ML20153F483
| ML20153F483 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1998 |
| From: | Kapoor A WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153F439 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-13795, WCAP-13795-01, WCAP-13795-1, NUDOCS 9809290143 | |
| Download: ML20153F483 (69) | |
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~. _ -.. - -. -. - ....-..~ - -...~.--.-_..-.---- -.-_-,-.-_ i s l g g, CMKIMW! WCAP 13795 I O a i i 1 1 i k i AP600 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 4 ) E](C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 192.} A heense is reserved to the U.S. Govemment under contract DE AC03-90sFtS495. GOVERNMENT LIMITED RIGHTS: 4 (A) These data are submitted wth bmhed rights under Govemment Contract No. DE Ac03-90sFt8495 These data may be reproduced and used j by the Govemment uth the express lenttabon that they mil not, ethout wntten pomusseon of the Contractor, be used for purposes of manufacturer nor declosed outside the Govemment except that the Govemment may dsclose these data outside the Govemment for the follomng purposes, if any, provided that the Govemment makes such declosure subject to prohibibon against further use and disdosure: 4 (I) TNs 'propnetary data
- may be disdosed for evaluaton purposes under the restnctes above.
(11) The 'propnetary data' may be disclosed to the Electne Power Research institute (EPRI). electne ut hty representabves and their drect consultants, excludng droc. commercial compettors, and the DOE Nabonal Laboratones under the proNbibons and restnchons above. (B) TNs notco shall be marked on any reproduchon of these data, in whole or in part. O WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 (NON PROPRIETARY) j EPRI CONFIDENTIAUOBLIGATION NOTICES: NOTICE: tO 20 3 E4 Os O CATEGORY: A EB DC OOOE OF 0 i O DOE CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DELIVERED DATA) subject to specified excephons, disclosure of this data is restncted until September 30,1995 or Des #gn Certficate under DOE contract DE AC03-90SF18495, whichever is later. j Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit Nuclear And Advanced Technology Division P.O. Box 355 q Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 4 i C 1993 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Reserved l 4 I 1 4 i 1 s 4 4 4 4 2 i 1 1 AP600 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS d .i 4 4 i 1 Anoop Kapoor 4 f i 4 1 1 . W l TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
......................................... 5 2.0 METHODOLOGY FOR UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS..................
5 3.0 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 6
3.1 Definition of Plant Damage States........................... 7 3.2 Data Base for Failum Probabilities and Frequencies................
7 3.3 Uncenainty Distribution for Plant Damage States 8
3.4 Dominant Initiating Event Categories......................... 9 3.5 Dominant Basic Events
................................10 3.6 Uncertainty Imponance by Initiating Events and Basic Events.......... I1 4.0
SUMMARY
AND CONC LUSIONS.............................
12 REFERENCES
.....................................66 4
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2 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3-1:
Uncertainty Distribu tion for Plant Damage S tates................................ 14 (I-A, I-B. and III-BE)
Figure 3-2:
Uncert y Distribution for Plan t Damage S tates................................. 15 (III-BR, III-C, and ID-D)
Figure 3-3:
Uncertainty Distribu tion for Plant Damage States................................. 16 (All Plant Damage States)
J l
1 1
4
_ - +
3 LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1: Definition of Plant Damage States..........................
17 Table 3-2: Distribution of Failure Probabilities and Frequencies of Basic and Initiating Events...
...................................18 Table 3-3: Plant Damage State Pmquencies and Uncertainties................
29 Table 3-4: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State I-A..........
30 Table 3-5: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State I-AP.........
31 Table 3-6: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State E-BE........
32 Table 3-7: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State E-BR........
33 Table 3-8: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State E-C.........
34 Table 3-9: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Plant Damage State E-D.........
35 Table 3-10: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-A.........
36 Table 3-11: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-AP........
37 Table 3-12: Risk Reduction by Basic Event for Plant Damage State E-BE........
38 Table 3-13: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State E-BR.......
39 Table 3-14: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State E-C........
41 Table 3-15: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State E-D........
42 Table 3-16: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State I-A..
43 Table 3-17: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State I-AP.
44 Table 3-18: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State m-BE................................................
45 Table 3-19: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State M-BR.
46 Table 3-20: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State E-C.
47 Table 3-21: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State E-D.
48 Table 3-22: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-A....
49 Table 3-23: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-AP...
50 Table 3-24: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Event for Plant Damage State M-BE....
51 Table 3-25: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State E-BR..
53
4 Table 3-26: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Event for Plant Damage State m-C...
55 Table 3-27: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State E-D...
56 Table 3-28: Contribution ofInitiating Events to Core Damage Frequency........58 Table 3-29: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Core Damage Frequency........
59 Table 3-30: Uncertainty Imponance by Initiating Events for Core Damage Frequency.
62 4
Table 3-31: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Core Damage Frequency...
63
l 5
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l Uncenainty analysis is a simulation methodology to perform repeated evaluations of the top event using Monte Carlo technique or Latin Hypercube Sampling. The samplhig results are then used to compute various estimators for the occurrence of the top event. The estunators typically include the mean, median, and quantiles (e.g., 5 percentile, 25 percentile, 75 percentile, 95 percentile, etc.). Such distributions am obtained for various plant damage states l
for the AP600 level 1 PRA. Additionally, the contributions to core damage from various
{
initiating events are also obtained in terms of distribution rather than a point estimate or mean.
Finally, various plots of the frequency distributions for all plant damage states and the core damage frequency are provided.
2.0 METHODOLOGY FOR UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 1
In order to perform the uncertainty analysis, the Westinghouse uncertainty analysis code WUNCERT (Reference 10) is used. The code consists ofI.atin Hypercube Sampling (WLHS) and Top Event Matrix Analysis Code (WTEMAC) and the Westinghouse Risk Code (WRISK).
The level 1 PRA fault tree and core damage frequency output files containing the information of the initiating events and minimal cut sets are used as input files. In addition, a data base file called WUNCERT.DB is also used containmg the uncertainty distribution information for all the basic and initiating events. A list file AP600.LST containing the list of all the input files is used for running the code in batch mode. These files are then processed using the uncertainty code. The input files are processed by WRISK to prepare the input files for WLHS and WTEMAC in the required format. For example, WLHS require,s.001 and.999 quantiles to be provided as input for all the basic events. WRISK makes those computations based on the distributions and parameters of the basic and initiating events.
l
6 The Latin Hypecube Sampling is a constrained sampling technique used to produce samples carresponding to a given distribution and parameters. %TEMAC is a code for estimating risk and perfonning unceitainty and sensitivity analyses with a Boolean expression.
WRISK is used to produce the Boolean expressions and oth:r intermediate files for further processing.
i WUNCERT is used to generate the probability distribution of plant damage states and the core damage frequency. These distributions are then plotted. A table is prepared to provide a summary of the distribution of the various plant damage states. The tables include parameters like mean, median and 90% confidence intervals. The contribution of various initiating and basic events is tabulated in terms of the uncertainty intervals. Finally, an analysis is performed for the uncertainty importance for the various events. The uncertainty importance provides the information of the relative impact on the variance of the top event by the distributions of various initiating and basic events.
3.0 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS In this section, the discussion and results of the uncertainty analysis are provided. The plant damage states which provide any significant contribution to various release categories are defined in Section 3.1. This is followed by establishing a data base for failure probabilities and frequencies in Section 3.2. The uncertainty distributions of various plant damage states are evaluated and discussed in Section 3.3. The contribution from the dominant initiating event categories is computed in terms of uncertainty intervals are outiined in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the risk reduction by various basic events is discussed. The uncertainty importance, a measure of contribution to vanance of the top event by various initiating and basic events is discussed in Section 3.6.
7 3.1 Definition of Plant Damage States Based on the analysis performed for Westinghouse AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (References 1 and 2), six plant damage states are the main contributors to various release categories. The six plant damage states (PDS) are as follows:
- 1. PDS I-A
- 2. PDS I-AP
- 3. PDS m-BE
- 4. PDS m-BR
- 5. PDS m-C
- 6. PDS m-D A description of the above plant damage states is provided in Table 3-1. For example, the PDS m-BR is a state of core damage following LOCA or other events with full RCS depmssurization, but CMT and accumulator failed. Each of the plant damr3 tates consists of a multitude of minimal cut sets leading to the damage state. A typical cut L..:onsists of an initiating event as the first element followed by various basic events (operator avdons, component failums, etc.).
3.2 Data Base for Fallure Probabilities and Frequencies i
In order to perform the uncertainty analysis the distributions of all the initiating and basic events contained in the minimal cut sets of various plant damage states are mquired. Various soumes are used to de: ermine such distributions, which include Refemaces 1 through 9.
A listing of all event i.d.s, their descriptions, the parameters of distributions and sources are provided in Table 3-2. For example, the event i.d. ATW-MANO3 defines the operator failure to trip reactor by de-energizing the M/G sets. The Reference 1, Appendix D provides the parameters of distribution. Here, the mean and vanance have been used to derme the lognormal i
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8 distribution. This is done for the sake of compatibility with the input mquimments of the codes used in the analysis. Similarly, other events are defined in Table 3-2.
l 3.3 Uncertainty Distribution for Plant Damage States l
At the conclusion of uncenainty analysis, a distribution of the plant damage state ammal frequencies is determined. The output of the WTEMAC segment of Westinghouse uncenainty analysis code WUNCERT code for the distribution of plant damage state provides a discrete distribution. Based on the discrete distribution, the mean, 5 percentile, 95 percentile, and median are estimated. A large sample size (500 for each basic and initiating event) is used. This results in the sample mean for the plant damage state in close agreement with the true mean.
The results of uncertainty distributions for the plant damage states are presented in Table 3-3.
