identified instances of poor radiokgical housekeeping in Personnel IR 97003 sescral high radiation and high contamination areas including reactor Per%mance water cleanup heat exchancer and filter /demineralizer rooms, radwaste Deficency tunnels and radioacthe waste storage areas which were related to inadequate post-maintenance cleanup acthities-.

3/21/97 NRC Maintenance Work instructions for inspecting the steam tunnel check dampers did not Inadequate IR 97003 contain an q, Lie qualitsthe or quantitath e accettance criteria. Procedure Instru crion l' age 21 <f 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Wh#

LaSalic DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 301!97 NRC Operations . The hcensee failed on May 23.1996, to notify the NRC of t!r permanent Inadequate IR 97003 reassignment of a licensed indhidual to ea ,sition which dai not require Osenight a imense. The inspectors also identific.% er status oflicenses could not be readily serified by the shift ma 9.c aformal communicatxms

=cre used to in%rm site personnel c%hy in license status, and lists used to control licenses were inacctte ho iw>i.uin were identified where an operator inam up ely assumed a licensed position.

301.97 Licensee Enginecrmg The licensee failured to perform IST testing of RilR containment Inadequate IR 47003 ,

isolation vahes in the correct direction (safety function) required by the h4dinstru ASME code during two quarterly suncillance intervals. The licensee crion had incorrectly resised procc ures following recognition prior to 1997 that the safety function of the sahes was in opposite direction.

10097 Licensee Maintenance During a sptem functional resiew. the licensee identified that the Inadequate LER 373 97013 suneillance procedure for the Group 7 primary centainment solaren Praedure/Instru logic sptem functional test did not check the automatic withdrawal ction function for all five transversing incere prebe machines.

3/18.97- Licensee Engineering Engineers identified during a walkdown that hangers were missing from OtherHA LER 37397010 the sprmiler sptem piping in the Unit I Dhision 2 cable spreadmg room Since safety-related cables could be damaged during an earthquake, the hcensee declared all Unit i Disision 2 equipment inoperable. De licence determined that the hangers had been missing since original construction.

3/I897 1.icensee Maintenance Durmg a sptem functional review, the licensee identified that calibration inadequate LER 373/9701I procedures for the source range monitors set the tetract permit at the Procedure 1nstru incorrect setpoint. Calibration procedures allowed a tolerance in which cten the source range monitor could be retracted at a value less than a!!cwed by Technical Specifications.

Page22of 23

9 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 'W M LaSalle DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3/17 S 7 NRC Maintenance Repair work on the reactor w ater cleanup fiber'demineraliters inlet PersonncI 1R 97006 check sahe w as not effectise ist repairing the leak and resuhed in Perfmnance reworL The established post-m6 tenance test would not necessarily Deficiency identify a con:inued problem in that it prosided for a hot retorque at operating temperature and pressure but no leakage check. The licensee had not ir= creased focus on this sabe despite a history of recurrmg problems.

. 3rf 97 NRC Operations During testing of the 2A EDG, the nuclear station operator failed to Personnel IR 97003 follow prcscedure by recording the time that the EDG reached rated load Performance instead of the time that the EDG output breaker was closed. Defeiency 3/IN7 NRC Maintenance A surseillance procedure contained incorrect acceptance criteria for lake inadequate IR 9M3. LER 37397000 level w hich was greater than that specifkd in the UFSAR. An unusual Procedure 1nstru event was declared after the lir.ensee identified that take lesel had been ction a!!cwed to rise abose the lesel of flood protection bamers in the plant.

3/I!97 NRC Maintenance Poor material conddion of the lake make-up and blowdown ystem Equipment iR 97003; LER 37397009 contributed to an unusual esent. Operators had been reluctant to secure Malfunaion cooling take make-up pumps knowing the difliculty insehed in restaning the pumps, thus allowing take level ta rise. Afler identifying lake lesel abose plant flood bamer design limits, draining the lake w as delayed due to a blowdown valve that had been broken for some time and had a history of frequent repairs.

Page 23 af 23

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX . 09-ar-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9/17/1997 NRC Engmeeting The Ikensee's statTdemonstrated ueak engineermg knowledge of the Enginecrmg1)e 97013 Ri1RSW system design basis (Sectkm El.I). 97013 sign Denciency 9'17/1997 NRC Engineering The inspectors rmted that neither the post-msafication testing nor the Engineermg1)e 97013 insenice testing ensured the R1IRSW pumps would perften within sign De6ciency acceptable limits of apphcable design dawts. Because of this. your staff was required to perform an eperabihty esaluatim of the RilRSW pumps. In addition. your statTcould not readily idemify or esplain the basis for the Ri(RSW pump flow suncillance criteria which was in conflict with the Updated Fina! Safety Analysis Report description of the R11RSW pumps. 47013 Coser l_etter 9/17/1997 NRC Engineering The licensee's stafThad been aware of a discrepancy between the EngmeeringT)e 97013 RllRSW pump suncillance requirement and the UFSAR pump sign Denciency description since at least March 1997 but had rmt p reconciled the difTering values. This is considered an unresched item (Sectkm El.1) 97013 9'l7/1997 NRC Engineering The licensen self-assessment identined good technical issues related to Engmeering De 97013 the RilRSW pump testing but resolution was not technically rigorous or sign De6ciency comprehensise. This is also considered an unresoh ed item (Sectkm El.2). 97013 9/17/1997 NRC Engineering The licensee did not have adequate controls to ensure the relocated Engineering ~De 97013 RIIRSW pump flew suneillance requirement was properly implemented sign Deficiency in the IST program. The failure to incorporate applicable requirements and acceptance limits into the IST program m as considered a siolatism of to CFR Part 50. Aprendit B.Criterkm XI(Sectkm E13).97013 4!17/1997 NRC Engineering No clearly dc<umented basis existed for the licensee's RIIRSW pump Engineering'De 97013 flow sun eillance criteria, but the test uiteria appeared to have technical sign Denciency merit. The i.-spectors concluded the pumps couki meet their specified function with reasonable assurance (Secti<m El.I). 97013

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M-Nd7 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9:5!!997 NRC Plant Suppwt Radmlogical houscLeeping w as acceptable w ith some imprmement Other NA 97015 noted in contaminated area control. Radmkgical postings reficcted actual area condstkms and workers were obsersed using good ALARA practices. Continued examples of problems =ith radmlogical labelings nere identined on the Umts 1 and 2 refueling floors on portable radiatkm detection instrumentation and on the Reactor and Turbine Building sample panels. 97015 9:5!1997 NRC Plant Support A lad of significant emergent or contingent work and improvements in Personnel 97015 a-low-as-reasonably-achiesable ( ALA RA) controis hase resulted in Performance low er than espected dose since the completion of the Umt 2 refueling DeGciency outage. Iloweser, there continued to be problems =ith rework and'or work planning w hich accounted for about i I rem of the total dose through August 12.1997. 97015 9/5/1997 NRC Plant Support Reactor water chemistry was escellent and the Unit 2 fuel leakage was TeamworlSkill 97015 well controlled. Chemistry technician aggregate and indisidua! dose Lesel totals were low and consistent with the actisities performed. Chemistry technicians used efTectise ALARA controls and exhibited acceptable sample collectkm and analytical technique during performance of routine chemistry actisities. 97015 9'5/1997 NRC Plant 4:pport The REMP program was impicmented as requrred by station inadequate 97015 procedures. One weakness was identiGed in that station personnel were Osersight not performing self-assessments of contractor actisities A similar obsersatkm was made during an April 1996 statkm audit. Additionally, the inspector identified a REMP sample point that had been remosed in 1994 but was still indicated as actis e in the Offsite IAm Calculatkm Manual (ODCM L This discrepancy had not been identined by the licensee during a recent resiew of the REMP documemation. 970I5 i

Page 2 of 45

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 04 697 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 9'5/1997 NRC Plant Support Chemistry in-line and laboratory analpis instrumentation were operable OtherNA 97015 and well maintained, but seseral problems =cre noted w ith the Ifig',

