HL-5166, Requests Exemption from 10CFR70.24(a), Criticality Accident Requirements, Requirements for Units 1 & 2.Criticality Accident Monitoring Sys Unnecessary

Requests Exemption from 10CFR70.24(a), Criticality Accident Requirements, Requirements for Units 1 & 2.Criticality Accident Monitoring Sys Unnecessary

ML20112F724
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/04/1996
From:	Beckham J GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HL-5166, NUDOCS 9606100077
Download: ML20112F724 (13)

Text

Georgia Power Company

, 40 inverness conter Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201

. Telephone 20s 877-7279

(;B'lj,'anbelear

, GeorgiaPower Hatch Project te swrtam dxtnc systan J'me 4, 1996 Docket Nos. 50-321 HL-5166 50-366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Contmission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reaniremellu Gentlemen:

T. f. / ant to 10 CFR 70.24(d) and 70.14(a), Georgia Power Company (GPC), as described in the unclosure, reby requests an exemptice.9pm th<: re,quirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a),

" Criticality Accident Requirements," for thu Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. This request involves no change to radiatien monitoring instrumentation or emergency procedures presently utilized at riant Hatch.

Specific exemptions from secuon 70.24 were previously granted for these units and were contained in the special nuclear material (SNM) licenses for each unit. However, the exemptions were inadvertently omitted from the Part 50 operating licenses at the time the licenses were subsequently issued. It is GPC's understanding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken the position that the exemptions from section 70.24 granted in the SNM licenses expire with the issuance of a Part 50 license. GPC is submitting these applications for operational flexibility, if needed.

- Georgia Power Company believes the exemption is technically ap;w priate for the same reasons the NRC granted the exemption in connection with the SNM licenses. A criticality accident monitoring system was and is not necessary at Plant Hatch.

Please contact this office ifyou have any questions or require any additional ir. formation.

Sincerely, 9606100077 960604 PDR ADOCK 05000321 p PDR J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Enclosure:

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GeorgiaPower d

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 4, 1996

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Enclosure:

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70 .24(a) Criticality Accident i Requirements JTBffMM/eb cc: Georgia Power Company H. L. Sumner, Jr., Plant Hatch General Manager NORMS II.S. Nuclear Reentatorv Commission. Washington. D.C.

K. N. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region H S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector Jtate ofGeorgia J. D. Tanner, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources l

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! Enclosure l Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant j~ Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements  ;

r Pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d) and 70.14(a), Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby l cequests an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a), " Criticality Accident l l 1 tequirements," for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Urits 1 and 2. This request is l l m administrative matter and involves no change to nadation monitoring l instrumentation or emergency procedures presently utilized at Plant Hatch Units 1 l' and 2.

l Specific exemptions from section 70.24 were previously granted for these units and l

were contained in the special nuclear material (SNhi) licenses for each unit. However, 1 the exemptions were inadvertently omitted from the Part 50 operating licenses at the time the licenses were subsequently issued.* It is GPC's understanding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken the position that the exemptions from section 70.24 granted in the SNhi licenses expire with the issuance of a Part 50 license. l Georgia Powei rompany believes the exemption is technically appropriate for the I same reasons the NRC granted the exemption in connection with the SNM Licenses. I A criticality accident monitoring system was and is not necessary at Plant Hatch. Such i

exemptions from section 70.24 are typically granted to Part 50 licensees.* Since the exemptions were issued, no changes in the use, stor:ge, or handling of SF% which l would make compliance with section 70.24(a) necessary, have occurred.* i I. REGULATORY REOUIREMENTS: I 10 CFR 70.24(a) requires licensees authorized to possess certain amounts of SNM to maintain a monitoring system and emergency procedures for the purpose ofdetecting and responding to accidental criticality. These requirements are applicable to Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2. Specifically, section 70.24(a)*

requireslicensees to:

i A. Maintain in each area in which such licensed SNM is handled, used, or

stored, a monitoring system meeting the requirements ofeither paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2), as appropriate, and using gamma- or neutron-sensitive radiation detectors which will energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs, l

l B. Maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored to ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of the alarm.

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Enclosure Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements C. Retain a copy of current procedures for each area as a record for as long as licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored in the area. The licensee shall retain any superseded portion of the procedures for three years after the portionis superseded. ,

Section 70.24(d) anticipates that relief from these requirements is appropriate in some circumstances and allows licensees to apply for an exemption from section 70.24 if good cause is shown. GPC believes good cause exists based on the ,

following.

