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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 ML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20210K1621999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Licensee in Process of Preparing Scope of Service Delineation for Environ Assessment to Be Performed for New Airport Located Near Russellville,Ar,To Identify Anticipated Environ Impacts from Various Agencies 1CAN079902, Documents ANO-1 Position Discussed on 990705,with Members of NRC Staff & Formally Requests Enforcement Discretion from Requirements of TS 3.7.2.C to Allow Continued Power of Operation1999-07-0606 July 1999 Documents ANO-1 Position Discussed on 990705,with Members of NRC Staff & Formally Requests Enforcement Discretion from Requirements of TS 3.7.2.C to Allow Continued Power of Operation ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl 0CAN069906, Forwards Corrected Pages to 1997 & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Repts, Issued 980430 (0CAN049804) & 990506 (0CAN059902).Ltr Number & Page Number Are at Top of of Corrected Pages to Replace Originally Pages1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Corrected Pages to 1997 & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Repts, Issued 980430 (0CAN049804) & 990506 (0CAN059902).Ltr Number & Page Number Are at Top of of Corrected Pages to Replace Originally Pages 1CAN069905, Forwards non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs 0CAN069903, Submits Rept of Each Change to or Error Discovered in Acceptable Evaluation Model or in Application of Such Model for ECCS That Affects Peak Cladding Temp,Iaw 10CFR50.46(a) (3)(ii)1999-06-10010 June 1999 Submits Rept of Each Change to or Error Discovered in Acceptable Evaluation Model or in Application of Such Model for ECCS That Affects Peak Cladding Temp,Iaw 10CFR50.46(a) (3)(ii) 2CAN069901, Forwards Probabilistic Operational Assessment of ANO-2 SG Tubing for Cycle 14. Replacement of SGs Planned for Next Refueling Outage (2R14) Scheduled for Fall of 20001999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Probabilistic Operational Assessment of ANO-2 SG Tubing for Cycle 14. Replacement of SGs Planned for Next Refueling Outage (2R14) Scheduled for Fall of 2000 1CAN069901, Submits 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Inconsistent Input in SBLOCA Analysis.Rept Submitted in Accordance with Recommendations Stated in Notice1999-06-0202 June 1999 Submits 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Inconsistent Input in SBLOCA Analysis.Rept Submitted in Accordance with Recommendations Stated in Notice 0CAN059906, Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20207E4341999-05-25025 May 1999 Submits 30-day Written Rept on Significant PCT Changes in ECCS Analysis for ANO-1.CRAFT2 Limiting PCT for ANO-1 Was Bounded by 1859 F PCT Calculated at 2568 Mwt for Crystal River 3 Cold Leg Pump Discharge Break Size of 0.125 Ft 1CAN059904, Informs NRC That Wl Franklin No Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 1.Requests License for Wl Franklin Be Withdrawn1999-05-20020 May 1999 Informs NRC That Wl Franklin No Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 1.Requests License for Wl Franklin Be Withdrawn 2CAN059906, Informs That ANO-2 UFSAR Will Be Revised to Include Comprehensive Discussions of Each Category of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices,Per NRC Review of 980806 TS Change Request Re Relocation of TS Table 3.8-11999-05-18018 May 1999 Informs That ANO-2 UFSAR Will Be Revised to Include Comprehensive Discussions of Each Category of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices,Per NRC Review of 980806 TS Change Request Re Relocation of TS Table 3.8-1 1CAN059902, Responds to NRC 990406 RAI Re risk-informed Inservice Insp Pilot Application,Submitted 980603.Approval of Alternative Is Requested Prior to End of July 1999,to Allow Sufficient Time for Util to Revise ANO-1 ISI Program1999-05-17017 May 1999 Responds to NRC 990406 RAI Re risk-informed Inservice Insp Pilot Application,Submitted 980603.Approval of Alternative Is Requested Prior to End of July 1999,to Allow Sufficient Time for Util to Revise ANO-1 ISI Program 2CAN059905, Expresses Appreciation for Staff & Mgt Team Efforts in Aggressively Pursuing Risk Informed ISI Initiative1999-05-14014 May 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Staff & Mgt Team Efforts in Aggressively Pursuing Risk Informed ISI Initiative ML20206P7681999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License (Form 398) for MW Little & F Uptagrafft.Without Encl 2CAN059903, Forwards Rev to Footnote Submitted to Provide Clarity to Aforementioned Guidance1999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rev to Footnote Submitted to Provide Clarity to Aforementioned Guidance ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 ML20206H7121999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, for Ano.All Radionuclides Detected by Radiological Environ Monitoring Program During 1998 Were Significantly Below Regulatory Limits 1999-09-09
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y J Entergy Operctions, Inc.
