ML20135D025
| ML20135D025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1996 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135D023 | List: |
| References | |
| PRA-GSR-004, PRA-GSR-4, NUDOCS 9612090209 | |
| Download: ML20135D025 (78) | |
Text
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I l
1 4
ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DIFFUSION FLAMES ON THE AP600 CONTAINMENT WALL AND PENETRATIONS
- 1 1
1 November 1996 4
t 4
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355 01996 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Reserved 9612090209 961127 PDR ADOCK 05200003 A PDR
AP600 DOCUMENT COVER SHEET TDC: IDS; i S Form 58202G(5/94)It:hxxx.wpf;1x]
AP600 CENTRAL FILE USE ONLY:
0058.FRM RFSe: RFS ITEM e: l AP600 DOCUMENT NO. REVISION NO. ASSIGNED TO j PRA GSR 004 0 Page 1 of 1 ALTERNATE DOCUMENT NUMBER:' WORK BREAKDOWN #: 3.2.4.17 DESIGN AGENT ORGANIZATION: Westinghouse (FAI)
TITLE: Assessment of the Potential impact of Diffusion Flames on the AP600 Containment Wall and Penetrations l
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i CALCULATION / ANALYSIS
REFERENCE:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
1 *
$ ERRt LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii LIST OF TABLES ...........................................iv i
l
1.0 BACKGROUND
AND APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 REVIEW OF HCOG DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3.0 AP600 PRA HYDROGEN SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 3 4.0 IRWST AND CMT FLOOR CONFIGURATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.0 DIFFUSION FLAME ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 17 5.1 IRWST Vents and Overflow Openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.2 Valve Vault Rooms Exits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.0 CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1 Containment Wall Thermal Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2 Containment Wall Structural Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.3 Equipment and Personnel Hatches Thermal Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.4 Electrical Penetration Thermal Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.0 S UMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8.00 REFERENCES ........................................ 38 APPENDIX A Plots of Hydrogen Generation, Containment Gas Composition, IRWST and Valve Vault Rooms Junction Flow Rates, Containment Pressure and Containment Temperature . . . . . . . . . A-1 APPENDIX B Heat Transfer Models for Equipment and Personnel Hatches and Electrical Penetrations ................... B-1 1
I ii
I i
I LIST OF FIGURES !
i a
l Elgut3t East l 1 Hydrogen Release History for 'Ihree Stage ADS Sequence . . . . . . . . . . 4 i
2 Hydrogen Release History for 3BE-FRF1 Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 i
{ 3 Hydrogen Release History for 3BL-FN Sequence ...............8 4 Hydrogen Release History for 3BE-FN1 Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 i ,
5 Hydrogen Release History for 3BR-FR1 Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 l 1
6 Hydrogen Release History for 3BR-FR1* Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 1 7 IRWST Cross-Section with Sparger and Igniter locations .......... 12
! 8 'Two region nad=1iration of the IRWST and flow junctions . . . . . . . . . . 15 9 Plan View of CMT Floor . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 16 i
10 Locations of standing diffusion flames on IRWST vents and overflows .. 21 1 ;
! 11 Leli=d heating of containment shell by standing diffusion flames on IRWST vents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
] 12 Correlation of centerline mean excess temperature in fire
- plumes as a function of elevation . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4
l 13 Temperature Dependence of Structure Shell Strength (
Reference:
SFPE j Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, First Edition, p. I-385) . . . . . 30 i
t 14 Azimuthal Extent of High Temperature Zone of Containment Wall i (@ opposite IRWST vents and @ opposite overflow opening) . . . . . . . 32 i 15 Vertical Extent of High Temperature Zone of Containment Wall . . . . . . 33 i
4
4 LIST OF TABLES Table East a
1 Accident Sequences with Fourth Stage ADS Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 IRWST Vent Configuration ............................ 13 4
l 3 Calculated Steady State Containment Shell Temperature i Above Operating Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4 Peak Containment Shell and Penetrations Temperatures on CMT Floor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 l
l IV
4 i
l
1.0 BACKGROUND
AND APPROACH i
! The potential impact on the AP600 containment shell and penetrations of standing diffusion i flames is a severe accident issue and not a design basis issue. The plant configuration including j the IRWST vent exit configuration and locations have been derived as part of the AP600 design j basis. The assessment presented in this report is directed toward determining the response of l this given plant configuration to the proposed severe accident events. A generally deterministic
- assessment is described in the report and subsequently interpreted in the probabilistic context of i the AP600 PRA to place its significance in the severe accident context.
l The general approach used to address the pctential impact of diffusion flames on the AP600 l containment wall and its penetrations included a review of the Mark m HCOG data, the use of i the hydrogen generation scenarios defined in the AP600 PRA, the use of the AP600 containment and IRWST specific geometry, the assessment of the IRWST gas space and vent design for the
- PRA hydrogen generation scenarios, the assessment of the valve vault rooms for the PRA i accident scenarios, quantification of the diffusion llames (flame height and flame temperature),
determination of the local containment waP.s and penetrations thermal responses, and an assessment of the structural significance of t'ae local heating of the containment wall.
2.0 REVIEW OF MARK HI HCOG DATA ne Mark m Hydrogen Control Owners Group (HCOG) sponsored and conducted a series of hydrogen combustion experiments in 1/4 scale models of Mark m nuclear reactor containments.
Several attributes of the HCOG data were considered to facilitate the data's application to the AP600 IRWST assessment. Rese attributes included the hydrogen release flow rates, the diffusion flame behavior in terms of its location, maximum flame height, radiant heat fluxes and pressurization due to diffusion flame light-off.
De 1/4 scale model facility included a simulation of the distributed igniter system installed in Mark E containments, a suppression pocl and the release of hydrogen through submerged spargers in the suppression pool, ne test facility and results (Tamanini,1988) were reviewed.
De two-volume test program and results document plus selected video tapes were exammed.
Tests with both high (approximately 1 kg/sec) and low (approximately 0.4 kg/sec) hydrogen release rates were reviewed and observed, nese tests demonstrated the formation and maintenance of diffusion flames anchored to the suppression pool surface which were initiated by the igniters in the test facility. The diffusion flame burning mode was maintained as long as the hydrogen source was maintained above an extinction level and sufficient oxygen was available to support combustion on the suppression pool surface. The general similarities in the 1
l l
1 test configuration as compared to the AP600 IRWST with hydrogen release through submerged ;
! spargers wasjudged to support the applicability of the HCOG's test results to the AP600 IRWST l
! and sparger configuration. The release flow rates of hydrogen incorporated in the HCOG test l program correspond to the range of flow rates expected during severe accident hydrogen l l discharge through the ADS valves into the IRWST water pool for the AP600. During the peak 3 hydrogen flow rate intervals complete combustion by diffusion flames located on the pool surface
{ are observed in the HCOG tests.
i Several observations were made during the HCOG test data review:
i j
- During the peak hydrogen flow rate intervals complete combustion of diffusion j . flames located on the pool surface are oberved. At low hydrogen flow rates less stable diffusion flames are observed and less than 100% combustion resulted.
i I
i
- As oxygen in the region above the suppression pool was depleted, secondary or lifted flames were observed in the HCOG experiments which moved from the l l pool surface to a higher elevation in the plant. The flames moved to a region in the containment which had sufficient oxygen to support the continued burning.
1 j
- Pressure rise in the suppression pool region was gradual due to continued global heating during the burn with an initial light-off pressure of between 1.5 and 3.5 I
l psid.
- ne co-injection of steam and hydrogen through the submerged spargers had no i
affect on the observed diffusion flame behavior. j
- Intermittent diffusion flame extinction was observed for diffusion flames on the pool surface for hydrogen flow rates in the range of 0.01 to 0.11 kg/s. Total diffusion flame extinction for hydrogen injection rates of 0.03 to 0.07 kg/s were observed, given that the background hydrogen concentration was less than 4%.
He hydrogen injection rate which caused total diffusion flame extinction was seen to decrease as the background hydrogen concentration increased. Thus, for a background hydrogen concentration of approximately 4.5%, the observed hydrogen injection rate leading to extinction was in the range of 0.01 kg/s.
These observations from the HCOG experiments suggest that for the AP600 IRWST during burns reducing the oxygen concentration in the IRWST gas space, that the diffusion flame could move from the pool surface to the vent exits given the flappers are open to the rest of the 2
t l
l coetainment. The diffusion flame burning rates and locations are seen to be a function of the j oxygen concentration in the IRWST gas space. Likewise, the extinction of a diffusion flame on '
l the pool surface is dependent on the hydrogen injection flow rate. The conditions causing j diffusion flame extinction for a flame attached to an IRWST vent were not examined in the
! HCOG experiments.
i j 3.0 AP600 PRA HYDROGEN SCENARIOS
, A three stage ADS scenario plus several of the accident scenarios defined in Chapter 41 of the j
{ AP600 PRA were used in this assessment. As discussed in the AP600 PRA the equivalent of l l 100% fuel-clad metal-water reaction for the cladding surrounding the active fuel was considered j to be oxidized for the hydrogen burn analyses. This would yield approximately 640 kg of
] for diffusion flames at the IRWST vent exits. This scenario was a transient initiated by a loss
j Its key feature is that it only considers the operation of the first three stages of the ADS system l and not the state 4 ADS valves. This results in a bounding hydrogen release rate to the IRWST
! and a maximum IRWST water level which minimizes the gas volume in the IRWST. All l hydrogen produced in-vessel is discharged through the ADS spargers and into the IRWST gas l space for this three stage ADS. This results in high hydrogen concentrations in the limited I
l IRWST gas space. It is important to note that the failure frequency of the 4th stage ADS is very l low (10-3 per year). Under most circumstances the 4th stage ADS will be actuated. When the i 4th stage ADS is actuated, most hydrogen would bypass the IRWST and be directly released to l the containment. The level of hydrogen buildup in the IRWST would be much lower and j unlikely to support any standing flames. A series of scenario analysis from the AP600 PRA i show that the operation of the 4th stage ADS prevents formation of diffusion flames at the i IRWST vents.
l The MAAP4 computer code was used to model the hydrogen generation and release sequences.
! A combination of parameters that control the amount of calculated clad oxidation and hydrogen
- i. production were selected to approximate the 100% oxidation of the active fuel cladding
! zirconium inventory. The MAAP4 simulation for the three stage ADS scenario yielded
- . proximately 110% oxidation of the active cladding. This provides some conservatism in the l mount of hydrogen bumed in containment for this assessment. De calculated duration of
- hydrogen evolution rates was sufficiently large to support a diffusion flame burning of i approximately 5000 sec. He peak calculated hydrogen release rate was 1.2 kg/s. He hydrogen l release history for the three stage ADS MAAP4 simulation is provided in Figure 1.