1. As explained below, the fuel storage design and procedural controls preclude accidental criticality.

2. Compliance with section 70.24(a) would not serve the underlying purpese of the regulation. l

3. Exemptions from section 70.24(a) were previously extended to Plant .{

Hatch Units 1 and 2 in the SNM licenses.

4. Since the original exemptions were issued, no changes in the use, storage, or handling of SNM, which would make compliance with section 70.24(a) necessary, have occurred.*

In addition to show good cause pursuant to section 70.24(d), a request for an exemption frorn section 70.24(a) must also satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 70.14(a).*

For the reasons given below, GPC believes the applications for exemption from the requirements ofsection 70.24(a) for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 are authorized under section 70.14(a).

II. THE EXEMPTION APPLICATIONS SATISFY TIIE STANDARDS UNDSR SECTION 70.14(a) AND SHOULD BE GRANTED:

The specific requirements for granting exemptions from Part 70 regulations are set forth in 10 CFR 70.14(a). Under section 70.14(a), the NRC is authorized to grant an exemption upon demonstration that the exemption is authorized by law; will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security; and is in the public interest. The following discussion addresses each of these requirements and demonstrates that the NRC should grant the requested exemptions.

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i Enclosure I

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements I

i A. Exemption Reauests Are Authorized by Law The NRC's authority to grant requests fbr exemptions from its regulations has existed since 1956.* The panicular authority to grant exemptions  ;

from the requirements of Pan 70 was codified in 10 CFR 70.14 in 1972.  !

S_eg 37 Federal Register 5745, 5749 (March 21,1972). Moreover, 70.24(d) clearly states that the NRC has specific and express authority to exempt licensees from the requirements of section 70.24. .Therefore, granting the exemptions is explicitly authorized by the NRC's regulations.

B. Exemotion Requests Will Not Endanger Life or Prooerty or the Common Defense Security ,

An exemption request will not endanger life or property or the common  ;

defense and security if the request meets the statutory standard of adequate  !

protection to the health and safety of the public.* To further ensure the common defense and security are not endangered, the exemption request must demonstrate that the loss or diversion of SNM is precluded. As described below, the use, storage, and bandling of SNM at Plant Hatch provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public, and precludes loss or diversion of SNM. In panicular, this discussion focuses on the following points: design, characteristics, Technical Specifications requirements, procedural controls, and existing accident analyses.

1. Use of SNM At Plant Hatch, SNM is principally in the form of nuclear fuel.

However, other quantities of SNM are used, or may be used (and stored) at each unit in the form of fissile material incorporated into nuclear instrumentation (e.g., source range monitors , intermediate l range monitors, and local power range monitors), fuel loading chambers, stanup source assemblies, and Health Physics calibration sources. The total amount of SNM used in non-fuel capacities is small - significantly less than the quantity specified in section 70.24(a). The small quantity ofnon-fuel SNM present, and I the form in which the SNM is used and stored, precludes an inadvertent criticality. Additionally,in accordance with section 70.24(c), Units 1 and 2 are exempt from section 70.24(b) for SNM "used or to be used in the reactor." Thus, with respect to irradiated and unirradiated nuclear fuel, the remainder of this discussion is directed only toward the requirements of 70.24(a).

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1 Enclosure j* Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements Inadvenent or accidental criticality of SNM while in use in the reactor vessel is precluded through compliance with the Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, including reactivity requirements j (e.g., shutdown margins, limits on control rod movement),

instrumentation requirements (e.g., reactor power and radiation ,

monitors), and controls on refueling operations (e.g., refueling equipment interlocks).(* In addition, the operators' continuous attention directed toward instruments monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in the reactor assures the facility is operated in such a manner as to preclude inadvertent criticality. Finally, since access to the fuel in the reactor vessel is not physically possible while in use and is procedurally controlled during refueling (section II.B.3), there l are no concerns associated with loss or diversion of the fuel.

Therefore, the requirements of section 70.24(a) are not necessary for SNM in the form of nuclear fuel while used in the reactor vessel; and thus, granting these exemptions will not endanger life or propeny or  :

the common defense and security.

