07-21-2004 | At 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br /> on May 23, 2004, during operations being conducted for restart of H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, the reactor operating MODE was changed from MODE 4 to MODE 3 with the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater ( AFW) pump flowpath not correctly aligned for operation, as required by Section 3.7.4 of the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications.
Specifically, the suction valve (AFW-4) to the Steam Driven AFW pump was closed with a caution tag that stated the valve was to be maintained in the "closed" position. At 2139 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.138895e-4 months <br />, the caution tag was removed and the suction valve was opened.
T Opening the suction valve restored compliance with the Technical Specifications requirement in Section 3.7.4, as delineated in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.4.1, which requires each AFW valve in each water flowpath to be in the correct position. It was determined that the root cause of this situation was conflicting requirements. Corrective actions to revise the appropriate procedures are planned that will improve the procedural guidance and prevent recurrence of this situation.
TThe health and safety of the public and plant personnel were not impacted by this event. The required safety functions were maintained, and the operating parameters of the plant were maintained within required safety limits.
T The condition described in this Licensee Event Report is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. |
---|
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) 11 � LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3) H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000261
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
At 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br /> on May 23, 2004, during operations being conducted for restart of H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, the reactor operating MODE was changed from MODE 4 to MODE 3 with the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump [EIIS System:Component BA:P] flowpath not correctly aligned for operation as required by Section 3.7.4 of the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications.
Specifically, the suction valve (AFW-4) [BA:V] to the Steam Driven AFW pump was closed with a caution tag that stated the valve was to be maintained in the "closed" position. At 2102 hours0.0243 days <br />0.584 hours <br />0.00348 weeks <br />7.99811e-4 months <br />, an Auxiliary Operator noted that the Steam Driven AFW Pump was rotating due to leakage past one of the steam admission valves (V1-8A) [BA:V], which in turn had resulted in elevated lubricating oil temperature. It was determined that the suction valve should be opened, because with the suction valve closed there is no cooling water being supplied to the Steam Driven AFW pump. The steam admission valve leakage and rotation of the pump is not directly related to the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath being improperly aligned, but assisted in the identification of the lack of pump cooling that was the result of the suction valve being closed.
At 2139 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.138895e-4 months <br />, the caution tag was removed and the suction valve was opened.
Opening the suction valve restored compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) requirement in Section 3.7.4, as delineated in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.4.1, which requires each AFW valve in each water flowpath to be in the correct position.
At 0148 hours0.00171 days <br />0.0411 hours <br />2.44709e-4 weeks <br />5.6314e-5 months <br /> on May 24, 2004, a clearance order was placed on the Steam Driven AFW pump to allow trouble-shooting of the pump and to take an oil sample to verify that no problems had been introduced by the rotation of the pump when no cooling water was being supplied. At 0549 hours0.00635 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.077381e-4 weeks <br />2.088945e-4 months <br />, the clearance order was removed from the Steam Driven AFW pump and the pump was considered available at that time. At about 1225 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.661125e-4 months <br />, the results of the oil sample verified that no bearing damage had occurred.
II. CAUSE OF EVENT
Investigation of this event was conducted using the Corrective Action Program and documented in Significant Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 127784. It was determined that the root cause of this situation was conflicting requirements (i.e., procedural errors). Specifically, a caution cap should have been placed on the main control board control switches for the Steam Driven AFW pump steam admission valves as FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3) H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000261 required by operations procedure OMM-001-9, "Equipment Tagging," and operations procedure GP-007, "Plant Cooldown from Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown," which has the caution tag placed on the Steam Driven AFW pump suction valve, did not conform to this guidance.
III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT
The health and safety of the public and plant personnel were not impacted by this event. The required safety functions were maintained and the operating parameters of the plant remained within required safety limits. The condition reported by this Licensee Event Report involves a failure to comply with the requirements of the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, as it pertains to a MODE change.
Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 states that when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. The improper alignment of the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath during the MODE change from MODE 4 to MODE 3, which occurred during startup activities associated with the recently completed refueling outage, resulted in the requirements of LCO 3.0.4 not being met.
The primary function of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is to provide feedwater to the steam generators for the removal of heat from the reactor coolant system upon a loss of normal feedwater supply. The HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, AFW system consists of three pumps and four associated flowpaths. The improper alignment of the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath affected one pump and one flowpath. The remaining two Motor Driven AFW pumps and three associated flowpaths were unaffected and operable as required.
TS LCO 3.7.4, Condition A, provides a 7-day Completion Time to restore an inoperable AFW flowpath in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
The consequences of this event are considered minimal based on several factors.
Specifically, the unit was in the process of being restarted after a refueling outage.
