ET-NRC-93-3990, Nonproprietary, AP600 RCS Leak PRA Evaluation
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| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1993 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
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| ET-NRC-93-3990, NUDOCS 9809290090 | |
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ET-NRC-93-3990 t
- OCTOBER 20,1993 i
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l AP600 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK i
i PRA EVALUATION l
- October 1993 ,
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l 9809290090 980922
- PCR ADOCK 05200003
- A PDR
- Table of Contents
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l PAGE l 1.0 Introduction 1 l
2.0 Purpose 1 3.0 Analysis 2 l l 3.1 Create the RCS Leak Event Tree 2 i
3.2 Quantify the Core Damage Frequency for the RCS Leak Event 3 3.3 Update the Containment Event Trees (CET) 3 4.0 Conclusion 3 e
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
During an NRC/EPRI meeting on the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) held on November 18,1992, R. Youngolcad of Brookhaven National Laboratories presented an evaluation of reliability goals and safety systems performance. This presentation included t the identification of 39 reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage events with leak rates between 1 and 100 gallon per minute (gpm) and 48 events with leak rates less than 1 gpm at pressurized water reactors (PWR) during the period from 1987 to 1992 which included i approximately 421 reactor years of PWR operation. Apparent concem over such events with l
respect to the AP600 design is that since the AP600 chemical and volume control system is a '
nonsafety related system, these leakage events are not adequately addressed by the AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The analysis presented in the AP600 PRA report covers the range of loss of coolant accidents from a 100 gpm leak (very small LOCA category) up through the double-ended severance of the largest pipe in the primary coolant system. This RCS leakage event is now included in the AP600 baseline PRA which improves accuracy of the focused PRA for the regulatory treatment of nonsafety systems.
1 l 2.0 PURPOSE l The purpose of this document is to discuss the resolution of the RCS leakage issue identified i
above. The two ranges of leak rates identified are addressed separately.
For the O to 1 gpm leak range, a qualitative evaluation is performed. For a 1 gpm leak, with no makeup flow, it takes more than 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> to empty the pressurizer and more than 190 l
hours to drain the volume of water from a core makeup tank (CMT) to the automatic depressurization system (ADS) actuation water level setpoint. That is, with both CMTs operating, it would take more than 18 days to get to the ADS actuation setpoint. Failure to recognize and identify such a leak and neither correct the situation nor manually bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition is sufficiently unlikely that it is not in the scope of typical risk assessment studies.
For the 1 to 100 gpm leak rate range, a quantitative evaluation of the RCS leakage event is performed. The analysis includes: calculating a leakage initiating event frequency, calculating the probability of repairing the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) makeup system, developing an RCS leak event tree, quantifying the event tree, and finally incorporating the results into the current Baseline PRA results. The release frequency is also reanalyzed due to the additional core damage sequences that propagate through to the containment event trees.
I This RCS leakage event is an addition to the other initiating events currently included in the baseline AP600 PRA. The core damage frequency and the release frequency associated with this event are a small addition to those values submitted to the NRC on June 26,1992 in the AP600 Probabilistic Ris'k Assessment Report. The AP600 PRA report tables dealing with core ;
damage frequency (i.e., Tables 7-1 and 8-1) change as a result of including the RCS leak l l event. The revisions to those tables are included in this letter as Tables 1 and 2. The l increase in release frequency is sufficiently small that it does not change any reported results.
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l 3.0 ANALYSIS i
The analysis of core damage frequency and release frequency for the RCS leakage event is performed in the distinct steps described in Subsections 3.1,3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 Create the RCS Leak Event Tree
- The RCS leak event, defined as an RCS leak rate less than or equal to 100 gpm combined with failure of the CVCS to provide makeup to the RCS, is actually a very small loss of coolant accident with the distinction that the leak is sufficiently small that a "long" period of time is required to deplete the primary coolant system to the extent that the water level in the core makeup tanks will cause actuation of the ADS. The length of this time period is a function of
- the leak rate but in any case is long enough to permit repair of the CVCS. A new event tree, Reactor Coolant System Leak, was created and is shown in Figure 1. This event tree is based on Figure F-18 of the AP600 PRA report (very smallloss of coolant accident event i
tree). Figure F 18 was modified to account for the possibility of repairing the CVCS ?f the core makeup tanks operated successfully. The RCS leak initiating event is given the acronym of
) SL.
l This study is done for a breach of the primary coolant system of such size that results in an
! initial leak flow rate of 50 gpm For such a leak, successful operation of the CMTs would 4
preclude ADS actuation for more than 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, during which time the CVCS could be repaired. '
This time is calculated on the basis of the pressurizer emptying to the safety injection signal setpoint and then one CMT injecting to get to the ADS actuation setpoint for CMT water level.
By using 1 out of 2 CMTs as the success criterion, fault tree CM2SL from the " June 26,1992" PRA could be used for this study. The probability of failing to repair the CVCS in 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> j was calculated to be 0.50 and this valuo is used in the core damage %quency analysis.
l RepElr of the CVCS is given the basic event identifier OTH CVCSFIX.
The initiating event frequency for the RCS leak event (LEV-SL) is based on data reported by EPRI for PWRs operating during the 1987 to 1992 time period. These data include 39
- leakage events that had a leak rate in the 1 gpm to 100 gpm range. The these 39 events
- were evaluated to determine whether or not each event was possible on the AP600 design.
As a result,30 of the events were screened out (for example, RCS pump seal leaks were eliminated because AP600 does not have RCP seals) leaving nine events that are possible on the AP600. Of these 9 RCS leakage events,5 occurred at power and 4 occurred during shutdown. The impact of these leaks is different for at-power and shutdown operation; The
] time available for corrective action at shutdown is significantly longer than at power and
! therefore contribute less to any change in core damage frequency. The maximum leak flow l
rate of the 5 at power leakage events that could have occurred on the AP600 is 10 gpm.
j Because of this, using a leak flow rate of 50 gpm in the calculations to represent the 1 to 100 i gpm range is reasonable and conservative with respect to historical data.
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The RCS leak initiating event is defined as an event having leakage from the ROS less than i 100 gpm combined with failure of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) makeup pumps. The 5 events from the EPRI data base represent 421 reactor years of PWR operation so the frequency of an RCS leak for AP600 is 5/421 = 1.2E 2 events per year.