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d Figure 1 Hydrogen Release History for Three Stage ADS Sequence 4
Five additional accident scenarios (see Table 1) were assessed with MAAP4 to investigate a l range of hydrogen release histories and locations. These hydrogen release histories involved j extended intervals of hydrogen generation during the boil-off of the vessel water inventory and
{ relatively brief intervals of peak generation rates during core reflood. Each of these five
- sequences meluded the operation of all fourth stage ADS valves so they were fully depressurized j sequences. The fourth stage ADS valves discharge directly to the steam generator
+
compartments. Thus, a large flow path for hydrogen release from the primary system that does not involve the IRWST is provided by the operation of each fourth stage ADS valve. I
! These five sequences include cases (3BE-FRF1 and 3BE-FN1) initiated by a direct vessel
! injection (DVI) line break which release hydrogen in the valve vault rooms. This alternate i hydrogen release location is used to assess the potential for diffusion flames being produced on i the core makeup tank (CMT) room floor at elevation 107' 2" in the AP600 containment. Two DVI line brei sequences were assessed to investigate the impact of flooding the break elevation
)
- on the potential of producing a standing diffusion flame at the valve vault room exits.12stly, a sensitivity case (3BR-FR1*) was evaluated to investigate the impact of uncovering the ADS l
spargers in the IRWST water pool given the operation of all four stages of ADS valves. The hydrogen release histories for each of the five sequences with fourth stage ADS operation are presented in Figures 2 through 6. The containment node receiving the principal hydrogen release was found to be steam inerted for each of these five sequences except for the 3BE-FRF1 sequence. In this sequence the release point for the hydrogen and steam mixture escaping the primary system was submerged in the water that flooded that compartment. Thus, as the three stage ADS was used to assess the IRWST vents, the 3BE-FRF1 sequence was used to assess the effect of a standing diffusion flame at the exit in the ceiling of each valve vault room. ,
1 4.0 IRWST AND CMT FLOOR CONFIGURATIONS 1
Figure 7 depicts the IRWST cross section and sparger and igniter locations. The spargers are l the locations where hydrogen produced by clad oxidation in the RPV is discharged following ,
actuation of the first three stages of the ADS. De irregular geometric shape of the IRWST cross section suggests that it be represented in the IRWST vent assessment by two nodes. The node boundary used to divide the IRWST into a sparger region and a "PRHR" region is also shown in Figure 7. De IRWST vent design is summarized in Table 2. The IRWST vents are ;
one directional flow devices. Each of the containment outer wall vents is located in the roof of the IRWST just inside the containment wall. The vents run straight up through the IRWST roof l and then make a 90' turn away from the containment wall. Hinged flaps are provided at each l exit to prevent significant exchange of air between the containment 5
Table 1 Accident Sequences with Fourth Stage ADS Operation Accident Pnncipal Total Mass Sequence Release H 2Released l Designator Sequence Description Location (kg)
I 3BE-FRF1 Full depressurized with failure Valve 710
- of gravity injection (DVI line Vault break with valve vault room Room flooded) i 3BL-FN Full depressurized with failure Steam 710 l of gravity recirculation (15 cm Generator hot leg break) Compartment i 3BE-FN1 Fully depressurized with failure Valve 710 of gravity injection (DVI line Vault break with valve vault
- n Room flooded) 3BR-FR1 Large LOCA with failure of Steam 540 accumulators Generator Compartment 3BR-FR1* Sensitivity case for 3BR-FR1 Steam 540 i sequence with ADS sparger Generator uncovered Compartment Note: Chapter 41 of the AP600 PRA provides a description and discussion of these sequences.
i 6
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IRWST SPARGER 1
- = / -
o a :
y a , :
o e =_ ;
o 2 M i j l g o I
@.J x :
~
i i e : , , , ,
0 .5 1 1.5 4
Time (Sec) x10 1
Figure 5 Hydrogen Release History for 3BR-FR1 Sequence.
l 10
e,a
, C
- l N 5 -
E
^ ^ :
- u 9 27 Note
- In vessel hydrogen released U .
M 5 through three discharge paths. I
!
- 2 - 1.c. line break, IRW5T sparger l
]T ,
{ and fourth atage ADS.
I W n !
- 9 i FOURTH STAGE ADS .
- o , 1 e
N U =
. r3
- g -
x = 1
- 2 F =
u -
m =
, , n = -
o :? , _ .
u u o .
. . =_
=
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=
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o n :
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s E W _ l LINE BREAK : l o e ~-
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IRWST SPARGER -
l u = / -
. E /
n -
o e :
o E x : :
I
~
~
g o h.-
.L qE 0 .5 1 1.5 Time (Sec) x10 Figure 6 Hydrogen Release History for 3BR-FR1' Sequence.
11
i l
e e
i 3 0.: asp
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p E / GNN g \
Ti & BNdd S/ " . '
b
. \
Ti
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go % \
c
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ig ...- - -~ ~~" ~~~~~....i.. ...
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+ ,e MN,
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Figure 7 gwST cross-W# with sparsa 12
Table 2
. IRWST Vent Configuration l
Vent Type Location Number Size Total Area 1
Outer well IRWST roof sparger side 12 .9 m (3') x .45 m (1.5')(D 4.5 d (48.9 ft2) behad SG 4 .9 m (3') x .45 m (1.5')(D 1.5 m2 (16.3 ft2)
PRHR side 2 2 5(3) .9 m (3') x .45 m (1.5')(D 1.9 m (20.4 ft )m SG wall IRWST roof SG wall 5 0.6 m (2') pipem 1.3 m2 (14.4 ft 23 2 2 9.3 m (100.0 ft )
Notes:
(1) Actual opening is 35" x 17" with 6" radius corners.
(2) 0.6 m (24") pipe schedule XXS has .58 m (23") ID. I (3) Note that there are 7 vents on the PRHR side of the IRWST, however 2 of them are being reserved for venting from the containment back into the IRWST to pn: vent overpressurization of the IRWST during a LOCA or SLB and as a result ,
will not be available for venting out of the IRWST.
l 13
l and the IRWST gas space during normal plant operation. He lowest point of the containment wall vent's discharge is 15 cm(6 inches) above the operating deck, which is intended to prevent l water on the operating. deck from draining back into the IRWST through the vents.
l <
The vents along the steam generator wall are also located in the roof of the IRWST next to that
{
wall. The vents run straight up through the roof of the IRWST. Flow through the steam !
generator wall vents discharges vertically through hinged flaps. Dese vents also discharge 15 I cm (6 in) above the operating deck elevation.
The IRWST gas space is connected to the refueling cavity by large overflow openings. A total of six rectangular weir openings each 0.38 m (1.25 ft) high and 0.91 m (3 ft) wide (2.1 m2 or l 2
22.5 ft total area) are provided in the IRWST design. Each overflow runs straight through the ,
l wall between the IRWST and the refueling cavity. Single or multiple flaps will be provided on each overflow opening to prevent significant exchange of air between the IRWST and the i
containment during normal operation.
The existence'of the ilappers on each of the IRWST vent paths to prevent mixing with the air ;
in the rest of the containment regions also impacts the diffusion flame assessment. He
)
availability of the various gas flow paths between the IRWST gas space and the balance of the ;
containment regions depends upon the relative differential pressures which influence whether the l flow path (flapper) is open or closed. l Considerations of the IRWST geometry and the referenced vent design which prevents mixmg during normal operation were used to produce a revised model for use in MAAP4 to perform the diffusion flame assessment for the IRWST vents. De MAAP4 representation of the AP600
( includes two nodes for the IRWST and additional junctions such that the assessment included i i the effects of the flappers. Figure 8 describes the IRWST naMintion and flowjunctions. The !
! I circled numbers in Figure 8 identify the containment regions as labeled in the figure. De arrows connecting the different containment nodes have arrow heads to represent if two-directional flow is possible or only one-directional flow due to the behavior of the flapper valves. Junction 25 represents tlie two vents on the PRHR side of the IRWST used to vent from
) the containment back into the IRWST.
l Figure 9 depicts the floor plan for the core makeup tank (CMT) room floor which is at elevation 107 2" in the AP600 containment. De CMT floor is one level below the operating deck. The two geometrically independent dead-end valve vault rooms are beneath the CMT floor. Each valve vault room has a grating covered opening in its ceiling which is the only gas flow path to i
( or from the valve vaults. Each valve vault room contains a direct vessel injection (DVI) line t
l 14 i
l 1
l l
l l 1 1
l l l l
l Upper Compartment h l N j l 12 16 26 23 25 y
Refueling : 0> IRWST : 24 : IRwST l
Cav,tyi Sparger Side PRHR Hx Side WL963007.CDR 3196 Hydraulic No. Description Total Area No.of Vent Diameter (m zfgg2) Vents Dimensions (m/ft)
Junction #8 IRWST overflow 2.09/22.6 6 0.9 m x 0.38 m 0.54/1.8 ;
(3' x 1.25') !
Junction #16 IRWST vents 6.03/65.1 16 0.9 m x 0.46 m 0.61"/2 i (3' x 1.5')
Junction F26 24" pips vents 1.337/14.4 5 0.58 m (23*) ID 0.584/1.9 Junction #24 Connecting sparger 34.45/37.2 - -
side to PRHR side Junction #23 IRWST vents 1.895/20.5 5 0.9 m x 0.46 m 0.61"/2 I
(3' x 1.5')
Junction #25 IRWST back-vents 0.757/8.2 2 0.9 m x 0.46 m -
(3' x 1.5')
" Based on fully opened area of fispe at each vent.
Figum 8 Two region nodalization of the IRWST and flow junctions.
15
4 J
i i
- N ->
l t1i i
1
\ \
> ~~
R !
J> l
-X \
ri , ,
' Diffusion '3
- ) !
Flame Diffusion Flame O i
1 r
at South 'l 3 Opening i at North Opening gV rt1 'l
% ,e"'s C l
__1 Cover Plate'
! .; cc33a with 3'x3'
- r# ,
Opening i .
l 1 .
,o ,
,UQ -4
/ ,
Electrical
-pk' Penetration Box
) Equipment Hatch
[ "# #~~ Cover Plate i
a / 3' with 3'x3'
} D' \ [rn3 Opening '
l l
I T . . .\ . . w l t
% Personal l- $
l '
Hatch a 5 8
. . . . . . . . . . s, , / o l
an =34i.conii249e
' \s ':
8'
,/
'b#
N
- Plan View Above 107'2" Elev. (Containment Room Floor) 4 t
Note: Dimensions of south valve vault exit are 3 x 15 ft.
i Figure 9 Plan View of CMT Room Floor.
l r
16
and its isolation valves which separate the IRWST from the RPV downcomer. For a DVI line break between the RPV and these isolation valves, in-vessel hydrogen and steam could be released to the valve vault room. If the DVI line isolation valves are closed the valve vault room would not be flooded, yet if they are opened, the valve vault room would be flooded and j the DVI line break elevation submerged.
l Figure 9 identifies the location and dimensions of valve vault room exits. The north valve vault room exit location has a direct line of sight to the containment wall and several electrical I penetrations. It does not have a direct line of sight to either the equipment or personnel hatches.
The south valve vault room exit orientation and location has only a limited view of the local l containment wall. The close proximity of the CMT, which is approximately 6.4 m (21 ft) tall, I and the refueling cavity wall greatly inhibit this exit's view of the containment wall. However, j I
although the south exit is significantly displaced from the equipment and personnel hatches, it does have a direct line of sight to them. The electrical penetrations are not in the south exit's direct line of sight. This geometry is considered in the evaluation of the thermal response of the containment wall and penetrations to a standing diffusion flame at either valve vault room exit.
The containment nadabration (FAlb,1996) used in MAAP4 to assess the potential for producing a standing diffusion flame on the CMT floor at either valve vault room exit used a separate node for the valve vault room. It also used a single node model for the IRWST as the more detailed two node model described above was not necessary. His containment model was used to calculate its temperature and pressure responses, the flow rates between containment regions and subcompartments, and the gas concentrations in the containment regions.
