05000324/LER-2014-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Airlock Door Interlock Design
| ML14135A047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/2014 |
| From: | Hamrick G Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BSEP 14-0040 LER 14-001-00 | |
| Download: ML14135A047 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3242014001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
(DUKEENERGY, George T. Hamrick Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 o: 910.457.3698 MAY 0 2 2014 10 CFR 50.73 Serial: BSEP 14-0040 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 Docket No. 50-324 Licensee Event Report 2-2014-001 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
Sincerely, George T. Hamrick MAT/mat
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Siva P. Lingam (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED'BY OMB:"NOd3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01131/2017 (02-2014)
.Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to tnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 2 05000324 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function due to Airlock Door Interlock Design
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
} FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR F
05000 DAY EARNUMBER NO.,50 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 06 2014 2014-001 00 05 02 2014 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
[E 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
F
'203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
L b,
'c)(1)(i)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[]
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[1 50..
'4i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(,
[El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[j 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 1E 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER
_ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)Abstract below or in
[:1 0.7(a)2)(i(B) El 0.73i)()(V(D)the plunger to be effective. The door may go out of alignment periodically due to heavy use, may not completely close under a high differential pressure, or may not be challenged by personnel; any of which potentially renders the plunger ineffective.
Safety Assessment
The safety significance of this event was minimal. The principal functions of secondary containment are to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive materials and to provide the means for a filtered and controlled elevated release of the reactor building atmosphere if an accident ý `ould occur. The safety objectivw. of secondary containment is to limit the releao'e of radioactivity to 'he environs after an accident so that the resulting exposures are kept to a practical minimum and are within 10 CFR 5G.CF7 ane!
10 CFR 100 values. The duration of a potential for releasc -'.c have occurred via the open airlock docrs was approximately oie to two minutes. Throughout t !s time, secondary containment negative pressure was maintained.
Corrective Actions
Any changes to the corrective actions and schedules noted below wili be made in accordancu with the site's corrective action program.
The following corrective actions have been completed.
" The secondary containment airlock doors were chsed to re-establish secondary containment.
Video monitoring equipment was installed for Units 1 and 2 at the 20 foot personnel airlock doors to be used for ingress and egress. The 50 foct personnel airlock d&)rs for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were identified as emergency use only. These actions will remain in place until the newly designed interlocks for the airlock doors have beer installed.
The following corrective action to prevent recurrence (CAPR) is p!anned.
Design and implement a new interlock for the Unit 1 and 2 secondary containment personnel airlock doors. This action is scheduled to be completed by December 30, 2014.
Previous Similar Events
A review of LERs for the past three years identified the following previous similar occurrence.
LER 2-2013-005, dated December 19, 2013, repoi~cd a loss of secondary containment integrity due to gaps in the Unit 2 secondary containment airlock door,eals. Corrective actions inclded translating design basis requirements for so. )ndary containment into acceptance criteria f-r the Unit 1 and Unit 2 secondary containment,
- - ure boundary doors, as well as comlrlting procedure revisions to incorporate the acceptanL
'eria. Since the causes of the events v--ro different, the actions from LER 2-2013-005 could not have reasonably bren c.xpected to r:-evw the condition reported in LER 2-2014-00'".
Commitments
No regulatory commitments are contained in this repoL.