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The unavailability of the. makeup system (where success of the system is either of the two l
' { makeup pumps starting and running for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is simply taken as the failure probability of the CSLOCA fault tree from the June 26,1992 PRA. This value is 5.4E 3. Therefore, the RCS leak initiating event frequency is (1.2E 2) (5.4E-3) = 6.5E-5 events per year.
A revised list of AP600 initiating event group frequencies is shown in Table 1.
3.2 Quantify the Core Damage Frequency for the RCS Leak Event The RCS leak event tree was quantified and the resulting core damage frequency is 1.6E-9 events per year. The core damage frequency associated with the RCS leak initiating event is combined with the other AP600 initiating events and the revised total core damage frequency l
is 3.4E-7 events per year. Table 2 shows the revised list of initiating events contributing to I core damage (Baseline, at power conditions) and Table 3 shows the revised dominant accident sequence cutsets for this case. An importance analysis is done to rank the revised set of initiating events and the results E.re shown in Table 4, 3.3 Update the Containment Event Trees (CET)
The revised release frequency is calculated by quantifying the containment event trees with the core damage frequency information that includes the RCS leak event. The only
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l containment event tree release frequency that was changed by the addition of ths RCS leak !
initiating event is impaired containment (Cl). The Cl release frequency was 2.01358 in the June 26,1992 analysis and increases to 2.017E-8 in this revised analysis due to the addition of the RCS leak event.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The evaluation of relatively small reactor coolant system leaks was performed in a conservative manner with respect to the assumed leak rate and probability of retuming the
! -failed primary coolant makeup system back into service. The results of this study show a 0.5 percent increase in core damage frequency and a 0.2 percent increase in the frequency of release from containment. This category of initiating events will be included in future AP600 PRA studies and PRA reports.
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. TABLE 1
{ AP600 INITIATING EVENT GROUP FREQUENCIES
, FREQUENCY EVENT (EventNear)
_ Manual Shutdown negligible Transients Turbine trip or spurious reactor trip 1.40 Loss of feedwater flow 0.46
! Secondary to primary side power mismatch 0.054 Core power excursion 4.47E 3 Spurious S signal 0.085 Loss of component cooling system 0.014 Loss of service water system 0.026 Loss of compressed air 0.014 Mairi steam line break downstream of main steam isol. valves 6.0E-4 Main steam line break upstream of main steam isol. valves 3.7E 4 i Main steam line safety valve stuck open 1.2E-3 Loss of Offsite Power 0.086 Loss of Coolant Accidents Large loss of coolant accident 9.7E 5 Medium loss of coolant accident 5.6E-4 Core makeup tank line break 1.3E 4 Safety injection line break 1.2E-4 Smallloss of coolant accident 5.2E-4 Very smallloss of coolant accident 5.5E 4 Reactor coolant system leak 6.5E 5 Passive residual heat removal tube rupture 5.0E 3 Steam generator tube rupture 5.2C 3 Reactor vessel rupture 3.0E 8 Interfacing loss of coolant accidents negligible Large break outside containment negligible Anticipated Transients Without Scram 0.53 I 4
. TABLE 2 INITIATING EVENTS CONTRIBUTING TO CORE DAMAGE k- (Base Case - At Power) -
CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE INITIATING EVENT (Events per Year) OF TOTAL Transients (except LOOP):
Turbine / reactor trip (TT) 4.3E-8 12.8 Others 2.9E-8 8.9 ,
1 LOOP (TE) 3.0E-9 0.9 Small LOCA (S2) 2.3E 8 6.9 Very small LOCA (S2S) 1.2E 8 3.5 Reactor coolant system leak (SL) ' 1.6E 9 0.5 PRHR tube rupture (S2P) 4.2E-8 12.4 Medium LOCA (SI) 1.2E 8 3.5 i
Safety injection line break (S1S) 7.3E-8 21.6 i CMT line break (S1C) 2.7E 9 0.8 Large LOCA (A) 1.6E-8 4.7 j SG triba rupture (V2) 2.6E 9 0.8 4
ATWS (TFA) - 4.6E-8 13.8 Vessel rupture (VR) 3.0E-8 8.9 TOTAL 3.4E-7 100.0
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I TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT SEQUENCE PERCENT SEQUENCE SEQUENCE ,
NUMBER PROBABILITY CONTFIR DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER ;
1 6.80E-08 18.89 SAFETY INJECTION LINE BREAE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV Sis FAILURE OF 1 OF 1 CRAVITY INJECTION LINE STS-IWIA 2 4.62E-08 12.83 LOSS OF FEEDWAT. WITNOUT SCRAM INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TFA REACTOR TRIP FUNCTION FAILURE STS-CE AMSAC SYSTEM FAILS STS-AMSAC 3 3.23E-08 8.97 PASSIVE RBR TURE RUPTURE INITTATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52P CSIACA AND FRI TOP EVENT NODES FAIL STS-RCSLPRI AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WIPRHR & CMT SYS-ADS l RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IACA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR 4 3.06E-08 8.49 TURRINElREACTOR TRIP /L.RCS FI4W INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TT COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-ICSP FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CM2AB MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) STS- A DT f MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O Ctfr) STS-ADI t 5 3.00E-08 8.33 VESSEL RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-VR I
6 2.58E-08 7.15 CLASS 2 EARLY CONTAI M NT LEAE OCCURS IEV FREQUENCY STS-IEC2E FAILURE TO RECOVER CONTAIN. ISOfATION IN THE IhMC TERM STS-CIR i FAILURE OF IRWST MATER MAKEUP FOR LONC 1ERM CORE COOLING SYS-IWTM 7 1.5tE-08 4.19 IARCE LOCA INITIATINC EVdNT OCCURS IEV-A FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES STS-IW2AB 8 1.40E-08 3.87 SMALL IACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCUR 3 IEV S2 AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WIPRHR & CNr SYS ADS AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. 852 W/PRHR & CTT SYS-ADV 9 1.11E-08 3.08 LOSS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-1 CSP FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIElfrS SYS-CM2AB MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSU'!!IZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADI ,
10 8.32E-09 2.31 TURRINE/ REACTOR TRIP /L.RCS FLOW INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TT COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-ICSP AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUIeIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADA RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR 11 6.62E-09 1.84 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS SYS.IECV2 6
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DELETE MON- -SENSICAL CUTSETS FROM V2 SEQUENCES- DEL-Y2 DEL AUTDMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FUIL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WIPRNR & CMT SYS-ADS !