l { P O. Box 31995 l
Jackson. MS 39286 1995 Tel 601368 5690 .
i Jerry W. Yelverton Esecutwe Vice Prestdent l and Ch.et Operatog off<cer i
I May 31,1996 1CAN059607 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station PI-137 !
Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Proposed Tecimical Speci6 cation Changes Extending The Surveillance Test Intewal For The Reactor Trip Breakers, Reactor Trip Modules, And Electronic Trip Relays Gentlemen:
Attached for your review and approval are proposed changes to the Arkansas Nuclear One -
Unit 1 (ANO-1) Technical Speci6 cations (TSs) and NUREG-1430, Revision 1, " Standard Technical Specifications For B&W Plants" that revise the surveillance test interval for the reactor protection system reactor trip breakers, reactor trip modules, and electronic trip relays from the currently specified monthly interval to a six-month intenal. This change is being proposed because the current TS required surveillance interval, which places the unit in a test configuration susceptible to a s7urious reactor trip, has been determined to be 1 unduly restrictive. The technical justi6 cation for this proposed change is provided in Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group (BWOG) Topical Report BAW-10167, Supplement 3, "Justi6 cation For Increasing The Reactor Trip System On-Line Test Intervals," dated January,1995.
l As this submittal is part of a joint submittal by the participating B&W utilities (ANO-1, Crystal River, Oconee 1, 2, and 3, and Davis-Besse), proposed changes to NUREG-1430, j
" Standard Technical Speci6 cations - Babcock and Wilcox Plants," are attached.
The proposed change has been evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.91(a)(1) using criteria l in 10CFR50.92(c) and it has been determined that this change involves no signi6 cant l hazards considerations. The bases for these determinations are included in the attached l submittal.
100010 ,
9606100100 960531 3 y PDR ADOCK 0500 i P
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- '. U. S. NRC May 31,1996 1CAN059607 Page 2 t'
l Entergy Operations requests that the effective date for this change be within 30 days of I approval. Although this request is neither exigent nor emergency, your prompt review is requested. 1 Very truly yours, y JA)'
JWY/cws 1
Attachments To the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements contained in this submittal are true.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for Tud4>
County and the State of Mississippi, this 36 EA day of h m_ ,1996.
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N IARY PU3tC STATE OF t/: RSSiFFI AT LARGE l Notdd PublIC MY COMMESION EXPES: Aoy.t 10,1M7
, My Commission Expires BONDED THRU HE;Dml/tARCHETTI,ING i
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U. S. NRC !
May 31,1996 1CAN059607 Page 3 cc: Mr. Leonard J. Callan Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One l P.O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 Mr. George Kalman NRR Project Manager Region IV/ANO-1 & 2 i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission )
NRR Mail Stop 13-H-3 '
One White Flint North I1555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Bernard Bevill l Acting Director, Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management l Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street Little Rock, AR 72205
i ATTACHMERI ID ICAN059607 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESPECTIVE SAFETY ANALYSES IN THE MATTER OF AMENDING LICENSE NO. DPR-51 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
I ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT ONE DOCKET NO. 50-313
Attachment to ICAN059607 Pa}e 1 of 6 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES e The Bases associated with Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5 have been revised to reflect the proposed change in test interval from monthly to semi-annually, e The test intervals associated with TS Table 4.1-1 item 1," Protective Channel Coincidence Logic," item 2, " Control Rod Drive Trip Breaker," and item 62, " Electronic (SCR) Trip Relays" have been increased from monthly to semi-annually.