Range Sampling System panel. Two discrepancies wcre identifict! in that the panel procedures did not refer to the appropriate section of the I inal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and that a recent modification to the system was not in accordance with the FSAR. One weakness uas identified in that panel maintenance work requests were not being timely addressed, forcing technicians to rely on alternate, ram-preferred sampling paths. In one case. the failure to address a work item increased the possibility of damage to the panet Some esamples uhere other chemistry procedures incorrectly referenced the FSAR were also identified. 97015 r27/1997 NRC Plant Support Radiatkm protectkm and chemistry department personnel effectisely Teamwork / Skill 9701I coordinated their cfTorts with the operations department during actisities Lesel in resptmse to indicatkms of the Unit 2 fuel leak (Sectum RI.1). 97011 807/1997 NRC Plant Support Ibe inyectors identified a posted Inked high radiation area (LI1RA) Personnel 9701I that w as not locked or attended as required by TS 612.B. The licensee Performance did not maintain proper control of the reactor building basement locked Defkiency high radiation area during L'mt I high pressure coolant injectica (IIPCI) system testing on two occasions (Section RI.2). 97011 3/27/1997 NRC Engineeriag Two examples of failing to incorporate design requirements into inadequate 970II operational procedures wcre identified from resiews oflicensee esent Procedure 1nstr reports (LER). The inspectors found a similar example alsre the uction procedure u;.Jate for post-accident operation of the RIIRSW sysicm was delayed although system modifications were completed in early 1997 (Sections E8.2 and E8 4). 97011 827/1997 NRC Engineering Print read %g training for engineering stalT was e(Tectise. The instructor Teamwork / Skill 97011 appeared to be highly qualified and demonstrated a high leset of skill in Level teaching the course material 'lowes er, the licensee failed to fop.ow the administrative control process for documenting the instructor's certificatkm(Section E5.1). 97011 rage 3 of ,ts

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX OMb97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8 27/1997 Other Maintenance Rescheduling a Ifigh Pressure Coolant Injection suncillance resulted in inadequate 9701I unpktnned additional esposure to statkm personnel and espenditure of Osersight additkmal resources predms!) planned for other work. A problem with the tummg gear da not present a direct safety concern however, the licensee elected to use procedures to compensate for equipment that dit not work reliably as designed and in this case, the failure also resulted in an additional radiation esposure to tm at higher dose lesels (Section M3.2). 97011 827/1997 NRC Maintenance the inspectors, based on a res sew of residua! heat remm al senice uater Inaccquate 97011 (RilRSW) Technical Specifications (TS) senciliance requirements. Procedure 1astr identified that four salses were not included in the suncillance action procedure. The licensce's followup to the inspectors

• concern was thorough and resulted in the licensee identifying eleven additional sahes that required position serification (Sectkm M3.1). 9701I 8 27/1997 NRC Operatkms The impettors did not fmd any edlence of operators c3cceding GL 82- Self-Critical 97011 12 mertime limits. The impectors ctmcluded. bawd on commitments made by department managers in response to Quality and Safety Assessment department audit fmdings and commitments to upper station management. that the licensee's m ertime program w as in cc.npiiance with GL 82-12 (Section 04.2).970II 827/1997 NRC All Multiple This report documents three actisities that the inspectors obsened to be imehed 970II wcli planned and controlled. Opera: ors generally performed well during Management the Unit 2 reactor s:artup. Work planning for the safe shutdtmn makeup pump system maintenance outage was thorough resulting in the resolutkm of e cral system deficiencies. Coordination of work grtmps in responw to the identification of a Unit 2 fuel leak allowed for the effecthe and timely identification of the afTected fuei bundle. 97011 Cmcr Letter 827!!997 Licensee Operatkes Tw o shifts of control room operators failed to detect increased ofTgas Personnel 97011 actisity resulting from a leak in a Unit 2 fuel element. Once detected. Perftenance tne licenwe tock appropriate action to identify the location of the leak Deficiency and suppress reactor power in the area of the afTected fuel bundle (Sectkm 01.5). 9701I r%ge h{ 3

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09 & ~9' Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REr 8 27/1997 NRC All Multiple Generally, operators ini.iated Problem Imprmement ihms (PIFs) as Personnel 9701I required by plant procedures. Iloweser, the impectors identified four Performance instances this repmt period that met the threshold criteria for generating Deficiency PIFs but none were initially written (Sections OI.-l. M3.2 and M4.1).

970iI 827!I997 NRC Operations Plant equipment uas not functitming as intended w hich resulted in Personnel 97011 additkmal compensatory me:aures or actions by operato 1 These Performance 4

operator uorkarounds =ere not identified and included on the licensee's Deficiency operator workaround list. The frequently aluming annunciator for the core spray discharre header pressure was of particular concern because operators tolerated the increased alarm frequency, but did not has e any esplanation for the atmormal condition (Section 01.3). 97011 8.77/1997 NRC All31ultiple While the open areas in the plant wcre kept clean, there was a buildup of Personnel 07011 debris in less accessible areas. This posed the potential for foreign Performance material to migrate to drains, sumps and possibly to uher more critical Deficiency plant equipment. In some cases, maintenance areas were left without adequate restoration of cleanhr ess. This indicated a tolerance for uncontrolled loose material in the plant that could lead to foreign materialintrusion problems (Secton 01.2). 9701I 8.27/1997 NRC Operations Although equipment problems occurred during the Unit 2 startup from Personnel 9701i the Q2R14 refueling outage, operator performance was generally good. Performance One poor operating practice ua revealed pertaining to operators using Deficiency an alarm to prompt a change in th _ electro-hy draulic control (EllC) system pressure setpoint. This oper:. ting practice was not obsersed during previous startups and appeared to be isolated to one operating crew (Sectron 01.I). 9701I l' age 5 vf 49

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-aw'?

Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIITION CAUSE REF 8/25/1997 NRC Engineering Based on the inspector's fmdmgs, the application of the engineering Engineering De 970to design change and correctise actkm processes appeared to be weak and sign Dermiency good engineering practices and plant procedures were not alway s followed. Improper applicatkm of the aftcmate parts replacement program allowed the insta!!ation of safety signincant parts whose form, 6t or function differed from the original. As a result, the safety functions of equipment were alTected Actions taken on problems noted in this area w ere not adequate to present repetition. Near the end of the inspection, howeser, your staff had taken steps to correct some of the poor practices and ensure proper use of the dc4gn change process.

97010 Coser Letter 8."25/1497 NRC Engineering Three siolatior:s of NRC requirements were identified during the EnginettingDe 97010 inspection. In the 6:st siolatkm. two instances were noted where the sign Denciency alternate parts replacement process was inappropriately used and -

alternate parts w ith difTerent fit or function wcre esatuated by procurement engineering, released for use and insta!!ed without using the design change process. In the two ruted instances, the replacement parts failed during testing and would not hase performed the required safety-related functions. In the second s iolatkm. adequate testing was not perfonned following changes made to plant equipment to serify that the equipment would satisfactnrily perfonn the required safety-related functkms. 'Ihe third siolatkm documented two instances where actions i wcre inadequate or untimely to correct significant problems in using the design change and alternate parts evaluation processes. Adequate corrective actions, aftes the discosery of the relicf salse problem in April of thh ut ar. could have substantially reduced the impact of problems with the emergency diesel generator air start motors in May. 97010 Coser Letter 4

l' age 7 of 45

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M-Dw-97 Ouad Cities D TE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTIDN CAUSE REF~

8725/1997 NRC Engmeeting improper application of the attemate parts replacement progr.un allow ed Inadequate 97010 the installation of difTerent safety significant parts u here the safety Oversight functk ts of related equipment were affected. Actions taken on problems noted in this area acre not adequate to p.esent repetitkm.

Early in the inspection engineering managements approach to the issues was ineffecthe. Near the end of the inspection however.the licensee had taken steps to correct sorne of the problems and ensure preper use of the design change and attemate parts esaluation processes. 97010 87_5/1997 NRC Engineering The decision to inses:igate the cause of the failure of the U-2 EDG to Engineering'De 97010 start after installation of the replacement air start motors was good; sign Deficiency howeser, the actkms taken to investigate and resche the problems appeared to be disorganiicd and infwmal. Pelem resolutim m as comphcated by the failure to conduct adequate testing fo!!owing actxins

' to correct dimenskmal problems on the replacement motors. 97010 8/1/1997 NRC Flant Support During this inspection, our ebservation of3 our acthities showed the Insehed 97012 security program to be effectisely implemented. Management attentkm Management resulted in impros ed performance. In particular, the effont and results of 3 our acthities to reduce secunty force personnel errors was successful and consequently the performance of tlw security organization improsed. No siolations of NRC requirements wcre ider.: %L 1loweser, your practice relating to security patrols appear te limit their efLctivenest 97012 Cmer Letter 8/l/1997 NRC Plant Support Security performance was effecthc. Security fbrce members insohtd 97012 demonstrated an appropriate worLing knowledge of security Management recuirements. Management support liv security requirements regarding staffing, training acth ities, and maintenance of security equipment was ,

soun+1 Secunty management's actions to address and resohe problems were timely and effecthe. 97012 8'I'1997 NRC Plant Support Secunty computer replacement project was completed in a timely and TeamworLSLill 97012 efTecthe manner. No significant problems were identified. (Sectisn Level S2.1)97012 l' age Ncf 48

i PLANT ISSUES MATI.IX Wac#

Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII' TION CAUSE REF 871/1997 NRC Plant Support The establishment and implementation of a program to reduce security invohed 97012 force personnel errors was a strength. Errors related to security force Management vrfumance base been significantly reduced. (Section 54.1) 97012 8'l/1997 NRC Plant Support The practice of starting your random and s aried patrols at designated im oh-d 97012 times limits their efTectiseness. (Section S3.1) 97012 Management 7/29'1997 Licensee Plant Support 073 97 Unit 2 cable relied upon in Appendis R Safe Shutdown LngineermgDe - LER 26597006 procedure w as found to be located in the same turbme building fire areas sign Defic.bry as the fire of concern. and therefore could be damaged by the fire.