5.0 DIFFUSION FLAME ASSESSMENT ne three stage ADS analysis represents the worst case scenario for potential existence of diffusion flames at the IRWST vents as it involves a release of all in-core hydrogen into the IRWST through the first three stages of ADS valves. In the expanded analysis, besides being released into the IRWST, hydrogen was also released directly into the containment through the fourth stage ADS. With an actuation of the fourth stage ADS, while the sparger is still submerged (3BE-FRF1 and 3BE-FN1) there was no likelihood of substantial build-up of hydrogen in the IRWST that may lead to potential existence of diffusion flames at the IRWST vents. If the sparger is uncovered due to IRWST draining (3BL-FN), moderately high concentrations of hydrogen and very high concentrations of steam may exist in the IRWST, whose conditions are unhkely to lead to potential existence of diffusion flames at the IRWST vents. The expanded analysis also shows that when the founh stage ADS was not yet actuated 17
_ .._ ._ _ _ . _ . _ ._ _ _ . . _ _. _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _
l during a hydrogen release (3BR-FR1 and 3BR-FR1*) the large break itself was enough to
! prevent hydrogen buildup in the IRWST.
1
[ 5.1 'IRWST Vents and Overhw Openings i
j The MAAP4 code with the two node IRWST model was used to quantify the hydrogen l generation for the three stage ADS scenario and assess the potential and characteristics of l di&sion flames which could be formed at the IRWST vents and overflow openings. Only
! scenarios involving the operation of first three ADS stages (no ADS stage four) could release i a significant amount of hydrogen into the IRWST and have the potential of producing standing l diffusion flames at the IRWST exits. The three stage ADS scenario was analyzed to determine ,
i the duration and height of standing di%sion flames at the IRWST exits. I l The MAAP4 three stage ADS analysis showed that the di&sion flame criteria were satisfied !
l inside the IRWST such that di%sion flames on the pool surface were briefly maintained while l the oxygen in the IRWST was depleted. During the interval of the standing diffusion flame
{ within the IRWST the hydrogen concentrations remained relatively high as they were in the l range of 36 to 55%. The diffusion flame buming rate is limited by the availability of oxygen f in the IRWST. He rate of oxygen being admitted to the IRWST through the existing venting l configuration was found to be far less than the hydrogen release rate. De unburned and highly i concentrated hydrogen then flowed out through the IRWST vents and overflow openings. The l
! oxygen supply in the balance of containment (outside of the IRWST gas space) was sufficient i l to support the buming of the high concentration hydrogen streams such that di&sion flames i burning at the operating deck level at the IRWST vent exits and overflow exits are considered i possible. Thus, the thermal impact of standing diffusion flames was quantified.
l
! The MAAP4 analyses were used to determine the diffusion flame heights at the vent exits and
} overflow openinge and the duration of the respective standing diffusion flames. The height of l l the diffusion flame anchored at these openings was used to assess the radiation view factors and
! estimate the size of the affected region of the containment shell above the operating deck.
l The correlation for the diffusion flame height was selected from the literature and incorporated in the MAAP4 code for these assessments.
E=aQ D
(5-1)
) In this equation, H is the flame height, D is the hydraulic diameter of tre source gas (in this case, the size of the vent), and Q* is a dimensionless heat release rate which is defined as I
i 18 l
i i -_ _ . _ _ - _
f Q*" (5-2)
- 9. C, T,fgD D 2 where
- p. is the density of gas in containment',
, C, is the heat capacity of gas in containment, I.
T. is the temperature of gas in containment,
- g is the gravitational acceleration, j
l and i Q is the heat release rate.
- Among several applicable flame height correlations, we select the one which gives the highest i flam9 height as a conservative approach, i.-e., a = 4.16 and b = 0.4 (Steward,1970). The
! cc. relation is applicable for a range of 1 < Q* < 10'. A typical Q* value for the AP600
-1 condition is about 2 for a vent flowrate of 2 kg/s, with 5% H 2mass fraction from a 0.6 m j diameter vent.
The flame height is proportional to the junction flow rate and the hydrogen concentration inside the IRWST. Both of these parameters are dependent upon the model selected to describe the junction (flapper) behavior. A variety of models were considered to assess this sensitivity and attempt to bound the standing diffusion flame heights. The bounding standing diffusion flame ;
heights and durations from these sensitivity assessments were selected for further analysis and are included in the summary table presented in Section 6.
One additional result obtained from the MAAP4 analyses was the differential pressure produced in the IRWST during the hydrogen burn. The peak differential pressure calculated during a burn inside the IRWST for the IRWST roof was 0.73 paid and the peak differential pressure on the wall between the IRWST gas space and refueling cavity was also calculated as 0.73 psid. These differential pressures act outward from the IRWST gas space to the adjacent containment regions.
19
5.2 Valve Vault Room Exits l
- The MAAP4 code was used to quantify the hydrogen generation for the DVI line break cases (3BE-FRF1 and 3BE-FN1) and assess the potential and characteristics of standing diffusion flames which could be formed at the valve vault room ceiling exits.
l The results for the DVI line break which is submerged by IRWST draining (3BE-FRF1)
- indicates that high hydrogen concentrations are produced in the valve vault room gas space. The steam that escapes the primary system with the hydrogen is condensed in the flooded cavity.
l The oxygen concentration in the valve vault room is too low to support combustion in that j room. Thus, the composition of the gas mixture which exits the valve vault room could support a standing diffusion flame given an ignition source on the CMT floor.
l l The MAAP4 analyses were used to determine the diffusion flame heights at the ceiling exit and
- the duration of the various diffusion flame heights. He flame heights and exit locations were i
. used to assess radiation view factors for the closest section of the containment wall, the closest i i
! electrical penetration and the equipment and personnel hatches. These results were used in a '
separate thermal assessment for each of these four items.
l 6.0 CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY RESPONSE 6.1 Cone =In==*nt Wau nennal Response I Lw=1i=1 heating of the conta!nment shell above the opemting deck elevation by standing diffusion flames at the IRWST vents or overflow opening as illustrated in Figures 10 and 11 are assessed. The objective is to assess the physical extent of the affected zone of the containment shell'and the maximum wall temperature produced by a standing diffusion flame. It should be noted that standing diffusion flames formed on the CMT floor at the valve vault room exits are further from the containment wall than those at the IRWST vents. nus, they result in lower wall temperatures as discussed below. He IRWST vent assessment is accomplished by performing the following steps:
- Assess the diffusion flame temperature.
- Assess the induced (entramed) air velocity in the vicinity of the diffusion flame and containment wall.
- Quantify the convective heat transfer from the diffusion flame to the containment wall.
i i 20 4
O-Or 0,
YE
- a. ~
0 - \
0, S \
&e a \
b' N 0I .
\
8
\
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f 4
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\
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fe G. ,cn 2
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'r
--s D Q0
.]
h 6)
A@
1 y -
\
I Q 2 Q e DQ f
Figure 10 ydonS 0g sanding diffusion SW'# IRWI '" ,4 overno*S-21
i l
/ \
l ( \ i
\\ ;
--* 4--- 4.1 cm ! -
Flames Containment / /.-
g l 1
y Shell ( j / l
- 1.07 m :
L- /s O !
f perating Deck l IRWST l Vent i 5 '
Water Pool
! _ _ _ _ _ [ Surface h IRWST-g Figure 11 Localized heating of containment shell by standing diffusion l flames on IRWST vents, l
l 22
i l
l
- Quantify the radiative heat transfer from the diffusion flame to the containment wall.
- Quantify the number of vents participating to define the azimuthal extent of the j IMali=1 heating. l The diffusion flame temperature is assessed from fire plume data. Measurements of centerline ;
values of mean excess temperature AT,in fire plumes irrespective of the fuel type and size have been found to obey the following relation (Heskestad,19R8)
I r '" ' j T*
AT, = 910 ( '
(6-1)
(K C r* P *. ,
I with 1
( = z - z" (6-2)
Q,** :
where AT, is a centerline mean temperature minus T , ;
T., is an ambient temperature (in this case the containment gas temperature),
p ., is the containment gas density, Q, is a convective heat rate [w] (assume 80% of the total reaction heat rate Q),
z is elevation [m],
z, is vutual origin of the flame that can be calculated from z, = 1.02D + 0.83 11000, (6-3) s The plot of Eq. (6-1) is a straight line with a slope of -5/3 as shown in Figure 12. The plateau on the left side of the plot occurs when ( <0.1 which indicates that the temperature does not change significantly in that region.
23
1000 - , ;, ,
100 : :
g I SLOPE = -5/3 2 r - -
A -
10 : ::
i i i i i e inie i i i i n iin i iei si 0.01 0.1 1 10 (Z-Z,1/Q,2/5 (m. kW -2/s)
Figure 12 Correlation of centerline mean excess temperature in fire plumes as a function of elevation.
24
i t
! Substituting Eq. (6-3) for zo in Eq. (6-2) yields !
l f 32/5 l (= 1 7 _.1.02D - 0.83 O (6-4)
Ql^ r1000 i i For an AP600 value of Q = 0.756 x 10 6W, and a flame height in the range of 2 6' m, the -
l corresponding value of & is from 0.007 to 0.027. Therefore, from Figure 12, the centerline i
! mean excess temperature of the AP600 diffusion flames is about 900 K (1160*F) for the height range being considered. It is conservative to assume that the diffusion flames are uniformly at a temperature of 900 K (1160*F) above the containment temperature for heat transfer analysis
{
- in the following section, i-A steady state heat transfer model was developed based on the above steps and used to calculate
{ the energy exchange between the diffusion flame, containment wall, PCCS baffle, and l surrounding concrete structure. Energy was transferred to the containment wall by radiation and l convection due to the diffusion flame. Radiation between the heated portion of the containment i wall, baffle plate and surrounding concrete structure were quantified. Additionally, convective j cooling due to air flow through the PCCS flow passages was calculated for the outer surface of j the containment shell, both sides of the baffle, and the inner surface of the surrounding concrete
! structure. The basic assumptions that were made to construct this energy balance are:
l a. For a given flame height, a steady state containment shell temperature is calculated.
l Transient effects are ignored. Thus, neither the heat capacitance of the various structures
! nor transient variations in the flame height are included in this model. This implies that
{ diffusion flames last long enough to reach a steady state and are not intermittent such that
) through the IRWST vent and the diffusion flame is extinguished and reformed. '
1 j b. A uniform flame-temperature is applied for the entire flame height.
- c. No credit for water films is included on the inner or outer surface of the containment wall. This precludes the concern about the degree of wetting on the outer surface by the passive spray included in the PCCS. The likelihood of a water film on the inner surface due to steam condensation on the containment shell is high. Detailed transient calculations should- include vaporization of the water film when assessing the containment's temperature response. A sensitivity case was calculated with a water film assumed on the outer surface of the containment wall. This showed that the inner surface of the containment wall was within 10*K (5.6*F) of the water film temperature which, for the purpose of the sensitivity study, was assumed to be 350*K (170*F).
25
I l
- d. Only one-dimensional conduction in the containment wall is modeled. Multi-dimensional conduction and the flow of energy to regions of the containment shell that are not significantly heated by the local diffusion flame have not been explicitly quantified.
Two flame height profiles are assessed for the IRWST exits. The first addresses flames near the containment shell standing at the IRWST vents and the other profile shows flames produced by diffusion flames standing at the overflow openings (see Figure 10). The azimuthal extent of the multiple diffusion flames standing on the IRWST exits is significantly larger than that for the locahzed heating due to standing diffusion flames on the overflow openings.