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRSR E CNT STS-ADY l
12 6.13E-09 1.70 MDIUM IACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S1 RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (tACAITRANSIENT) SYS-RNR AUTUMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. ($1 WIT 11 CNT) STS-ADM ,
13 5.44E-09 1.51 MDIUM IACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-SI i
RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN
. INJECTION MODE (IACAITRANSIENT) SYS-RNR FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJEC' ION LINES SYS-IW2AB t
14 5.33E-09 1,48 VERY SMALL IACA INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-525 RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCAITRANSIENT) SYS-RNR FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 GRAVITY INJECTION LINES STS-IW2AB 15 5.23E-09 1.45 PASSIVE RBR TURE RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52P ADV EVENT TREE NODE IS SUCCESSFUL (ALTID DEPRESS.) DEL-ADV 7
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TABLE 3 DOMIRANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT r
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SEQUEL:CE PERCENT SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY CONTOIR DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER i PRI AND RNR TOP EVENT IODES FAIL STS-IPRIRNR f AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUP.IT. (52 W/PRHR & CMT SYS-ADS r
16 5.04E-09 1.40 SMALL IDCA IMITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52 RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCAlTRANSIENT) SYS-RNR i FAILURE OF 2 0F 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES SYS-IW2AB 17 3.55E-09 .98 VERY SMALL IDCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2S CVCS MAKE-UP FAILS DURING S2S/S2P (VERY SMALL LOCA) SYS-CSIDCA i NJTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL ACS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRHR & CMT SYS-ADS I RNS FAILS 11) OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCAfTRANSIENT) STS-RNR t
18 3.49E-09 .97 SAFETY INJECTION LINE BREAK INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-SIS AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (St WITH CMT) STS-ADM 19 3. ole-09 .84 IASS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF COND AND S W AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-ICSP AtN)MATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH Cl!T: STS-ADA RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCAITRANSIENT) SYS-RNR l t
20 2.57E-09 .71 PASSIVE RHR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52P PRI AND RNR TOP EVENT NODES FAIL STS-KPRIRNR FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES SYS-IW2AB l 21 2.39E-09 .66 STEAM CENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-V2 DELETE NON- SENSICAL CUTSETS FROM V2 SEQUENCES DEL-V2 DEL i SCTR CONTINUES STS-V2 CONT AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULI. RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRBR & CNT STS-ADS !
AUTOMATIC ADS A.CT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRHR & CMT STS-ADV 22 2.13F-09 .59 CONSEQUElrTIAL MSL SV STUCK OPEN INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS SYS-IECTSOV FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRAN1) SYS-PRT '
FAULURE OF 212 CMTS FOR SMELL LOCAS SYS-CH2SL MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/0 Cifr) SYS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/0 Ctfr) SYS-ADI 2s 1.73E-09 .48 SMALL IDCA INITIATIM E"ENT OCCURS IEV-S2 FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIDCA W/PRER, Wl0 CMT) SYS-ADN MANUAL ADS ACT FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/0 CIfr) SYS-ADZ 24 1.41E-09 .39 CNT LINE BREAK INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-SIC ,
RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MOD 2 (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR AUlt)MATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (St WITH Ctfr) SYS-ADM i
25 1.25E-09 .35 CMT t.INE BREAK INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-SIC 8
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TABLE 3 f DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAR EVENT j RMS FAILS TO OPDtATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES SYS-IW2AB f
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i 26 1.19E-09 .33 SMALL IDCA INITIATIlec EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2 !
FAULURE OF 212 CNTS FOR SMALL IDCAS '
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MANUAL ADS ACnlA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. StarA WIPRaIR. W/O CMT) STS-ADN !
MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (52 W/PRRR W/O CMT) STS-ADZ
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.33 SPURIOUS *S* SICNAL INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TS SFW AND PRT SY3TEMS FAIL SYS-IWF l
FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL '
MaleUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FUt1 RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADT. I MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADI 28 1.18E-09 .33 SECONDARY TO PRIMARY SIDE POWEk MISMATCH IN. EVENT OCCURS IEV-YM COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-1 CSP FAILURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR TRANSIENTS SYS-CH2AB I t
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TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT SEQUENCE PERCENT SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBASILITY CONTRIB DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADI 29 1.16E-09 .32 YERY SMALL IACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV S2S CVCS MAKE UP FAILS DURING S25/S2P (VERT SMALL LOCA) STS-CS!JDCA l FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS STS-RCSL MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIACA W/PRRR, WlO CMT) SYS-ADN MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRRR W/O CMT) SYS-ADZ 30 1.IIE-09 .31 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLIDWINC IDSP 0111-R05 FAllERE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (LOSP) SYS-PRP FAILURE OF SFW TO SUPPLY SC A FROM CST - NO DST SYS-SWP FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TE SYS-CH2P MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCSL DEPRESSURIZATION (TE W/O oft) SYS-ADL MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TE W/O CNT) SYS-ADR 31 9.07E-10 .25 IDSS OF COMPRES AIR SYSTEM INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TCA FAILURE OF 2/2 SFW TRAINS -NO INSTRUMENT AIR- SYS-SFM FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) STS-PRT FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CM2AB i MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADT I MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS V/O CMT) SYS-ADI 32 8.34E-10 .23 IEV-SL IEV-SL OTH-CVCSFIE OTH-CVCSFIX i AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PR.1R & CNT SYS-ADS AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PKHR & CMT STS-AD#
33 8.30E-lO .23 SECONDARY TO PRIMARY SIDE POWER MISMATCH IN. EVENT OCCURS IEV-TM STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAILABLE DEL-COND FRACTION OF POWER MISMATCH EVENTS IN WHICH SW IS ALSO IDST OTM-VAL 3 !
