05000364/LER-2004-002, From Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Plant Entered Mode 3 with One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable

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From Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Plant Entered Mode 3 with One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable
ML041550307
Person / Time
Site: Farley 
Issue date: 06/01/2004
From: Stinson L
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-04-0930 LER 04-002-00
Download: ML041550307 (4)


LER-2004-002, From Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Plant Entered Mode 3 with One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
3642004002R00 - NRC Website

text

L M. Stinson (Mike)

Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.5181 Fax 205.992.0341 SOUTHERN A COMPANY Energy to Serve Your World' NL-04-0930 June 1, 2004 Docket No.: 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2004-002-00 Plant Entered Mode 3 with One Train of Comnonent Cooline Water Inonerable Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2004-002-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely, LMS nso L. M. Stinson LMSfWAS/sdl Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2004-002-00 cc:

Southern Nuclear Onerating Company Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr., Executive Vice President Mr. D. E. Grissette, General Manager-Plant Farley Document Services RTYPE: CFAO4.054; LC# 14042 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. S. E. Peters, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. C. A. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector-Farley

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APPRVEDBY MB N. 350-104EXPIRES 7-31-2004 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Estmaled, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a digits/characters for each block) person Is not required to respond to, the Information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 05000364 1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Plant Entered Mode 3 with One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUNTIA REVFACILiTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV__

MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MO DAY YEAR 04 09 2004 2004 002 00 06 01 2004 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check all that apply) (11)

MODE (9) 3 20.2201 (b)

_ 20.2203(aX3)(ii)

_ 50.73(aX2Xii)(B) 50.73(a)(2Xix)(A)

POWER 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(aX4) 50.73(a)(2Xiii) 50.73(a)(2yx)

LEVEL (10) 00 20.2203(aX))

_ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A) 73.71 (a)(4)

=

20.2203(a)(2)(i)

_ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2XvXA)

_ 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2Xv)(B)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(aX3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(V)(C)

Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(aX2)(i)(A)

_50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

(if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

The design function of HV3096A, CCW from Evaporator Packages and H2 Recombiners, is to automatically close on a low-low CCW surge tank level and to isolate the safety related portion of the system from the non-seismic, non-safety related portion of the system. On April 7, 2004, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, HV3096A would not open from the Main Control Board and was opened using its manual operator. A caution tag was placed on the valve documenting the abnormal position, and a work order was written for failure of the valve to open. In Mode 5, an actual LCO Action requirement did not then exist. Personnel who authorized placing the valve on the manual operator did not recognize that the condition made the on service train of CCW inoperable, and therefore did not generate an administrative LCO tracking sheet for the upcoming Mode 4 entry.

Work order review for Mode 4 entry did not detect the condition since the work order did not note that the valve had been placed on its manual operator and opened. Personnel reviewing tagging order status for Mode 4 entry erroneously determined that the valve status given on the tagging order would not constitute an LCO when Mode 4 was entered. Performance of this review is required by procedure, but the process for performing it is not formally defined.

Mode 4 was entered on April 8, 2004, at 1729. The condition was detected on April 8, 2004 at 2200 during the tagging order review for the upcoming Mode 3 entry. The valve was taken off its manual operator and closed, returning it to its fail safe condition.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

DOCKET (2)

FACILITY NAME (1)

NUMBER LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 05000364 3

OF 3

2004 002 00 NARKATI VE (lr more space is requirea, use adaitonal copies or iwKL; i-orm 300J ( 17)

Cause of Event

This event was due to cognitive personnel error. Personnel who authorized placing the valve on the manual operator did not recognize that the condition made the on service train of CCW inoperable, and therefore did not generate an administrative LCO tracking sheet for the upcoming Mode 4 entry.

Personnel reviewing tagging order status for Mode 4 entry erroneously determined that the valve status given on the tagging order would not constitute an LCO when Mode 4 was entered.

Safety Assessment

The other train of CCW remained operable throughout this event.

The health and safety of the public were unaffected by this event.

This event does not represent a Safety System Functional Failure.

Corrective Action

Personnel involved have been coached.

A Training Advisory Notice has been sent to Operations personnel informing them of the details of this event.

The Operations staff will be counseled concerning this event during the next training cycle by August 31, 2004.

A formal Mode change tagging order review process will be instituted by July 31, 2004.

Additional Information

The following LERs have been submitted in the past two years concerning Technical Specification violations:

LER 2003-002-00 Unit 1, Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Set in Place with Technical Specification 3.4.12 Not Met.

LER 2002-003-00 Unit 1, Technical Specification Violation due to Section of Condensate Storage Tank Missile Barrier Not in Place.