The results for this assessment indicate that a global flow pattern is established in the upper containment region, down into the IRWST node without the spargers, into the IRWST gas space q region with the spargers and back through vents in that region into the upper compartment.
Burns are predicted to occur in the IRWST until the oxygen concentration is reduced such that combustion can not be supported within the IRWST gas space. This reduced oxygen condition occurs despite the global flow through the IRWST gas space and its limited ability to resupply oxygen through the vents on the PRHR side of the IRWST. The diffusion flame temperature i
was found to be 1300*K (1880*F). The hot spot temperatures for the containment shell local to the two different regions of standing diffusion flames are summanzed in Table 3. The results are shown to be dependent on the calculated peak flame height that has been associated with each of the intervals listed in the table. Hydrogen burns (standing diffusion flame) occurred over a total interval of approximately 5000 sec during which time the containment pressure was approximately 1.5 bar (22 psi) (absolute). A higher containment pressure of 2.2 bar (32 psi)
(absolute) was calculated during a global deflagration in the upper containment prior to this diffusion flame interval and its concomitant localized containment wall temperature. However, no local wall heating (hot spot) existed during the global burn.
1 1
As mentioned above, the thermal response of the containment wall for the CMT floor elevation ,
was assessed for a standing diffusion flame at either valve vault room exit. Essentially the same l approach as outlined above for the IRWST exits was employed for diffusion flames on the CMT floor. However, the boundary condition of the containment wall's outer surface is different at this lower containment elevation. The PCS annulus does not extend down to this elevation. The different geometry was included in the heat transfer model. Also, a transient rather than steady state calculation was performed. The diffusion flame height and duration for a DVI line break was quantified and used to assess the thermal response of the containment wall and its penetrations at this plant elevation. The view factor for the radiation heat flux for the part of the containment wall closest to a diffusion flame on the CMT floor is smaller than that for the wall adjacent to the IRWST vents. The smaller view factors are due to the different geometric 26
J
\
- arrangement on the CMT floor and the larger displacements between either diffusion flame l l location and the different containment boundary components. The peak calculated containment i shell temperature for the CMT elevation is 417'K (291*F) (see Table 4). This result is bounded l by the IRWST vent diffusion flame result (see Table 3).
6.2 Containment Wall Stmetural Response l Membrane tension at temperature will be the controlling loading condition of interest for ,
l considering the impact of a lWi=4 hot spot in the containment wall due to a standing diffusion i
flame. A simple hoop stress expression (Pr/t) is a sufficient means of estimating the wall's
- response for the membrane tension. The hoop stress is compared to the yield stress corrected '
l . for the local hot spot temperature. Since this is not a design basis event, but rather a severe j accident event, the ASME code allowables need not be applied. Thus, the allowable stress is l based on a local wall temperature that still provides sufficient useable capacity of the steel l containment wall. The resulting temperature limit to be considered for the hydrogen diffusion j flames is 1200*F (922*K). This was inferred by considering the effect of temperature on the I
modulus of elasticity of structural steels (see Figure 13). If the yield stress limit for structural steel at ambient conditions is approximately 60,000 psi, for the AP600 containment with a containment pressure of about 1.5 bar (22 psi) (absolute), approximately 30% of the load carrymg capacity would be required to cope with the wall hoop stress. Based on Figure 13 (curve 1) the modulus of elasticity is reduced to 0.3 of the room temperature value at a wall temperature of approximately 850'K (approximately 1080*F). The precise stress values and temperatures can be supplied for the AP600 design based on the design specific materials. This approach incorporates margin in that the allowable Xicld stress rather than allowable ultimate stress has been considered. In practice some strain could readily be tolerated without failure of I the containment wall which would permit use of the allowable ultimate stress in the structural assessment. The possibility of creep of the containment wall due to an extended exposure to high temperature and wall stress was also reviewed. The general approach used in MAAP4 based on the Larson-Miller formulation was reviewed and felt to be reasonable for application to the containment wall. If a wall temperature of 930'K (1210*F) is assumed for an AP600 containment loading of 1.5 bar (22 psi) (absolute) and, using a Larson-Miller parameter of thirty-four, the time required to induce creep failure is approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Larson-Miller parameter (LMP) of thirty-four applies for low carbon steel. Other carbon steels are 27
Table 3 Calculated Steady State Containment Shell Temperature j Above Operating Deck !
A. Local to IRWST Vents j Hot Spot Duration (sec) Flame Height (m/ft) Flame Temocrature (K/F) Temocrature (K/F) I 3000 1.6/5.3 1300/1880 850/1070 1000 2.3/7.5 1300/1880 910/1180 1000 0.3/1.0 1300/1880 590/600 i 1000 2.6/8.5 1300/1880 930/1210 B. Local to Overflow Opening Hot Spot Duration (sec) Flame Height (m/ft) Flame Temocrature (K/F) Temocrature (K/F) ,
3000 4.4/14.4 1300/1880 540/510 1000 6.8/22.3 1300/1880 585/590 1000 1.1/3.6 1300/1880 430/310 1000 7.8/25.6 1300/1880 600/620 28
k, Table 4 Peak Containment Shell and Penetrations Temperatures 4 on CMT Floor i
j A. Standing Diffusion Flame at North Valve Vault Room. Exit0) l Hot Snot Temnerature (K/F)U)
Containment Electricall') ,
I Duration (sec) Flame Heinht (m/ft)G) Shell Penetranon i
- 300 6.5/21.3 396/253 423/301 300 4.8/15.7 401/262 446/343
- 300 4.4/14.4 404/267 457/363
! 550 0 403/265 439/330 i 450 6.2/20.3 412/282 468/382 i 450 4.2/13.8 417/291 474/393 l .
{ B. Standing Diffusion Flame at South Valve Vault Room Exit l
l Hot Snot Temnaenture (K/F)O) i Containment Personnel Equipment i Duranon (sec) Flame Heieht (m/ft)G) Sh*H Fetch Match j 300 5.9/19.4 396/253 395/251 407/273 i 300 4.2/13.8 401/262 397/255 418/292 l 300 2.8/9.2 403/265 398/256 424/303 i 550 0 401/262 395/251 420/296 l 450 5.3/17.4 409/276 401/262 440/332 i- 450 2.9/9.5 412/282 402/264 448/346 1
l 0) Exit covered with plate so partial opening of 3 x 3 ft at southwest' corner.
- G Flame temperature taken as 1385'K (2030*F) for all thermal assessments.
l WPeak temperature at the end of each of the six sequential intervals.
l
(" Temperature of air trapped within penetration enclosure.
i
)
t, I
I 29 u .
% .0
' I 08 - % 1
~
s 06 -
j \
W s
0.4 * .
~
\
\
0.1 ~
s \
0 '
0 400 200 200 400 $00 600 700 TE M9t R ATunt. *C fi .144.1.
t The ofret of temproture en the modules of clasticity of
(}) strutturel steel /* end (2) reinforcing bars?'
Figure 13 Temperature Dependence of Structure Shell Strength (
Reference:
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, First Edition, p. I-385).
30 l
r i
l known to have larger LMPs such as thirty-six to thirty-seven at similar stress levels. A LMP l value of thirty-seven would imply a creep failure time of approximately 130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />. Thus, some
- margin appears to exist in the 2 hr estimate that assumes low carbon steel. The anticipated 4
duration of a hydrogen diffusion flame at the IRWST vents producing such a 930*K (1210*F) i containment shell hot spot temperature is less than 0.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Thus, when the estimated high
- local containment wall temperature is applied for its calculated interval shell failure would not i
be expected by the creep mechanism. The calculated thermal response of the containment shell
! adjacent to the outboard IRWST vents near the ADS spargers could produce this limiting
! condition. The calculated thermal response of the containment shell due to standing diffusion l flames at the IRWST overflow openings is much lower (600*K) (620*F) and the time required to induce creep failure is very long, i.e., practically infinite since the materials strength is i essentially not diminished at that temperature.
Predicated on this consideration of the controlling structuralloading mechanisms and the thermal
- loading produced by a standing diffusion flame, the definition for the heat affected zone of the containment wall due to hydrogen flames standing on the IRWST vent exit is as follows
4 l 1. The extent of the high temperature region for the containment wall local to the IRWST vents (see Region @ of Figure 14 and Figure 15) can be approximated j by a zone 2.6 m (8.5 ft) high with a 60* arc of the containment wall
- circumference. The extent of the high temperature region for the containment j wall local to the overflow openings can be approximated by a zone 7.8 m (25.6 ft) high with a 3* arc of the containment wall circumference (see Region @ of l Figure 14).
l
- 2. The temperature of the affected zone should be viewed as uniform in the azimuthal direction over the entire 60' (Region @) and 3' (Region @) arcs.
- 3. The vertical temperature distribution for each affected zone varies linearly by 1 approximately 90*K (160*F). However, a first approximation can conservatively apply the hot spot temperature for the entire heat affected zone.
The calculated thermal response of the containment shell for CMT floor elevation (107' 2") is lower (412*K/282'F) than either result for the IRWST diffusion flames. Thus, the time required to induce creep failure of the containment shell at this plant elevation by diffusion flame 31
,,.~
0:' ;
l 0E :
-o s .' - ' lh}c:
t
'> / 'b\ l
,\ CE ':, l b o 7
C:
ft
~
l l
/
W 0 i j
01010101o o-o o
[ /
( K ,
l
~T ~IE :!
i
, (( g
" ' - ' ~ ~ - ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' - - - - - --
i-----
O r
, H /0 i
\' ) O
\ C i
& Ao o o !
\ 'Nk Qm 7 -
e.
\
/*Q w li c
\
\/
/
h\.;
a i i
g e
N i $
Q 8 i3 O Ol N !
@ ~.. !
Figure 14 Azimuthal Extent of High Temperature Zone of Containment Wall ( @ opposite IRWST vents and @ opposite overflow opening).
32
I I
=
1 l
% i i
l
% I
- c. !
s 1 s '
l
! l t
l s l a;g m' s o,. s i
i > - l
.; ,m .
(
f j x
j u ., u .. I
[ _
s l A
.. /'
s k., m:
'~
MN _ . , , < . -
i l
s !
N o..
s Figure 15 Vertical Extent of High Temperature Zone of Containment Wall.
33
l heating is also very much longer than the loading condition interval. The bounding containment !
shell loading condition due to a local hot spot is produced by a standing diffusion flamt. at the l
IRWST vents.
l 1
6.3 Equipment and Personnel Hatches nennal Responses l The heating of the equipment and personnel hatches by a standing diffusion flame at the south l valve vault room was quantified (FAlb,1996). A simple model of each hatch was constructed J j to perform a transient lumped heat balance for each hatch and the air enclosed within them (see ;
Appendix B for details). Heat loss to the auxiliary building was not modeled. The peak !
temperature calculated for the equipment hatch was 448'K (346*F) and for the personnel hatch !
l was 402*K (264*F). l I
6.4 Electrical Penetration Hermal Response l l
The heating of tne electrical penetration closest to the north valve vault room was quantified.
This single calculation was selected to represent the bounding effect of a standing diffusion flame on all the electrical penetrations. His provides significant margin in the calculated peak temperature for those electrical penetrations that are further from the valve vault room exit. A simple model was used to perform a transient lumped heat balance for a penetration enclosure and the air enclosed within it (see Appendix B for details). The thermal response of the electrical penetration internals and sealing matenal was not assessed. The back wall of the penetration enclosure was assumed to be at the local containment wall hot spot temperature. No heat loss to the auxiliary building was modeled. The peak temperature calculated for the air in the penetration enclosure was 474*K (393*F).