FAILURE OF THE PRRR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS PRT FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS SYS-CH2AB MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADT MANdAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADI 34 8.24E-10 .23 SPURIOUS *S* SICNAL INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TS l FRACTION OF SPURIOUS S SIGN. EVENTS IN WHICH SFW IS ALSO LOST OTH-VAL 4 I FAILURE OF THE PRRR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS-PRT j FAULURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR LOCAS SYS-CH2L -
MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADT t%NUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART'L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADI ;
35 7.14E-10 .20 PASSIVE RHR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2P l ADZ EVENT TREE NODE IS SUCCESSFUL (AUTO DEPRESS.) DZL-ADZ i
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TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUDICE CUTSETS - INCLLTES RCS LEAT EVENT I
FAILURE *O TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS STS-RCSL I PRRR ISOIATION FAILURE FOLLOW. PRHR TUBE RUPT. CVS UNAVAIIABLE STS-PRI! !
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SLOCA WIPRRR, Wlo CMT) STS-ADN RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCAlTRANSIENT) STS-RNR 36 6.88E-10 .19 VERY SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52S ADV EVENT TREE NODE IS SUCCESSFUL (AUTO DEPRESS.) DEL-ADV AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRHR & CNT SYS-ADS RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/TitANSIENT) STS-RNR f 37 6.64E-10 .18 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUSE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS STS-IECV2 f FAlfDRE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES STS-IW2AB ;
RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR i 38 6.50E-10 .18 SMALL IDCA INITILTINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2 AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WlPRRR & CNT STS-ADS $
j RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR
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TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EYENT SEQUENCE PERCEN1 SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY CONTRIB 7ESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER 39 6.43E-10 .18 IAf". OF SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TSW SFW UED PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-IWP FAIL 4E OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CH2AB MANW.L ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADT 40 6.18E-10 .17 SPUM OUS *S* SICNAL INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TS SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-XVP
- AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURI2.. (TRANS WITH CND STS-ADA r AtrTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADIA 41 5.82E-10 .16 VERT SMALL lACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2S CVCS MARE-UP FAILS DURING S2SfS2P (VERT SMALL LOCA) STS-CSLOCA AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRHR & CMT STS-ADS AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 W/PRHR E CMT STS-ADV 42 5.80E-RO .16 LOSS OF OFFSITE PCWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLLOWINC IASP OTH-R05 FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REf93VE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (LOSP) STS-PRP ,
FAILURE OF SfW TO SUP?LY SC A FROM CST - NO DST STS-SFWP '
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (LOSP WITH CMT) STS-ADAL AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TE WITH CMT) STS-ADRA 43 5.38E-lO .15 TURRINElREACTOR TRIP fL.RCS FIDW INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TT '
STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAILABLE DEL-COND ,
FWT AND SFVIY AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-IFSP FAILURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CH2AB MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS Uf0 CMT) STS-ADI 44 5.22E.10 .14 CONSEQUENTIAL MSL SV STUCK OPEN INITIATING EVENT OCCURS STS-IECTSOY FAIIEltE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) STS-PRT AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADA r AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) STS-ADIA 45 3.54E-10 .10 CONS *QUENTIAL MEDIUM IDCA INITIATING EVENT OCCURS STS-IECSI RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (St WITH CMT) STS-ADM 46 3.53E-10 .10 CONSEQUENTIAL MEDItRf IDCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS STS-IECSI I RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IACAfTRANSIENT) STS-RNR FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY IHJECTION LINES STS.IW2AB 47 3.19E-10 .09 SECONDARY TO PRIMARY SIDE POWEP MISMATCH IN. EVENT OCCURS IEV.TM COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-ICSP AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADA 12 I
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DOMINANT ACCILE3T SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK ITENT [
t RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCAlTRANSI'NT) SYS-RNk 48 3.06E-10 .08 LOSS OF FW TO STEAM CLNERATOR INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF i i
FRACTION OF IDSS OF FW EVENTS IN WHICN CONDENSOR IS ALSO 14ST OTH-VAL 2 f SFW AFD PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-IWP !
FAILURE OF 2/2 CNT3 FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CM2A8 !
MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADT !
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CNT) STS-ADI l
19 2.92E-10 .08 LOSS OF COMPONE C00LINC SYSTEM INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TCH ,
COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-ICSP !
FAILURE OF 2/2 Of75 FOR TRANSIENTS SYS-CM2A8 [
MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O C18T) STS-ADT !
50 2.91E-10 .08 IEV-SL IEV-SL l OTH-CVCSFIX OTH-CVCSFIX i RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCAfTRANSIENT) SYS-RNR I FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY INJECTION LINES SYS-IW2A8 ;
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TABLE 3 DOMIIIANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CtrTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT j SEQUENCE PERCENT ffQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY CONTRIB DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER 51 2.85E-10 .08 SPURIOUS "S" SICNAL INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TS SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-IWP FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR LOCAS SYS-CM2L MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURII. (TRANS W/O CMT) STS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEFRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADI !
52 2.71E-10 .08 PASSIVE RRR TUBE RUPYURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2P CSLOCA AND PRII TOP EVENT NODES FAIL SYS-ICSLPRIl AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (52 W/PRNR & CNT SYS-ADS AUYOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PAk1L nh Ut.PRESSURIZ, (S2 W/PRHR & CNT SYS-ADV f
53 2.59E-10 .07 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE ;
COPt10N CAUSE FAILURE BATTERY CCI-BY-PN i FAILURE OF PRRR TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT FROM RPV (AYWS) STS-PRW t 54 2.55E-10 .07 IEV-SL IEV-SL FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIACA W/PRflR W!O CMT) STS-ADN l MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/O CNT) STS-ADZ i 55 2.52E-iO .07 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS SYS-IECV2 ,
FAILURE OF Y1tE PRRR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. EEAT FROM RPV (S2) SYS-PRL '
FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL LOCAS SYS-CH2SL l RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECYION MODE (IDCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR 56 2.47E-10 .07 MAIN STEAMLINE SV STUCK OPEN INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TSOV FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. REAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS-PRT l FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL IACAS SYS-CH2SL I MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPkESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA Ft.ILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADI 57 2.27E-10 .06 IASS OF COMPRES. AIR SYSTEM INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TCA FAILURE OF 212 SFW TRAINS -NO INSTRUMENT AIR- SYS-SFM i FAILURE OF THE PRNR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) STS-PRT i AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADA !
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS-ADIA j 58 2.20E-10 .06 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS SYS-IECV2 i DELETE MON- SENSICAL CUTSETS FROM V2 SEQUENCES DEL-V2 DEL FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL ,
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SLOCA W/PRHR, W/O CMT) STS-ADN [
MANUAI. ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/O CMT) SYS-ADZ 59 1.95E-10 .05 SECONDARY TO PRIMARY SIDE POWER MISMATCH IN. EVENT OCCURS IEV-TM ,
STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAIIABLE DEL-COND l 14 i
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TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUT 5ETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAE ETC3T FRACTION OF POWER MISMATCN EVENTS IN WHICH SFW IS:ALSO LOST OTH-VAL 3 FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) STS-PRT AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH Ciff) SYS-ADA !
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIE. (TRANS WI13 CMT) SYS ADIA 60 1.95E-10 .05 TURRINEfREAC1DR TRIP IL.RCS FIAW INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TT COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS XCSP AUTOMATIC ADS ACT FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) STS-ADA
- AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIE. (TRANS WITE CPff) SYS-ADIA 61 1.95E-10 .05 SPURIOUS "S" SICNAL INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TS FFACTION OF SPURIOUS S SICN. EVENTi. IN WHICH SFW IS ALSO LOST OTH-VAL 4 FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO LEMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS-PRT AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADA
, AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART' RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH Off) STS-ADIA 62 1.90E-10 .05 PASSIVE RNk TURE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCr*1tS IEV-52P CSIDCA AND PRIl TOP EVENT NODES FAIL STS-XCSLPRIl 1
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l TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT SEQUENCE PERCENT SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY CONTRIB DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL IDCAS SYS-CH2SL MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIDCA W/PRNR, W/O CPfr) STS-ADN MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (52 W/PRHR W/O CMT) SYS-ADZ 63 1.85E-10 .05 STEAM CENERATOR TURE RUPYURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV.V2 SCTR CONTINUES SYS-V2 CONT FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL LOCAS SYS-CH2SL MANUAL ADS ACRIA FAILS FULL RCS DEPpESSUR. SIDCA W/PRHR, W/O CNT) SYS-ADN MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/O CMT) SYS-ADZ 64 1.76E.10 .05 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS SYS.IECV2 FAULURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR SMALL IDCAS STS-CH2SL ,
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIDCA W/PRHR, W/O Off) SYS-ADN
- MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/O CNT) SYS-ADZ 65 1.73E.10 .05 IASS OF SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV.TSW SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-1WP !
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS-ADA '
66 1.70E-10 .05 IASS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC E*ENT OCCURS IEV-TF FRACTION OF LOSS OF FW EVENTS IN WNICH CONDENSOR IS AVAILABLE SUC. VAL 2 STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAIIABLE DEL-COND FWT AND SFWT AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-IWSP FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CM2AB MAPUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CKr) SYS-AD1 67 1.47E-10 .04 IEV-SL IEV-SL FAULURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR SMALL LOCAS SYS-CM2SL l MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SLOCA W/PRHR, W/O CNT) SYS-ADN MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPP.ESSUR. (S2 W/PRHR W/O CMT) SYS-ADZ 68 1.34E-10 .04 PASSIVE RHR YUBE RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2P CSIDCA AND PRIl TOP EVENT NODES FAIL STS-ICSLPRI!
FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL IACAS SYS-CM2SL ,
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSI'R. SIhCA W/PRHR. W/O oft) SYS.ADN RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR 69 1.28E-10 .04 thSS OF FW 10 STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF !
FRACTION OF IhSS OF FW EVENTS IN WHICH CONDENSOR IS AVAltABLE SUC-VAL 2 STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAIIABLE DEL-COND FRACTION OF LOSS OF FW WITH BOTH FW PUMPS IDST OTH-VALI SFWT AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-ISP FAILURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR TRANSIENTS SYS-CM2AB MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CPfr) SYS-ADT '
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADI 16
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TARLE 3 i DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK IVRWT I 70 1.13E-10 .03 VERT SMALL tECA INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-sis ADZ EVENT TREE NODE IS SUCCESSFUL (A*JTO DEPRESS.) DEL-ADZ FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUNPS STS-RCSL MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIACA W/PRHR, W/O CNT) STS-ADN i RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IACA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR !
71 1.07E-10 .03 SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-52 l
FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUNPS f STS-RCSL I MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIACA W/PRRR. W/O CMT) STS-ADN RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN !
INJECTION MODE (thCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR !
72 9.86E-11 .03 PASSIVE RRR TURE RUPTURE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2P f
CSLOCA AND PRI! TOP EVENT NODES FAIL STS-ICSLPRI!
FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUNPS STE-RCSL MANUAL ADS AC112A FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSUR. SIECA W/PRRR W/O CNT) STS-ADN RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR l
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TABLE 3 I DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT m
SEQUENCE PERCEm'T SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROSABILITY CONTRIE DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER 73 9.35E-il .03 TURBINE / REACTOR TRIP /L.RCS FLOW INITIATTNC EVENT OCCURS IEV.TT STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAILABLE DEL.COND FWT AND SFWTD AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS.IFSP AUTOMATIC ADS ALT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS-ADA e AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS.ADIA 74 9.3IE.ll .03 VERY SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2S FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL IACAS . SYS-CH2SL FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRAPS) STS-PRT MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESUR. S2 W/O PRRR & CMT) SYS.ADC MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS PARTL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 Wlo PRHRfCMT STS-ADY 75 9.17E.ll .03 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLIAWINC LOSP OTH R05 CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 24 HOURS FOLIAW. ING LOSP OTH-R24 FAILURE OF THE PRNR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RFV (S.8) STS-PRB l
FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TE SYS-CH2P i iiANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (BIJtOUT W/O CMT) SYS-ADB !