2. Storage of SNM SNM as nuclear fuel is stored in one of two locations-the spent fuel. )

pool"* or the new fuel vault. The spent fuel pool is used to store l irradiated fuel under water after its removal from the reactor. The pool is designed to store fuel in a geometric array that precludes criticality. In addition, existing Technical Specification limits on kar are maintained 5 0.95,(") even in the event of a fuel handling l l

accident.02)

The new fuel vault is used to receive and store new fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading in the reactor. The new fuel vault is designed to store new fuel in a geometric an'ay that precludes criticality. In addition, existing safety evaluations demonstrate that kar is maintained 5 0.95 when the new fuel racks i' are fully loaded and dry or flooded with unborated water, or in the  !

l event of a fuel handhng accident.("*")

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! New fuel is shipped in a plastic wrap. When the fuel is removed from )

! its transportation cask, the wrap is removed and the fuel is placed in j the fuel inspection stand.. Following inspection, the new fuel can j either be placed in the new fuel storage vault or in the spent fuel pool t (typically placed in spent fuel pool). In no case is the plastic wrap i

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. l Enclosure ,

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Requirements reinserted on the fuel. (Removal of the wrap requires it to be slit down the length of the new fuel assembly, thereby making its reuse highly unlikely.) Therefore, there is no concern that the plastic wrap used as part of the new fuel package will be assessable to hold water from flooding from overhead sources. Additionally, as discussed above, the new fuel storage racks were analyzed for a postulated flooded condition, and the results show that k.ais maintained less than or < 0.95.

3. Handling of SNM Both irradiated and unirradiated fuel is moved to and from the new fuel vault, the reactor vessel, and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling operations. In addition, fael movement into the facility and within the reactor vessel or the spent fuel pool occur. In all cases, fuel movement is procedurally controlled and designed to preclude conditions involving criticality concerns. Moreover, previous }

accident analyses oe.nonstrate that a fuel handling accident (i.e., a dropped fuel element) will not create conditions which exceed design specifications.*) In addition, the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manuals specifically address refueling operations and limit the handling of fuel to ensure against an accidental criticality and preclude certain movements over the spent fuel pool and the reactor vessel."

The procedural controls discussed in section II.B.2 ensure SNM

- handling is authorized and monitored, thereby minimizing the potential opportunity for loss of diversion. Similarly, the absence of an accidental criticality monitoring system would not affect the

. capability of GPC to ensure SNM is safeguarded during handling.

Relative to the SNM Licenses for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2,* the exemptions from the requirements of Section 70.24 were based upon an express finding that "the inherent features associated with the storage and inspection of unirradiated fuel established good cause for granting the exemption aad that granting such an exemption will not endanger public life or property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the public interest." The facilities, storage and inspection and procedures and other safeguards in place at the time the exemptions were granted remain in place andjustify the exemptions requested herein.

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Enclosure Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a) l

Qiticality Accident Requirements Therefore, the requirements of section 70.24(a) are not necessary for the handling of SNM Granting these exemptions relative to fuel handling will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security.

C. Exemption Requests Are in the Public Interest The NRC has not provided specific detailed guidance on how to apply the "public interest" standard under section 70.14(a). However, in a 1985 amendment to section 50.12(a), the NRC deleted the "public interest" standard in favor of defining the "special circumstances" that justify requesting an exemption from NRC regulations (50 Federal Register 50764, December 12,1985. At the same time, the NRC implied that section 70.14(a) was not revised to be consistent with section 50.12(a) v Jy .

because the NRC did not envision frequent use ofsection 70.14(a)." It seems reasonable to accept that the NRC intends the "special circumstances" in section 50.12(a) to serve the same purpose as the "public l interest" criterion of section 70.14(a) and that an exemption request which satisfies the special circumstances of 50.12(a) also satisfies the public

, interest element of 70.14(a). I Among the several special circumstances identified in section 50.12(aX2),

two"* are relevant to these exemption requests:

(aX2Xii) Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose cf the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule; or .

(aX2Xiii) - Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that j are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated . .

Each of these 50.12(aX2) items is reviewed in turn below. l (ii) Aeolication of 10 CFR 70.24 would not serve and is not necessary to achieve the underiving pumose of this

! requirement.

The explicit language of section 70.24 does not identify the purpose (s) for

! requiring an accidental criticality monitoring system and the associated i;

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Enclosure

, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements emergency procedures. However, the regulatory history underlying this requirement indicates that: 1 The following amendments [i A, section 70.24] to these regulations

[ir, Part 70] is [ sic] designed to assure that all licensees who are authorized to possess special nuclear material in amounts which may produce conditions of accidental criticality have in operation adequate alarm systems and emergency plans to evacuate personnel.

23 Federal Register 8747, November 11,1958 (emphasis added). Based ,

on this language, the NRC apparently promulgated section 70.24 to ensure

, licensees are aware of, and take appropriate response to, conditions of  !