The plant damage states E-BE, and E-BR appear to have larger frequencies (1.5E-07 and 1.7E-
- 07) than plant damage states I-A,1-AP, E-C, and E-D (6.5 E-08, 5.5E-08, 7.6E-08, and 7.3E-08 respectively). The uncenainty intervals vary significantly from one plant damage state to the other. For example, for plant damage state I-A the median is 2.6E-09 per year, and the 5/95 percentile uncenainty interval is [7.3E-11,1.4E-07]; while for the plant damage state E-D the median is 7.3E-07 per year and 5/95 percentile uncenainty interval is [1.9E-08, 7.3E-07]. The mean for both plant damage states, however, are 6.5E-08 and 7.3E-08 respectively, which are relatively close to each other. The AP600 core damage frequency (CDF) is 3.3E-07 per year with 5 and 95 percentiles uncenainty interval as [1.9E-08,7.3E-07].
Histograms were prepared for each of the plant damage states described above. An effort was made to establish the underlying distribution for various plant damage states. Commercially available Statgtuphics sc ftware was used to aid the curve fitting process. The fitted curves were compared with the histograms. Once it was estab!ished that the fitted curves closely resemble the histograms, the curve depicting the probability density function was plotted. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the probability density functions for various plant damage states. Figure 3-3 shows
l 9
l all the damage states in one plot. Even though this figure is busy, it was included to provide l
an overview of all the plant damage states.
3.4 Dominant Initiating Event Categories In this section, an effort is made to determine which initiating event frequencies are responsible for the major numerical portion of the frequencies of the various plant damage states.
The contributions fmm various initiating event frequencies are computed and tabulated in Tables 3-4 through 3-9. An individual table is prepared for each plant damage state.
For plant damage state I-A the major contributors for the frequencies of occurrence am turbine / reactor trip / L. RCS flow initiating event IEV 'IT and loss of feed water to steam generator initiating event (IEV-TF). In fact, these two initiating events contribute more than 90% of the total frequency fer release category I-A.
Each of the other initiating events contributes less than 5% for.he plant damage state I-A.
The Table 3-4 lists all these contributions. 'Ihis table also lists the uncertainty intervals for the contributions of various initiating events. For example, the mean contribution for initiating event IEV-TS (spurious S-signal initiating event) is 2.3E-09 per year. The 5 and 95 percentiles for the contribution by this initiating event are 7.5E-13 and 3.6E-09 respectively.
More than two-thirds of the frequency of plant damage state I-AP is contributed by the passive RHR tube rupture initiating event (IEV-S2P). The least contribution for this plant damage state is from the initiating event IEV-S2S (very small LOCA initiating event). Its contribution is 5.0E-09 per year with 5 and 95 percentile uncertainty intervals as [2.0E-II, 1.3E-08). Refer to Table 3-5 for more details.
For plant damage state III-BE (core damage following large LOCAs or other event with full depressurization), more than 85 % of the contribution is from the initiating events IEV-SIS (safety injection line break), IEV-S2P (passive RHR tube rupture), and IEV-A (large LOCA
10 initiatmg event). Each of the other initiating events contributes less than 5% to plant damage state m-BE. Refer to Table 3-6 for details on the uncertainty intervals for the contributions of j
various initiating events leading to plant damage state E-BE.
i For plant damage state E-BR, more than 90% of contribution is from initiating events EV-SIS, EV-S2P, EV-S2, and EV-A. Table 3-7 provides more details. There are two major initiating event contributors to plant damage state E-C (Core damage following vessel rupture).
These events are EV-TFA (loss of feedwater without scram) and EV-VR (vessel rupture
{
initiating event). Refer to the Table 3-8 for more details including the summary of the uncertainty intervals for the contributions of the two initiating events.
Finally, Table 3-9 summarizes the contributions from various initiating events to plant damage state E-D. The major contributors are: EV-S2P (Passive RHR ube rupture initiating event) and EV-T (Turbine / reactor trip / L. RCS flow initiating event). These two initiating events contribute more than 75% to the plant damage state E-D. Table 3-28 provides the contribution of initiating events to core damage frequency.
3.5 Dominant Basic Events The fm p;ency of occurrence of top events, i.e., the plant damage states depends on the frequency of occurrence of the initiating events and basic events included in the minimal cut sets for the plant damage state. The risk reduction by a basic event is defined as the reduction in the frequency of the top event if the probability of that basic event can be forced to zero. For example, if a basic event is defined as " operator fails to trip reactor by de-energizing the M/G set", then the risk reduction for this basic event is obtained by reducing the probability of operator failure to zero; and then evaluating the reduction in the occurrence of frequency of the top event. In this section the dominant basic events contributing to various plant damage states are discussed. The uncertainty intervals for the risk reduction will also be computed and tabulated.
11 Table 3-10 summarizes the risk reduction by basic events for plant damage state I-A.
It is observed that main contributors to the risk are common cause failures like CCX-DAS (common cause failure within DAS and DIS), and CCX-40EAI (M40, EAI cards CCF: 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> test), etc. The uncertainty interval for the risk reduction can be very wide. For example the risk reduction by the basic event CCX-DAS is 5.lE-08 per year for the plant damage state I-A.
The uncertainty interval for the risk reduction is [3.4E-11,1.3E-07]. Refer to Table 3-10 for a summary of risk reduction and the corresponding 5 and 95 percentile uncertainty intervals.
1 The risk reduction by basic events of other plant damage states are summarized in Tables 3-11 through 3-15. These tables also summarize the 5 and 95 percentile uncertainty intervals for the risk reduction. Refer to Table 3-29 for a summary of risk reduction by basic events for core damage frequency.
3.6 Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events and Basic Events The uncertainty in the estimates of the initiating event frequencies and basic event probabilities results in the uncertainty of the estimates of occurrence of plant damage states. The uncertainty or variance of the top event (plant damage state) can be reduced by reducing the uncertainty associated with the initiating and basic events. The uncertainty importance for an initiating event is a measure of the expected reduction in the variance or uncertainty of top event due to ascertaining the value of the initiating event under consideration. The same definition of uncertainty importance is applicable to the uncertainty importance of basic events.
Tables 3-16 through 3-21 summarize the results of uncertainty importance computations by initiating events for various plant damage states. These tables also provide average percentage reduction of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual petrentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event. The tables also provide the percentage changes in the variance of the top event frequencies taken at the minimum and maximum values of initiating
12 events. Similarly Tables 3-22 thmugh 3-27 summarize the results of the uncertainty importance by basic events for various plant damage states. For example, the average percentage reduction by the initiating event IEV-SIS for plant damage state III-BR is 35.4%. The uncertainty importance for IEV-SIS (safety injection line break initiating event) is 1.5E-07. This provides a measure of the expected reduction in the frequency of occurrence of plant damage state III-BR due to ascertaining the value of the initiating event IEV-SIS. The percentage change in the variance of top event frequency taken at minimum and maximum values of the initiating event IEV-SIS is -54.5 and 20007.6 respectively. Refer to Tables 3-16 through 3-27 for more details of uncenainty importance analysis of other events for various plant damage states. Tables 3-30 and 3-31 summarize the uncertainty importance by initiating and basic events for core damage frequency.
4.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS The uncertainty analysis is able to provide not only the mean values for the frequency, but the associated uncertainty intervals as well. For example, the AP600 mean core damage frequency is 3.3E-07 per year and associated 5 and 95 percentile uncertainty interval is [1.9E-08,7.3E-07]. The failure rates of the components, human error probabilities and initiating event frequencies are not cast in concrete and almost always have a certain degree of uncertainty associated with those. The uncertainty analysis is able to propagate these uncertainties to the top event (core damage frequency, plant damage states) and pmvide the uncertainty intervals for the occurrence of top events. Such information is of value to the decision maker. The uncertainty importance analysis pmvides information of those components, human ermrs, common cause failures, and initiating events, that contribute significantly to the variance or uncertainty of the top event. For example, for the plant damage state III-BE, the basic event IWX-CV-AO (common cause failure of gravity injection check valves to open: 8 of 8) is the main contributor to the uncertainty of this plant damage state. The average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known with certainty is more than 60% in this case. If with more
_. _ _. ~
13 testing and data the uncertainty interval for the this failure is reduced, the uncertainty for the occurrence of the plant damage state III-BE can be significantly reduced.
It should be noted that the mnking of initiating or basic events' contdbution based on the mean values some times may be different than the ranking based on the uncertainty importance.
If a component or initiating event has a very high vanance associated with its distdbution, it may show higher up based on the uncertainty importance ranking as compared to the rankmgs based on the mean values. During the decision making process, both the rankings must be considered to reduce the risk of plant operation based on the mean values as well as the tail end frequencies.
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t 17 Table 3-1: Definition of Plant Damage States No.
Plant Damage State Description 1.
I-A Core damage with reactor coolant system at high pressure following transient or very small LOCA.
2.
I-AP Core damage following small LOCA and very small LOCA with no depressurization but with passive residual heat removal operating.
3.
M -BE Core damage following large LOCAs or other event with full depressurization.
4.
m-BR Core damage following LOCA or other events with full RCS depressurization, but CMT and accumulator failed.
l 5.
m-C Core damage following vessel rupture.
l 6.
m-D Core damage following LOCA (except large) with partial depressurization.
4
i 18 Table 3-2: Distribution of Failure Probabilities and Frequencies of Basic and Initiating Events No.
EVENT I.D.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TYPE OF SOURCES PARAMETERS OF DISTRI-DISTRIBUTION" 2' BUTION PARAMI PARAM2 1.
ATW-MANO3 Operator fails to trip reactor by Imgnormal Ref. I, App. D, 1.53E-02 1.43E-03 de-energizing the M/G sets E.F. = 10 p.17
[
2.
CCX-03XTS M03, XTS boards CCF Iognormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.80E-05 2.30E-08 (Monthly tested)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 3.
CCX-19-SA M19 boanis CCF (Monthly test)
Imgnormal Ref.1, App.,E, 1.10E-05 8.58E-09 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 l
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CCX-19-YA M19 boards CCF (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> Iognormal Ref.1, App. E, 3.00E-06 6.38E-10 f
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E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 5.