76 8.10E-Il .02 LOSS OF COMPONE. COOLING SYSTEM INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TCW COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS.XCSP AtTIOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS-ADA 77 7.53E-11 .02 LOSS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV.TF COND AND SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS.ICSP AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIE. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS-ADA '
AUIUMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) SYS.ADIA ,
t 78 7.51E-11 .02 MAIN STEAMLINE BREAK UfMSIV INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TSLU f FAIIARE OF THE PRRR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS.PRT
- FAULURE OF 2/2 CNTS FOR SMALL IACAS SYS-CH2SL MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS.ADT MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS.ADI 79 7.llE-11 .02 MEDIUM IACA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-SI RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION HODE (tACA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR '
FAILURE OF RECIRCULATION SYS-RECIRC l L 6.77E.11 .02 SAFETY INJECTION LINE BREAK INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV. SIS FAILURE OF 1/1 CMTS SYS.CM1A MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (S1 W/O Ctfr) STS-ADQ l 81 6.77E.11 .02 VERY SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV.52S RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS.RNR FAILURE OF RFCIRCUIATION SYS-RECIRC 18 i
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TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLtfDES RCS LEAK EVENT f 3
82 4.75E-11 .02 LOSS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF FRACTION OF IfSS OF FW EVENTS IN WHICH CONDENSOR IS ALSO IDST OTH-VAL 2 i
SFW AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-IWP AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADA AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADIA ;
83 6.40E-11 .02 SMALL IDCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S7 RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (IDCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR ;
FAILURE OF RECIRCUIATION STS-RECIRC .
i' 84 5.88E-11 .02 MAIN STEAMLINE SV STUCK OPEN INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-TSOY FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM BPV (TRANS) SYS-PRT '
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADA i AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CMT) STS-ADIA i 85 5.12E-11 .01 SECCNDARY TO PRIMPRY SIDE POWER MISMATCH IN. EVENT OCCURS IEV-Di STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAIIABLE DEL-COND ,
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1 TARLE 3 s DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAK EVENT I i
L SEQUENCE PERCENT SEQUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBA81LITY CONTRIB DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER ,
SFVT AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-ISP FAILURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR TRANSIENTS STS-CM2A8 [
MANUAL ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS W/O CMT) SYS-ADT '
MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS PART*L RCS DEPRESSURIZATION (TRANS W/O CNT) SYS-ADI
{
86 5.05E-11 .
.01 CONSEQUENTIAL SC TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OCCURS SYS-IECV2 t DELETE MON- SENSICAL CUTSETS FROM V2 SEQUENCES DEL-V2 DEL AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WIPRHR E CNT STS-ADS RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (LOCA/ TRANSIENT) SYS-RNR 87 4.24E-11 .01 YERT SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2S ;
FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL i FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 ACCUMUIATORS AC2AR-FAILS f i
88 4.02E-11 .01 SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV.52 FAILURE TO TRIP ALL FOUR RCS PUMPS SYS-RCSL FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 ACCEPtUIATORS AC2AB-FAILS ;
$9 3.82E-11 .01 IDSS OF FEEDWAT. WITHOUT SCRAM INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TFA I SYS-ICM STS-ICM ;
OTH-M OTH-M !
\
90 3.78E-11 .01 IARCE LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-A FAILURE OF RECIRCUIATION l SYS-RECIRC i 91 3.47E.11 .01 SMALL IACA INITIATING EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2 FAILURE OF THE PRNR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. DEAT FROM RPV (52) STS-PRL AUTOMATIC ADS i ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) STS-ADA i AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADIA 92 3.38E-11 .01 thSS OF FW TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF !
FRACTION OF LOSS OF FW EVENTS IN 14tICH CONDENSOR IS AVAILABLE SUC-VAL 2 STEAM DUMP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAIIABLE DEL-COND !
FWT AND SFWT AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL SYS-IWSP !
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADA j AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURII. (TRANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADIA l
93 3.34E-11 .01 SAFETY INJECTION LINE BREAE INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-SIS I FAILURE OF 111 CNTS SYS.CMIA FAILURE OF 1 OF 1 ACCUMULATORS (
ACIA-FAILS t 94 3.32E-11 .01 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLIDWINC IDSP OTH-R05 FAILURE OF THE PRRR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (IDSP) SYS-PRP FAILURE OF SFW TO SUPPLY SC A FROM CST - NO DST STS-SIVP RNS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (TE) SYS-RNP i I
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A - e TABLE 3 DE*tIIIANT ACCIDENT SEqutRCE CUTSETS - INCLUDTS RCS LEAK EVENT FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 CRAVITY 1PJECTION LINES STS-IW2AB 95 3.10E-Il .01 IEV-SL IEV-SL OTH-CVCSFII OTH-CVCSFII AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (S2 WIPRRR & CNT STS-ADS RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN IN.!ECTION MODE (IACA/ TRANSIENT) STS-RNR 96 3.03E-11 .01 CONSEQUENTIAL MSL SV STUCK OPEN INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS STS-IECTSOY FAILURE OF TEE PRNR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RFV (TRANS) STS-PRT .
FAULURE OF 2/2 CMTS FOR SMALL IDCAS SYS-CM2SL FAILURE OF 2 OF 2 ACCUNULATORS AC2AB-FAILS 97 2.63E-11 .01 LOSS OF W TO STEAM CENERATOR INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TF FRACTION OF LOSS OF FW EVENTS IN ifMICH CONDENSOR IS AVAILABLE SUC-VAL 2 STEAM DLDIP AND MAIN CONDENSOR AVAII.ABLE DEL-COND FRACTIOtt OF IASS OF FW WITH BOTH N PUMFJ LOST OTH-VAL 1 SFWT AND PRT SYSTEMS FAIL STS-ISP 21
l A . .