BACKGROUND !
The rod drive control system (RDCS) provides for withdrawal and insertion of the control rod assemblies (CRAs) to maintain the desired reactor output and is described in ANO-1 SAR l Section 7.2.2. The RDCS consists of three basic components: (1) control rod drive (CRD) l motor power supplies, (2) system logic, and (3) trip breakers. The power supplies consist of four group power supplies, an auxiliary power supply, and two holding power supplies. The group and auxiliary power supplies are of a redundant,6 phase, half-wave rectifier design. In each half of a group power supply, rectification and switching of power is accomplished through the use of Silicon Controlled Rectifiers (SCRs). This switching sequentially energizes first two, then three, then two of the six CRA motor stator windings in stepping motor fashion to produce a rotating magnetic field for the CRA motor to position the CRA. Switching is achieved by gating the six SCRs on for the period each winding must be energized. Six gating signals are required since 6 phase AC is rectified to produce the DC output to each winding.
- Gating signals for the group power supplies are generated by a solid state programmer consisting ofinput interfacing relays, a programmed microcomputer, and output drivers. The insert and withdraw commands and the driver outputs are redundant. thus providing separate but synchronized gating signals to the dual power supply units, Identical type power supplies are used for the regulating (control) groups and for the auxiliary power supply, Each half of each group power supply is capable of driving up to 12 drive mechanisms, the maximum number that may be in any group. The power supplies have dual power inputs, each half fed from separate power sources and cepable of carrying the full load.
Unlike the control group power supplies, the holding power supply is used to maintain the safety rods fully withdrawn; consequently, switching is not required. A 6-phase rectified power supply is used for this purpose. Two holding power supplies are provided. Each is rated to furnish power to one winding of 48 mechanisms.
The auxiliary power supply is used to position the safety rod groups and to provide single rod control. The safety groups are maneuvered with the auxiliary power supply and then, when fully positioned, are transferred to the holding buses described above. After positioning the safety rods, the auxiliary power supply is available to the regulating groups, through transfer relays, to serve either as a single rod controller, should repositioning of a single rod be necessary, or as a spare group controller, should one of the group control power supplies
' 4 Attachment to ICAN059607 Pap,e 2 of 6 require maintenance. The auxiliary power supply cannot be used to control more than one group at a time.
! RDCS trip breakers and electronic trip contactors are provided to interrupt power to the l control rod drive motors. When power is removed, the roller nuts disengage from the
, leadscrew and a gravity free-fall trip of the CRA occurs. Two series trip methods are provided for removal of power to the CRA motors. First, a trip is initiated when the reactor protection system (RPS) logic interrupts power to the undervoltage trip circuit of the main I l AC feeder breakers (reactor trip breakers). Secondly, a trip is initiated when the silicon !
control rectifier (SCR) gating power and the DC holding power are interrupted. As parallel i power feeds are provided on both holding and gating power, interruption of both feeds is required for trip action in either method of trip. The RDCS and associated trip circuitry are shown as simplified block diagrams in ANO-1 SAR Figures 7-9 and 7-10.
AC power feed breakers are of the 3-pole, stored energy type, each housed in a separate metal-clad enclosure. Each breaker trip mechanism provides diverse tripping action by utilizing an instantaneous undervoltage trip device and a backup shunt trip actuated by an undervoltage relay. The secondary trip breakers, mechanically gauged for DC service, are also of the stored energy type and utilize the same type diverse trip circuitry parallel connected to each breaker pair of common supply. The undervoltage relays and trip devices are operated by the RPS as ;
are the 2-pole gating power contactors. .
