05000333/LER-2008-001, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Resulting from Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation Signal

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Loss of Shutdown Cooling Resulting from Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation Signal
ML083300362
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/2008
From: Peter Dietrich
Entergy Corp, Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JAFP-08-0119 LER 08-001-00
Download: ML083300362 (5)


LER-2008-001, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Resulting from Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation Signal
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3332008001R00 - NRC Website

text

SEntergy Entergy Nuclear Northeast Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

James A. Fitzpatrick NPP P.O. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093 Tel 315 349 6024 Fax 315 349 6480 November 17, 2008 JAFP-08-0119 Pete Dietrich Site Vice President - JAF United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-2008-OO1-O0 Loss of Shutdown Cooling Resulting-From Invalid -PCIS Actuation, Signal

Dear Sir or Madam:

This report isr submitted in accordance with 10:CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Any eV'entor condition that resulted in manual or'automatic actuation of.. (B)()

general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than. one.-system" and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... (B) remove residual heat."

There are no commitments contained in this report.

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. Gene Dorman, Acting Licensing Manager, at (315) 349-6810.

Petd Dietrich Site Vice President PD:jm Enclosure cc:

USNRC, Region 1 USNRC, Project Directorate USNRC Resident Inspector INPO Records Center

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is. not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 333 1

OF 4

4. TITLE Loss of Shutdown Cooling Resulting from Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation Signal
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILIT NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000 NUMBER NO.

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 16 2008 2008 001 00 11 17 2008 N/A 05000

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

[

20.2203(a)(3)(i)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) fl 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 20.2201(d) fl 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) fl 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

O 20.2203(a)(1) 5 20.2203(a)(4) 5 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

O 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 5 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 5 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 5 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 0

20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 5 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

[

50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 5 50.73(a)(2)(x)

[]

20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 5], 50.36(c)(2) 5 50,73(a)(2)(v)(A) 5 73.71(a)(4) 000 E] 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 5 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

EJ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 5 73.71(a)(5)

[0] 20.2203(a)(2)(V) 5 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 5 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

[

OTHER C] 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below I

or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The event began on September 16, 2008 at 0734 and was terminated within 53 minutes at 0827 after restoration of SDC. During the period that SDC was isolated, the reactor was shutdown in Mode 5 for refueling, cavity flood-up was in progress and the time to boil was greater than 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The reactor water temperature at the onset of the event was 100°F and 1080F upon restoration of SDC. The resulting increase of 80F did not significantly alter plant conditions.

There were no nuclear, radiological or industrial safety consequences associated with the event. All systems performed as designed and there were no component or system failures. In the event that the RHR pumps could not be restarted, an alternate train of redundant RHR pumps was available for SDC. In the event that the SDC suction isolation valves would not open from the control room, manual re-opening of the valves could have been performed if directed by the shift manager. Therefore, barriers providing safety to the public were not compromised and the safety significance of this event is considered low.

SIMILAR EVENTS

No similar events at JAF have occurred during the past ten (10) years.

REFERENCES JAF Condition Report CR-JAF-2008-02997, SDC Isolation While Hanging, PTR