7.0
SUMMARY
ne issue of potential standing diffusion flames at the IRWST exits producing locally high temperatures on the c.ontainment boundary were identified for evaluation. An evaluation of the potential impact on the containment boundary integrity during severe accidents was conducted.
A three stage ADS sequence was defined to evaluate the impact of the IRWST vent configuration i including the flappers on standing diffusion flames. The three stage ADS scenario was taken I as a loss of feedwater transient with system failures leading to a severe accident with large j hydrogen release rates and inventories. This sequence only involved the first three stages of the ADS system and assumed the complete failure of the fourth stage ADS. These stages all discharge through spargers submerged in the IRWST water pool. It is important to note that the failure frequency of the 4th stage ADS is very low (10-8 per year). Under most circumstances !
l 34 I
j the 4th stage ADS will be actuated. When the 4th stage ADS is actuated, most hydrogen would l . bypass the IRWST and be directly released to the containment. The level of hydrogen buildup l in the IRWST would be much lower and unlikely to support any standing flames.
I
- The assessment of this three stage ADS indicated that there is a potential for producing standing i diffusion flames. The height and temperature of the star. ding diffusion flames were used to perform a thermal assessment of the local containment shell. De degree of containment shell heating was quantified and based on the coincident wall stresses due to containment l pressurization for the transient interval of lacalimi shell heating; it was estimated that the l containment shell would survive. A material creep assessment based on the Larson-Miller parameter for containment steel was used to make this determination for these severe accident j conditions. Hus, based on mechanistic rather than probabilistic arguments the bounding three
- l. stage ADS assessment concluded that the containment shell would survive the effect oflacali=4 heating due to a standing diffusion flame at the IRWST exits.
} Subsequently, an expanded set of accident sequences have been used to further evaluate the potential for diffusion flames locally heating the containment boundary. The expanded set of
! sequences include all four stages of the ADS valves and the operation of the IRWST drain line.
! primary system (hot leg) directly to the steam generator compartments which directly
! communicate with the upper containment region. For sequences with the fourth stage effective, unlike the base case with only the first three stages of ADS considered, standing diffusion flames at the IRWST vent exits are not produced. The rate of hydrogen inflow to the IRWST through j the spargers is reduced due to the availability of the fourth stage ADS valves or large LOCAs in the RCS piping and their direct path from the primary system to the steam generator
- compartments.~ This flow path has less flow restrictions and, therefore, the majority of the flow i
from the primary system is to the steam generator compartment. The reduction of the hydrogen l' inflow to the IRWST is sufficient to prevent the formation of standing diffusion flames at its exit for this family of severe accident sequences.
i The expanded set of sequences included LOCAs produced by a break in the direct vessel injection (DVI) lines. A DVI line is located in each of the valve vault rooms which are dead-
- end compartments with a single flow path in their ceilings. His flow path connects the vault rooms to the CMT floor which is at elevation 107' - 2". The potential for forming standing diffusion flames at each of the valve vault room exits following a DVI line break initiated LOCA 3
has also been assessed. His assessment also studied the impact of the initiation of the IRWST drain line operation during DVI line break initiated LOCAs. It was found for those sequences i that do not flood the DVI line break elevation with IRWST water that no standing diffusion 1
?
35
1 i 1 flame is produced at the valve vault room exit. This is due to the highly steam inerted and low l hydrogen concentration mixture produced in the valve vault room gas space for these types of l
! sequences. For those. DVI line break sequences which flood the break elevation prior to the release of steam and hydrogen from the primary system, the steam is stripped from the escaping gases and a high hydrogen, non-inerted concentration is produced in the valve vault room gas l l space. The water level in the valve vault room may even be high enough to flood the igniter
! ' located in that compartment. However, the oxygen supply available to the valve vault room gas i space is insufficient to support continual burning of the hydrogen released into that room even j if the igniter is operable. Thus, the availability of the igniter is not a critical consideration for i sequences which have high water levels in the affected valve vault room. The inability to inert l the gas space in the valve vault room or to bum the hydrogen as it is released can produce high i
hydrogen concentrations which can exit the vault room and produce a standing di%sion flame f at its exit. Thus, the potential for a standing di%sion flame at each valve vault room exit must
! be assessed for the CMT floor. However, only one valve vault room exit at any given time
{ would experience a diffusion flame since DVI line breaks are addressed one at a time.
l The sensitive components on the CMT floor which maintain the containment integrity include j the containment shell, equipment hatch, personnel hatch and electrical penetrations. Thermal
- assessments for standing di%sion flames have been performed individually for each of the valve j vault rooms. These two valve vault rooms have been designated north and south to facilitate i their reference. A review of the 107' - 2" floor plan view allows the determination that a j standing diffusion flame at the exit to the north valve vault room would have a direct line of j sight of both the containment shell and several electrical penetration assemblies but not the j containment hatches. De thermal assessment of the containment shell and electrical penetrations j takes into account the distances between the standing diffusion flame at the north valve vault l room exit and these two components. The insults show that the containment wall lacilimi
) heating is significantly less than the three stage ADS assessment described above. Furthermore, l the electrical penetrations will be heated to temperatures that do not exceed the equipment I survivability temperature (477'K (400*F)] during the interval that a standing diffusion flame
{ could be produced. The peak calculated transient temperature of the gas within the electrical penetration assembly is estimated to be approximately 474*K (393*F).
1 i
j A standing diffusion flame at the south valve vault room exit would have the potential of heating
} the containment shell, the equipment hatch and the personnel hatch. The displacement between j that diffusion flame and the containment shell is even larger than the displacement between the i diffusion flame at the north valve room exit and the containment shell. Thus, lower i temperatures for the containment shell on the CMT floor elevation would be produced for the j flame at the south valve vault room than for the diffusion flame on the north valve vault room.
i 1 36 i
4 1
1_ . .__-_ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ , . . _ , . _ _ ~ . _
Likewise, an assessment of the thermal response of both the equipment and personnel hatches shows that their peak temperatures during the interval with the standing diffusion flame are lower than the 477'K (400*F) temperature used in the containment failure assessment j incorporated in the PRA (AP600,1996). 7hus, a standing diffusion flame at the exits to the
~
valve vault rooms do not produce containment shell or hatch temperatures which exceed those employed in the PRA containment failure assessment. Since the limiting temperature of 477'K (400'F) used in the AP600 PRA evaluation is not exceeded by the localized diffusion flame heating, it is concluded that the PRA evaluations are bounding.
J 4
4 4
1 37
8.0 REFERENCES
AP600,1996, Chapter 42, Conditional Containment Failure Probability Distribution, AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
Heskestad, G.,1988, " Fire Plume," The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Chapter 6, pp.1-107 to 1-115.
Steward, F. R.,1970, Combustion Science and Technology, 2, 203.
Tamanini, F., et al.,1988, " Hydrogen Combustion Experience in 1/4 Scale Model of a Mark m Nuclear Reactor Containment (Volumes 1 and 2) Prepublication Copy," EPRI Project PRY 101-01.
38
i
. I APPENDIX A Plots of Hydrogen Generation, Containment Gas Composition, i
IRWST and Valve Vault Rooms Junction Mow Rates, l 4
Containment Pressure and Containment Temperatures for 4
nree Stage ADS and DVI Break in South Valve Vault Room ;
2 i
i
., (Note: He plots for a DVI Break in North Valve Vault Room l art essentially the same as those for the South Valve i
! Vault included in this appendix) !
l i
i I i
l I'
i l
3
)
i i
l j
i f
i f
i d
A-1 l
s 1
t 750 ..m i = ,,,,,,,1m. .I , , i :
! = =
! 650 !--
=
_.5
[ =
1 = =
^ 550 5-E l aa =
=
l M i E
! - 450 :- =
=
=
i = =
l = = E i o 350 i- 2
.a = =
o E i
~ = = l e 250 E- = l x 5 E x g THREE STAGE ADS i 150 E- =:
50 i- E E J E
-50 5"" '
"'""'""'""I"'"I"I"I"'""I'"'""
l 750 gi,,,,,,,p.n,....p.n.o.g.ni,,op,n,,,,,pnoi,,,pi,.n,o3,,,o.,,,p.....,g
650 i- -E
= :
550 i- I
^ : :
oo = =
w i E
- 450 -
=
=
o
!=- F !-
350 =
aa =
o E
= i= i e 250 =-
E 1 x E =
x i 3BE-FRF1 i 150 E- =J
=
50 i-
=
E .I ., ,,,,,!,,,,,, ,,l,n ,,,,,!o , ,,,,le,,o....li,,,,,,,,l.,,,,o .I. . 5
-50 1
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 l Time (Sec) x10 '
l I Figure A-1. Integrated in-Core Hydrogen Generation History A-2 ;
i
i 750
_g . . . . . ; o . . . . m . ; , , n . , , m p ..o m ,
,,.7,,,, ,,,,,m.,
E =
650 i-1=
=
.
~ 550 5-
=
_5
=
no : :
w I E
- 450 E- _.E
E E o 350 =- E no, =
o i i s- = =
= 250 ;- +
> i E z I 3BL-FN E
. 150 g- E i .
E 50 g-- 5
1
5 " " " ^ " " " ' " I ' " " " " I " " ' " " I ' " " ' " ' I " " ' " " I " ' " " " I " " " " ' ,' ' " " " " I " " " ' " I ' " " ' "=
-50 750 gooo, ,,,onopno..,i,m.,ntipu,,,n.p,,,,,,,,p,,nnopn,,,n
,,nio,,
,,mn,q,,,,n,g 650 5-E
^ 550 E-4:
oo : :
w E
-
E ,
! - 450 <
- i
=
o 350 i- E i ao E E o : :
=
, 250 E-x 5 E m i 3BE-FN1 1 150 g- =_ l i : :
- =
=
- 50 g-
= J E
- i i i 1 i i i i ;
- . -)l**, . , i s e l i t e s e t t i t i t t t i s t i ,11 t l i t t t i t i l a t t ., t . , s i l t i s s i s t i l l e , t s t i t ' i l t e ' t ' s ialttiti lt 't' :
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
] Time (Sec) x10 '
4
., Figure A 2. Integrated In Core Hydrogen Generation History A-3 6
1
)
550 _
- (
i i e i i , E i i .
450 i _E l -
i oo :
w 350 --
4
. c -
- o 250 - - .2 4 oo
1 o :
- w :
"a :
x 150 - - -
x 3BR-FR1 E
=
1 :
! 50 -
i E E 4 : '
-50
' " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' l ' ' ' " ' " l ' ' ' ' " ' l ' " ' " ' ' l ' ' " ' " I ' ' " ' ' ' 1 ' ' " " ' :-
i 550 Er i i i i i i i "'"E l :
- 450 E- 4 4 : ;
.I
^
On i
E w 350 E 4
- m
- i. : :
c _
o ao 250 E 4
j O :
,- w -
e :
i
! x 150 : -
4 l z -
3BR-FR1 E i -
50 - -
4 j E E 4
- , i :
4 4 . i i i . . l. ii: ..i. .
i
.tiliiii i :l.,
i e'iiiiei,ee;iirlii.iii. 'it i+ -
, -50 2 0 . 5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 i 4
, Time (Sec) x10 Figure A 3. Integrated In Core Hydrogen Generation History i
i A4 4
4 4
= .5 =uuno usuun unig.lii nin.junouipuinioluuninpunio.pu..uis:
o -
. = rii -
~
~
g \ : ;
n .4 l \ -
~ '
" ' \
E \ THREE STAGE ADS E
- ,s \ :
o 3 \ H2 2
.3 --
,1 \ o o E [i ,
\g si.. ....... ----
E 2 : ;\ / :
g\A / s :
a .2 / s s --
, . :....I s i w s s :
i, s~~.