CCX-40EAI M40, EAI cards CCF (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> Iognormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.40E-05 1.39E-08 f
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E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 1
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CCX-4828M M48, M28 boards CCF Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.50E-05 1.59E-08 (Monthly test)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 7.
CCX-51EHX M51, EHX boards CCF (84 Lognormal Ref.1, App. E, 5.30E-06 1.99E-09 I
hours test)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51
{
8.
CCX-AV-LA Common Cause Failure of four Imr, normal Ref.1, App. E, 6.20E-05 2.72E-07 AOVS to op:n E.F. = 30
- p. PE-50 9.
CCX-BY-PN Common Cause Failure of Imgnormal CMTOT.WLK 3.90E-05 1.08E-07 battery E.F. = 30 10.
CCX-DAS CCF within DAS and DlS Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.00E-03 7.09E-05 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 11.
CCX-DU-SA DLU board CCF Lognormal Ref.1, App. E, 7.30E-05 3.78E-07 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 12.
CCX-EEMM12 IEEE bus, MDM, M12 boards Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 3.20E-06 7.26E-10 CCF (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> test)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 13.
CCX-EP-SA CCF to operate the EPO boards Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 4.40E-06 1.37E-09 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 j
.20 14.
CCX-ESF M56, ERX cards CCF (Monthly Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.20E-05 1.02E-08
]
test)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 15.
CCX-FU-RQ Common cause of fuse Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 2.80E-07 5.56E-12 disconnect switches to open E.F. = 30
- p. PE-44 spuriously 16.
CCX-HARDI IEEE bus, M51, EHX, MDM, Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 3.30E-05 7.72E-08 M12 boards CCF (Monthly E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 Test) 17.
CCX-PW-SA EPC power converter CCF Imgnormal.
Ref.1, App. E, 7.20E-06 3.67E-09 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 18.
CCX-SFTW Software CCF within all cards Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.20E-06 1.02E-10 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 i
19.
CCX-TF-UF CCF of temperature Lognormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.40E-04 1.39E-06 transimitterw continuously E.F. = 30
- p. PE-46 interfacing high tempr.
20.
CCX-XMTR CCF of safety tmnsmitters Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 2.40E-04 4.08E-06 continuously interfacing high E.F. = 30
- p. PE-45 pressure i
l
21 21.
CCX-XMTR195 CCF of pressurizer level Iognormal Ref.1, App. E, 2.10E-06 3.13E-10 transmitters E.F. = 30
- p. PE-51 22.
DAS Unavailability goal for DAS Imgnormal Ref.2 9.00E-03 5.74E-03 E.F. = 30 23.
DIS Unavailability goal for DIS Lognormal Ref.2 9.00E-03 5.74E-03 E.F. = 30 24.
ECIBS00lTM Unavailablity of bus ECS ES 1 legnormal Ref.3, 2.70E-03 4.44E-05 due to unscheduled maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 25.
EC2BS002TM Unavailablity of bus ECS ES 2 Lognormal Ref.3, 2.70E-03 4.44E-05 due to unscheduled maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 26.
ECX-CB-GO Common cause failure of 4KV Legnonnal Ref.1, App. E, 5.50E-04 2.14E-05 breakers to open E.F. = 30
- p. PE-50 27.
ED3BS00lTM Distribution' panel unavailable Lognormal Ref.3, 3.00E-04 5.48E-07 dur to test or corr. maintenace E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 l
28.
ED3 MOD 03 Battery dbl unavailable Iognormal CMTOT.WLK 2.70E-03 4.44E-05 E. F. = 10 t
i i
2' 29.
IDABSDS2TM Bus unavailable due to test or IAgnormal Ref.3, 3.00E-04 5.48E-07 corrective maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 30.
IDBBSDS2TM Bus unavailable due to test or IAgnormal Ref.3, 3.00E-04 5.48E-07 corrective maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 31.
IDCBSDS2TM Bus unavailable due to test or Iognormal Ref.3, 3.00E-04 5.48E-07 corrective maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 32.
IDDBSDS2TM Bus unavailable due to test or legnormal Ref.3, 3.00E-04 5.48E-07 corrective maintenance E. F. = 10
- p. A-24 33.
IEV-A large LOCA initiating event legnormal Ref.2, 9.70E-05 5.73E-08 occurs E. F. = 10 App. B 34.
IEV-SI Medium LOCA initiating event Iognormal Ref.2, 5.60E-04 1.91E-06 occurs E. F. = 10 App.B 35.
IEV-SIC CMT line break initiating event Lognormal Ref.2, 1.30E-04 1.03E-07 occurs E. F. = 10 App.B 36.
IEV-SIS Safety injection line break Imgnormal Ref.2, 1.20E-04 8.78E-08 initiating event occurs E. F. = 10 App.B
23 37.
IEV-S2 Small LOCA initiating event Lognormal Ref.2, 5.20E-04 1.65E-06 occurs B. F. = 10 App. B 38.
IEV-S2P Passive RHR tube rupture Lognormal Ref.2, 5.00E-03 1.52E-04 initiating event occurs E. F. = 10 App.B i
39.
IEV-S2S
' Very small LOCA initiating Lognormal Ref.2, 5.50E-04 1.84E-06 event occurs E. F. = 10 App. B f
40.
IEV-TCA Loss of compressor air system Lognormal Ref.2, 1.44E-02 1.26E-03 initiatir,g event occurs E. F. = 10 App.B 41.
IEV-TF Loss of FW to steam generator Lognormal Ref.2, 5.06E-01 1.44E-01 initiating event occurs E. F. = 3 App.B 42.
IEV-TFA Loss of feedwater without Imgnormal Ref.2, 5.30E-01 1.58E-01 scram initiating event occurs E. F. = 3 App. B k
43.
IEV-TM Secondary to primary side Lognormal Ref.2, 5.40E-02 1.78E-02 power mismatch initiating event E. F. = 10 App. B occurs 44.
IEV-TS Spurious S-signal initiating Lognormal Ref.2, 8.50E-02 4.40E-02 l
event occurs E. F. = 10 App.B l
i i
-24 45.
IEV-TSW Loss of service water system Lognormal Ref.2, 2.62E-02 4.18E-03 initiating event occurs E. F. = 10 App.B 46.
IBV-TT Turbire/ reactor trip /L. RCS Lognormal Ref. 2, 1.40E+00 1.10E+00 flow initiating event occurs E. F. = 3 App.B 47.
IEV-V2 Steam generator tube rupturr Lognormal Ref.2, 5.20E-03 1.65E44 initiating event occurs E. F. = 10 App. B 48.
IEV-VR Vessel rupture initiating event Imgnormal Ref.2, 3.00E-08 6.38E-14 occurs E. F. = 30 App. B l
49.
IWA-PLUG IRWS'".lischarge line "A" Lognormal CMTOT.WLK 5.00E-05 1.52E-08 plugged E. F. = 10 50.
IWACV122AO Check valve 122A fails to open Lognormal CMTOT.WLK 8.76E-03 4.68E-04 E. F. = 10 51.
IWACV123AO Check valve 123 A fails to open Ingnormal CMTOT.WLK 8.76E-03 4.68E-04 E. F. = 10 52.
IWACV124AO Check valve 124A fails to open Lognormal CMTOT.WLK 8.76E-03 4.68E-04 E. F. = 10 4
53.
IWACV125AO Check valve 125A fails to open Lognormal CMTOT.WLK 8.76E-03 4.68E-04 E. F. = 10 54.
IWX-CV-AO CCF of gravity injection check Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.50E-04 1.59E-06 i
valves to open (8 of 8)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-45 55.
IWX-CVl-AO CCF of gravity injection check Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 6.00E-05 2.55E-07 valves to open (4 of 4)
E.F. = 30
- p. PE-44 56.
IWX-PLUG Plugging of both IRWST Lognormal Ref.1, App. E, 5.00E-06 1.77E-09 discharge lines E.F. = 30
- p. PE-46 57.
LPM-MAN 01 Operator fails to recognize need Iognormal Ref.2, 2.20E-03 2.95E-05 for ADS manual actuation E. F. = 10 App. D 58.
LPM-MANO3 Operator fails to recognize need Lognormal Ref.2, 8.30E-02 3.87E-03 for ADS manual actuation E. F. = 3 App. D 59.
LPM-MAN 04 Operator fails to recognize need Iognormal Ref.2, 8.30E-02 3.87E-03 for ADS manual actuation E. F. = 3 App. D 60.
MGSET MG set fails to de-energize Imgnormal CMTOT.WLK 8.74E-03 4.66E-04 E. F. = 10
26 61.
OTH-PM Failum of MSL SV or PORV to legnormal CN-PRRA 1.10E-02 7.37E-04 reclose (2 SVs opened)
E. F. = 10 347-R0 62.
OTH-PMI Failum of MSL SV or PORV to legnormal CN-PRRA 2.10E-02 2.69E-03 melov., (4 SVs opened)
E. F. = 10 347-R0 63.
OTH-SGTR Imgnormal CN-PRRA 1.60E-02 1.56E-03 E. F. = 10 347-RO 64.
OTH-SGTRI Imgnormal CN-PRRA 8.00E-03 3.90E-04 E. F. = 10 347-R0 4
65.
OTH-VAL 3 Fraction of power mismatch Imgnormal CN-PRRA 8.33E-02 4.23E-02 events in which SFW is also E. F. = 10 347-R0 lost 66.
OTH-VAL 4 Fraction of spurious S signal Imgnormal CN-FRRA 5.26E 02 1.69E-02 events in which SFW is also E. F. = 10 347-R0 lost 67.
PMX-ESFAC Softwam CCF within ESFAC Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.10E-05 8.58E-09 subsystems E.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 l
i
~
^
^
i, 27 4 68.
PMX-PLC Software CCF within PLC Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.10E-05 8.58E-09 boards B.F. = 30
- p. PE-52 69.
RCX-RB-FA Reactor trip breakers CCF Lognormal Ref.1, App. E, 1.80E-04 2.30E-06 E.F. = 30
- p. PE-48 l
70.
