05000333/LER-2004-001, Regarding Inadvertent Actuation of ECCS and EDGs While in Refueling Mode
| ML050270178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/2005 |
| From: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| JAFP-05-0012 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML050270178 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3332004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
11hEntergy Entergy Nuclear Northeast Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
James A. Fitzpatrick NPP RO. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093 Tel 315 349 6024 Fax 315 349 6480 T.A. Sullivan Site Vice President - JAF January 19, 2005 JAFP-05-001 2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-2004-001 Revision 0 (CR-JAF-2004-04457)
Inadvertent Actuation of Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Emergency Diesel Generators While in Refueling Mode
Dear Sir:
As referenced in our telephone notification of Nov. 22nd, (ref: Emergency Notification number 41214) of an event involving invalid actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling and Emergency Power Systems, this report is being submitted as a voluntary Licensee Event Report.
There are no commitments contained in this report.
Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. Andrew Halliday at (315) 349-6055.
TAS:ed cc:
USNRC, Region I USNRC, Project Directorate USNRC, Resident Inspector INPO Records Center JAFP File RMS
Abstract
On October 7, 2004 at 20:55, James A. Fitzpatrick was in a refueling outage with the reactor cavity flooded and the spent fuel pool gates removed. l&C Technicians performed a scheduled calibration of a reactor vessel pressure indicator. During restoration of the indicator, a pressure perturbation was introduced in the sensing line, causing reactor vessel level transmitters that share this line to sense an invalid low reactor water level condition, resulting in an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) initiation logic. The initiation logic functioned as designed, all EDGs started, but did not power the emergency buses (since there was no loss of offsite power) and all low pressure ECCS pumps started and injected into the reactor vessel. Operations personnel verified plant conditions, secured ECCS injection and secured the EDGs. All systems that actuated operated per design. As a result of the injection, water overflowed from the reactor internals storage pit and into the reactor building (RB) floor drain system, resulting in contamination of limited portions of the RB. RB access was restricted and thorough surveys were conducted to identify and post contaminated areas. Once the extent of contamination was identified, a recovery plan was implemented. This LER is being submitted as a voluntary LER.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
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Safety System Functional Failure Review:
Although the actuation signal was invalid, all safety systems responded as designed. There were no safety system functional failures associated with this event.
SSION