7/2Ill W 7 NRC Maintenance Monthly TS suneillance for R!lRSW sahe pmition serification dal not Personnel LER 97018. IR 9701 I include sahes associated with RilR pump oil and seal coolers. (NRC Performance r and Licensee identifiedt. Inadequate procedure due to personnel Deficiency performance deficiency durmg TSUP resiew. IR 97011 7/13'I997 Licensee Operations Voluntary LER. Control room personnel misread an indscation delaying Personnel LER 265 97009. IR 9711 discm ery of abnormal offgas radiation readmgs and a fuel leak in Unit Performance

2. Inaccurate readings wcre recorded mer two shifts (four readings). Deficiency IR 97011 7JlI/1997 NRC Engineering The inspectors identified an inadequacy with an abnormal operating inadequate 97003 procedure fie the high pressure coolant mjection illPCI) system. The Procedure Instr procedure dal not include a reference for manually engaging the turning uction gear if necessary after an llPCI turbine trip. 97008 7/lI/1997 Licensee Plant Support As low as reasonably achiesable ( ALARA) initiatises during the Unit 2 Teamwork' Skill 97003 refuel outage helped to reduce metall station dose to date. Radiation (esel protection tracking and trending of dose was imprmed mer presious refuel outages and abwed the mid-year resiskm to the dose goal The 1997 station dose goal was revised from 1260 rem to 7'O rem. 97008 7/lI/1997 Licensee Operations Operators inappropriately used the discrete component operation process inadequate 97008 to perform attemate system lineups for the fuel pool (noling system. Os ersight drywcli Nor drain system. and the feedwater system during unit shutdowns.97003 l' age 9 of n

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-he' Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION cat 3E REF 7/lI/1997 NRC Maintenance The inspectors resicwed and obsen ed seseral logic functional tests on Penonnel 97003 Unit 2 The tests wcre satisfactority performed. The impectors obsened Performance minor deficiencies including one pretest brief where the test director was Deliciency unprepared and a maintenance error in w hich a jumper was placed in the

' wrong locatkm.97003 7/II11997 NRC M sintenance The inspectors identified. through a sampimg ofemergency diesci Personnel 97008 generator (EDG) suneillance procedures, where the EDG suncillance Performance program did not meet either the Technical Specification (13) and'or ti e Defsiency design basis dauments. There was also one esample where the test methodology was not adequat. determme the sealing capability of a check saise in the starting air sptem for the EDG. 97008 7/l I/1997 Other All Muhiple During this inspection perkt major actisities such as the Unit 2 TeamworL%ill 97005 refueling and startup were performed in a controlled manner and Loct 4

essentia!!) error free. Iloweser,less significant esolutions acre not always phnned as carefully and occasionally resulted in unexpec es ents or challenges to operators. Maintenance workers performed tasks safely and according to procedures. The successful repair of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system steam supply valse was well pbnned. Coser Letter 7/l I/1997 NRC Maintenance Maintenance uorkers performed tasks safely and accordmg to TeamworL3 kill 97008 procedures. The successful repair of the reactor core isolation cooling Lesel (TCIC) system steam supply saise was well pbnned 97005 7/1Ir1997 Other All' Multiple A.2jor activities such as the Unit 2 refuelmg and startup uere performed Teamwork.3 kill 97008 in a controlled manner and eswntia!!y error free. Less signifwant Lesel esolutions acre not always planned as carefu!!y and occasionally ,

resulted in tmexpected events or charenges to operators. 97008 7/lI/1997 Licensee Phnt Support The failure to take appropriate correctise action in response to identified Perrenne! 97005 rebra mussel growth in 1995 resulted in both fire pumps becoming Performance impble in 1996 due to clogged suction strainers. 97008 Del ciency Page 10 of 4%

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Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 6'29/1997 Licensee Staintenance Fise CRDs uere not scram time tested prior to 40*. power as required by inadequate LER 26F47005 IR 97014 TS following core afteratkms and maintenance. Upon dhcmcrv the Procedure Instr draft CRDs were declared inoperable and apprepriate actorts were taken. uctkm Subsequent testing was satisfactory. IR 97014 (draft) '

( f23/1997 NRC Maintenance Voluntary LER. Operating crews soluntarily emered 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdowe Personcel LER 254S7017. IR 970Ii LCOs twice to perform maintenance'sunci!!ance (36 and 56 minutes Performance respectisely). Deficiency 6/12/1997 T.C Engineering Voluntary LER. Umt 2 and Unit % EDGs declared inoperatie due to Personnel LER 26597005, IR 97010.

parts issue with air start motors. LER is(trrrently bemg resised. (NRC Performance identifiedt SALP. Engineering, Perso. met Performance Definimcy and Deficiency inadequate Proccduresinstructions. IR 97010.

6/10!I997 Self-Revealed Maintenance Unit 2 was shut dow n to replace the 2B recirculation pump seal During Personnel 97003 startup the seal a as obsened to not be staging properly Sub-equent Performance root cause insestigaten identified improper installation due to the failure Deficiency to folkm the installation procedure as the most likely cause of the seal failure.

$!!1/1997 NRC Plant Support Workers u ere generally familiar with management expectations and Personnel 97007 RPTs were obsened using good controls during work actisities. Performance floweser, some problems were identified regar ling the understanding of Deficiency requirements fiw ctmtrol of contaminated areas and use of engineermg controls and one weakness was identified with the use ofoptional controls in RWPs. 97007 5/1I/1997 NRC Plant Support Total exposure for routine operator and fire w atch rounds and for IM 0 herNA 97007 work decreased owing to station ALARA efforts. Iloweser. station laborer dose increased owing to station decontammation cfTorts. 97007 i

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX N -97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4'l6/1997 Licensee Maintenance or16970ne of four RCIC area high temperature switches would not Perwnnel LER 254.97013 actuate due to excess seatrng samish. The sw itch was inoperable from Performance Sept 1996 until 4'I7/97. TS require a!! four switches operable or the DeGciency closure of the RCIC steam supply isolation vahes within I lamr.

4115/1997 Licensee Plant Support The licemee's mersight and preparation for work on an RWCU pnmary Personnel 97007 isolation sahe was meffectise. Specifically, a lack of worker familiarity Performance with the controls specified for the job and a pow self-check by the Deficiency w orkers prior to and during the job. resulted in specified engineering controls not being used and a workers intake of radioactive material.

One s iolation, with two esamples, w as identified for the failure to use the specified en,aveering controls. The similarity of this esent to other esents in presious outages indicates that imprmement was needed in the planning and control of vahe work. 97007 4'I0/1997 Licensee Engineering 4/1997 Design deficiency would allow the Refuel Bridge monoraillloist Engineering De LER 254;265N7012 to be mer a portion of the core without the Refuel Bridge positxm sign DeGeiency Interlock being actuated.

4N!1997 NRC Plant Support Conservatise 97004 Decision Security performance was satisfactory. Security force members demonstrated an adequate working knowledge of security requirements.

Management support for security requirements regarding stafGng, training actisitses, and maintenance of security equipment uas gtwwi Security management's actions to address and resohe problems were time,y and efTectise. (S4)97004 4N/1997 NRC Plant Support The impector identified a s iolatum w hen a schicle was inadequately Personnel 97004 searched. It appears this was caused by the o0icer's failure to follew Performance procedure guidance and a weakness in a training actisity. The Deficiency significance of the finding was raised uhen it w as determined that other ofTicers would hase committed the sate error. (Section 54.1) 97004 I'ayy 14 of a w . _ . __

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX p c- r Oi:ad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3,., , , g 997 ........... . " * * " " " " " * " "

Umt I turbine generator taken offline to repair moisture seperator drain IR 97002 (drafi) tank lesel ctmtrol sahes. After the turbine was tripped. high flow m the turbme's EllC system resulted in a decision to shut down the reactor on N1 arch 22.

3 21/1997 Licensee Engineering Significant timling was disem red in the 2B Core Spray Room cooler Personnel LER 26597003. IR 97006.

during an outage inspectitm. The conditkm may hase esisted from June Perfiwmance 1996, rendering the room cooler and the 2B CS system inoperable. Defidency (Licensee identif'ed). Personnel Performance Deficiency. SALP -

Staintenance' Engineering. IR 97006.