REAMVil7GO Hardware failure cause recire Imgnormal Ref.3, App. A 1.10E-02 7.37E-04 MOV i17A fails to open E.F. = 10 71.
REAMVil8GO Hardware failure cause recirc Imgnormal Ref.3, App.A 1.10E-02 7.37E-04 MOV ll8A fails to open E.F. = 10 72.
REG-MAN 00 Failure of manual valves V069 Imgnormal Ref.3, App.A 2.10E-01 2.69E-01
& V070 to entrl flow to SG E.F. = 10 73.
RNNMOD05 Hardware failure to open MOV Imgnormal Ref.3, App.A 1.14E-02 7.92E-04 V022 E.F. = 10 74.
RNNMOD08 Hardware failure of isol. valves Lognormal Ref.3, App.A 1.16E-02 8.20E-04 on the common discharge E.F. = 10 header j
75.
RNX-MV-GO CCF to open the motor operated Imgnormal Ref.1, App. E, 4.40E-03 1.37E-03 l
valves E.F. = 30
- p. PE-47 I
i
28 76.
TIME-CVSNO Time fraction during which Lognormal CMTOT.WLK 9.85E-01 5.45E-01 CVS is in standby in normal E.F. = 3 l
operation 3
NOTES:
1.
PARAMI and PARAM2 for NORMAL and LOGNORMAL distributions are MEAN and VARIANCE.
2.
PARAMI and PARAM2 for UNIFORM and LOGUNIFORM distributions are LOWER and UPPER limits.
3.
'Ihe guidelines provided in referene 9 are used to establish error factors for lognormal distributions whenever other sources did not provide this information.
l I
i
)
1
l 29 Table 3-3: Plant Damage State Frequencies and Uncertainties No.
Plant Mean 5%Ie Median 95%1e Damage State unnumanummmmmmmmmmmusumummmmmmmmmmmmmmmme ummmmmmmmummmmmmmmmmmmmmmma 1.
I-A 6.5E-08 7.3E-11 2.6E-09 1.4E-07 2.
I - AP 5.5E-08 9.3E-10 9.3E-09 1.4E-07 3.
m-BE 1.5E-07 4.0E-09 4.0E-08 4.3E-07 4.
m-BR 1.7E-07 7.4E-09 4.7E-08 3.7E-07 5.
m-C 7.6E-08 5.2E-10 9.4E-09 1.8E-07 6.
m-D 7.3E-08 1.9E-08 1.1E-7 7.3E-07 l
1 4
30 Table 3-4: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State I-A Initiating Contribution 5%Ie 95%1e
% age Cumulative Event
% age IEV 'IT 3.7E-8 2.5E-11 1.lE-7 67.1 67.1 IEV-TF 1.4E-8 8.1E-12 3.7E-8 25.4 92.5 IEV-TS 2.3E-9 7.5E-13 3.6E-9
< 5.0 IEV-TM 1.4E-9 4.lE-13 2.6E-9
< 5.0 IEV-TCA
- 4. lE-10 4.0E-14 6.lE-10
< 5.0
31 Table 3-5: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State I-AP Initiating Contribution 5%Ie 95%Ie
% age Cwnulative Event
% age IEV-S2P 3.1E-8 1.9E-10 9.3E-8 64.6 64.6 IEV-S2 1.3E-8 1.2E-10 4.lE-8 27.1 91.7 IEV-S2S 4.0E-9 2.0E-11 1.3E-8 8.3 100.0
ammuunusumum 32 Table 34: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State III-BE hittating Contribution 5%Ie 95%Ie
% age Cumulative event
% age IEV-SIS 6.9E-8 6.8E 10 2.6E-7 52.6 52.6 IEV-S2P 3.lE-8 1.7E-10 9.5E-8 23.6 76.2 EV-A 1.5E-8 2.1E-11 3.9E-8 11.4 87.6 EV-S2 6.5E-9 2.1E-11 2.2E-8
< 5.0 EV-S2S 6.4E-9 1.8E-11 1.6E-8
< 5.0 E V-SI 2.9E-9 8.5E-12 7.2E-9
< 5.0 EV-SIC 3.6E-10 1.9E-13 1.0E-9
< 5.0 1
4 4
i i
l 33 Table 3-7: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State III-BR Initiating Contribution 5%Ie 95%Ie
% age Cumulative Event
% age IEV-SIS 6.9E-8 6.3E-10 2.4E-7 47.6 47.6 IEV-S2P 3.lE-8 1.5E-10 8.6E-8 21.4 69.0 IEV-S2 1.7E-8 1.4E-10 5.0E-8 11.7 80.7 IEV-A 1.5E-8 2.0E-11 3.0E-8 10.3 91.0 IEV-S2S 8.lE-9 3.8E-Il 2.2E-8 5.6 96.6 IEV-SI 2.9E-9 9.9E-12 1.3E-8
< 5.0 t
IEV-TM
- 6. lE-10 5.1E-14 8.5E-10
< 5.0 IEV-TS
- 6. lE-10 2.8E-14 6.3E-10
< 5.0 IEV-TCA
- 4. lE-10 5.0E-14 6.6E-10
< 5.0 IEV-SIC 3.6E-10 1 2.3E-13 1.0E-9
< 5.0 l
t t
l I
l
34 Table 3-8: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State III-C Initiating Contribution 5%1e 95%Ie
% age Cumulative Event
% age IEV-TFA 4.2E-8 3.7E-11 9.9E-8 58.3 58.3 IEV-VR 3.0E-8 1.2E-10 1.1E-7 41.7 100.0 l
35 Table 3-9: Contribution of Initiating Events to Plant Damage State III-D Initiating Contribution 5%Ie 95%Ie
% age Cumulative Event
% age EV-S2P 3.3E-8 2.2E-10 1.0E-7 61.3 61.3 IEV-TT 8.lE-9 1.8E-12 1.9E-8 15.0 78.3 IEV-SI 2.9E-9 8.0E-12 9.7E-9 5.4 83.7 IEV-TF 2.7E-9 3.0E-13 4.2E-9 5.0 88.7 IEV-S2 2.7E-9 7.lE-12 8.7E-9 5.0 93.7 EV-S2S 2.3E-9 3.7E-12 6.4E-9
< 5.0 EV-SIS 1.4E-9 9.6E-13 5.6E-9
< 5.0 EV-TSW 3.7E-10 7.4E-15 3.5E-10
< 5.0 EV-SIC 3.6E-10 2.3E-13 1.1E-9
< 5.0
36 Table 3-10: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-A Base Event Risk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie CCX-DAS 5.1E-8 3.4E-11 1.3E-7 CCX-40EAI 3.lE-8 4.7E-12 6.5E-8 CCX-51EHX
- 1. lE-8
- 1. lE-12 1.9E-8 CCX-EEMM12
- 6. lE-9
- 5. lE-13 9.8E-9 CCX-19-YA 5.7E-9 4.0E-13 1.0E-8 DAS 2.2E-9 5.8E-15 9.7E-10 DlS 1.6E-9 5.8E-15 9.7E-10 LPM-MAN 01 1.6E-9 4.7E-13 3.1E-9 CCX-AV-LA
- 6. lE-10 4.7E-13 3.1E-9 OTH-VAL 3
- 6. lE-10 5.3E-14 8.9E-10 OTH-VAL 4 4.1E-10 3.8E-14 7.2E-10 REG-MAN 00 4.1E-10 4.0E-14 6.1E-10
37 Table 3-11: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-AP Base Event Risk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie LPM-MANO3 4.lE-8 6.5E-10 1.2E-7 CCX-HARD1 1.8E-8 1.6E-11 4.5E-8 CCX-03XTS 9.9E-9 1.1E-11 3.0E-8 CCX "IT-UF 6.7E-9 2.8E-12 1.8E-8 DIS 3.0E-9 7.4E-13 5.2E-9 CCX-XMTR195 2.3E-9 3.3E-12 6.2E-9 CCX-51EHX 2.2E-9 1.0E-12
- 5. l E-9 CCX-EP-SA 1.8E-9 7.9E-13 4.0E-9 CCX-EEMM12 1.3E-9 8.9E-13 4.5E-9 CCX-19-YA 1.2E-9 6.6E-13 2.9E-9 CCX-19-SA 9.8E-10 8.3E-13 3.5E-9 CCX-4828M 6.5E-10 2.6E-13 1.4E-9 LPM-MAN 01 6.3E-10 4.5E-12 2.5E-9 ECX-CB-GO 6.3E-10 4.5E-12 2.5E-9 CCX-SFTW 5.0E-10 2.6E-13 1.2E-9 FMX-PLC 4.8E-10 2.4E-13 1.4E-9 PMX-ESFAC 4.8E-10 2.7E-13
- 1. lE-9
38 Table 3-12: Risk Reduction by Basic Event for Plant Damage State III-BE Base Event Risk Reduction 5" ele 95"41e IWX-CV-AO 4.1E-8 6.1E-11 1.1E-7 LPM-MAN 03 3.3E-8 3.3E-10 1.2E-7 CCX-HARDI 2.0E-8 3.1E-11 6.lE-8 IWACV123AO 1.8E-8 3.4E-11 5.3E-8 IWACV124AO 1.8E-8
- 4. l E-11 6.lE-8 IWACV125AO 1.8E-8 3.5E-11 5.4E-8 IWACV122AO 1.8E-8 3.4E-Il 7.lE-8 CCX-03XTS