The RPS monitors parameters related to safe operation and trips the reactor to protect the reactor core against fuel rod cladding damage as described in the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Section 7.1.2. It also assists in protecting against reactor coolant system (RCS) damage caused by high system pressure by limiting energy input to the system through reactor trip action. The RPS consists of four identical protection channels, each terminating in a trip relay within a reactor trip module (RTM). In the normal, untripped state, each protection channel passes current to the terminating trip relay and holds it energized as long as all inputs are in the normal energized (untripped) state. Should any one or more inputs become de-energized (tripped), the terminating relay in that protective channel de-energizes (trips).
Each protection channel trip relay has four logic controlling contacts, each controlling a logic relay in one RTM. Therefore, each RTM has four logic relays controlled by the four protection channels. The four logic relays combine to form a 2-out-of-4 coincidence network in each RTM. The coincidence logics in all RTMs trip whenever any two of the four protection channels trip. The RTMs are given the same designation as the protection channel whose trip relay they contain and in whose cabinet they are physically located. Thus, the i protection channel "A" RTM is located in protection channel "A" cabinet, etc. The l coincidence logic in each RTM controls one or more breakers in the control rod drive power
! system. A block diagram of the RTMs is shown in ANO-1 SAR Figure 7-1 and a simplified j block diagram of the trip logic has been included in this submittal as Figure 1.
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Attachment to [
lCAN059607-Pa'ge 3 of 6 The coincidence logic contained in the RPS channel "A" RTM controls breaker "A" in the control rod drive power system, channel "B" RTM controls breaker "B", channel "C" RTM controls breaker "C" and electronic trip contactor "E", and channel "D" RTM controls breaker "D" and electronic trip contactor "F". Breakers "A" and "B" control all the 3-phase primary i power to the control rod drives (CRDs); breakers "C" and "D" control the DC power to rod groups 1 through 4; and electronic trip contactors "E" and "F" control the gating power to rod groups 5 through 8.
The RDCS circuit breaker and electronic trip contactor combinations that initiate a reactor trip can best be stated in logic notation as:
(A and B) or (A and DF) or (B and CE) or (CE and DF).-
This is a 1-out-of-2 logic used twice and is referred to as a 1-out-of-2 x 2 logic. When any 2-out-of-4 protection channels trip, all RTM logics trip, commanding all control rod drive breakers to trip.
The undervoltage coils of the control rod drive breakers receive their power from the protection channel associated with each breaker. A redundant shunt trip coil will also receive a breaker trip input from its associated RPS channel. The manual reactor trip switch is interposed in series between each RTM logic and the assigned breaker's undenoltage coil.
RTMs, reactor trip breakers (RTBs), and electronic trip relays are currently tested once per month, in conjunction with the monthly RPS channel test. This testing includes channel trip as well as coincidence logic functions. The tests are staggered so that one channel is tested each week. Separate testing of the RTB shunt trip devices and undervoltage devices is also performed. These tests trip the associated RTB and therefore have the effect of causing a
" half-trip" of the CRDs, which can result in a reactor trip if another RPS channel trips (via RTB or electronic trip).
TS 3.5.1.6 requires that in the event that one of the trip devices in either of the power sources to the CRDs fails in the untripped state, the power supplied to the CRDs through the failed trip device shall be manually removed within 30 minutes of detection. The condition must be corrected and the remaining trip devices shall be tested within eight hours of detection, or be in the hot shutdown condition within an additional four hours.
DISCUSSION OF CHANGE l
l This proposed change to the surveillance test intenal for the RTMs, RTBs, and electronic trip relays is based on Supplement 3 to Topical Report BAW-10167, " Justification For Increasing The Reactor Trip System On-Line Test Intervals." The methodology used in Supplement 3 is the same as used for the BWOG submittal on reactor protection system instrument string test
- intervals, BAW-10167A (Volume 1&2, and Supplements 1&2), which the NRC has reviewed
, and approved in Safety Evaluation Reports dated December 5,1988 and July 8,1992.
