CY-98-088, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-01 on 980113-0413.Corrective Actions:Proposed LAR Submitted for Approval to Declare New Seismic Monitoring Sys Operable Per TS Manual
| ML20249B275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1998 |
| From: | Mellor R CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-213-98-01, 50-213-98-1, CY-98-088, CY-98-88, NUDOCS 9806220258 | |
| Download: ML20249B275 (9) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:__-___. a l CONNECTICUT YANKEE AT O M IC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT 362 INJUN HOLLOW ROAD e EAST HAMPToN. CT 06424-3099 June 12,1998 Docket No. 50-213 CY-98-088 Re: 10 CFR 2.201 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Haddam Neck Plant Reply to a Notice of Violation (NOV) l NRC Integrated Insoection Reoort No. 50-213/98-01 The purpose of this 'et+er is for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Com ny (CYAPCO) to reply to a notice of violation contained in NRC Inspection Report 98-01 The violation involved the modification of the seismic monitoring instrumentation, as described in the safety analysis report and technical specifications, without obtaining prior NRC approval as required by 10CFR50.59. to this letter restates the cited violation and provic:es the required CYAPCO response. As requested by the NRC's letter of May 13,1998, CYAPCO has included in the response to the cited violation a discussion on whether tae corrective actions j CYAPCO put in place to address the May 12,1997 enforcement action were effective in preventing this event from occurring. l presents CYAPCO's commitments made within this letter and the attachments. Other statements within this letter are provided for information only. l (1) Marie T. Miller letter to R. A. Mellor, *NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-213/98-01 and Notice of Violation," dated May 13,1998. \\ axo -{ m e .... m.,
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U. S. Nucle r Regul tory Commission CY-98-088/ Page 2 If there ' are any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. G. P. van Noordennen at (860) 267-3938. Very truly yours, l CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY P ANS-Russellh. Mellor I Vice President - Operations and Decommissioning Attachments cc: H. J. Miller, Region i Administrator M. T. Miller, Chief, Decommissioning and Laboratory Branch T. L. Fredrichs, Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant i .W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant K. T. A. McCarthy, Director, CT DEP Monitoring and Radiation Division l j l
m Docket Number 50-213 CY-98-088 Haddam Neck Plant Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/98-01 L i-i t June 1998 l l
U S. Nucle r Rrgul tory Commission CY-98-088/ Attachment 1/Page 1 Restatement of Violation 1 During NRC inspections conducted at the Haddam Neck Plant on j January 13-April 13,1998, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance j with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below. A. 10 CFR 50.59 states that the licensee may make changes to the facility as described in a safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless ) the proposed change involves a change in the technical specifications. Final Safety Analysis Report Section 3.7.4 describes the seismic monitoring instrumentation at Haddam neck, which includes the RSA-50 response spectrum analyzer. Technical Specification 3.3.3.3 and Table 3.3-5 identifies the following seismic monitoring instruments to be operable at all times: the DCA-300 Digital Cassette Accelerograph; the RSA-50 Response Spectrum Analyzer; and the SMR-102 Playback System. Contrary to the above, on March 5,1998, the licensee changed the seirmic monitoring system per Design Change Record (DCR) 97-019, which removed the DCA-300 Digital Cassette Accelerograph, the RSA-50 Response Spectrum Analyzer, and the SMR-102 Playback System from the facility. The facility changes were made without prior Commission approval. As a consequence of the inadequate 50.59 review, the facility was in violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.3. This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1. A). Reason For The Violation The cause of the avent was personnel error in that the personnel involved in the task were focusing on assuring equivalent Technical Specification functionality of the seismic monitoring system, rather than on the non-equivalency of the model numbers of the individual components. This approach allowed the individuals to convince themselves and others that the seismic monitoring system was functionally equvaient to the existing l system as provided in the bases of the Techri; cal Specifications, and therefore did not require a technical specification change. The seismic monitoring system was declared inoperable on July 8,1997. On August 14,1997, CYAPCO notified the NRC staff that it had decided to replace the W Digital Cassette Accelerograph, the Response Spectrum Analyzer, and the Playback System bLsed upon the unavailability of repair parts. (1) CYAPCO letter CY-97-082 from G. H. Bouchard to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated August 14,1997.
U. S. Nucirr Regul tory Commission CY-98-088/ Attachment 1/Page 2 CYAPCO also noted in the August 14,1997 lette.; that the development of the design modification to replace components with newer model equipment would take greater than the 30 days allowed by the technical specifications, and was therefore submitting a special report in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.3. The new components have improved system reliability and provide additional information on seismic events - beyond that provided by the old components. The Triaxial Servo Accelerometer, cabling and the Seismic Warning Panel were not replaced. As part of the design change process, CYAPCO personnel developed a technical specification change to modify the technical specifications to reflect the new equipment. The first draft of the safety evaluation for the design modification, which was developed in accordance with the recently revised 50.59 procedure, correctly indicated that this modification would necessitate a technical specification change. During the review process, the Licensing Department incorrectly focused on the functionality of the system and concluded that the two systems were functionally identical and that no technical specification change was needed. The Licensing Department incorrectly concluded that even though the model numbers would change in the technical specification, this was an editorial change and would not affect the basis of the technical specification and therefore, this change could be processed later. At the time this design change was being developed, the Licensing Department was aware of a separate technical specification change that was being processed to delete the seismic monitoring system from the technical specifications in accordance with A previous guidance provided by the NRC. This technical specification change would, in essence, eliminate the need to correct the perceived editorial issue. This technical specification change was delayed numerous times. A separate proposed license amendment deleting the seismic monitor requirements from the technical specifications was submitted on June 2,1998* However, to assure compliance with the technical specifications, the design change should have identified that a technical specification change was required. The Licensing Department was able to convince the Engineering Department that ary necessary editorial changes could wait until a change to remove the seismic monitoring system from the technical specifications was approved. As such, the safety evaluation was modified to eliminate the need to revise the technical specifications prior to installation of the new components. (2) NRC Generic Letter 95-10. " Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation," dated December 15,1995. (3) R. A. Mellor letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Proposed Revision to Technical Specification - Seismic Monitoring", dated June 2,1998.