- 1. lE-8 l.lE-Il 3.3E-8 IWX-CVI-AO 7.2E-9 4.9E-12 2.1E-8 IWA-PLUG 6.0E-9 4.3E-11 3.0E-8 LPM-MAN 04 4.6E-9 3.4E-11 1.4E-8 DIS 2.3E-9 1.9E-13 2.9E-9 CCX-51EHX 2.2E-9 1.0E-12 6.9E-9 RNNMOD08 1.9E-9 3.3E-13 3.9E-9 RNNMOD05 1.8E-9 5.5E-13 4.8E-9 CCX-EP-SA 1.8E-9 1.0E-12 5.2E-9 REAMV118GO 1.8E-9 4.5E-13 2.7E-9 REAMVil7GO 1.8E-9 4.0E-13 3.1E-9 CCX 'IT-UF 1.4E-9 7.6E-13 3.lE-9 CCX-EEMM12 1.3E-9 7.0E-13 2.9E-9 CCX-19-YA 1.2E-9 4.2E-13 3.4E-9 PMX-PLC 9.9E-10 1.1E-12 2.5E-9 RNX-MV-GO 7.lE-10 4.5E-14 1.3E-9 CCX-SFTW 5.0E-10 3.3E-13 1.2E-9 IWX-PLUG 4.9E-10 2.9E-13 1.3E-9
39 Table 3-13: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State III-BR Base Event Risk Reduction 5%1e 95%1e LPM-MAN 03 4.1E-8 5.9E-10 1.1E-7 IWX-CV-AO 4.1E-8 7.0E-11 1.2E-7 CCX-HARDI 2.0E-8 2.5E-Il 5.5E-8 IWACV123AO 1.8E-8 3.4E-11 5.5E-8 NACV125AO 1.8E-8 3.4E-Il 4.9E-8 IWACV124AO 1.8E-8 4.0E-11 8.lE-8 IWACV122AO 1.8E-8 3.4E-11 5.3E-8 CCX-03XTS 1.1E-8 1.6E-11 2.7E-8 CCX 'IT-UP 8.lE-9 8.4E-12 2.3E-8 IWX-CVI-AO 7.2E-9 5.2E-12 1.6E-8 NA-PLUG 6.0E-9 3.1E-11 2.4E-8 LPM-MAN (M 4.6E-9 3.3E-11 2.0E-8 D1S 3.0E-9 5.5E-13 4.5E-9 LPM-MAN 01 2.3E-9 8.8E-12 6.3E-9 CCX-XMTR195 2.3E-9 2.lE-12 7.4E-9 CCX-51EHX 2.2E-9 8.3E-13 4.5E-9 RNNMOD08 1.9E-9 6.lE-13 3.lE-9 RNNMOD05 1.8E-9 5.0E-13 4.0E-0 CCX-EP-SA 1.8E-9
- 8. lE-13 4.6E-9 REAMV117GO 1.8E-9 5.0E-13 4.8E-9 REAMV118GO 1.8E-9 5.5E-13 3.9E-9 CCX-AV-LA 1.6E-9 3.6E-13 2.9E-9 CCX-EEMM12 1.3E-9 6.5E-13 3.4E-9 CCX-19-YA 1.2E-9 5.5E-13 3.3E-9 PMX-PLC 9.9E-10 1.4E-12 3.5E-9
j i
40 Table 3-13 (Continued)
Base Event Risk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie i
CCX-19-SA 9.8E-10 9.4E-13 3.0E-9 RNX-MV-GO
- 7. lE-10 3.3E-13 6.6E-10 CCX-4828M 6.5E-10 3.2E-13 1.6E-9 ECX-CB-GO 6.3E-10 3.3E-12 2.0E-9 OTH-VAL 3
- 6. lE-10 5.lE-14 8.5E-10 OTH-VAL 4 6.lE-10 2.8E-14 6.3E-10 CCX-SFTW 5.0E-10 2.4E-13 1.5E-9 IWX PLUG 4.9E-10 4.1E-13 1.5E-9 PMX-ESPAC 4.8E-10 3.2E-13 1.5E-9 REG-MAN 00 4.lE-10 5.0E-14 6.6E-10
41
\\
Table 3-14: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State M-C Base Event Risk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie i
DAS 3.6E-8 7.8E-12 7.1E-8 ATW-MANO3 2.7E-8 1.lE-11 5.0E-8 RCX-RB-FA 2.4E-8 2.2E-12 3.4E-8 MGSET 1.5E-8 7.1E-12 2.8E-8 CCX-DU-SA 9.3E-9 6.7E-13 1.1E-8 CCX-HARDI 4.9E-9 8.1E-13 5.7E-9 CCX-DAS 3.2E-9 3.0E-13 6.3E-9 CCX-4828M 1.7E-9 5.8E-14 1.4E-9 CCX-ESF 1.4E-9 3.7E-14 1.2E-9 ED3 MOD 03 1.lE-9 2.1E-13 2.4E-9 CCX-PW-SA 5.3E-10 8.0E-15 4.9E-10 ED3BS00lTM 4.4E-10 4.1E-14 5.8E-10 CCX-XMTR 3.5E-10 5.0E-15 2.7E-10
42 Table 3-15: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Plant Damage State III-D Base Event Risk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie LPM-MAN 03 3.4E-8 3.4E-10 1.1E-7 i
CCX-HARDI 2.0E-8 2.5E-11 5.0E-8 CCX-51EHX 1.2E-8
- 6. lE-12 3.5E-8 CCX-DAS
- 1. lE-8 4.2E-12 2.5E-8 CCX-03XTS
- 1. lE-8 1.5E-11 2.8E-8 LPM-MAN 04 4.6E-9 3.5E-11 1.8E-8 DIS 2.3E-9 2.2E-13 2.7E-9 CCX-EP-SA 1.8E-9 6.9E-13 4.0E-9 CCX-EEMM12 1.7E-9 1.1E-12 5.0E-9 CCX-19-YA 1.6E-9 1.1E-12 4.3E-9 CCX 'IT-UF 1.4E-9 9.6E-13 5.6E-9 CCX-BY-PN 1.1E-9 2.7E-13 2.8E-9 PMX-PLC 9.9E-10 1.1E-12 3.4E-9 IDABSDS2TM 9.0E-10 2.0E-12 3.2E-9 IDDBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.4E-12 3.4E-9 IDCBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.8E-12 2.5E-9 IDBBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.4E-12 2.9E-9 EC2BS002TM 5.3E-10 8.6E-14 9.6E-10 ECIBS001TM 5.3E-10 1.1E-13 1.5E-9 CCX-SFTW 5.0E-10 3.1E-13 1.2E-9 CCX-40EAI 3.7E-10 7.4E-15 3.5E-10
43 Table 3-16: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State I-A
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- initiating event of initiating event IEV-TT 2.7E-8 0.4
-90.1 465.1 IEV-TF 1.0E-8 0.1
-24.5 136.4 IEV-TS 4.8E-8 0.0
-0.9 109.5 IEV-TM 2.7E-9 0.0
- 0.3 40.0 IEV-TCA 8.6E-10 0.0
-0.2 1.6
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
44 Table 3-17: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State I-AP
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- initiating event of initiating event IEV-S2P 6.lE-8 2.7
-92.2 5153.6 IEV-S2 2.7E-8 0.5
- 7.3 2745.9 IEV-S2S 8.4E-9 0.1
- 2.5 189.5
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
" The minimum and maximum values am the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
1 1
1 l
45 Table 3-18: Uncedainty Importance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State III-BE
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Initiating Uncedainty Average %
Minhnum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- initiating event of initiating event IEV-SIS 1.4E-7 44.2
-51.0 24433.4 IEV-S2P 6.1E-8 9.0
-20.1 7085.4 IEV-A 3.2E-8 2.5
-30.3 6720.5 IEV-S2 1.4E-8 0.5
-14.2 778.2 IEV-S2S 1.4E-8 0.4
- 2.0 893.7 IEV-S1 5.6E-9 0.1
- 0.8 90.6 IEV-SlC 7.5E-10 0.0
- 0.1 8.0
- Average percentage mduction in the variance of the top event fmquency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual pementage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
" The minimum and maximum values am the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
46 Table 3-19: Uncertainty Impoitance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State III-BR
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- initiating event of initiating event EV-SIS 1.5E-7 35.4
-54.5 20007.6 IEV-S2P 6.4E-8 6.6
- 8.6 5144.2 IEV-S2 3.6E-8 2.1
-8.4 1100.3 IEV-A 3.0E-8 1.5
-42.5 5229.0 IEV-S2S 1.6E-S 0.4
-10.9 413.4 IEV-S1 6.1E-9 0.1
- 0.8 104.3 IEV-TS 1.3E-9 0.0
-0.1 28.7 IEV-TM 1.3E-9 0.0
- 0.0 196.1 IEV-TCA 8.5E-10 0.0
- 0.1 3.9 IEV-sic 6.8E-10 0.0
-0.1 8.6
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
1
~
47 Table 3-20: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Plant Damage State III-C
]
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Meximum value Event Importance reductions initiating event of initiating event IEV-VR 1.0E-7 65.1
-64.4
-64.4 IEV-TFA 3.lE-8 6.0
-34.6 1167.7 Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the i
sample values for the initiating event in question.