3/17/1997 NRC N1aimenance The 2 A control rod drise pump was rebuilt twice in 1946 and is still out Personnel IR 97002 of senice for high s ibratitm and seal Icakage. Perfirmance Deficiency 3/I7/1997 Unit I turbine returned to senice after replacement of the failed 103D IR 97002 (draft) relay.

3/17/1997 NRC Operations imprm ements u ere noted to prmide more stringent control room access, Insched IR 97002 (draft) reduce inuwning phone calls. and reduce the general nohe lesel htanagement 3/17/1997 NRC hiaintenance Numerous rotating equipment problans exist includmg including the I A Equipment IR 97002 reactor feed pump which has been out of senice for mer 3 mtmths. the Atalfunctkm 1B reactor feed pump which has a seal leak after just being m erhauled, the i A reactor water cleanup pump and the 2A CRD pump.

3/17/1997 NRC hiaintenance IC and 1D RIIRSW pump merhaul actisities uere performed well Teamwork / Skill IR 97002 (draft)

Level 3/17!!997 NRC Plant Support Plant water chemistn was good, but problems =ith hydrogen gas supply. Equipment IR 97002 (drafu condenser leaks. and reactor water cleanup system problems caused Ntalfuncti< .

chemistry transients.

3/17/1997 Other Plant Support A second esent wi;hin 12 months of contrminated mr.l,crial generated Inad. uc IR 97002 (draft) onsite and found ofTsite was diwmered by a scrap metal processing Oses plant radiation / .cctor.

,,,,,,,,, Uni, I wa-asathei> wui un ana e 108Wy im IR 97W2 WW during testing.

l l' age 15 vf 4M

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-h97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSF REF 37/1997 NRC Plant Sepport Matein umdstion of the ethent radiatica monitors was good. but there Teamwork /Sk 11 97003 were teo esamples of poor communication of system syerability Lesel problems. In particular, a problem aswciated with the Eberline SPING <

microprocessor had not been identiGed sis the hcensee's problem identification process nor had it been s. ell communicated to the chemrstry and system engineermg stafT.

3/7/1997 NRC Operatkms Operators failed to comply with TS action statement after the 10$C RPS Personnel IR 97002 (draft) VIO relay failed. TS required channel be placed in trip condition within 1 Performance hour; howeser, operators reset the trip for t-shooting i and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Deficiency after initial failure.

3/7/1997 NRC Operatkms The inspectors identiGed that additional exhaust fans were not started in Personnel IR 97002 (draft) VIO response to positise turbine building pressure as required by annunciator Performance procedures. Since the fans were out of senice, operators opened the DeSciency turbine building roll up door instead.

3 7/1997 NRC Plant Support Sesefal problems were identified w ith the licensee's osersight of the Personnel 97003 CAM and ARM program, including: the iirc:: could not proside the Performance basis for CAM and ARM alarm set pchts and had not serified (prior to Deficiency the inspectors res iew ) if the set points met the basis; the station procedure that listed the required CAM sun eillances did not list the weekly requirement for the changing of litter papers; and there were seseral examples of missing data in CAM source check and sampic logbook entries from October-December 1996.  !

3/7/1997 NRC Plant Support De licensee was effectisely resicwing the state ofinfrequently entered Personnel 97003 areas per procedure no QCRP 6020-03. Ilowes er.during plant Performance i w alkdaw ns the inspectors identified ses eral examples of poor control of Deficiency contaminated areas and radiological postings and labelings which resuhed in a wiolation. t 2/28/1997 Self-Rescaled Operstkms A Unit Two shutdown was required due to four of fise power operated Equipment IR 97002 (draft) relief s alses failing to meet insen ice testing closing time requirem:nts Malfunctkm specified by plant procedures.

l' age IV ef M

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec-C' Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF

• "*""*" *********** Unit 2 mas shut down about S hrs earlier than plam:ed for a refueling *"""""

2/28/1997 IR 97002 (draA) outage. The TS required shutdown was entered into after 4 of 5 ADS vahes failed the required stroke times in the closed directions. Failed closure times acre slightly abme acceptable. The shut &vwn was in accordance with procedures and well esecuted.

2/27/1997 Self-Revealed All Multiple An madsertent IiPCI initiation occurred on Unit 2 during the Inadequate IR 97002 (draft) performance of an IM suneillance. The suneillance was not intended to Proceduteinstr be p rformed during poweroperations. Operator response to the uction unexpectd IIPCI initiation was good 2/27/1997 Self-Rescaled Maintenance Unit Two llPCI inadsettently started, w ith possibility ofinjection. due to inadequate IR 97002 (draH) l a problem with automatic depressurization system suneillance testing. Procedure 1nstr uctioen 2'2I/1997 Licensee Plant Support The licensee's osersight and controls mer the unconditicial release of Personnel 97007 scrap material to an offsite vendor was ineffectisc Specit'cally, e non- Perfmmance consenative approach to the unconditkmal release sun ey resulted in the Deficiency release of contaminated material to the offsite sendor. On: violation was identified for the failure to follow RP procedures regarding the unconditional release ofitems from the RI'A. 97007 2/14!1997 NRC Plant Support A routine security inspection identified two cited siolations and two non- Penonnel IR 97004 cited siolcions. The cited siolations included an inadequate schicle Perforance search mid and inadequate security bamer. The NCVs imohed fitness De'.ciency for duty procedures and an insttentive security offwer.

2/5/1997 NitC Operations Although the material condition and syerability of your radiation Personnel 97003 monitoring system w as generally good, a number of problems u ere Performance identified in this area during the inspection. In particular, printer Deficiency problems or electrical fluctuations caused a control room radiation monitoring system microprocessor to lock up. Plant operators were required to reset the system each time this occurred. While this did not etrect the operability of the system. this problem was not reported through 3our problem identification proe, ram nor was it commur:cated to the responsible sy stem engincer.

I'm-19 of 45

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W-Ike C Ouad CiticS DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII' TION CAL 5E REF 2/$/1997 NRC Plant Suppet So eral examples of a failure to follow radiological procedures for Personnel IR 97003 posting control of contrmmated areas and ra!ioacth e material. Performance Deficiency 2/571997 NRC lant Support Oserall management osenight of the area radiation and continuous air inadequate IR 9 r003 monitors was weak. Oversight 1 27/1997 Licensee Lngineering Engineering Cates performed in response to GL 96-06 indicated that Other NA lek 254065N7002 several isolable piping sect ons may esperience stresses abose UFSAR allowables following a LOCA. Conectise acthms include partia!Iy draining certain sectkms of piping. Analysis of situation contir.ued.

I/27/1997 NRC All Multiple Management osersight was not always adequate to ensure consistent Inadequate IR 06020 quality operability oaluations were being performed and salidated for Osersigitt key systems.

I/27/1997 NRC Plant Support The impectors identified that the flow switch and pressure indicator for inadequate IR 96020 the senice water c'Iluent radiation monitor dk1 not h.ne a required Procedusefinstr calibratkm frequency. uction 1/27/1997 NRC Engineering WF AKNESS: Problems identified with the licensee's operability inadequate IR 96020I1.l;IFI esaluation for the shared EDG start failure (esaluation did not arrne at Osersight 251765 06020-04 roet cause resolution or provide effbctise followup action) and with methodology for determining EDG reliabihty data f poor component trending). An impecter folk.wup item initiated to resicw licensee *s root cause assessment correctis e actions and resolution of reliability testing.

1/27/1997 NRC Maintenance The inspectors obsened some operator know! edge and procedural Inadequat: IR 96020 wenknesses during the performance of the CREVS monthly suneiPiance Oversight test. The operations department did not promptly update the procedure and tra:n operators on the current system status.

1'27/1997 Licensee Ope ations Some der.line in control room operator performance was noted during Penonnel IR %020; NOV the inspection period. Operators mispositkmed a control rod during Performance control rod esercising and misaligned one train of the standby gas Deficiency treatment system.

1%ge 21 of M

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Nw 97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF i 1/27/1997 Licens(e Engineering ENS Call (31671): SEVERAL PIPING SECTIONS FOUND OUTSIDE Engineering De UFSAR DESIGN ALLOWABLES per GL 46-06. sign Deficiency.

1/27< 1997 NRC Maintenance lhe licensee failed to ensure that control room sentilation was Iriadequate IR 96020 adequately testing using RilRSW. Procedure'Ingr uction l'27/1997 Self-Revealed Maintenance lhe shared emergency diesel generato, experienced a failure to stop and Equipment IR 96020 a failure to start. ~he step failure was attributed to a failed gosernor Malfunction solenoid and the failure to start uas an air start motor problem. Both failed components uere repeat problems with the EDG sy stem.