1
, o =
s...... w ..... ... ........... . -------
i a *, ,. _I ...- ................................._E l s E E o : _1 _m :
o :
- 0 : :
o : :
= :
o .o.1 hittiteit Ilttillil Ifflfllil 198118118 lilllllll liffll'Il 1999f'' IIlllll IIllll!
! = .45 an n o u l u n i u n j in u u n j u n io n j u u n n i j u n io n j u u u u ip u n u n j u u n ng
,s -
o _ s :
" = ',i ' # ' s 4
.35 -
\
m :I -
\
El s -
= Of -
tv %'s s :
~
C- ' -
25 2 t 's~~~___ -
2 :
= c -
m -
o : 3BE-FRF1 --
.15 m.
m z.
, ........,,,,,,......................*.. .......... b
" .05 c -
F :
a _
o .o.05
'""""l"""'"l""'""l"""'"l""'""l"""'"l"'"""l""""'l"'"'"'
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 Time (Sec) x10 '
r l
' Figure A-4. Upper Compartment Gas Composition A-5 1
i
.i l
i
- e .6 ,,,, , , ,,, ,,,,,,, , _
o : ,,,,i,,,,,,,,,i ! i-5
~ ,g
- = 1
- : it . =
- .5 E- \\ =
- a - =
< u = l \ = l i S 5
- - l\ 3BL-FN
=
i 4
u : I \ g =
2
~
3 l \
0 ........ =
o :
\ ---.
2 3 l \s... /\ =
\ ^
3
=
a 3
1 g s /
/ \
\
Na /
l
/ %
N_--',E E
- s i -
=
0 .2 E -
N
% / s % .s '
=_
m = .
..... N u .i :/. .
=
=
a
, .1
?
..........................g E
u 5
- =_
. O 5
f E u = =
a = =
=
i'''';'''' ''''i'''' ''''
lm 0.1
= .45 -,,,,
o : , , , 1 , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , _:
/g u : I\ :
a : I g I w .35 -
m a g m - -
- .I t - ,
u RI g : i l \,l \ ,#..-~. -
o s -
.N 2 .25 -
i _
. _ i _
a : i :
O
.15 i 3BE-FN1 -
- L. .. .. :
= : . . . . .. ,
E * -
O -
o .05 o -
= --
= _ ,.,,,,, ,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,, , i. , , , ,,,. .,. -
- s .0.05 0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 Time (Sec) x10 Figure A 5. Upper Compartment Gas Composition A6
4
,l ,,.I ,l ,,+) "'
$ l ,jjl
!i(
0, 8 % ,I I I f t p i{ e & 5 j! l 9 l 1 4 4 g 5 , ) { ! $ I 4 - 4 6 o il i,O !2 ! lg :
~ -% E 4
- "* I -
- " .5 =
= Eb * -
3 4
m E s E a E \ :
.- g :
- 4 -
s =
. o E s n 2
3BR-FR1 :
_ % o non.. E o -
- s s... ----
2 ' =
- .3 E-- s -
s ' -
1
=
a i
\s '
,, i
=
l i
I o .2
- = !
's*s. -,,
i
- m. : ~
! E
. o g E__ . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . " " " " " " " " " " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =. . . .
- u 2 - -- _
E h
1 i - E O
a :
- m. : :
a, : : ,
- :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,: 4 i
- o -0.1
! = .6 , , , , , , , , 1 , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , , l , , , , , , , , , I , , , , , , , , , l , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , , I , , , , . c t--
o -
i .- t kf% 5 a .5 Ev \\
4
]. - E \ E 4 : \
i 4 E- \ E o : \ :'
1 -
E s E
- o
- s :
i 2 .3 E-
\s 3BR.FR1* .
4:
., : s , -
a a
ws ,
's r 1
o .2 E- -
=
i =_. %g-- /a --
, m. :
! E ****""*********** ............... E E -
o .1 -, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
=
Q _
i :
- 0 :
o :
- a. = -
- m. : ....I, i :
- ... ..i ...ii.,i ii,iiiii, ....
i,ii,i, ,irii,ii, . i i i i i i ii i. 'r .-
D -0.1 -
1 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
} Time (Sec) x10 '
4 i
! Figure A.6. Upper Comp Gas Composition A-7
j j .85 .
=- ., ,.
i j 3 y
}-
! l .75 .
4 a ; =
u .65 =- -
l :
a .-
m
'55 3 ........
o
= ?
o A5 [ .
) -
.35 .-:-
= <
< ~ - - ~ . -
n 3 I,r\ s' -
= ;
f%'~"f
\
d
=
I l O 25 E-
=
\ -
1 I H 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ig , ,> ,1 gg j -
=
m '15 =- - ,
k l-- ,.- ~k)- I ll s
/ A 's =
u .05 3- .
=
. . =_
=
= " " ' ' ' '" " "- '" ' < ' " " ' -
= '
-0.05
.4 _. , , ,
7, y, ..;. .,,,, .......
i i _
2 :
=
o : il's ~ ~~s s ,
~
- i , __~~--- , -
u .3 -
E n I
" : i
- i _.
- I -
u .2 -
i
,......,..,n o .- . _
- s i, it.f 7 _
- 6 : .
-} E) ***............................................
n r1 a
e p : -
m 0
- f -
S : 3BE-FRF1 x :
i
, i. . ;. . !... . ... , .
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 4 i Time (Sec) x10 !
Figure A 7. IRWST Gas Composition A-8
.1 I
4 1 ,_
s
= /~s i e '9 * -
o =
=
. 1%
i I \
s 2 .
.8 i- ; \
i o g :
i n
=
= s 3BL-FN !
'7 l \ -
l
- 2. f E
IRwsT a 2 IRWST *.......
l g
s s
) g
- - IRWST 3 cam --
1 s g ,s % =
g s. s s o =
=
g j.,I s s
I *v ss 2 .5 ~p -. :
i 5
- ~,'
a s,,,,,-
> a 2
.4 i
e . +- 1
.o i_
I
.3 i- a H 2 s :
l m e o ;
y .2 - -
2 x g ,vg,. . . . . . : .:.u u u -<. . . ,
i
- .1 5- , .
.=
i
=
. s -
...........a.......................-.;
i . . ,
0
. .25 _
i 4
1 1 : ' -
- =
a _
4 o -
~ =
.2 --
t o
I is ,%,,--
- ,..,....,.j g r%-s,,, _____ .
1
- : i -
i,
- .15 r 8' _
, o :
Q..
4 4 e : ; .
M *$ b~ gI ..................f................ _
gI \ sg/
~
- e -
, : ~
a : 2 C .05 s 2 m : 3BE-FN1 5 0 5--
A M :
~
i 0.05 0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 Time (Sec) x10 Figure A . 8. IRWST Gas Composition A-9
1 g,,,,,,,,,,o niinjiniiniij E
iiui .jiini iiij iiiiiin g q uiiiiiig
, E
= .9 o
i-E -
, /
/ -i 5
E s E
- .8 g- fis~%- - -g
. n E I i
$ .7 l- taWST 8 2 11WST 0
/ 3BR-FR1 2 5 g E
~
o .6 g- I R W S T S hu m --
g -g_.
E I E o E g E 2 .5 ;- , -;
E I 5
.4 5- I -5=
= ;
.3 50s ,~~
5l
"~'# N H E E m El E 1
jg: 2 j
x =
.1 g...."""""",,-
-=
- o 5 " ' " " ' ' ' ' " I ' " ' " " # " ' g~ " " " g ' " " "" g " ' " " ' g ' " ' " =E -
1
,, ,uiji o u u njiiin uiiju nii nij u n u nijoiii n ;i4. p -cr g n u o u E
=
o
.9 E
[ (s%
/\ _
-j=
-. El % / E
~
- 8
=
+ L / 2 o
- 5:
E LI /
/ E E
- e. =I / =
m 7 l gT f 7E El s , ,, * % ' "/
~
o .6 is- -i El E
- O g g 2 .5 g- -g 8 E a .4 El- -E i g E
- o g E H
.3 g- 3BR-PRI. -i
" g E
.2 3- -5 i S B E
- M E
.1 -i E
, , , ,. ,_, L . . . "". .,. . . .,. ,,,,,, 7.* - ul.a s u u u h u uu _o h i , , i i i i i l i i , , , , , , 5 g
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A-9. IRWST Gas Composition A-10
. ~ . . _._ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ .. -_. _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ -.
.-_._.___._y 4
- o
.75 2,,,,,, .
. j'> >> '
- ,i......,,;. < >I ! i' '
i i . i =
' i
~
o
.65 E-E
-i E l
" i E =
2 m .55 t- 3BE-FRF1 I E Ef
=
' H ~
o E 2
- E- o i o .45 sham.....'=---- 3 I
E 2
= 35 e'A""",N i ,
' '~ ...- - -1
=
I= V N =
[
A~~L o 5 -:
.25 -
m I_ _
o : E_
o .15 _.=
m 5.......
L
- 'e,........,,,..............=' .= '* '*'
E
=
s .05 5-4 2 f._ i o -0.05 2,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,},,",ii.,}' 'iI,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,l
~
.,"> "I''==
.75
,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,i,,,,,,,,j,i,,,,iig i
o e :
=
.- 2 =
~
o
.65 E- -=
=
a i =
w E E m .55 E- -E E E o E i o .45 t,-
2 3 /g 3BE-FN1 E 35 A' \ 4
= _
v g =_
= i o
5 s
s
<ss,.- s' -
e,,,,,v -\ - - - - -
_E E
.25 -
=
5 :
o = =
- 15 5..............
i=
m g ..................................................... g
- 05 2 i r i
=
'*il' u ~
- il - I' ''I''' ,i''''I'''',- '=
- 0. 0 5r 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4
Time (Sec) x10 Figure A 10. CMT Floor Gas Composition A-11
J i
d
- 1
= 1.5 ,,,,;, ., ,,,,,,,,, ,,
l 4
o -
.....,,,I,. ....,I,,,,....,l,,,,,, ,I..
. i
, u -
1
! M -
~
3BE-FRF1 -
- o n -
' O ........
.- "o"" -
\
s... ----.
. 2 _ t l,
- \g :
= _ i - _
- l. c -
I t , II ' %s s g 4 t )i -* ~
l . .5 -
ti 11i \ \ , s~ -
j m -
sI l ; i e' -
i a -
I i -s l
_se8, -
o - -
a -, . ;,, f. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
....... 4.,
,,,o,,
e
> 0
- e 1.5 1
,t o _
o.,u,,,;,,,,,,,,, o ,, o i m p i o o i p o n o o p u o u o p o n o 't i
k M ~ _
! o - _
j m - -
4 1 (L - _
1 , -
4 o \
2 :- (, 3BE-FN1 l: m 4 -
g -
a -
g
, o -
g
- -~
s
- 5 - \- -
4 g in f- s _
i 8
" [ l j \ --
gl \
s,___
O -
0 j ..,
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Time (Sec) x10 Figure A.ll. Valve Vault Gas Composition A-12
15
. .........i.,mou,
,,,,,,.,,,m.,
i
..p .,o,. , ,
.,n,,,,,, ,,,.,, _
= : - :
w : .