i 4
4 i
k
48 Table 3-21: Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Event for Plant Damage State III-D
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- initiating event of initiating event EV-S2P 6.9E-8 62.4
-75.7 32103.9 EV-SI 6.2E-9 0.5
-12.5 1057.2 IEV-TT 6.0E-9 0.5
- 7.5 189.6 EV-S2 5.5E-9 0.4
- 6.0 568.2 EV-S2S 4.9E-9 0.3
-17.2 456.8 EV-SIS 2.8E-9 0.1
- 0.7 309.4 l
EV-TF 2.0E-9 0.1
- 2.0 27.6 IEV-TSW 7.8E-10 0.0
- 0.1 21.5 EV-S1C 7.4E-10 0.0
-0.5 65.5
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The
{
actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
49 Table 3-22: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-A i
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event CCX-DAS 2.0E-7 22.5
-99.9 29670.2 CCX-40EAI 1.1E-7 6.9
-23.3 67682.7 CCX-51EHX 4.0E-8 0.9
-68.2 9437.0 CCX-EEMM12 2.2E-8 0.3
-41.1 3670.9 CCX-19-YA 1.9E-8 0.2
-0.4 3559.8 DAS 8.9E-9 0.0 0.0 57.6 DIS 8.6E-9 0.0 0.0 635.9 CCX-AV-LA 5.6E-9 0.0
-0.1 183.5 LPM-MAN 01 3.5E-9 0.0
-0.1 10.9 OTH-VAIA 9.7E-10 0.0 0.0 1.3 OTH-VAL 3 7.0E-10 0.0 0.0 1.5 REG-MAN 00 2.4E-10 0.0
- 0.1 0.3
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
l 50 Table 3-23: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State I-AP
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event CCX-HARDI 7.2E-8 3.8
-90.2 4995.2 CCX-03XTS 3.3E-8 0.8
- 3.3 1616.3 LPM-MAN 03 3.lE-8 0.7
-99.3 1502.9 CCX-TT-UF 2.8E-8 0.6
-6.5 769.3 DIS 1.2E-8 0.1
- 0.7 3128.1 CCX-51EHX 8.5E-9 0.0
-0.2 160.7 CCX-XMTR195 7.7E-9 0.0
- 0.2 47.3 CCX-EP-SA 7.5E-9 0.0 0.0 116.8 CCX-EEMM12 4.8E-9 0.0
- 0.2 68.8 CCX-19-YA 4.7E-9 0.0
-0.5 61.4 CCX-19-SA 3.5E-9 0.0
- 0.1 14.4 CCX-4828M 2.2E-9 0.0 0.0 14.7 PMX-ESFAC 2.0E-9 0.0
- 0.1 9.4 CCX-SF1~W 2.0E-9 0.0
- 0.1 16.0 PMX-PLC 1.9E-9 0.0
- 0.2 9.1 LPM-MAN 01 1.2E-9 0.0 0.0 2.7 ECX-CB-GO 4.3E-15 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Average percentage reduction in the vanance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
l l
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
t
51 Table 3-24: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Event for Plant Damage State III-BE
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average Importance Minimum value Maximum value reduction of base event of base event IWX-CV-AO 1.6E-7 60.9
-43.9 27775.3 CCX-HARD1 7.3E-8 12.9
-18.7 13613.8 IWACV123AO 4.0E-8 3.8
-10.6 3037.4 IWACV122AO 3.9E-8 3.7
-17.9 2974.5 IWACV124AO 3.8E-8 3.5
-11.7 6962.3 IWACV125AO 3.7E-8 3.4
-17.1 6876.2 CCX-03XTS 3.6E-8 3.1
- 1.5 4268.4 IWX-CVI-AO 2.8E-8 1.9
- 7.7 2578.5 LPM-MANO3 2.5E-8 1.5
-20.0 572.8 IWA-PLUG 1.2E-8 0.3
- 9.9 340.5 DIS 9.2E-9 0.2
- 1.1 785.2 CCX-51-EHX 8.3E-9 0.2
- 0.4 253.2 CCX-EP-SA 7.lE-9 0.1
- 0. 6 181.1 CCX-TT-UF 5.6E-9 0.1
- 0.7 354.0 CCX-EEMM12 4.6E-9 0.1
- 0.4 105.0 CCX-19-YA 4.4E-9 0.0
- 0.2 94.4 PMX-PLC 4.0E-9 0.0
- 0.5 33.5 RNNMOD08 3.9E-9 0.0
- 0.7 603.9 RNNMOD05 3.9E-9 0.0
- 1.3 586.1 REAMV118GO 3.6E-9 0.0
- 6.3 520.5 LPM-MAN 04 3.5E-9 0.0
- 1.5 23.6 REAMVll7GO 3.4E-9 0.0
- 1.9 545.4
52 Table 3-24 (Continued)
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event RNX-MV-GO 2.8E-9 0.0
- 5.9 513.3 CCX-SFTW 2.0E-9 0.0
-0.1 23.1 IWX-PLUG 42.0E-9 0.0 0.0 22.2
- Average perrentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
53 Table 3-25: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State III-BR
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event IWX-CV-AO 1.7E-7 47.2
-56.0 20138.7 CCX-HARDI 8.0E-8 10.4
- 5.8 22766.5 IWACV122AO 3.9E-8 2.5
-14.7 2831.1 IWACV123AO 3.9E-8 2.4
- 9.9 2827.0 IWACV125AO 3.8E-8 2.4
- 9.0 5760.5 CCX-03XTS 3.6E-8 2.1
- 2.4 6960.1 IWACV124AO 3.5E-8 2.0
-18.2 5430.1 LPM-MAN 03 3.lE-8 1.5
- 9.7 301.6 IWX-CVl-AO 3.0E-8 1.4
-13.0 2032.6 CCX 'IT-UF 2.8E-8 1.2
- 0.7 2517.3 IWA-PLUG 1.3E-8 0.3
- 2.8 271.6 DIS 1.0E-8 0.2
- 0.8 280.4 CCX-XMTR195 9.2E-9 0.1
- 0.1 114.9 CCX-51EHX 8.5E-9 0.1
- 0.5 588.3 CCX-EP-SA 7.3E-9 0.1
- 0.2 415.2 CCX-AV-LA 6.0E-9 0.1
- 0.1 241.2 CCX-EEMM12 5.5E-9 0.0
- 0.2 231.7 j
LPM-MAN 01 4.8E-9 0.0
- 0.2 170.0 CCX-19-YA 4.7E-9 0.0
- 1.4 203.8 PMX-PLC 4.lE-9 0.0
- 0.1 35.7 l
RNNMOD08 3.9E-9 0.0
- 4.4 271.6 i
REAMVil8GO 3.8E-9 0.0
- 6.7 245.0
l l
54 Table 3-25: (Continued)
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event RNNMOD05 3.6E-9 0.0
- 1.8 275.9 REAMVil7G 3.5E-9 0.0
- 1.4 264.3 O
l CCX-19-SA 3.5E-9 0.0
- 0.3 48.7 LPM-MAN 04 3.4E-9 00
- 1.0 17.5 RNX-MV-GO 2.8E-9 0.0
- 3.9 251.7 CCX-4828M 2.2E-9 0.0
- 0.1 38.6 CCX-SFTW 2.lE-9 0.0
- 0.1 43.6 IWX-PLUG 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 9.1 PMX-ESFAC 1.6E-9 0.0
- 0.2 22.3 OTH-VAL 4 9.4E-10 0.0
- 0.1 7.1 OTH-VAL 3 7.0E-10 0.0 0.0 2.6 REG-MAN 00 2.4E-10 0.0 0.0 0.5 ECX-CB GO 1.6E-14 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Average percentage reduction in the vanance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
l l
1 i
l
55 Table 3-26: Uncertainty hnportance by Basic Event for Plant Damage State III-C
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event DAS 1.5E-7 133.3
-31.7 4110383.0 RCX-RB-FA 8.4E-8 45.0
-23.1 89382.8 ATW-MANO3 5.2E-8 17.0
-30.1 34534.1 CCX-DU-SA 3.2E-8 6.4
- 9.3 14651.9 MGSET 3.1E-8 6.1
-11.2 11372.9 CCX-HARD1 1.8E-8 2.0
- 2.2 3779.0 CCX-DAS 1.2E-8 0.9
- 8.5 51303.9 CCX-4828M 6.1E-9 0.2
- 2.0 736.2 CCX-ESF 5.3E-9 0.2
- 0.5 499.9 ED3 MOD 03 2.2E-9 0.0
- 1.0 330.2 CCX-PW-SA 2.2E-9 0.0
- 0.6 158.2 CCX-XMTR 1.4E-9 0.0
- 0.4 2301.1 ED3BS001TM 9.3E-10 0.0
- 1.7 662.6
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
- The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in genemting the sample values for the base event in question.