I/7/1997 Licensee Operations T S required readings were not taken within the required time period after Personnel LER 2549700I, IR.%020 changing from 8 he- m 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts. IR 96020. Performance Deficiency 12/23/1996 Licensee Engineering ENS Call (31503): ECCS SUC710N STR AINER WOT BUILT Engineering'De IR %020!E2.2: LER IN ACCORDANCE WITil DESIGN. UFSAR assumed the maximum sign Deficiency 96025; IFl 254f265-96020-headioss across the ECCS suction stramer as 1-foot d'p at rated flow 06 (10,000 gpm). The installed strainer's ana!)tical model used 5.8-foot d'p at rated flow. ~Ihe 50.59 esaluation used 15 and 3.4 psig containment oser-pressure for short and long term calculations. respectis ely. System declared oper?ble, but degraded uith no USQ. An amendment change wa4 planned. An inspector followup item initiated to resiew the limits on over-pressure since specific values were not included in the UFSAR.

12/13!!996 NRC Maintenance inadequate System Logic Functional Test for Control Room Ventilation inadequate IR 96020; NOV isolation System. Based on resident inspector's questions, licensee Procedure / Instr res iew ed logic test and determined that existing sun eillance had not uction adequately tested complete logic circuit. Licensee resised test and successfully completed suneillance. Rlll DRS initialinvestigation determined that revised test appeared adequre. Additional references ENS 31452. LER 96-024 12/6/1996 NRC Operations The U-l circulating water tras elling screens maintenance was not well Inadequate IR 96017 coordinated from a risk perspectise. Osersight IMge 22 of 45

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX o*De#

Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 12/6/1996 Licensee Maintenance During oserhaul and modification of the 2D RIIRSW pump, the licenwe Inadequate IR 960l7 identified and corrected a signincant number of problems including Oversight deSciencies in sendor supplied parts. Mechanics initially installed the pump seal housing improperly. Final test results indicated that the oserhaut effort was successful.

12/6/1996 NRC Operations Operations scheduling failed to ensure cold weather preparations wcre Inadequate IR 96014 completed before the onset of cold weather. Osersight 121 1996 NRC All/ Multiple Repeai problems w ith feedw ater heater tesel co, trol s alses and gland Equipment IR 96017 steam condenser les el control salses netessitated increased operator Malfunction inten ention, caused incremed personnel radiation exposure, redirected pres iously scheduled maintenance activities, and impacted unit operation.

12/6'1996 NRC Engineering VIO SL IV (Criterion XI "fest Control"): Failed to incorporate TS Inadequate ' IR 96017/E3.I-requirements into applicable suneillance procedures for Control Room Procedure / Instr Emergency Filtration System Charcoal Adsorber. uction 12;671996 NRC Operations Operations exhibited good control of switchyard work insolved IR 96017 Management 22/6'1996 NRC Operations Operations failed to ensure a suneillance test for iIPCI operability w.. Inadequate 1R 96014 performed in a timely manner. Oversight 12/2/1996 Self-Res ealed Maintenance U-2 reduced power to less than 15 percent due to problems uith RWCU Equipment IR 96017 system isolation valse packing leak. Mall' unction i I/26!!996 NRC Engineering VIO SL 111 (EA 96-530; Criterion ill " Design Control' and .50.59): Two inadequate IR 96019 El.l .b.iii & iv apparent violations regarding the safety-related function of the reactor Oversight building siding. -

4 II/26/1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance Shared standby diesel generator inoperable to Unit 2 due to a relay Equipment IR 96017 problem. Malfunction i I/24/1996 Iicensee Maintenance The control room emergency Gitration system was declared inoperable inadequate ENS Call 31377; LER because CREFs airflow was below the required minimum. Followup Procedure / Instr 46023 action included adjusted CREFs airflow and calibrating the permanent uction plant instrument hmp. Previously the flow indication was not calibrated against an actual air flow measurement.

l' age 23 of 3

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W A -97 Ouad Cities DATE ID IW SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF i i 1/24'l996 NRC Maintenance Design Control NOV for improper bolts used in two RilRSW pumps. Engineering /De IR 96017; NOV sign Deficiency 11/12/1996 Self-Res caled Operations LPCI declared inoperable after pump discharge check vahe fe; led to Equipment IR 96017 reseat, resulting in loss ofline fill pressure. Diwharge piping Malfunction repressurized approx.1/2 hour later and LPCI was declared openble.

Additional references ENS 31320; LER 26596003 10 28/1996 Licensee Engineering VIO SL 111 (EA 96-531; 1S. Criteria XI " Test Control" and 50.59) Inadequate IR 96017/E2,1; LER 96022 ENS Call (31227): lNOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY Oversight VENTILATION SYSTEM. Three apparent siolations conceming the CREVS; 1) TS LCO exceeded. 2) Post-modi 6 cation and surseillance tests failed to ensure system me: UFSAR requirements and 3) Inadequate safety res iew conceming a change to the UFSAR for control room IIVAC calculations.

10 07/1996 Self-Resealed Maintenance U-2 nuin turbine taken off-line due to problems uith moisture separator Equipment IR 96017 drain tank lesel control vahes. Foreign material found on vahes caused Malfunction two vahes to stick open.

10 76/1996 Licensee Maintenance The licensee invalled incorrect bolt material in the IC and 2C lillRSW Inadequate IR 96017; NOV pumps due to inadequate control of s endor processes. Other examples Osersight ins oh ing inadequate control of s endor processes and materials w ere identified. Vio1;ohn of 10 CFR Part 50, App. B Criteria 111, for use of incorrect bolt mateiial.

1026/lW6 NRC Maintenance Mechanical maintenance s orkers failed to follow procedures while Personnel - IR 96014; VIO working on an emergency diesel generator air stan motors. Rework was Performance required, an the supersisor was not informed. Deficiency 10.06'l996 NRC Maintenance Maintenance work on the IC RilRSW pump and shared standby diesel Teamwork / Skill IR 96014 generator w ere well coordinated and executed according to schedule. Lesel 10 76'1996 NRC Maintenance The inspectors found poor supervisory osersight for work on the shared inadequate IR 46014 emergency diesel generator. Osersight l' age 24 of D

PIANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-D e-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID11Y SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10/26/1996 NRC Maintenance inspectors found unquahfied w orkers supersised by vendor Personnel - IR 96014.VIO representatises during recaris on the shared emergency diesel generator. Performance Deficiency 100 6'1996 Licensee Maintsnance Quad Cities put a hold on all parts receis ed from the Comed Central Other/NA IR %014 Receipt inspection and Test (CRIT) facility based on a number of problems with parts received.

1006/1996 1.icensee Maintenance 10 2696 Questionable botting materials found in IC and 2C RilRSW Equipment LFR 254;265/97044, IR pumps. Bolts were replaced. IR 96017 Malfunction 96017

"""*"" *""*"*" ...u...... ...........

107 611996 SAI P I3 ENDS (7/23 95 - 100696) 10/26'1996 NRC Maintenance The licensee showed some progress in the implementation of the work Teamwork' Skill IR 96014 control process, as esidenced by some correctise maintenance backlog Level reduction and improed schedule adherence.

1003/1996 Licensee Operations The inspectors concluded that panel monitoring by control room Teamwork / Skill IR 96014 operators was gomi in detecting the U-2 number I cor:,bine intermediate Level valse (CIV) not fully open, but monitoring could has e been better in detecting generator swings produced during troubleshooting actisities.

Operations

• response to the CIV drifting ck> sed was conservatis e.

10/11/1996 NRC Engine _ ring STRENGill: GOOD QUESTIONING ATTITUDE BY SYSTEM Cther/NA IR %014/El.1; LER 96021 -

ENGINEER led to the identification and subsequent repair of a design deficiency in the safety-related ponion of the control room IIVAC sy stem. Original design deficiency led to sy stem inoperability.

10/11/1996 NRC Operations An NRC initial license examination was administered to eight Personnel IR 96302 individuals; three who had applied for Reactor Operator licenses and Performance fise who had applied fcr Senior Reactor Operator Licenses. One Reactor Deficiency Operator applicant failed the wri; ten portion of his esamination and was denied an operating license. All other applicants passed all portions of their examinations and w ere issued Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator licenses.

l' age 25 of M

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SALP DCSCRIPTION CAUSE REF l DATE ID BY ,

Engineering Eshaust from swing EIXi caused sentilation for S110 DG battery and Engineering De RI Obsenation 8.27/1996 Self-Re s ealed day . ak rooms to secure. NRC obsened that control room operators sign DeGeiency responded in a passise manner. Issue turned mer to DRS for followup.

Maintenance Unit I remained at about 1-10 psig (TS grey area) for seseral days due to Personnel IR 96012 8 27/1996 Self-Revealed inability to successfully complete RCIC and 11PCI oserspeed trip tests. Performance Seseral minor problems with turning gear auto-disengage and barometric DeGciency condensers complicated esolution.