10 L 2 5 : :
o 2 :
a 5 L .
2
- 2 THREE STAGE ADS :
o
! : r
" = =
" 0 A' --
-y
{
o -
.= : :
~
-5 -
o -
2 .
w -
' ' " " ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' i ' " " ' ' l ' ' ' ' " l " ' " " ' l ' " " " ' I ' ' " ' " I ' ' " ' " ' ! ' " ' ' " ~-
-10
= 40 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,n,,,,,;,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,uo;,,,,,,,o ,,,,,,,,,,,,o,,,,,,,o,ogE no 5 W 35 i- -5 E
=
THREE STAGE ADS i a E- =
5 30 i i
-* = =
. = =
25 g-w i i o = ,=
.o 20 5-w 3 E a i i o- 15 =- 7
=
. =
- i E-i 10 E 5 s E
~
o E 5 E- 4 w &
=
E
=
~ = ^
4 o 0 5 i o E ;
=
> i"" ""
-5 " ' ' " " ' ' " ' " ; " ' " " ' " ' 3" ' ' j3.5 ' ' " " " 4" ' " '4" j ' ' " ' "
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 '
Time (Sec) x10 Figure A 12. IRWST Gas Exchange Flow Rates A-13
1 1
15 .
o,,m,:
,pm.,,...;,o,o,on....o..p,,,.m.
,,,,,,,o, i
j
~
ta0 _
w -
1
- _ I n ~
o 10 -
a -
a : -
l
- 1 T
x : THREE STAGE ADS s 5 -
1 l A -
I v
O - -
% 0 e :
o : :
> ~
~ " " " " l " " " ' " l " " ' " " I " " ' " " I " " ' " " i " " ' " " i ' " " ' " l ' " " " " l " ' " " ' ~"
I-
-5 9
gm . . . m .
=
o......;o,,,,o, ou,,,o;,..o.,o;..o,,o;,,o.,,,, ,m..mo;,o.oog _
z-
=
1 8
= =:
." i THREE STAGE ADS i 7 e-w i_ i_
, 6 l- -j o- e E i
- m 1 1 m
5 r
- 9 :
se a 4 i- =:
o a E
> 3 a
=-
E a e -=-
4 2 E-m a e
=
1 =_
=.
=
= e~
=
i' l'"'""'l
""l'"" 'l"""1""""'I"'"'"I'""""
- 0 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 Time (Sec) x10 '
l Figure A 13. IRWST Gas Exchange Flow Rates A-14
oo w
25 ,o...,,
- ......i.. u n o
,, ,1 _
o , , , , m, m , , , , , . ,; , , , , . , , , , I , , o , :
e : :
y a 20 2-x 5
=.
- 2 15 -
3-x 3 _
m : :
10 7-THREE STAGE ADS i:
w : :
0 $ i- f oo : :
- = =
a = =
1 ? w 2 m
0
=
P E
=
s : :
O -5 g- i_:
4
- " " ' " ' ' ' ' ' " " ' ' " ' ' " " ' " ' ' " ' ' ' " ' ' " ' ' ' ' " ' ' " ' ' " " ' " ' " =
, -10
-- 15 ........ o.,oin ,,,,,,,,, i,,oin, ,,,,,,,,, ,,o ,i,,, ,,,o,,,, ino,,o n,o,,,.
w _
= THREE STAGE ADS s -
W -
7 y -
O _
! W 5 -
c:
o -
o 0
A Qg ,_ ,
a w -
, , i t
- . .....,,,,,,, ,,,:,,,,, ,s.......ri,i.,,i,,,,,,iii .. ,,,,,,;ii!4 .,,,,, . .-
-5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A 14. IRWST Gas Exchange Flow Rates A-15
l i l 50 _,,,,,, ,,,, ...., ,,,,,, ,,,,,,, !
. - I 00 2 -
w -
I
' S 0 1 i f :
t
- u. :
w 4
m -50 h 3BE-FRF1 i _
s y _ _.
a : :.
> -100 -
o : :
1, m -
'''''''''''''''''''''''''"''''''''I''''I''''''''''''~_
l
. -150 1
5 3, .., .
..i......is
,, g .,... jii.......,,,,,,,,,ii.,,,,,,,,,,,,,:,i,,,,i
- . = _ 5
% -5 ? .
-l =
w : 5
-15 i- -i5 i =
o 5
=
- -25 5-
!i-
-35 =i
.~ l: 3BE-FN1 -p N --
=
m -45 ;--
- =
~
-55 =
=
a -65 i- -2
> E i
=
u -75 g- 1_
> s 5
- = =
= -85 5- n
> i' 3 ,
'l''''j''''''''''''''l''''l'' .' 5
- 9 5' 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A 15. Valve Vault Exit Flow Rates A-16
2.5
...".,,,;,......;,,,,,,,,q,,,,,,,..p.m.., ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.q,,,,,,,,. _
w -
= -
A -
]
_. 1
- I _
U 2 - THREE STAGE ADS _7
_ i m -
J _
- F _
E -
o - _
u -
1.5 S _ l a _
D - _
l
.ie iI#t11til 11: 111Ill It Itillt 81,1164et : lisiItit slitiaiie it.,1.sai iii,ilii~
4,4iaaiil iilI4eii1 4iiili1ii ti1iiiiil l4iii!iiI 4l64ilI6i ilIi14iii ll,sieti! l,Ii1114i l M -
i
= _-
o 2 -
m - _.
g - -
n
\
~
e - _.
g o -
3BE-FRF1 _
w 1.5 _.
u _.
m - _
o -
.....!,,,....,,l,,,,,,,,l.....,,,l.,;,,,,,,li........I,iii,..!,,,iii..I,,,,,,,-
i 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A 16. Upper Compartment Pressure A-17
d M
h i
e i 3 .., . . . ., , , , , , ,,,
o 3,, ; ... ,,,. ..;, . ,
w -
)..
i a : :
a m -
.; 2.5 -
}
i 3BL-FN
= :
U _ _
! k ._ _
m _
g - -
I
- a _ _
e : : -
l O : :
!, o _
i a 1.5 -- -
4 a _ _
i o : :
4
,,.,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,.i,,,,,,,,iI,,,,,,,,,!,,,,,,,,,!,,,,,,,-
- 1 1 e j 2.5 ,,,,,,, , , , , , , , , , , , ,
i w -
- ce -
m _ _-
2 1
, a 2 - -
l 2 - -
i _ ~
a _ -
i E - -
! o -
3BE-FN1 -
!I o -
e i 1.5 _
, o _
a _
i a _
! o -
3 6 ,il
- a l ) t 0 l g
- ? ) , t 6 ,l ,l ;l
. ,l l , , l ,,;,,,l l f I I b
- i 8 1
i 0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 4
- Time (Sec) x10 i
i
- Figure A.17. Upper Compartment Pressure t
4 i A-18 1
4
. - _ - . . - .- -. =_ -_ _ - - - _ - - . . . - _ . . . _ --- .-.-
J 1
6 1 -
! 3.5 .... .. ,,,,,,,,, ,,,, .. ,;.
o ,,,. . . ...,,,,,,,,,, .,, ,
. n -
a _
m 3 : - -
l l
E o
3BR-FR1 E I
e o., 2.5 2 _
- c. :
i E : E
. o -
2
- u 2 1
, u - _
o : :
- o. : :
a- 1.5 2
4 4
o :
4 ,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I1
,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,_
3
'; 3.5 ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,
o 2 ,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,ji... ..,l,,,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,
g -
- Z n ..
m 3 : - -
i .
i a :
4 o _
u
' 2 s 2.5 -
- a. _
g -
i o : 3BR-FR1 :
u 2 _
u -
- c. : :
i -
2 I
1.5 --
4 o :
, .., .,, , ,,,,,,,,. ,,,,,,,,, i ....,,,iii .,,,,:,,1,,,,,,,iii,,,,,, ,, , ,,1 -
, 1
- 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2,5 3 3.5 4 Time (Sec) x10 '
1 Figure A - 18. Upper Compartment Pressure A-19 J
i 2 .
3 .,,,... ....,,,..,,,,, ,1, , ... ,,
s o ..,,.. ..i ,
s
- 1.9 l=-
=
-l
= =.
=
=
1.8 F
=
4= 1
\
. 2 1 i
m
. 1.7 F
=
THREE STAGE ADS 4 =
c g g
" 1.6 E-- =
m & E
. E E o
1.5 F s
-!E w
1.4 b a
I E
= _-
H 1.3 2- -j l 2
a 1.2 ig- '
i g l
= = i
= = <
l.1 5-
=
E
=
s ..,jii... iiil,iiiiiiiil i E g e. .. . i i,.. ... iiiii , iiiii.a 2.5 . iii , ... .
.......,,j., iiii,ij, . iii,li iiiiiiii ; .. .
o m
w : I m
= 2 --- -
o - -
6 -
k o -
o -
~
3BE-FRF1 h w _
1.5 -
H .
y -
U
, ,!,,,......li..,,,,,,!,,,i.... li,i,i,ii,lii ,,i 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Time (Sec) x10 Figure A.19. CMT Floor Pressure A-20
3 . ,,,, ,, ,,,,, , ;.., , ..., ,, ,..
i ,,.
o - ,
w :
m 2.5
}
o 3BL-FN i
~ :
m -
m 2 - _
o : :
o -
m :
s : :
,=,
4 1.5 .
E.
o :
.....,,,!,,,,,,,,ili,,,,,,,,li,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,;
2.5 -
O -,,,,,,,,,,,,,ii,iiii,,,,ii,,,,,i,,,,,,,,,,,,,!,,,,,,,,,-
w - _
m
= 2 -
u - _
w _ _
m - _
o -
3BE-FN1 _
w -
1.5 - -
H !
y -
U :
I g
= , ,. ,,l,,,,,,,,,l . ....,,!... .
..,l... ,,ii,!,,
-0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 Time (Sec) x10 Figure A 20. CMT Floor Pressure A-21
3.5 . ,.,,. _
o ....,,,, ,,,,,,,,i ,,,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,;,,,,, -
i : i -
< E 3 _
< 3 :_
7 A
4 3BR-FR1 -
i o :
- 2.5 -
2
- A
d i o .- _
i o 2 2
4 u., : :
i F 2 E 2 : :
U 1.5 -
- ,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,-
3 3.5 ,
.,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,_
o : I : 1
- l M -
_- \
< 3 :_ _- i m -
~
1 1
1
- I
<a -
o :
s
- 2.5 -
m m _
o -
~
o 2
3BR-FR1 r m -
F : :
2 : :
1.5 u --
,,,,,,,,li, ii ,,,li,,iii.,iliiiii,i,iliii.i. .iliiiiiiiiil,,i,i ii,Ii, >i, b 0 .5 l' l.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A 21. CMT Floor Pressure A-22
1 1
I 4
600 u n u n j u niu uluin u n joiniin j uin u n j u u u u q u ain uliin u n luin ui 4
l l
w E E
l
- . 550
- z_
- a. : : 1 1 E E E l
- 2 i
, F 500 -- THREE STAGE ADS ,
E I i : :
. : : i i
- E E l C 450 E- = 1
- a : :
! E [
5 ;
I 400 --
i: !