56 Table 3-27: Uncertainty Importance by Basic Events for Plant Damage State III-D
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event CCX-HARDI 8.0E-8 84.0
-46.7 131296.5 CCX-51EFIX 4.2E-8 23.5
-10.6 135874.8 CCX-DAS 4.lE-8 21.9
- 8.2 60340.5 CCX-03XTS 3.6E-8 16.7
-37.6 39686.1 LPM-MANO3 2.5E-8 8.1
-86.1 1784.8 DIS 9.4E-9 1.2
- 6.0 1906.8 CCX-EP-SA 7.3E-9 0.7
- 1.0 2527.8 CCX-EEMM12 7.0E-9 0.6
- 5.6 1899.7 CCX-19-YA 5.7E-9 0.4
- 6.9 1692.7 CCX-TT-UF 4.8E-9 0.3
- 0.7 621.3 PMX-PLC 4.lE-9 0.2
- 0.4 178.6 CCX-BY-PN 4.1E-9 0.2
- 1.7 508.8 LPM-MAN 04 3.4E-9 0.2
-12.9 85.6 CCX SFTW 2.1E-9 0.1
- 0.2 269.9 IDDBSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0
- 2.6 114.7 IDBBSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0
- 2.8 157.7 IDABSDS2TM 1.8E-9 0.0
- 2.3 166.3 IDCBSDS2TM 1.7E-9 0.0
- 2.6 117.4 CCX-40EAI 1.4E-9 0.0
- 0.1 22272.2 EC2BS002TM 1.1E-9 0.0
- 1.1 289.8 ECIBS00lTM 1.0E-9 0.0
- 0. 8 287.3
=
57 Table 3-27 (Continued)
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
l
58 Table 3-28: Contribution of Initiating Events to Core Damage Frequency Initiating Contribution 5%Ie 95%Ie
% age Cumulative Event
% age IEV-SIS 6.9E-8 7.7E-10 2.2E-7 24.6 24.6 IEV-TFA 4.2E-8 2.4E-11 7.5E-8 15.0 39.6 IEV 'IT 3.9E-8 6.4E-11 6.9E-8 13.9 53.5 IEV-S2P 3.3E-8 2.5E-10 1.3E-7 11.8 65.3 IEV-VR 3.0E-8 1.2E-10
- 1. l E-7 10.7 76.0 IEV-S2 1.7E-8 1.5E-10 6.3E-8 6.0 83.0 IEV-A 1.5E-8 2.2E-11 3.4E-8 5.4 88.4 IEV-TF 1.4E-8 1.9E-11 2.5E-8 5.0 93.4 IEV-S2S 8.1E-9 3.7E-11 2.1E-8
< 5.0 IEV-SI 7.0E-9 3.4E-11 1.9E-8
< 5.0 IEV-TS 2.3E-9 7.4E-13 3.2E-9
< 5.0 IEV-V2 1.4E-9
- 1. lE-12 3.6E-9
< 5.0 IEV-TM 1.4E-9 3.4E-13 2.4E-9
< 5.0 IEV-TCA
- 4. lE-10 3.5E-14 7.0E-10
< 5.0 IEV-TSW 3.7E-10 1.lE-14
- 3. lE-10
< 5.0 IEV-SIC 3.6E-10 1.8E-13
- 1. lE-9
< 5.0
59 Table 3-29: Risk Reduction by Basic Events for Core Damage Frequency Base Event Risk Reduction 5%1e 95%1e CCX-DAS 5.5E-8 4.6E-11 1.1E-7 IWX-CV-AO 4.5E-8 7.2E-11 1.4E-7 LPM-MAN 03 4.3E-8 6.6E-10 1.4E-7 DAS 3.9E-8 6.7E-12 5.lE-8 CCX-40EAI 3.lE-8 3.3E-12 6.1 E-8 ATW-MAN 03 2.7E-8 9.3E-12 4.6E-8 CCX-HARDI 2.6E-8 4.1E-11 7.0E-8 RCX-RB-FA 2.4E-8 3.0E-12 3.0E-8 NACV125AO 1.8E-8 2.8E-11 4.8E-8 i
IWACV123AO 1.8E-8 3.2E-11 4.5E-8 IWACV124AO 1.8E-8 3.0E-11 5.2E-8 IWACV122AO 1.8E-8 3.2E-11 4.9E-8 MGSET 1.5E-8 4.7E-12 2.2E-8 CCX-51EHX 1.3E-8 4.5E-12 2.8E-8 CCX-03XTS
- 1. lE-8 1.5E-Il 4.3E-8 CCX-DU-SA 9.3E-9 7.5E-13 1.1E-8 CCX-TT-UF 8.lE-9 7.1E-12 1.8E-8 CCX-EEMM12 7.4E-9 3.1E-12 1 SE-8 IWX-CVI-AO 7.2E-9 6.5E-12 2.3E-8 CCX-19-YA 7.0E-9 2.5E-12 9.8E-9 l
IWA-PLUG 6.0E-9 4.2E-11 2.6E-8 DIS 5.1E-9 8.3E-13 3.9E-9 LPM-MAN 04 4.6E-9 3.5E-Il 1.5E-8 1
~
60 Table 3-29 (Continued)
Base Event Ri.sk Reduction 5%Ie 95%Ie RNNMOD08 2.8E-9 8.8E-13 7.0E-9 RNNMOD051 2.8E-9 1.3E-12 6.2E-9 REAMV117GO 2.7E-9 1.1E-12 8.2E-9 REAMVI18GO 2.7E-9 7.2E-13 6.1E-9 CCX-4828M 2.4E-9 8.7E-13 3.3E-9 LPM-MAN 01 2.3E-9 9.2E-12 5.2E-9 CCX-XMTR195 2.3E-9 2.9E-12 7.0E-9 CCX-EP-SA 1.8E-9 9.6E-13 4.6E-9 CCX-AV-LA 1.6E-9 3.6E-13 3.0E-9 OTH-SGTR 1.5E-9 5.6E-13 3.2E-9 TIhE-CVSNO 1.4E-9 1.1E-12 3.6E-9 CCX-FU-RQ l.4E-9 1.1E-12 3.6E-9 OTH-PM 1.4E-9 4.6E-13 3.4E-9 CCX-ESF 1.4E-9 4.1E-14 1.2E-9 ED3 MOD 03 1.1E-9 1.8E-13 3.2E-9 RNX-MV-GO
- 1. lE-9 5.9E-14 2.0E-9 CCX-BY-PN
- 1. lE-9 4.0E-13 1.9E-9 PMX-PLC 9.9E-10 1.1E-12 3.1E-9 CCX-19-SA 9.8E-10 1.1E-12 2.7E-9 IDCBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.5E-12 2.4E-9 IDBBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.4E-12 2.2E-9 IDABSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.7E-12 2.3E-9 IDDBSDS2TM 9.0E-10 1.6E-12 2.4E-9
61 Table 3-29 (Continued)
Base Event Risk Reduction 5%1e 95%Ie ECX-CB-GO 6.3E-10 3.3E-12 2.4E-9 OTH-VAL 3 6.lE-10 5.8E-14
- 1. lE-9 i
OTH-VAL 4 6.1E-10 3.7E-14 8.3E-10 EC2BS002TM 5.3E-10 9.0E-14 9.9E-10 ECIBS00lTM 5.3E-10 9.7E-14 1.0E-9 CCX-PW-SA 5.3E-10 1.2E-14 4.4E-10
\\
^
CCX-SFTW 5.0E-10 2.4E-13 1.5E-9 IWX-PLUG 4.9E-10 3.3E-13 1.3E-9 PMX-ESPAC 4.8E-10 3.6E-13 1.5E-9 OTH-PM1 4.7E-10 3.5E-14 8.lE-10 ED3BS00lTM 4.4E-10 5.3E-14 9.0E-10 REG-MAN 00 4.lE-10 3.5E-14 7.0E-10 CCX-XMTR 3.5E-10 5.3E-15 2.8E-10 OTH-SGTRI 3.4E-10 3.0E-14 6.lE-10
l l
l l
62 Table 3-30:
Uncertainty Importance by Initiating Events for Core Damage Frequency
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Initiating Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value of Maximum value Event Importance reduction
- Initiating event of initiating event l
IEV-SIS 1.4E-7 2.4
-6.6 1603.5 l
IEV-VR 1.1E-7 1.5
- 1.0 1.0 IEV-S2P 6.5E-8 0.5
- 0.6 444.9 IEV-S2 3.2E-8 0.1
-89.8 340.6 IEV-A 3.2E-8 0.1
-0.8 396.6 IEV-TFA 3.0E-8 0.1
- 1.1 44.7 IEV-TT 2.8E-8 0.1
- 4.1 117.0 IEV-S2S 1.7E-8 0.0
-0.3 77.9 IEV-S1 1.5E-8 0.0
-1.5 67.8 IEV-TF 1.0E-8 0.0
-1.2 23.8 IEV-TS 4.7E-9 0.0
-0.1 11.1 I
IEV-V2 2.9E-9 0.0
- 0.0 3.0 IEV-TM 2.7E-9 0.0
- 0.0 2.3 IEV-TCA 8.2E-10 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 IEV-TSW 7.6E 10 0.0
- 0.0 1.0 IEV-SIC 7.5E-10 0.0
- 0.0 0.4
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the initiating event, given that the value of the initiating event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the initiating event.
" The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the mnge used in generating the sample values for the initiating event in question.
63 Table 3-31: Uncertainty importance by Basic Events for Core Damage Frequency
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event CCX-DAS 2.3E-7 6.4
-5.3 10106.3 IWX-CV-AO 1.8E-7 4.1
-3.3 1834.8 DAS 1.5E-7 2.9
-0.5 5521.5 CCX-40EAI 1.2E-7 1.8
-1.2 8076.4 CCX-HARD1 1 lE-7 1.4
-0.6 1666.7 RCX-RB-FA 8.6E-8 0.9
-1.0 26276.9 CCX-51EHX 5.2E-8 0.3
-1.3 1133.2 ATW-MAN 03 5.2E-8 0.3
-0.6 682.3 CCX-03XTS 4.0E-8 0.2
-0.4 223.0 IWACV125AO 3.9E-8 0.2
-1.5 664.3 IWACV124AO 3.8E-8 0.2
-2.1 688.9 IWACV122AO 3.8E-8 0.2
-1.2 154.6 IWACV123AO 3.6E-8 0.2
-2.5 146.7 CCX-TT-UF 3.4E-8 0.1
-88.3 265.5 LPM-MAN 03 3.2E-8 0.1
-47.3 287.6 CCX-DU-SA 3.2E-8 0.1
-0.1 4408.4 MGSET 3.0E-8 0.1
-0.6 219.1 CCX-EEMM12 3.0E-8 0.1
-1.3 419.1 IWX-CVI-AO 3.0E-8 0.1
-0.1 158.3 CCX-19-YA 2.4E-8 0.1
-2.4 370.4 DIS 2.0E-8 0.1
-76.8 320.1
64 Table 3-31 (Continued)
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: **
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event IWA-PLUG 1.2E-8 0.0
-0.1 24.5 CCX-4828M 8.6E-9 0.0
-0.2 208.2 CCX-XMTR195 8.2E-9 0.0 0.0 17.1 l
CCX-AV-LA 6.5E-9 0.0 0.0 18.5 CCX-EP-SA 6.2E-9 0.0 0.0 11.2 RNNMOD08 6.1E-9 0.0
-0.7 1%.8 CCX-ESF 5.7E-9 0.0 0.0 129.4 RNNMOD05 5.5E-9 0.0
-1.3 102.2 REAMV117GO 5.4E-9 0.0
-0.4 99.0 REAMVil8GO 5.3E-9 0.0
-0.6 98.4 CCX-FU-RQ 5.1E-9 0.0 0.0 5.4 LPM-MAN 01 4.4E-9 0.0 0.0 4.7 RNX-MV-GO 4.4E-9 0.0
-0.1 99.9 CCX-BY-PN 4.2E-9 0.0 0.0 21.7 PMX-PLC 4.0E-9 0.0
-0.1 9.3 CCX-19-SA 3.7E-9 0.0
-0.1 10.1 LPM-MAN 04 3.4E-9 0.0
-2.0 18.6 OTH-SGTR 3.1E-9 0.0 0.0 3.6 OTH-PM 2.9E-9 0.0 0.0 3.7 ED3 MOD 03 2.2E-9 0.0 0.0 7.9 CCX-SFTW 2.1E-9 0.0 0.0 1.2 l
65 Table 3-31 (Continued)
% change in the variance of the top event frequency taken at the: "
Base Event Uncertainty Average %
Minimum value Maximum value Importance reduction
- of base event of base event IDBBSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 1.2 IDCBSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 1.4 PMX-ESPAC 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 8.3 IDDBSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 1.4 IDABSDS2TM 1.9E-9 0.0 0.0 1.1 CCX-PW-SA 1.7E-9 0.0
-0.3 40.2 IWX-PLUG 1.6E-9 0.0 0.0 0.7 CCX-XMTR 1.4E-9 0.0 0.0 0.8 EC2BS002TM
- 1. lE-9 0.0 0.0 0.8 ECIBS00lTM
- 1. lE-9 0.0 0.0 0.8 OTH-VAIA 9.6E-10 0.0 0.0 0.9 ED3BS00lTM 9.2E-10 0.0 0.0 0.2 OTH-PM1 9.0E-10 0.0 0.0 0.4 OTH-SGTR1 7.3E-10 0.0 0.0 0.4 OTH-VAL 3 7.2E-10 0.0 0.0 0.1 REG-MAN 00 2.5E-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 TIME-CVSNO 7.0E-12 0.0 0.0 0.0 ECX-CB-GO 4.8E-14 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Average percentage reduction in the variance of the top event frequency taken over the range of the base event, given that the value of the base event is known. The actual percentage reduction is dependent on the specific value of the base event.