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1 Attachment to l ICAN059607 l'
Page 4 of 6 I For RTBs, operating experience indicates an improvement in reliability since Topical Report BAW-10167 was originally submitted. This improvement is due primarily to upgrades installed in response to Generic Letter 83-28, " Required Actions Based On Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." NRC sponsored research, reported in NUREG-1366,
" Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements," supports the L assertion that improved RTB reliability can be attributed to Generic Letter 83-28 l improvements, and also found that a primary stress mechanism for the breakers is routine
! mechanical cycling associated with testing.
t B&W Owners Group Topical Report BAW-10167, Supplement 3, January 1995, l " Justification For Increasing The Reactor Trip System On-Line Test Intenals," provides the l analysis and technicaljustification for increasing the reactor trip devices' test interval. ANO-1 l uses General Electric manufactured model AK breakers as analyzed in BAW-10167. The results of the analysis show that the test interval extension is not a significant contributor to system unavailability or core damage risk. For the Oconee design group, which includes ANO-1, described in the topical report the incremental change in unavailability is shown to be 2.9 x 10 failure / demand and the net incremental risk (difference between the reduction of spurious trips and reactor trip system failure to trip probability) is shown to be 2.6 x 104
, frequency of core damage / reactor year. Entergy Operations has rr, viewed BAW-10167 and
( found it applicable to ANO-1.
Entergy Operations has also reviewed the surveillance test history of the ANO-1 reactor trip devices for the last five years. This review found two failures of the RTBs. One failure to trip occurred in 1991 and was attributed to internal binding. In 1993, an RTB failed on response time criteria, but did trip. This failure was attributed to paint residue in the trip mechanism. I The proposed increase in surveillance intenal will not contribute to the frequency of these types of failures since neither one is considered to be time-related. Programmatic controls i introduced following the 1991 failure to trip have resulted in a reduced probability of these j l types of failure mechanisms. Data searches in support of BAW-10167 found 14 events at B&W and CE plants in which RTBs of the General Electric model AK manufacture failed to trip or were slow to trip. These events were sorted to discriminate those failures caused by cyclic stress from those caused by time-related stress. These were then included in the topical I
report considerations of RTB reliability. ,
Based on the good performance of these components, the results of BAW-10167, the low potential for significant increase in failure rates of the components under a longer test interval, and the introduction of no new failure modes, it is concluded that there is no adverse effect on ,
nuclear safety by increasing the surveillance test interval to six months. Furthermore, it l
l remains acceptable to allow the continued application of TS 4.0.2 (interval extension of 25%)
when it is utilized on a non-routine basis.
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4 Att:chment to IQAN059607 Page 5 of 6 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT II AZARDS CONSIDERATION An evaluation of the proposed change has been performed in accordance with .
10CFR50.91(a)(1) regarding no significant hazards considerations using the standards in I 10CFR50.92(c). A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment request follows:
Criterion 1 - Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.
The accident mitigation features of the plant are not affected by the proposed test interval extension. The results of the B&W Owners Group Topical Report BAW-10167, Supplement 3, " Justification For Increasing The Reactor Trip System On-Line Test Intervals," show that the test interval extension of the reactor protection system trip devices is not a significant contributor to trip system unavailability or the risk of core damage.
Therefore, this change does p_o_1 involve a significant increase in the probability or ;
consequences of any accident previously evaluated. !
Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Dilierent Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.
The reactor trip device surveillance test interval is not, in and ofitself, considered to be an accident initiator. Failure of a trip device to functio 1 is an analyzed condition and does not constitute a new or different kind of accident.
Therefore, this change does no_1 create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.
The results of the B&W Owners Group Topical Report BAW-10167, Supplement 3,
" Justification For Increasing The Reactor Trip System On-Line Test Intervals," show that the test interval extension of the reactor protection system trip devices is not a significant contributor to trip system unavailability or the risk of core damage. In addition, the uncertainty analysis contained in BAW-10167 confirms the robustness of the results by demonstrating that even with an order of magnitude change in the failure data, the incremental increase due to an increased test interval is insignificant. Entergy Operations has reviewed BAW-10167 and found it applicable to ANO-1.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, Entergy Operations has determined that the requested change does nni involve a significant hazards consideration.
Attachment to 1CAN059607 -
Page 6 of 6
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