us. i U, S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-98-088/ Attachment 1/Page 3 The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Nuclear Safety Assessment Board (NSAB) also had an opportunity to identify this error. The original engineering assessment of the need for a technical specification change and Licensing Department decisions that were made during the development of the change package were not highlighted by the presenters at these meetings. The focus of presentations and discussions remained on the equivalent or better functionality of the new units. Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken And The Results Achieved The seismic monitoring system contin..es to remain in the " inoperable" status, although it is currently functional and capable of determining if a seismic event has occurred. A proposed license amendment request has been submitted to the NRC by which, when approved, we will be able to declare the new seismic monitoring system " operable" per the Technical Requirements Manual. With regard to the personnel error made by the Licensing Department, this is considered an isolated error in judgment. The two Licensing engineers involved in this issue have over 45 years of plant experience and are well aware of the regulations of 10CFR50.59. In this lone example, these individuals made an error in judgment. The individuals involved have reviewed this issue and are well aware of the error and have been counseled. This error has been discussed with Licensing personnel with particular emphasis on conservative decision making and verbatim compliance with the technical specifications. j A root cause evaluation of this issue was performed. The recommendations in the root cause report have been implemented except for the inclusion of appropriate surveillance requirements in the Technical Requirements Manual. This recommendation will be completed when the proposed license amendment is approved by the NRC. Also, a review of the Design Control Manual determined that adequate procedures and processes are in place and a revision was not needed. CYAPCO has revised the design change package, including the safety evaluation, to clearly indicate that prior NRC approval of the submitted Technical Specification change is required prior to declaring this system operable. l l The Nuclear Safety Assessment Board (NSAB) conducted a critique of this error on i May 7,1998 as to why this error was not identified by the NSAB. It was suggested that the NSAB also review the supporting documentation to a rt:ety evaluation to provide a more thorough review of the proposed change. NSAB is currently evaluating this recommendation. l l 1 -_--_____J
U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ' CY-98-088/ Attachment 1/Page 4 ~ Corrisctive Steps That Will Be Takan To Avoid Further Violations The Plant Operations and Review Committee will conduct a critique of this error, review the root cause report, and discuss why this error was not identified during their review. CYAPCO will also modify the Safety Evaluation Procedure to require a management review of the 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review form in the event an Engineering recommendation regarding technical specification changes is modified. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved CYAPCO is currently in full compliance with 10CFR50.59. Effectiveness of Corrective Action From CYAPCO's June 11,1997 letter The NRC's May 13,1998, letter to CYAPCO requested CYAPCO to "please describe why the corrective actions in response to the May 12,1997 enforcement action did not prevent this violation". It is CYAPCO's position that these two problems are very different.- The May 12,1997 violation was a programmatic problem, whereby the tools available to people and the training they received, was poor. in the second example the programmatic controls are in place and are effective, however, two individuals made an - error. L The June 11,1997 letter indicated that the causes of the May 12,1997 violation, as it W . pertains to 10CFR50.59, were attributable to not having a procedure for screening 10CFR50.59 applicability and poor knowledge of the 50.59 process by both engineering and management personnel. With regard to the violation discussed in inspection Report 98-01, the cause of the event was a personnel error. The programs and training that have been completed as a result of the June 11,1997 response have had the desired L effect in that the quality of the programs to establish and maintain fW licensing basis l ~ have improved. In fact this improvement in quality has been noted by the NRC in the l letter of May 13,1998 report, wherein the NRC states "... improvements have been noted L, in the programs to establish and maintain the licensing basis...". CYAPCO is striving to continue improvement in the safety evaluation screening process which will in tum g enhance management review of the process to maintain the licensing basis. l l (4) CYAPCO lette CY-97-059 from R. A. Mellor to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reply to a Notice of Violation (NOV), inspections 50-213/95-27, 96-06, 96-07, 96-08, 96-11, 96-80 & 96-201," dated June 11,1997 L 1
s Docket Number 50-213 CY-98-088 l l l' l 1 Haddam Neck Plant CYAPCO Commitments NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/98-01 1 1 i l-l 1 l June 1998 1 L
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- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-98-088/ Attachment 2/Page 1 The following are new CYAPCO's commitments made within this letter and attachments.
Other statements within this letter are provided for information only. L CY-98-088-01 The Plant Operations and Review Committee will conduct a critique of this error, review the root cause report, and discuss why this error was not identified during their review. CY-98-088-02 CYAPCO will also moaify the Safety Evaluation Procedure to require a i management review of the 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review form in the event an Engineering recommendation regarding technical specification ' changes is modified.' f ( i i. l. l l l l .e}}