" The minimum and maximum values are the endpoints of the range used in generating the sample values for the base event in question.
o
, r.
i N
66 REFERENCES l
1.
Westinghouse AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Proprietary version, DE-AC03-90SF18495, June 26,1992.
t 2.
Westinghouse AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Non-proprietary version, DE-AC03-90SF18495, June 26,1992.
3.
"AP600 Plant Probability Safety Study Guidebooks," WCAP-12699, Rev.1, June 1992.
4.
USNRC NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2084, " Analysis of Core Damage Frequency:
Internal Events Methodology," Vol.1, Rev.1 5.
USNRC NUREG/CR-2728, SAND 82-1100, " Interim Reliability Evaluation Program Procedures Guide," January 1983.
i I
6.
USNRC NUREG/CR-2815, BNL-NUREG-51559, "Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," Vol.1, Rev.1.
7.
USNRC NUREG/CR-1278, SAND 80-0200, " Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications," Final Report.
8.
" Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Documents," Volume HI, Chapter 1, Appendix A, PRA Key Assumotions and Groundmles, Rev. 3, May 1992.
9.
" Guidelines for Assessing the Variance of Lognormal Distributions," CN-PRRA-93-123, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, June 1993.
10.
User Manual for Westinghouse Uncertainty Analysis Software: WUNCERT," WCAP-13302, May 1992.
I
V i
Westingtiouse Energy Systems sm355 El8ClflC C0fp0 fall 0D ons w W s$ n a1$ m 355 DCP/NRCl413 NSD NRC-98-5757 Docket No.: 52 003 August 14,1998 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: T. R. Qusy
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO NRC LETTERS CONCERNING REQUEST FOR WITIU10LDING INFORMATION
Reference:
- 1. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 design !ctter of October 20,1993," dated June 18,1998.
- 2. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 design letter of January 17,1994," dated June 18, 1998.
- 3. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding information from public disclosure for Westinghouse AP600 letters of September 20,1993, January 21, 1994, and February 3,1994," dated July 10,1998.
- 4. Letter, Sebrosky to McIntyre, " Request for withholding proprietary information for Westinghouse letters dated April 18,1995," dated July 15,1998.
- 5. Letter, Huffman to McIntyre, " Request for witaholding information from public disclosure of Westinghouse report on AP600 function based task analysis," dated July 17,1998.
Dear Mr. Quay.
Reference 1 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated October 20,1993, that contained the response to a staff request for additional information regarding the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment. The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in the current (1998) nonproprietary version of the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) report. In addition, the staffindicated the material was used by the staffin the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should l
remain on the docket. At the time this request for additional information response was provided to the smns
. Th.I C '/ /
40/10'd 2002 Girt 0C18 01 244P PLC 2tr 3 T11 A30dNOW-3de ad 40:GI 86.Pl 9nd
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1 DCP/NRCl413 NSD.NRC.98 5757 2
August 14,1998 NRC technical staff, the infonnation was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it I
contained infonnation that had commercial value to Westinghouse. If this request for additional information response was indeed used by the staffin development of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, almost five years later, this information is
. no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 2 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated January 17,1994, that contained the response to a staff request for additional information regarding the AP600 instrumentation and control system. The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in the current (1998) nonproprietary version of the AP600 standard safety analysis report. In addition, the staffindicated the material was used by the staff in the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this request for additional information response was provided to the NRC technical stafT, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. If this request for additional information response was indeed used by the staffin development of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, over four years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 3 provided the NRC assessment of the Westieghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated September 20,1993, that contained information related to the AP600 PRA l
and WCAP 13795, which provided the PRA uncertainty analysis / The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in the current (1998) nonproprietary version of the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) report. In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by
~
the stafY in the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this information was provided to the NRC technical staff, it was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. if the information transmitted by the Westinghouse September 20,1993, letter was indeed used by the staffin development of the AP600 draft final safety evaluation report in November 30,1994, then at this time, almost five years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 3 also provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated January 21,1994, that contained WCAP-13913, " Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance" (SAMG). The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in current (1998) nonproprietary AP600 documents (e.g., WCAP.13914
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"). In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the staffin the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this Framework for SAMG was provided to the NRC technical staff, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over four years later, this information is no longer considered to be poprietary by Westinghouse.
{
%r l40/20*d 2002Glet0CI8 01 2Lar PLC zir allinacduou-3ae ad 40:61 86.rt ene
DCP/NRCl413 NSD NRC 98 5757 3-August 14,1998 Reference 3 also provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated February 3,1994, that contained additional copies of WCAP-13913,
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"(SAMG). The NRC assessment was that the material was similar to material that exists in current (1998) nonproprictary AP600 documents (e.g, WCAP 13914, " Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance"). In addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the stafTin the development of the AP600 draft safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this Framework for SAMG was provided to the NRC technical staff, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over four years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 4 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated April 18,1995, that contained information for a MAAP4/RELAP comparison for the AP600 in response to a staff request for additional information. The NRC assessment was that the Westinghouse cover letter indicated that Enclosure 2 is a non proprietary version of Enclosure 3, however, the staff could not find any portion of the enclosures marked as proprietary. The staff assessment further states the conventional bracketed superscript notation also appears to be missing.
Finally, the NRC assessment states the staff could not determine which part of the material enclosed with the Westinghouse letter was Enclosure 1,2, or 3. It should be noted that the Westinghouse April 18,1995, cover letter states " Enclosures 2 (nonproprietary) and 3 (proprietary) provide the requested information." The letter does not indicate that enclosure 2 was a duplicate of enclosure 3 minus the proprietary information. A cover sheet was provided just prior to each of the enclosures to the Westinghouse letter. De enclosures contained the following: Enclosure 1 provided a copy of the NRC's two page request for information for the MAAP RELAP comparison. Enclosure 2 provided the requested information, and was titled " Requested Information for AP600 MAAP4/RELAP Comparison." Under section 4, initial Conditions, of Enclosure 2 it states the initial conditions information (which was proprietary) is provided in Enclosure 3 of the subject Westinghouse letter.
Finally, Enclosure 3 contained the list of initial conditions. He information provided in Enclosure 3 was labeled as Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2 at the top of the page, however, the specific proprietary information was not indicated by the bracketed superscripted notation. In addition to the initial conditions, a mark-up of AP600 PRA Figure K-1 was provided in Enclosure 3. Again, the information was labeled as Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2 at the top of the page, however, the specific proprietary information was not indicated by the bracketed superscripted notation. At the time the information provided in Enclosure 3 of the subject Westinghouse letter was provided to the NRC technical staff, the information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse. At this time, over three years later, this information is no longer considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse.
Reference 5 provided the NRC assessment of the Westinghouse claim that proprietary information was provided in a letter dated February 8,1994, provided a copy of WCAP-13957, "AP600 Reactor Coolant System Mass Inventory: Funation Based Risk Analysis." The NRC assessment was that the material was not "information that the staff customarily accepts as proprietary." in addition, the staff indicated the material was used by the ;taffin the development of the AP600 final safety evaluation report and therefore should remain on the docket. At the time this report was prepared, the ouw 40/CO'd 2002G!r100t8 01 2LLr rLC 2ir 371:n3OdHOW-3dd dd 80:SI 86,ri W
1 DCP/NRCl413 i
NSD-NRC 98 5757 August 14,1998 i
information was considered to be proprietary by Westinghouse since it contained information that had commercial value to Westinghouse and was of the type ofinformation that was customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse. Wat the material was not infonnation that the staff customarily a as proprietary is not relevant to making the proprietary determination. However, in an effort to expedite the issuance of the AP600 Final Safety Evaluation Report and Final Design Approval, Westinghouse agrees to no longer consider this infonnation to be proprietary, in a telephone call on July 8,1998, the staff informed Westinghouse of a concern related to WCAP-13288 and WCAP-13289, which were associated with the AP600 check valve testing specification.
The concern was that the proprietary report had no proprietary information identified and the nonproprietary report had been placed in the public document room. Westinghouse has reviewed these reports and, at this time, considers none of the information to be proprietary.
This response addresses the proprietary issues delineated in the references.
.A.,
Brian A. McIntyre, Mana Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing jml ec:
J. W. Roe - NRC/NRR/DRP \\1 J. M. Sebrosky - NRC/NRR, DRPM W. C. Huffman - NRC/NRR DRPM H. A. Sepp - Westinghouse nwt e
40/r0*d 2002Gir10C18 01 224r PLC 2tr 3711630dNOW-Da0 dd 60:G1 86.r! 900
__