Therefore, the decay heat load of the reactor was substantially less than after the reactor has operated at full power for an extended period of time. Additionally, FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 PAGE 3 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000261 sufficient AFW supply was available via the Motor Driven AFW flowpaths, and no TS LCO Required Action Completion Times were exceeded.
During subsequent surveillance testing conducted on the Steam Driven AFW pump on May 25, 2004, it was discovered that there was rubbing, unrelated to the event described in this Licensee Event Report, that caused the Steam Driven AFW pump to be declared inoperable. LCO 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered at 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> on May 25, 2004. The pump repairs were completed and Condition A was exited at 1754 hours0.0203 days <br />0.487 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.67397e-4 months <br /> on May 27, 2004. Based on the results of testing and maintenance on the Steam Driven AFW pump, it is likely that the pump was inoperable until the repairs were completed on May 27, 2004. The total time that the unit was in MODE 3 while the Steam Driven AFW pump and flowpath were inoperable was approximately four days. This is less than the Completion Time for the Required Action of seven days to restore the flowpath and pump to operable status associated with LCO 3.7.4, Condition A.
The condition described in this Licensee Event Report has been determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
This event involves a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications due to the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath being improperly aligned for operation when the plant entered the MODE of applicability of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater System." Corrective actions that have already been completed include verification of the correct alignment of the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath, and the steam admission valve (V1-8A) was repaired to reduce the steam leakage that caused the Steam Driven AFW pump to rotate.
The corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this event include the following:
- Revise operations procedures to use a clearance order on the Steam Driven AFW pump, rather than a caution tag on AFW-4, during shutdown conditions when the Steam Driven AFW pump is not required to be aligned for operation. Also, include clear guidance for when the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath is to be properly aligned for operation and to ensure cooling to the Steam Driven AFW pump. This action is planned for completion by September 16, 2004.
FACILITY NAME (1) A�� DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3) H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000261
- Revise operations procedures to ensure review of caution tags, temporary modifications, and equipment inoperability records prior to crossing into MODE 5, 4, 3, or 2. This action is planned for completion by September 16, 2004.
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.Failed Component Information:
No components were considered to have failed during this event. As previously stated, the leakage associated with the steam admission valve was not directly related to the improper alignment of the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath. The subsequent discovery of inoperability of the Steam Driven AFW pump was also a separate condition that is not directly related to the improper alignment of the Steam Driven AFW pump flowpath.
B.Previous Similar Events:
A review was performed for similar events at HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, where a MODE change was not performed in accordance with the requirements of LCO 3.0.4 due to equipment misalignment. No recent events of this type were identified.
NRCFOMA366A(1-2001)
|
---|
|
|
| | Reporting criterion |
---|
05000348/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000333/LER-2004-001 | Inadvertent Actuation of ECCS and EDGs While in Refueling Mode | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000306/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2004-001 | Failure To Comply With Technical Specification 3 .7 .5 .1, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System | | 05000301/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000313/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000285/LER-2004-001 | Failure To Perform A Leakage Test Due To Lack Of Understanding of Penetration Design | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000271/LER-2004-001 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeds a Technical Specification Leakage Rate Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000266/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000318/LER-2004-001 | . Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Water Level After Feed Pump Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000289/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2004-001 | | | 05000247/LER-2004-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Oscillating Feedwater Flow and Steam Generator Level with Flow Perturbations Caused by a Degraded Feed Water Regulating Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000244/LER-2004-001 | Gaps in the Control Room Emergency Zone Boundary | | 05000255/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000364/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000461/LER-2004-001 | Clinton Power Station 05000461 1 OF 4 | | 05000414/LER-2004-001 | relPowere Vice President A Duke Energy Company Duke Power Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Rd. / CNO1VP York, SC 29745-9635 803 831 4251 803 831 3221 fax November 9, 2004
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/04-001 Revision 0
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage
Due to Small Cracks Found in Steam Generator
Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators
Attached please find Licensee Event Report 414/04-001
Revision 0, entitled "Reactor Coolant System Pressure
Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in.Steam
Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators."
This Licensee Event Report does not contain any regulatory
commitments. Questions regarding this Licensee Event Report
should be directed to R. D. Hart at (803) 831-3622.