. : i l m : : :
. : : 1 I = 350 -
- = E =
o :
E l
300 Gillfill!llt!It11fl !!!ItIfIfit!lilllit Itliftlifiltil111IlilllllllillIIIIItillitillllll% '
1 j 600 u n u ulu u ni n jin u u n join u ulu u n nijin uu n j u u n u.p u u u u j o uu n :
4 w E E
. 550 :- i
- a. : :
i 8 E E i e : E 1 H 500 E- =
=.
=
a : :
O i
450 --
i _
- = E \ 3BE-FRF1 E a : :
i 0 400 - 4
- E E
- $. 350 _
a : :
D E E_
-lien t oln n ninln n n n flu n nininin n nit n n n nin o n nilt u n n nInin ni+
300 1 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.f 3 3.5 4 4.5 4
Time (Sec) x10 i 4 l Figste A-22. Upper Comp Gas Temperature A-23 4
i t
450 g,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,_
l l
w _
m _ _
i e
'BL-FN -
< F 400 _
= - Q -
4 .
. s b
\ _
b
~
a -
4 o 350 -
i a _
3 _
'''I''''I''''I''''I''''I''''-
300 550 a,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,. -
w E E
l
- d. 500 -
a : -
o : _
s :
450 E-- !
o E
= E 3BE-FN1 ,
E a 400 --
(
o : :
U : :
w : :
a 350 - 7 m : _
m : _
- 3 : :
=
''''I''''I''''l''''l''''l'''"~
300
-0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 Time (Sec) x10 '
Figure A-23. Upper Comp Oss Temperature A-24
i i
j 600 i n i,iiiliiiii u n li n n u iiIii o i u iiliiiiiiiiilii n i n iiIi n iiiiiili,,,,,, .. -
1 w -
a i 550 -
, e :
l [ 3BR-PRI j_
- . 500 z _
< a -
o :
E 450 -
o :
o :
m _
o 400 z
- a. :
'""'"I'""""I""'""'"","_""'"'"""'"""'"I'""'"~ '
350 600 ,uniujouninjinuinijuoniiijuniniijiiiiniiijinitiiii;iiiion M -
4 550 -
a :
o :
s :
. 500 -
a :
O :
- 3BR-FR1 :
a 450 --
o :
o :
- : i e
m.
400 -
- m. :
o :
350
"'"'"'""''""""'"'""I:" l 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 l Time (Sec) x10 '
Pigure A 24. Upper Comp Gas Temperature A-25
1 400 ,,,,,,,, ..... ... ,,,...,,,
j 3 ...,, ..i. ,,,,,,, , ,
g s a w 390 }-
1
- E 1
=
380 b -i i
i n. a a
'=
i H
! 370 --
-j
=
i i i !
360 i- =
. e = ,
s !
i o 350 F 3 1:
l I "
340 !-
s -
-Ia ;
o a a
! E 330 F THREE STAGE ADS i
?
E 320 i- E ,
i 2 i
=
i
=
u 310 p _g ;
' = =
i'''l''''l''''l''''l''''t'' 'I'''E 1 300 !
. 500 3,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,
t i w _
- m. _ _
! E -
~ ~
! g 450 - -
o 4
o 3BE-FRF1 : l
. ~
( ~
. . 400 --
g -
1 )
! H _
)
j 2 [ [ '
u _
1 i
~
t i t
- 1 e er ,e i f Iat it i I t e i I ,t isiiei,I I I , , i 1 , I e it t I I I I te l i
- 4 t e I O .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 .
j 4 Time (Sec) x10
- l l
i 4 1 l
i Figure A-25. CMT Floor Gas Temperature i 1
4 A-26 i i
1
. i
J l
400 2,...... , , , , , ,
- ; ,,i,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , ,
2 _
i e
M -
I o.
390 -
2 e :
- a : 3BL-FN E
, s :
I
, 380 -
z
- a -
1
, o : :
4 w _
! o 370 -- 2 1 i o :
1
- u. :
Is -
F i 360 _- Z 2 -
l 1
u :
2 4
"'''I''''I''''I''''I''''I'''~
s 350
- 500 ... ..
- _,,,,,,,,,;..... .. ,l,,,,,,,,,ji.. . .. ;,,,,,,,,,_
4
- w 1 m. _ _ l l e - -
l l [ 450 h i _
us - _
j o -
3BE-FN1 -
3>
. 400 .- -
w
(
i H -
\ Lmt. :
- y _
q - - - _ _
j u _
t 9 t ,I I l 3 4 1 3 5 ,I i l 1 1 1 ,1 6 3 i i! I I l I l 8 ' l I I I I l l 1 % ' ' I I I 350 l -0.5 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5
, 4
- Time (Sec) x10 i
4 l Figure A 26. CMT Floor Gas Temperature i
k
- A-27 4
l 500 _
o,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,,,,,,,,I,,.....,,,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,:
i i
. w _
! d- -
i e _
450 -
3BR-FR1 -
F -
l 4 . _
- a _
- o -
l C
~
. 400 --
l
- w _ .
- 2 -
- u _ :
"I""I""'I'""I"'I'""'I""'I'
350 500 u i . .
- ,l,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,j,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,o,,l,,,,,,.,,;oi,,,,,,
. w :
. a _ _
- e - -
~
[ 450 - -
j N _
o - _
- - 3BR-FR1 -
! o i
. 400 - -
m i -
t
! H 2 -
U _ _-
l' 350 O .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 4
- Time (Sec) x10 1
i Figure A-27. CMT Floor Gas Temperature I
A-28
4 1
4 k
APPENDIX B 1
t, 1
1 Heat Transfer Models for Equipment and I Penonnel Hatches and Electrical Penetrations l l
4 l
l I
l i
I l
B-1
B.1 Equipment and Personnel Hatches The model to evaluate radiative heating onto the equipment and personnel hatches due to standing diffusion flames at the south opening in the CMT room is depicted in Figure B-1. The hatch wall, which is also part of the containment boundary, receives radiation heat fluxes from flames on one side and loses heat by radiation and natural convection on the other side. The hatch wall is assumed to be a flat 4 cm (1.6 in) thick circular disk subject to the same level of radiation fluxes to the hot spot. Hence, the calculated hatch wall temperature will be the hot-spot temperature. Air, trapped within the hatch enclosure bounded by the hatch wall and the door in the auxiliary building, would be heated by the hatch wall. This air loses heat to the colder structures including the door on the auxiliary building side and approximately the portion of the enclosure wall lying beyond the containment shell line. This portion of the 5sure is not directly subject to any heating processes inside the containment. The length of tnis portion is indicated by W in Figure B-1. This portion and the door on the auxiliary building side is assumed to be 4 cm (1.6 in) thick steel. Dese combined masses constitute relatively large heat sinks such that heat losses from them can be neglected in these transient calculations.
The model described above can be written into three ordinary differential equations governing the behavior of the hatch wall temperature (T,), the enclosure air temperature (T.), and the temperature of the lumped heat sinks (T,) as follows d p,c, dT' = ql(Ty ,T,,F) - h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) 'a{T'*-T,*)
, , (B-1)
-I +-
b' )
1+ ,H '
L p,c, dT* = h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) - h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) 1 + gw' H g,
AXp,c, dT* = a{T'*-T) + h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) (B-3) dt f 1 -l+i s, e, g 1 + 4W' H,
ne same initial conditions as specified for the containment shell assessment (T, = 390 K (242*F); T = 360 K (188'F); T, = 330 K (134*F) are also applied here. Rese equations can be applied to both the equipment hatch and the personnel hatch. The only differences are geometric parameters d, L, H, AX, and W. Values for these parameters for each hatch are shown in Figure B-1.
B-2
Containment p Wall
+-W*
o Radiation 4
Radiation
- Natural 1 330 K
- Convection i;
& J H Auxiliary Building's Staging Area d : L : - AX u
Personnel Hatch Equipment Hatch d = 0.04 m d = 0.04 m L = 4.4 m L = 3.4 m H = 1.8 m H = 4.5 m AX = 0.04 m AX = 0.04 m W = 3.0 m W = 1.0 m WL96J149.CDR 84 98 Figure B-1 Model for equipment and personnel hatches.
B-3
B.2 Electrical Penetration Boxes l De model to evaluate radiative heating onto the electrical penetration boxes due to standing flames at the north opening in the CMT room is depicted in Figure B-2. The whole box is inside the containment with the back end connected to the containment shell. The front wall of the box is assumed a 6 mm (0.25 in) thick circular plate made of steel. The front wall receives radiation heat fluxes from the flames on one side and loses heat to air inside the box by natural convection and to other parts of the box by radiation. The penetration box is relatively small compared to the flame height, its elevation is also fixed. This elevation does not necessarily correspond to one half flame height which is the height where hot spot occurs. However, we 1 will assume that the box's front wall always receives heat fluxes at the same level as at the hot spot regardless of the change in flame height. Therefore, very conservative radiation heat fluxes are used here. Radiation heat loss from die front wall is assumed to be limited to only the back cnd of the box with the same area.
Air inside the box may also be heated by horizontal side walls of the box which are inside the containment. The back end of the box may also be heated by conduction from the adjacent containment shell that is heated by the same flames. Since we already calculate the containment shell temperature separately, we can assume that the back end of the box is at the same temperature as the containment shell hot spot. This is another conservative assumption. In order to calculate heating of air by the side walls, we assume that the side wall temperature is approximated by an average of the front wall temperature and the containment shell hot-spot temperature.
The model described above can be written into two ordinary differential equations governing the behavior of the front wall temperature (T ) and the temperature of air in the box (T,) as fol:ows:
d p,c, dT* = ql(Ty ,T,,F) - h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) ,a {T** - T**) (B-4)
- !,+ -
r *s *s
- @g L p,c, dT* = h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) - h,(T,,T,) (T, - T,) Al
' ' A (B-5)
+h a ' T* + T* ' T* + T' -T* 1 t 2
- T', s 2 ,A i l
l l
B-4
i i
~
- i i
i l Containment Wall l Circular Front Wall
- L : - AL ~
u .
gRadiation m
Flame e Radiation e H
, 0.3 m ~_)
d- +- D "
" A Natural \
F/ Convection
\
Cylindrical Side Wall d=6mm L=0.6m H = 0.9 m AL = 0.3 m WL9&J151.COM 7 29-96 Figure B-2 Schematic of heat transfer model for electrical penetration box.
B-5
where
. h(T - T,) { T,>T, for connctive heating pom containment gas l
- fu " h,($,,T,MT,-T,) ' ( T,<T, for connctin cooldown when share is no fame T, = CMT room gas temperature (500 K for heating and 420 K for zero-flame i cooldown are conservatively assumed) h 2
= heat transfer coefficient (assumed value of 3.1 W/m *K) i T, = calculated containment shell hot-spot temperature i
At = wH2 4
A2 =
1
{ (0.5H)2 i
)
A3 = rHL 1
h The initial conditions consistent with the values in the neighborhood of 390 K as used for containment shell and hatches are assumed:
at t = 0 , T, = 390 K (B-6)
T, = 389 K i T, = 388 K j In practice, it is much more convenient to use the c&lainment shell hot-spot temperatures ,
averaged over each flame ~ height duration. His strafegy is adopted here. The necessary geometric parameters (d, H, L) for the calculation are shown in Figure B-2.
B.3 Solution Technique ne transient heat-up calculations were performed for the six consecutive intervals used to characteri::e the standing diffusion flame at each valve vault exit. The flame height is held constant for each duration. Each interval has a different flame height. The first interval uses the initial conditions described above. The second interval uses the end values of the first interval as initial conditions. Similarly, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth intervals use the end values of the immediately preceding interval as initial conditions.
B-6