Maintenance Licensee revised acceptance criteria for RCIC oserspeed test. The test Inadequate IR 96012 806!!996 Licensee required numerous attempts before meeting the success criteria. Factors Osersight l

contributing to the difGculty of passing the established criteria included l use of a hand-held tachometer, first time esolution of oserhauling the l

turbine since commercial operation of Unit I, change in practices of l

i using contract or sendor personnel, and the sendor manual instructions were not clear.

Engineeriag Operators trip U-l during surtup due to rise in indicated water lesel. Personnel IR 96012 ROS/1996 Licensee Transient caused by llPVs coming open because of nonlinear calibration Performance of EllC at low pressure. LER Deficiency Operations Unit 2 alternate 125 VDC battery drained due to operators leasing failed Personnel IR 96012 825!I996 Self-Revealed trickle charger attached. Performance Deficiency ENS call. Licensee retroactively declares secondary containment EngineeringDe IR 96012; URI 8 03/1996 Licensee Engineering inoperable due to broken bolts on blow-out panels Engineering slow to sign Deliciency report problem. LER 96016 Licensee's initial screening of degraded secondary containment blow-out Personnel IR 96012; URI 8 23/1996 Licensee Engineering panel bolts failed to identify all apnlicable UFSAR accident analysis Performance requirements. Deliciency

"""""* IR 96011 8 22/1996

• ""*""* Plant Support Overall performance of 1996 EP exerci e considered very good.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09ar-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 8/22/1996 Licensee N1aintenance Soere plugging of sessel bottom head drain line results H innaccurate inadequate IR 9601I bottom head temperature indication. Osersight 8'22/1996 Licensee Engineering Licensee identified that the rupture disk downstream of the 4D code Engineering De IR 960F safety relief vah e had ruptured. No indication of relief vahe lifting of sign Deficiency leak-by was found. Condition attributed to DWEDS piping arrangement.

8'l6/1996 Licensee Engineering ENS call. Unit 2 IIPCI whip pipe restraint determined to hase been Engineering!De IR 9601I; URI incapable of restricting applied design loadmg doe to incorrect!) sign Deficiency installed anchor bolts. Temporary Alteration installed.

S'15/1996 """"*" *"*""*" Unit 2 synchronized to the grid. a a n..... .u..u..n 31IIll946 Self-Re caled N1aintenance ENS call. Poor reassernbly of IIPCI discharge check sah e led to Personnel IR 9601I excesshe leakage (l4 gpm) from mechanicaljoint.11PCI declared Performance inoperable. Deficiency S'9'1996 Licensee Operations Operations management discontinued a U-2 startup pending the Conservathe IR 96011 evaluation of a breaker calibntion test desice. Electricans identified a Decision disparity between digital and anaks readings on the desice and were concerned that some safety related breaker's trip setpoints had been set non-conservarh ely.

8 v1996 Licensee Engineering Hoth diesel driven fire water pumps were declared inoperable because of EngineeringDe IR 96011; URI rebre mussel fouling of the inlet strainers. Biocide injection point was sign Deficierry <

dcwnstream of fire water pump suction point in water bay. LER 96013 8'9/1996 Self-Revealed N1aintenance ID RilR Service Wu '-e Pump experiences bearing failure (seal last Personnel IR 4601I worked in 9J93) due to s.eud in seal. Shaft also found to be incorrectly Performance sized. Deliciency 7/29!!996 1.icensee N1aintenance Licensee identified and resobed problems with safety related battery Engineering'De RI Observation mounting fixtures. Batteries being grounded by buildup of salt in sign Deficiency styrofoam padding.

7/29!!996 Licensee N1aintenance Workers miswired power supply breaker for 1 A LPCI outboard isolation Personnel IR c'01 I; NOV sahe. QA inspectors signed that w iting was correct. Breaker smoked Performance during post maintenance testing. Deficiency l' age 32 of a

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09-Dw-97 PLANT ISSUES M ATRIX Ouad Cities 1

SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF DATE ID BY Maintenance During post-maintenance testing of residual heat remos al sen ice w ater Personnel IR 9601I; NOV 5'28'!996 Licensee pump, licensee noted problems uith the inboard bearing seal. Performance Maintenance personnel determined that the seal centernig clips uere not Deficiency removed and the collar set screws were not tightened as required by the work package. Esample of a siolation for failure to follow procedure.

(Issue first identified as URI 96003-07)

Engineering ENS CALL U2 operated in unanalyzed condition with flPCI turbine Engineering'De IR 96008 504/1996 NRC discharge vacuum breakers isolated sign Deficiency ENS CALL UI AND U21.PCI INJECTION VALVES INOPERAllLE Engineering /De IR 96008; URI 5/23/1996 Licensee Engineering UNDER DEGRADED VOLTAGE SCENARIOS. The licensee found sign Deficiency the condition while preparing mod for MCC 29-2 cable pull. Cable length information in data baw used for original soltage calculations was non-conservatise. LER 96009 Maintenance ENS CALL.11 CR llVAC INOPER AllLE. Controlling at 82 degress F Equipment IR 96006 )

5/17/1996 Licensee '

vs. required band 70 to 80 degrees F. Malfunction Maintenance 2A CRD pump eshibits high vibration after only 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of service Personnel IR 96012;IR 96003 5/17/1996 Self-Rescaled following complete rebuild. Rotor found to contain incorrect material Performance and incorrect shims. Deficiency Engineering ENGINEERING TEST DIRECTOR INATTENTIVE DURING TEST Personnel IR 96006;IFl 5/16!!996 NRC IN CONT ROL ROOM. During lull in activities inspector found Performance indisidual apparently asleep. Identified by IDNS inspector. Deficiency Maintenance 3 of 6 alternate rod insertion soleniod vent sah es on U-2 failed to open Equipment IR 96006 5/12/1996 Licensee during testing. Malfunction Maintenance 3 OF 6 AL'IERNNilVE ROD INSERTION VENT VALVES FAILED Equipment IR 96006 5/12/1996 1.icensee TO OPEN DURING TESTING ON UNIT 2. Vent vahe solenoids Malfunction replaced. Licensee still performing root cause analysis.

Page 35 of 4X

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX - W-a r-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID 11Y SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 4'29'1996 Licensee Maintenance REACIOR llEAD SET AND PARTI ALLY BOLTED ONE BOLT Personnel IR 96006; NCV llOLE OUT OF ALIGNMENT. Technicians improperly aligned head to Performance wrong mark. Denciency 4/25'19 % NRC Operations Operators incorrectly used a procedure change form to perform the Personnel IR 96006; NOV

" Control Rod Drise Scram Air lleader Fest." Original test required no Performance fuel in sessel during test. A procedure change form was issued to allow DeGeiency test with fuel in sessel Violation for change ofintent of procedure without adequate resiew.

4/18!!996 self-Rescaled Operations One U-2 rod mm ed in wrong direction due to problem with notch Equipment IR 96006 o erride switch. Malfunction 4117/1996 Licensee Plant Support UNAUTilORIZED ACCESS INTO FACILITY BY INDIVIDUAL llY Personnel IR 96004 TAILGATING TilROUGli ACCESS. Intentional tailgating by Performance contractor employee was caugtit immediatley by security. Denciency 4/10/1996 Licensee Maintenance Si!LC SQUlB VALVE DID NOT I1RE. FOUND LOOSE WIRE IN CR Equipment IR 96044 CAlllNET. Wire later improperly soldered - problem recurred. Malfunction 4/10/1996 Licensee Maintenanu CONTRACTOR llORSEPLAY DURING CRD REBUILD AND Personnel IR 96004 INTENTIONAL BYPASS OF RAD MONITOR. RP tech identified, and Performance contractor sent offsite. De6ciency 3'24'1996 Licensee Operations POOR COMMUNICATIONS RESULTED IN AN EQUIPMENT Personnel IR 960G4 OPERATOR REMOVING Tile BACKUP N2 TO U-1/2 EDG Performance DAMPERS IN LIEU OF Tile U-l BACKUP N2. Operator Dc6ciency acknowledged error and quickt corrected. No efTect to equipment operability.

3/20'l996 1.icensee Maintenance CONTRACTOR ems ASSEMBLED SWEDGELOK FITTINGS INTO Personnel IR 96004 IIOKE l~lTTINGS ON llCUs. ems not trained on improper practice of Performance mixing matching fittings. Deficiency 3/19'1496 Licensee Maintenance U-2 flPCI declared inoperable due to apparent problems with auxiliary Equipment IR 96004 oil ump.

f Actual problem was with control room annonication circuit. Malfunction 3/1811996 Licen~ Maintenance Tile M AIN FEED 1 ROM BUS 19 TO BUS 18/19-5 (LPCI SWING Equipment IR 96004 BUS) CAUGill FIRE. I ound bad coil in contactor. Malfunction Page 37 of .48

PLANT ISSUES M ATRIX ' 09&c-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID IlY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 3'15/1996 Lice.;see Operations ESF AClUATION DURING OOS. Operator remosed wrong fuses in Personnel IR 96004 RPS bus; resulted in LSF actuation Ril sentilation stopped. SBGT auto Performance started. All primary containment group Ill actuated components Deficiency operated per design.

