05000324/LER-2016-001, Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability
| ML16231A019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2016 |
| From: | William Gideon Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 16-001-00 | |
| Download: ML16231A019 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3242016001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
£~DUKE
~ ENERGY AUG 0 a*2016 Serial: BSEP 16-0062 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 Docket No. 50-324 Licensee Event Report 2-2016-001 William A. Gideon Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 o: 910.457.3698 10 CFR 50.73
. In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills the requirement of 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(1) for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
William R. Gideon SWR/swr Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2-2016-001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Ms. Catherine Haney, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission (Electronic Copy Only) 432 S Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4300 swatson@ncuc.net
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
~e-J"R~&~'°°'
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
~
~
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
~
l Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail
... (f' (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control httQ://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3l) number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Unit 2 05000324 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System lnoperability
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 15 2016 2016 - 001
- - 00 08 08 2016 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (b)
D 20.22os(a)(s)(i)
D 50.73(a}(2}(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a}(2}(viii}(A) 1 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.22os(a)(s)(n>
D 50.73(a}(2}(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a}(2}(viii)(B)
D 20.22os(a)(1 >
D 20.22os(a)(4)
D so.1s(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.22os(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a}(2}(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a}(2)(x) 1 O. POWER LEVEL D 20.22os(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c}(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 1s.11(a)(4)
D 20.22os(a)(2)(iii)
D so.ss(c)(2>
D 50.73(a)(2}(v)(B)
D 1s.11(a)(s).
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.4s(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2}(v)(C)
D 13.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2}(v)(D)
D 13.77(a)(2)(il D 20.2203(a)(2}(vi) litf' 50.73(a)(2}(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 1s.11(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in 05000-324 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 The apparent cause of this event is that procedures lacked sufficient control of the positions of the subject instrument valves. Procedures allowed operators to select which valves to manipulate under certain conditions, creating the possibility that valves might be left in the incorrect position during system restoration.
Safety Assessment
The purpose of the RHRSW system is to provide a heat sink for the RHR system. It normally receives suction from the NSW system supply header and moves cooling water through the RHR heat exchangers.
The RHR heat exchangers receive flow from the RHR system. In the suppression pool cooling mode, RHR water is circulated from the suppression pool to the heat exchangers where RHRSW flow cools it.
In this event, one of two RHRSW subsystems was inoperable for a period greater than the allowable seven days. The unaffected division of RHRSW was always operable during this time. Consequently, the safety function of the RHRSW system was maintained.
Based on this analysis, this event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
Any changes to the corrective actions and schedules noted below will be made in accordance with the site's corrective action program.
- The affected instrument valves were placed in the correct position, and the RHRSW system was made operable. This action is complete.
- Procedures governing use of the affected instrument valves will be revised to specifically designate as-left positions, and valve positions will be independently verified. This action will be completed by September 16, 2016.
Previous Similar Events
A review of LERs and the site's corrective action program for the past three years did not identify any previous similar occurrence~ in which mispositioned components rendered a safety system inoperable.
)
j
Commitments
This report contains no regulatory commitments. Page _3_ of _3_