! accidental criticality, l As a corollary, this language further implies that where design and/or  ;

procedural safeguards ensure against conditions of accidental criticality in the first place, compliance with section 70.24 would not serve the  !

underlying purpose of the regulation. The NRC echoes support for this interpretation in its regulatory position contained in Section C.1 of Regulatory Guide 8.12," Criticality Accident Alarm Systems," Revision 2, i October 1988 (emphasis added), as follows:

1 Section 70.24 of 10 CFR Part 70 requires alarm coverage "in each area in which such licensed special nuclear matt. rial is handled, used or stored . . ." whereas paragraph 4.2.1 of the standard states that the need for criticality alarms must be evaluated for such areas. Ibuc_h an evaluation does not determine that a notential for criticality exists.

as for example where the quantities or form of special nuclear material make criticality practically impossible or where geometric spacing is used to preclude criticality, such as in some storage spaces for unirradiated nuclear plant fuel, it is appropriate to request an l exemotion from 70.24."

As discussed above in section II.B, the design of and safety analyses for the spent fuel pool and new fuel vault, as well as the associated procedural

, control and Technical Specifications requirements, ensure conditions of l accidental criticality are precluded. Therefore, the application of .

section 70.24(a) to Plant Hatch would not serve and is not necessary to

! achieve the underlying purpose of this requirement. l i

L Based on these special circumstances which would justify the granting of

!; the exemption applications using the guidance of section 50.12(a), the s

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c Enclosure l

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a) 1 Criticality Accident Requirements

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exemption requests are in the public interest for the purposes of i I

section 70.14(a).

J iii) Compliance with section 70.24(a) would result in undue hardship or other costs significantly in excess of those contemplated when this I regulation was adopted. or that are sinnificantly in excess of those incurred by others.

. A criticality accident monitoring system requires a considerable expenditure of resources, including the design and installation of the system, the l development and implementation of any associated emergency procedures, and the operation and maintenance of the system for the life of the plant. ,

In light of the purpose ofan accidental criticality monitoring system, these expenditures could otherwise be put to bet er use improving the operation

of the plant. Accordingly, compliance with section 70.24(a) would result in an undue hardship and other costs that are significantly in excess of those likely contemplated when this regulation was adopted.

It is GPC's understanding that exemptions from the requirements of l section 70.24(a) are typically granted to Part 50 licensees. As a recent example, Centerior Energy was granted an exemption from section 73.24(a) relative to the possession of SNM at its nuclear facility.

Moreover, this exemption was granted under circumstances very similar to the present application." Moreover, an exemption was included in the Operating Licenses for GPC's Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2" which employ facilities and procedures that are not materially different from those in place at Plant Hatch. Therefore, GPC concludes that since Plant Hatch Units 1  ;

and 2 are not dissimilar from other facilities which have received such an l

exemption, compliance with section 70.24(a) would certainly create an i undue hardship and additional costs.

III. CONCI,USION:

Because exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, is in the public interest due to the presence of i

special circumstances, and is requested for good cause, GPC respectfully submits

! that, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.14(a) and 70.24(d), the NRC should grant the requested exemptions.

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Enclosure '

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Requirements NOTES

1. Compare the Unit I and Unit 2 Operating Licenses, dated August 6,1994, and June 13,1978, respectively, with the Unit I and Unit 2 SNM licenses, dated August 2,1973, and October 28,1977, respectively.

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2. This request is in accordance with NRC guidance on section 70.24 contained in Regulatory Guide 8.12," Criticality Accident Alarm Systems," Section C.1.  ;

Revision 2, dated October 1988. "[W]here the quantities or form of special i nuclear material make criticality practically impossible or where geometric spacing is used to preclude criticality, such as in some storage spaces for unirradiated nuclear power plant fuel, it is appropriate to request an exemption from 70.24."

3. Changes in the storage of SNM as irradiated fuel have occurred at Plant Hatch -

since receipt of the initial operating licenses (e.g., reracking both spent fuel pools); however, the changes did not affect previous conclusions regarding accidental criticality.

4. Section 70.24(a) does not require underwater monitoring of SNM that is handled

. or stored beneath water shielding.

5. Changes in the storage of SNM as irradiated fuel have occurred at Plant Hatch since receipt of the initial operating licenses (e.g., reracking both spent fuel pools); however, the changes did not affect previous conclusions regarding

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accidental criticality. (Note: An interim outdoor new fuel storage facility for i Unit I was constmeted before completion of the permanent new fuel storage  ;

vaults located inside the Reactor Building, where chances of a criticality event are  !

now even lesslikely.) '

6. Although Units 1 and 2 are licensed under Part 50, these exemption requests need not be brought under section 50.12, since relief from any Part 50 requirements is not being sought. Sse 50 Federal Register 50764, 50775, December 12,1985 (" exemptions from the provisions ofeach part of the regulations must be evaluated and granted under the exemption provisions contained in that part."). However, as described later in this application, the section 50.12 "special circumstances" requirement is in effect applicable to this j request.