3/5/1996 Licensee Plant Support SCOTT CO. EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERAllLE DUE TO ERROR Equipment ENS Call; IR 96004 M ADE IlY PERSONNEL IN SColT COUNTY IOWA SilERIFF'S Malfunction OFTICE.

3/4/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance U-2 CONDENSATE DEMINERAllZER MASTER FLOW Equipment IR 96002; Open CONTROLLER OSCII.LATIONS. Resulting pressure changes almost Malfunction reached low suction pressure trip ofcondensate booster pump.

3!4/1996 Self-Resealed Maintenance U-2 M AIN TURillNE CONTROL VALVE #2 OSCILLATING. Equipment IR 96002;IR 960(L1 Problem with serso-motor. Power rapidly reduced to < 45% Turbine Malfunction offline nest day for repairs.

3/4/1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance SAFETY RELAT ED "II" CONTROL ROOM llVAC TRAIN Equipment ' ENS Call;IR 96002 REMOVED FROM SERVICE DUE TO SUPPLY AND EXIIAUST Malfunction DAMPERS FAILED OPEN. Failed relay replaced.

3/3/1996 Licensee Operations Out of Sersice Error on Shared EDG. Durirg planned maintenance of Personnc! IR 96004; NOV shared EDG with circuits associated uith l' i EDG, license incorrectly Performance wrote and hung an OOS to remose fr.es that would disable the shared Deliciency EDG osercurrent protection during auto startup from the U-2 EDG circuits.

3/3/1996 Licensee Operations DURING PLANNED M AINT ENANCE ON U-l/2 SilDG CIRCUITS Personnel IR 96002; Open ASSOCIATED WITil Performance U-1,'IllE OVERCURRENT PROTECTION RELAY FUSES FOR Tile Deficiency U-1.2 SilDG WERE REMOVFD PER Tile OOS INSTRUCTIONS.

The OOS stated that removin;; the fuses would disable the U-!/2 osercurrent protection during an auto startup from U-2 circuits. De U-1/2 SilDG would not have auto started and loaded to Unit 2.

2/28/1996 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-l/2 SilDG INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED 11REAKER FOR OIL Equipment IR 96002; Open CIRCULATING PUMP AND FAILED LUllE OIL IIEATER. Malfunction Page 35 of 3

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec-97 Ouad Cities -

SALP DESCRIPTION DATE ID BY CAUSE REF ,

2/3/1996 Licensee Operations SAFETY RELATED ~B"IIVAC SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO Engineering De ENS Call; IR 96002; Open EXTREME COLD TEMPERATURE (-28 DEG F).14 day LCO exited sign Deficiency later in day. New technical speciGcations will eliminate exterior temperature requirement.

1/30/1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance U-l llPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO AUi.. OIL PUMP CYCLING ON & Equipment ENS Call;1R 96002; Open OFF DURING SURVEILLANCE. Problems due to coordination of Malfunction pressure switch setpoint and relief vahe setpoint.

I!29/1996 Licensee Engineering U-2 SBDG INOPERABLE DUE TO FUEL Olt TRANSFER Personnel IR 96002; Open DRIFTING PRESSUFE SWITCil SYSTEM CilECK VALVE. Missing Performance personnel failing to adequately track surseillace tests. Deficiency I/24!!996 Licensee Operations CllEMICAL RELEASE (SODIUM BISULFITE)INTO MISSISSIPPI Personnel ENS Call;1R 96002; Open RIVER DUE TO CIIEMISTRY TECilNICI AN DISTRACTED FROM Performance CliEMICAL INJECTION SECURING SEQUENCE! PROCEDURE. Deficiency I/23e1996 Self-Res caled Maintenance BOlli UNITS COMMENCED DOWNPOWER (0335) DUE TO Equipment ENS Call;IR 96002; Open INADEQUATE LEVEL IN CIRCULATING WATER FOREBAY. Inlet Malfunction trash rake clogged with debris from Mississippi riser Trash rake broken. Both diesel fire pumps inoperable due to inadequate forebay lesel(less than 568'6"). The RilRSW & SilDG cooling water pumps need 566'3" Downpower stopped at i115 when debris removed from trash racks.

1/22/1996 Licensee Maintenance TIIE ~B" CONT ROL ROOM IIVAC SYSTEM ClllLLER llEAD Personnel IR 96002; Open llEAT EXCIIANGER (IlX) IMPROPERLY INSTALLED YEARS Performance AGO. Identified by maintenance and corrected. Ileat exchanger Deficiency etTiciency reduced but not inoperable.

1/15/1996 Licensee Engineering COMPUTER ROOM IN AUXILIARY BUILDING EXCEEDED Engineering'De ENS Call;IR 95010; URI MAXIMUM DESIGN BASIS FOR FIRE LOADING DUE TO SLICE sign Deficiency ELECTRICAL DATA !!ASE IMPROPERLY CilARACTRIZING CABLE LENGTil AND CABLES UNDER FLOOR NOT ACCOUNTED FOR.

(Uge 40 of 48

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Dec-97 Outid Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 1/10/1996 Licensee Mair:tenance CUT ON BOFTOM GASKET OF ELEMENT IN IIIE 2G Personnel IR 95010 CONDENSATE DEMINERAllZER. Result uas high d'p on post Performance strainer and remosal from senice. This is a continuing problem for Deficiency operators.

I /-l'1996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance SIIARED "A" DIESEL FIRE PUMP TRIPPED ON OVERSPEED DUE Equipment IR 95010 TO OILY RESIDUE ON MAGNETIC PICKUP IN CONTROLLER. Malfun<. tion

!!311996 Self-Rescaled Maintenance I.EAK OF 2A MOIS!URE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANK LEVEL Equhnnent . IR 95010 INSTRUMENT PIPING DUE Q CORROSION OF DEGRADATION Malfunction OF FLEXIBLE PIPE. Reduced power to 25?. replace flex pipe.

1/1/1996 Self-Res ealed Maintenance U-l MAIN GENERATOR TRANSFORMER COOLING FAN Equipment IR 95010 TRIPPED. Forced load reduction to troubleshoot and repair. If I fan Malfunction trips, entire group of 6 fans tnp. Breaker tripping coordination problem.

Octurred summer 1995 too. Prehlem not yet resolsed - need mod to replace molded case circuit bre'4.3.

1/1Il996 NRC Engineering U-2 RCIC TRIP TilROTTL1 *LVE COPRECTIVE ACTIONS Inadequate IR 95010 WERE NOT PERFORMED / rLANNEP BY OPERATIONS FOR A Oversight PREVIOUS EVENT.

12/3I/1995 Self-Rescaled Maintenance Loss of control room annunciator at< Cble alarms due to a computer Equipment IR 95010; RI Observation failure (a condition repeated ses eral times in 1995). Malfunction 12/23!!995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 stator water cooling temperature control valve failed. Controlling Equipmert . IR 95010 manually. Malfunction 12/23/1995 Licensee Maintenance U-l power reduced to repair an air leak to IC2 feedwater heater level Equipment IR 95010 control valve. Malfunction 12/22/1995 Licensee Operations inadsertant start of residual heat removal (RilR) puinp. PIF written that Personnel IR 96002; IR 96012; NCV described unexplained RIIR system alarms when RIIR senice water Performance (SW) pump started during surveillance. Investigation determined RilR Deficiency punsp was actually started.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M c-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 11/19/1995 Self Rescaled Mamtenance U-2 Sil!Xi inoperable due to slow startup during surseillance (11/19 & Equipment IR 95009 I10095) Malfunction 1I!!6/1995 Licensee Maintenance Steam leaks in U-l heater bay. Leaks on 1Cl & IC2 heater vent piping. Equipment IR 95009 I low Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) engineers not infonned. Malfunction iI/14/1995 Licensee Engineering Nuclear engineers deseloped wrong rod pull sheets. Poor review of new Personnel IR 95009 software implementation. Rod worth minimiter (RWM) presented rod Performance mos ement. Deficiency i I /13/1945 NRC Maintenance Steam leak in U-I heater bay on 2 inch line. Two inch or less had been inadequate IR 95009 identified by FAC program as susceptible to corrosion in 9 95. Unit i Osersight refueling outage 14 (QIR14) had not included plans to inspect any of the pipeing 2 inches or smaller that were susceptible and not mode: led.

Also, offgas k>op seals blown again. The drain from 1B moisture separator not working. Charcoal beds got wet, but operable.