t TABLE 3 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUTSETS - INCLUDES RCS LEAE EVENT
]
SEQUENCE PERCENT SaqUENCE SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBASILITY CONTRIB DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITR CNT) SYS ADA AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART' RCS DEPRESSURIZ.'(TRANS WITE CMT) STS-ADIA 98 2.51E.Il .01 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE i CRID IS NOT *ECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLLOWINC IASP OTH-ROS
. FAILURE OF THE PRNR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (LOSP) SYS-PRP FAILURE OF SFW TO SUPPLY SC A FROM CST - No DST SYS SFWP FAULURE OF 212 CNTS FOR TE SYS CM2P MANUAL ADS ACTUA FAILS FULL RCSL DEPRESSURIZATION (TE WlO CNT) SYS-ADL RMS FAILS TO OPERATE IN INJECTION MODE (TE) SYS-RNP 99 2.40E II .01 1455 OF OFFSITE POWER TMITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-TE CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLLOWINC IASP OYH-ROS 2 t
CRID IS NOT RECOVERED WITHIN 24 BOURS FOLLOW. INC IASP OTH-R24 FAILURE OF TBE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (S.8) SYS-PRB AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (BLKOUT WITH CNT SYS-ADAB ;
100 2.36E-11 .01 VERY SMALL LOCA INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS IEV-S2S FAILURE OF THE PRHR SYSTEM TO REMOVE DEC. HEAT FROM RPV (TRANS) SYS-PRT '
AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS FULL RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TBANS WITH CNT) SYS-ADA AUTOMATIC ADS ACT. FAILS PART* RCS DEPRESSURIZ. (TRANS WITE CMT) SYS ADIA i
i l
22 i
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l TABLE 4 INITIATINC EVENT IMPORTANCES FOR RISE < DECREASE MIRE t t
t SYSTEM UNAVAIIABILITY (Q) = 3.358E-07 NUMBEE OF BASIC EVENTS = 23 [
NUMBER OF CUTSETS = 9900
- NUMBER DECREASE i IMP 0ttTANCE OF IN SYSTEM BASIC EVENT !
5ASIC EVENT (1 DECREASE) CUTSETS UNAVAIIABILITY FROBABILITY {
1 IEV-SIS 21.60 284 7.2533E-08 1.2000E-04
- i 2 IEV-TTA 13.78 378 4.6266E-08 5.3000E-01 i 3 IEV-TT 12.75 705 4.2508E-08 1.4000E+00 !
4 IEV-52P 12.41 1601 4.1669E-08 5.0000E-03 I 5 IEV-VR 8.93 1 3.0000E-08 3.0000E-08 6 IEV-52 6.85. 877 2.3013E-08 5.2000E-04 .
t 7 IEV-TF 5.42 1225 1.8184E-08 5.0570E-01 !
! 8 IEV-A 4.73 114 1.5867E-08 9.7000E-05 !
9 IEV-52S 3.54 897 1.1882E-08 5.5000E-04 I 10 IEV S! 3.53 960 1.1836E-08 5.6000E-04
- 11 IEV-TS 1.31 399 4.4149E-09 8.5000E-02 12 IEV-TE .86 956 2.8769E-09 8.6000E-02 l 13 IEV-111 .83 242 2.7726E-09 5.4000E-02 1 14 IEV-SIC .81 448 2.7079E-09 1.3000E-04 .
15 IEV-V2 .78 123 2.6053E-09 5.2000E-01 16 IEV SL .47 102 1.5733E-09 6.4800E-05 '
17 IEv TCA .40 145 1.3423E-09 1.4400E-02 ;
18 IEV-TSW .35 176 1.1766E-09 2.6200E-02 t 19 IEV-TSOY .26 132 8.6466E-10 1.2000E-03 i 20 IEV-TP .21 17 7.0750E-10 4.5000E-03
.11 {
21 IEV-TCW 44 3.7587E-10 1.3500E-02 !
22 IEV-TSLU .06 60 2.1309E-10 3.3300E-04 i 23 IEV-TSID .02 14 8.0270E-Il 6.0000E-04 i l
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TABl.E 4 INITIATING EVENT IMPORTANCES FOR RISE . INCREASE MEASURE F
SYSTEN UNAVAIIA8ILITY (Q) = 3.358E-07 NUM8ER OF 8ASIC EVENTS = 23 NUM8ER OF CUTSETS = 9900 NUM8ER INCREASE IMPORTANCE OF IN SYSTEM L*31C EVENT l 8ASIC EVENT (% INCREASE) CUTSETS UNAVAllASILITY PRO 8A81Lla7
.....................s .......... ....... .............. ...........
1 IEV-VR 2.978244E*08 1 1.0000E+00 3.0000E-08 2 IEV-SIS 179996. 284 6.04 7E-04 1.2000E-04 3 IEV-A 48712.4 !!4 1.63'-6E-04 9.7000E-05 4 IEV-S2 13173.7 877 4.4233E-05 5.2000E-04 5 IEV-SL 7230.46 102 2.4278E-05 6.4800E-05 6 IEV-525 6430.30 897 2.1591E-05 5.5000E-04 7 IEV-51 6291.28 960 2.ll24E-05 5.6000E-04 8 IEV-SIC 6202.89 448 2.0827E-05 1.3000E-04 9 IEV-52P 2469.57 1601 8.2920E-06 5.0000E-03 10 IEV-TSOY 214.339 132 7.1968E-07 1.2000E-03 11 IEV-TSIE 190.518 60 6.3970E-07 3.3300E-04 12 IEV-V2 148.439 123 4.9841E-07 5.2000E-03 13 IEV-TP 46.6139 17 1.5651E-07 4.5000E-03 14 IEV-TSID 39.8200 14 1.3370E-07 6.0000E-04 15 IEV-TCA 27.3614 145 9.1871E-08 1.4400E-02 16 IEV-1?! 14.4661 242 4.8573E-08 5.4000E-02 17 IEV-TS 14.1541 399 4.7525E-08 8.5000E-02 18 IEV-TSW 13.0248 176 4.3733E-08 2.6200E-02 19 IEV-TFA 12.2192 378 4.1028E-08 5.3000E-01 20 IEV-TE 9.10615 956 3.0576E-08 8.6000E-02 21 IEV-TCW 8.18007 44 2.7466E-08 1.3500E-02 22 IEV-TF 5.29349 1225 1.7774E-08 5.0570E-01 4
24
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DCP/NRCl413 NSD NRC-98-5757 Docket No.: 52 003 4 -
August 14,1998 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
' Washington, DC 20555
~ A'lTENTION: T. R. Quay:
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO NRC LETTERS CONCERNING REQUEST FOR WITlGIOLDING INFORMATION -
1
Reference:
- 1. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 design !ctter of October 20,1993," c'ated June 18,1998.
- 2. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public J disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 design Ictter of January 17,1994," dated June 18,1998.
i
- 3. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 letters of September 20,1993, January 21, 1994, and February 3,1994," dated July 10,1998.