I j 7. Ses 50 Federal Register at 50766-67, citing U.S. v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel. 406

U.S. 742,755 (1972); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,636 F.2d 323,357 (D.D.

! Cir.1979); and WAIT Radio v. FCC. 418 F.2d 1153,1157 (D.C. Cir.1%9).

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4 Enclosure Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Requirements t

8. Sgg 50 Federal Register at 50767-68. In discussing the "not endanger" terminology in the original language of section 50.12(a), the NRC concluded that this criterion was "never intended to embody any special standards for exemptions that differed from the statutory standards that licensees must provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and be in accord with the common defense and security." 11 at 50678. Although section 70.14(a) still employs the "not endanger" language, no defmitive guidance for its application is given. Therefore, it is concluded that the guidance offered under section 50.12(a) regarding endangerment is likewise applicable to part 70 exemptions

9. Sag gg, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.1, " Reactivity Control Systems;" 3.3, " Reactor Protection System Instrumentation;" and 3.9, " Refueling Operations."

10. 10 CFR 70.24(a) expressly provides that the section "is not intended to require underwater monitoring when SNM is handled or stored beneath water shielding. . ." Thus, no exemption is necessary for storage of SNM as nuclear fuel in the spent fuel pool and, as such, is not described herein.

I 1. Sgg Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specification 4.3, " Fuel Storage."

12. Sgg Unit 1 "inal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 10.3, " Spent Fuel Storage," and Appendix F, section F.3, " Evaluation with Respect to 1971 General Design Criteria," GDC 62; and Unit 2 FSAR sections 3.1, "Conformance with NRC GDC" GDC 62, and 9.1.2, " Spent Fuel Storage." -

13. See Unit 1 FSAR section 10.2,"New Fuel Storage," and Appendix F, section F.3, " Evaluation with Respect to 1971 General Design Criteria," GDC 62; and Unit 2 FSAR sections 3.1,"Conformance with NRC GDC" (Criterion 62), and 9.1.1,"New Fuel Storage."

14. Sec Unit 1 FSAR sections 10.2,"New Fuel Storage;" 10.3," Spent Fuel  !

Storage;" 14.4.4," Refueling Accident;" and Appendix F section F.3," Evaluation with Respect to 1971 General Design Criteria," GDC 62.

Sgg Unit 2 FSAR sections 3.1, "Conformance with NRC GDC," GDC 62; 9.1.1, l "New Fuel Storage;" 9.1.2, " Spent Fuel Storage;" and 15.1.41, " Fuel Handling Accident."

15. Sgg Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.9 " Refueling Operations;" and Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual sections T3.9.3, " Refueling i

• Crane and Holst," and T3.9.4, " Crane Travel."

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Enclosure

, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24(a)

Criticality Accident Reauirements

16. The exemption for Unit I was granted prior to the construction of the permanent fuel storage facility, and was, therefore, based upon temporary facilities and procedures in use during the constmction of the permanent facility. The current Unit I and Unit 2 storage facilities and procedures are the same, and the exemption in the Unit 2 SNM license supports the exemption for Unit I requested herein to the same extent its supports the exemption for Unit 2.

17. Specifically, the NRC commented as follows on the need for consistent exemption language throughout its regulations:

' The NRC has considered the need to revise other parts ofits regulations to correspond to the criteria in 50.12(a). Because the majority ofexemption situations arise in the context of 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, the NRC has determined that revisions to other parts of the regulations are not necessary at this time. S_eg Federal Register at 50775.

18. Section 50.12(a)(2) identifies six special circumstances that can be used tojustify requesting an exemption; however, an exemption does not require that all six circumstances to bejustified. GPC r6 viewed these exemption requests against

. the criteria in Section 50.12(a)(2) and concluded that items (ii) and (iii), most directly apply to Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 in this instance.

19. The value/ impact statement published in connection with Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 8.12, which remained applicable to Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 8.12, provides:

As indicated in Regulatory Position 1, a reauest for an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, " Criticality Accident Requirements," . . is anoropriate when there is no real oossibility of criticality. for example in situations where geometric spacing is used to preclude criticality . . .

20. See 59 Federal Register 50260, October 3,1994.

21. Sgg Vogtle Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, Revision 9, NUREG-1137, March 1989; Vogtle Unit 1 Operating License, Item 2.D; and Vogtle Unit 2 Operating License, Item 2.D.

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