"*"" *""""" U-l STARTUP AND GENERATOR SYNCllRONIZED TO GRID "**"""* "*""""

I1/13!!995 II/9/1995 Self-Res caled Maintenance U-l stanup. Main steam line drain valve (220-1) packing leak identified Equipment IR 95009 during startup, U-l shut down next day. Malfunction 11/4/1995 Self-Res caled Maintenance U-l/2 SillXi failed to start on surseillance. Time delay relay in Equipment IR 95009; IFl protection circuit failed. Malfunction 1I/3/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-1 C & D inboard main steam isolation vahes (MSIV) failed to close Equipment IR 95009 on spring press alone during " fait safe" testing. Replaced vahe stem Malfunction packing; vah es passed.

Il/3/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 SillXi operable. Air staning motors were identified as the root Other/NA IR 95009; URI cause of the U-2 SillX) starting problems from 8'95 to 1035.

1I/1/1995 NRC Maintenance Boron deposits on U-2 standby liquid control (SBLC) relief valves. lleat Personnel IR 95009 trace elements for U-2 SilLC rot set at the appropriate temperatures. Perfonnance Deficiency i1/1/1995 Licensee Maintenance U-l "l E" dryw ell cooler pow er supply cable experienced a high current Equipment IR 95009 condition. Cable replaced. Malfunction Page 43 of 4M

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Iw-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY EALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 1I/I/1995 Licensee Maintenance Shared instrument air compressor placed on limited sersice due to Equipment IR 95009 increased s ibration and temperature indications. Malfunction iI/I/1995 Self-Res ealed Maint, nance Clogged drain on U-I offgas moisture separator resulted in moisture Equipment IR 95009 carry os er into the absorber beds. Malfunction iI/1/1995 NRC Maintenance Numerous examples of scram v' limit switches not properly aligned. Personnel IR 95009 Many presiously identified and not corrected, some were recently Perfivmance identified. De limit suitches prosided scram salve position indication Deficiency to control room ope..itors. Did not affect of the operability of the scram s ah es.

II)draulic control unit (IICU) directional control s alve solenoids interfered with scram inlet sahe stroking.

I l/1/1995 Self-Resealed Engineering U-2 SBDG sentilation fan trippud due to undensized thermal oscrloads. Enpincering/De IR 95009 Oserloads replaced with higher rated oserhuds. sign Deficiency 11/Il1995 NRC Maintenance Water leaking on to a 13.8 kV transformer and on top of the U-l SBDG Equipment IR 95009 output junction box in the turbine building after a heavy rain. Similar Malfunction leaks found in the turbine building presiously. The licensee corrected the immediate issue w hen infi>rmed, but not the oserall problem.

10/3I/1995 NRC Operations Interim admin;stratise control to present oserk>ading safety bus feeder inadequate IR 95009 breakers not implemented. Procedure!1nstr uction 10/'6/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance Smoke from motor control center (MCC) 28-2 feeder breaker to Equipment RI Observation hydrogen seat oil current transfi>rmer. Malfunction 10.25/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 2G" dr>well cooler fc.n blade failure. Destroyed sentilaton Equipment IR 95009 ductwork and cooling water (RBCCW) piping. SRI tour in drywell Malfunction nc?ed cooler was still leaking even after isolated. liigh nitrites in torus from leak _

10'24/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 SBDG failed to start on mor routine surseillance test. Root Equipment IR 95009 cause attributed to air start moto _ gradation. Root cause evaulation Malfunction -

was better, but had not identified performance criteria for air start motors.

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-Du-97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10'4/1995 Self-Res caled Engineering 480 Vac U-2 MCC (29-2) tripped on oserhud during routine operations. Engineering De IR 95007; NOV 111; LER Normalloads exceeded 300 amp rating. Emergency kuds also escceded ~ sign Deficiency 95006 breaker ratings on some of the other safety MCCs. Similar esent at Dresden in 1994. Quad only addressed one MCC (25-2). Quad had data to indicate problem on MCC 29-2.

10'4/1995 Self-Rescaled Maintenance U-2 IIPCI inoperable due to not going on turning gear. No root cause Equipment IR 95007 identified. Malfunction 10'l!!995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 ICV #2 continued to oscillate. Equipment IR 95007 Malfunction 1OfI/1995 Licensee Engineering I'our U-I motor operated s als es (MOV) susceptible to cracked motor- Equipment 1R 95007 rotors due to IGSCC. Motors replaced. One of the four indicated Malfunction potential crac ked rotor during diagnostic testing.

10!!/1995 Licensee Maintenance U-2 CRD cart elesator malfunctioned during replacement of CRD K-7. Equipment IR 95009 Result was uorkers receising extra dose (OctEov 1995). Malfation 9/29/1995 Licensee Maintenance Craft performing acid etching in the SHO building used too high a Personnel IR 95007;IFl concemration of muriatic acid and damaged exposed copper conductors. performance U-l SHO battery charger trip. Damage to both umts. Deficiency 9/29'1995 Self-Res caled Maintenance U-2 TCV #2 began oscillating. Equipment IR 95007 Malfunction 9.26/1995 Scif-Rewaled Maintenance U-2 SBDG failed to start during routine surveillance. Licensee attributed Equipment - IR 95007; URI cause to fuel oil priming pump Poor root cause evaluation. Malft;nction 9/I3/1995 Self-Revealed Maintenance U-2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable following routine Equipment IR 95007 surveillance run due to over pressure in suction piping. Leaking Malfunction isolation valses.

9/12/1995 Self-H a caled Plant Support Sirens in White ide City ir. operable due to lightning damage to radio Other/NA ENS Call; IR 95007 control unit.

9/4 fl995 Self-Resealed Engineering

• t-1 IIPCI inoperable due to slow stroke times on three AOVs.

. Equipment IR 95007

< ngineering evaluated the stroke increase as acceptable. Malfunction l'a;.y 46 of 48

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7 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX O N 97 Ouad Cities DATE ID BY SALP DESCRII"IION CAUSE REF l 7/26'1995 Licensee Maintentnce All four U-2 condenser vacuum pressuce switches were out of TS Personnel - ENS Call; IR 95006 tolerance. Pressure suitches replaced during outage due to problems Perfortnance with drift. New switches also prone to drift. Licensee changed setpoint Deficiency and increased calibration frequency.

7/26/1995 Self-Res caled Maintenance U-2 shutdown due to TIIV oscillations. Equipment IR 95006 Malfunction 7/24/1995 Scif-Revealed Maintenance U-2 reactor recirculation pump speed increase due to test equipment Equipment IR 95006 problems. Power increased alwut 5 %. Malfunction 7/22/1995 """""* *""""** ""*"*"* ***********

SALP 12 ENDED (12'26 93 - 7/2295).

7/20!!995 * " " * * " " ""**""* "*""**"

U-2 STARlUP AFTER Q2R13 COMPLETED. ." " " * * * "

l' age 48 of 48 C

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 09-*c-97 Zion DATE l

L ID BY l SALP DESCRIPTION CAUSE REF 10/1S.97 Licensee Plant Support An operator failed to lock the door to the Radaaste Annex, a high Personnel Future Report radiation area, after performing rounds in the area. Performance Deficiency 10/17/97 NRC Operations During an NRC Oversigl.t Panel meeting, the licensce's characterization Other/NA Draft Oversight Panel of operator performance, ualike previous r'nectings, was much more Meeting Summary for consistent with the NRC's current assessment. 10!!7/97 10/2/97 Licensee Operations A non-licensed operator founhthe cap for the I A e.aergency diesel Personnel DRAFT IR 97022 generater train A, manual starting air check test tap isolation valve Performance installeu, although an existing out-of-service required it to be open. Deficiency 10/2/97 Self-Reveale' Operations Unit 2 pressurizer level unexp,ectantly decreased 3 percent when a 2B Personnel DRAFT IR 97022 residual heat removal heat exchanger bypass valve was open during a Performance surveillance insteas' of the closed position required by an out-of-service. Deficiency 10/2/97 NRC Operations During a public meeting conducted on October 2,1997, the licensee Other/NA NRC letter dated 10/20!97 de<cribed actions being taken to address a " chilled environment" at Zion Station. The NRC sent a letter to the licensee on October 20,1997, which requested a formal written response addressing this issue.

9/30/97 NRC Engineering Several operability program improwments have been implemented by . Other/NA DRAFT IR 97023 the licensee including a designated program manager, established tracking for corrective actions and compensatory actions, improved opera.or interface, and special reviews of existing operability assessments. The licensee still needed to issue a revised program procedure, provide training to appropriate personnel, and trend related problem identification forms.

9/30,97 NRC Engineering The licensee fa led to correct deficiencies in the tube oil analysis Inadequate DRAFT IR 97023 program which the NRC identified in 1996. Inspectors noted four Oversight instances of out-of-specification oil samples from late 1996 and early 1997 on w hich the licensee did not perform root cause analysis, one instance in which an out-of-specification sample was not identified in the corrective action program, and the continued absence of a tracking process for receipt ofoil samples.

. N-Page i of 29 r

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