Sincerely,
Dhiaa Jamil
Attachment
www.dukepower.corn 00- U.S. Nuclear Reguldhory Commission
November 9, 2004
Page 2
XC: W.D. Travers
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Administrator, Region II
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
E.F. Guthrie
Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Catawba Nuclear Station
S.E. Peters (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop 10-B3
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
NRC FORM 366� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)� COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50
hours. Reported lessons learned are Incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back
to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashinMon, DC 2055
LICENSEE EN/ENT REPORT (LER) 0001, or by Internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management(See reverse for required number of and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an Information col ectiond( inverse �for each block) does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person Is not required to respond o. the Information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 050- 00414 1 OF�6 4. TITLE Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in
Steam Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam Generators | | 05000368/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000423/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2004-001 | Control Rod Shutdown Bank Anomaly Causes Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000413/LER-2004-001 | Gas Accumulation in Centrifugal Charging Pump Suction Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000395/LER-2004-001 | Reactor Trip Due to Valve Failure During Forced Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000390/LER-2004-001 | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Invalid Turbine Trip Signal (P-4) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000369/LER-2004-001 | Auxiliary Feedwater System in prohibited condition due to inadequate procedure. | | 05000454/LER-2004-001 | Exelent
Exelon Generation Company, LLCRwww.exeloncorp.com NuclearByron Station 4450 North German Church Road Byron, IL 61010-9794 October 17, 2004 LTR: BYRON 2004-0111 File: 2.01.0700 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject:RLicensee Event Report (LER) 454-2004-001-00, "Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Flow Rates Below Technical Specification Requirements Due to Inaccurate Flow Indication" Byron Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-37
NRC Docket No. STN 50-454
Enclosed is an LER involving the August 17, 2004, event involving low flow conditions discovered in Unit 1 Reactor Containment Fan Coolers for a time period longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. William Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance. Manager, at (815) 234-5441, extension 2800. Respectfully, Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station Attachment LER 454-2004-001-00 cc:RRegional Administrator, Region III, NRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector— Byron Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7.2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T.6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) *I@ nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Informabon and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB:10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not _ conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1 rand ITV NAUP o natuerr An warn q par= . Byron Station, Unit 1 0500454 1 OF 5 4. Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Flow Rates Below Technical Specifications Requirements Due to Inaccurate Flow Indication | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000336/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000364/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000423/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000237/LER-2004-002 | Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000237 1 of 5 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000244/LER-2004-002 | Consolidated Rod Storage Canister Placed in Incorrect Storage Location | | 05000530/LER-2004-002 | Main Turbine Control System Malfunction Results in Automatic Reactor Trip on Low DNBR | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000305/LER-2004-002 | | | 05000247/LER-2004-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing 23 Steam Generator Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Closure Due to a De-energized Solenoid Operated Valve from Wiring Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000414/LER-2004-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to Control Rods from Shutdown Bank D Dropping into the Core | | 05000251/LER-2004-002 | AAA | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(b) | 05000397/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000346/LER-2004-002 | Reactor Trip During Reactor Trip Breaker Testing Due To Fuse Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000395/LER-2004-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Load Due to Momentary Fault on Incoming Feed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000269/LER-2004-002 | eif Powere RON A. JONES Vice President A Duke Energy Company Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Power ONO1VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax September 9, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269,-270, -287
Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1
Problem Investigation Process No.: 0-04-2808
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached
is Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1, regarding
a Main Steam Line Break mitigation design/analysis
deficiency which could result in the main and startup
feedwater control valves being technically inoperable for
mitigation of some steam line break scenarios.
This report is being submitted to supplement Revision 0
submitted July 6, 2004. At that time the root cause
investigation and an analysis of the consequences of
potentially exceeding the Environment Qualification (EQ)
envelope curve were still in progress.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR
50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical
Specifications, 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an Unanalyzed
Condition, and 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D) as a potential loss of
safety function for Accident Mitigation. This event is
considered to be of no significance with respect to the
health and safety of the public.
www.dukepower.corn Document Control Desk
Date: September 9, 2004
Page 2
Attachment: Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1
cc: Mr. William D. Travers
Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
Mr. L. N. Olshan
Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D.C. 20555
Mr. M. C. Shannon
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station
INPO (via E-mail)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7-2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DCLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to bpi @nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and(See reverse for required number of Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection doesdigits/characters for each block) not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and,1 nnmnn lc not rent Owl to tocnnni-I to the intnrmatinn rntlentinn 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 050-81 OF 0269 11 4. TITLE Main Steam Line Break Mitigation Design/Analysis Deficiency | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000313/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000271/LER-2004-002 | Special Nuclear Material Inventory Location Discrepancy | | 05000285/LER-2004-002 | Inoperable Diesel Generator for 28 Days Due to Blown Fuse During Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000336/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000311/LER-2004-002 | Failure To Comply With Technical Specifications During Reactor Protection Instrument Calibration . | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000254/LER-2004-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2004-002 | | | 05000302/LER-2004-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Due To Fuel Oil Header Outlet Check Valve Leaking Past Seat | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
|