" 4.' Letter, Sehrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding proprietary information for -
. Westinghouse letters dated April 18,1995," dated July 15,1998.
i
- 5. Letter, Hu1Tman to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public
. disclosure of Westinghouse report on AP600 function ba<ed task analysis /' dated l July 17,1998. i
Dear Mr. Quay:
l
- Reference 1 provided the NRC assessment of the Wes'.,nghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated October 20,1993, that contained the response to a staff request for
- additional information regarding the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment. The NRC assessment was ;
that the material was similar to material that exists in the cu Tent (1998) nonproprietary version of the i AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) report. In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the staff in the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this request for additional information response was provided to the _
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DCP/NRCl413 NSD-NRC-98 5757. 2 August 14,1998 NRC technical staff, the infonnation was considered to be picprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. If this request for ridditional information response was indeed used by the staff in development of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, almost five years later this information is no longer considered to ce proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 2 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was
, provided in a letter dated January 17,1994, that contained the response to a staff request for additional information regarding the AP600 instrumentation and control system. The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in the current (1998) nonproprietary version of the AP600 standard safety analysis report. In addition, the staffit'dicated the material was used by the stafY in the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this request for additional information response was provided to the NRC technical stafT, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained l information that had commacial value to Westinghouse. If this request for additional information response was indeed used by the staffin deselopment of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, over four years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
! Reference 3 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was l provided in a letter dated September 20,1993, that contained information related to the AP600 PRA l snd WCAP-13795, which provided the PRA uncertainty analysis. The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in the current (1998) nonproprietary version of the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) report. In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by
[. the staffin the development of the AM00 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain l on the docket. At the time this information was provided to the NRC technical staff, it was
- considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse, if the information transmitted by the Westinghouse September 20,1993, letter was indeed used by the staffin development of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, almost five years later, this infonnation is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse, j j
Reference 3 also provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse c! aim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated January 21,1994, that contained WCAP 13913, " Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"(SAMG). The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in current (1998) nonproprietary AP600 documents (e.g., WCAP 13914
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"). In addition, the staff indicated the l material was used by the staffin the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and l
therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this Framework for SAMG was provided to the l NRC technical staff, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over four years later, i this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
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DC'P/NRCl413 NSD NRC-98 5757 3- August 14,1998 Reference 3 also provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary infonnation was provided in a letter dated February 3,1994, that contained additional copies of WCAP-1391'i,
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"(SAF3). De NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in current (1998) *mm toprietary AP600 documents (e.g , WCAP 13914, " Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Managem.n Guidance"). In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the staff in the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this Framework for SAMG was provided to the NRC technical staff, the infonnation was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over four years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse Reference 4 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated April 18,1995, that contained information for a MAAP4/RELAP comparison for the AP600 in response to a staff request for additional information. The NRC assessment was that the Westinghouse cover letter indicated that Enclosure 2 is a non-proprietary version of Enclosure 3, however, the staff could not find any portion of the enclosures marked u proprietary. The staff assessment further states the conventional bracketed superscript notation also appears to be missing.
Finally, the NRC assessment states the staff could not determine which part of the material enclosed with the Westinghouse letter was Enclosure 1,2, or 3. It should be noted that the Westinghouse April 18,1995, cover letter states " Enclosures 2 (nonproprietary) and 3 (proprietary) provide the requested information." De letter does not indicate that enclosure 2 was a duplicate of enclosure 3 minus the proprietary information. A cover sheet was provided just prior to each of the enclosures to the Westinghouse letter. The enclosures contained the following: Enclosure 1 provided a copy of the NRC's two page request for information for the MAAP-RELAP corriparison. Enclosure 2 provided the requested information, and was titled " Requested Information for AP600 MAAP4/RELAP Comparison." Under section 4, Initial Conditions, of Enclosure 1 it states the initial conditions information (which was p.oprietary) is provided in Enclosure 3 of the subject Westinghouse letter.
Finally, Enclosure 3 contained the list of initial conditions. He information provided in Enclosure 3 was labeled as Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2 at the top of the page, however, the specific proprietary information was not indicated by the bracketed-superscripted notation. In addition to the initial conditions, a mark up of AP600 PRA Figure K-1 was provided in Enclosure 3. Again, the information was labeled as Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2 at the top of the page, however, the specific proprietary information was not indicated by the bracketed superscripted notation. At the time the information provided in Enclosure 3 of the subject Westinghouse letter was provided to the NRC technical staff, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over three years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 5 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated February 8,1994, provided a copy of WCAP-13957, "AP600 Reactor Coolant System Mass inventory: Function Based Risk Analysis." He NRC assessment was that the material was not "information that the staff customarily accepts as proprietary." in addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the staff in the development of the AP600 final safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this report was prepared, the 21 .y LO/CO*d 2002GirIOC18 01 2LLP PLC 2'r 3 P11 A N N O W ')d e d :3 80:GI 8 6. r ! 90e
- - ~ , _ _ _ _ _ __, __ , . _ . _ _ _ , , , _
__ ~ . . - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ . _ . _ _ _ ._ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _
l DCP/NRCl413 NSD-NRC-98 5757 4 August 14,1998 information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had l
commercial value to Westinghouse and was of the type ofinformation that was customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse. That the material was not information that the staff customarily as proprietary is net relevant to making the proprietary determination. However, in an effon to expedite the issuance of the AP600 Final Safety Evaluation Report and Final Design Approval, Westinghouse agrees to no longer consider this infonnation to be proprietary.
In a telephone call on July 8,1998, the staffinformed Westinghouse of a concern related to WCAP-13288 and WCAP-13289, which were associated with the AP600 check valve testing specification.
The concern was that the proprietary report had no proprietary information identified and the nonproprietary report had been placed in the public document room. Westinghouse has reviewed these reports and, at this time, considers none of the information to be proprietary. l This .esponse addresses the proprietary issues delineated in the references, bk YS' Brian A. McIntyre, Mana Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing i jml cc: J. W. Roe NRC/NRR/DRPM J. M. Sebrosky NRC/NRR/DRPM
~
W. C. Huffman - NRC/NRR/DRPM H. A. Sepp West nghouse i l l l 3% #
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