05000293/LER-2018-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line

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Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line
ML18079A105
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 03/05/2018
From: Miner P
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2.18.011 LER 2018-001-00
Download: ML18079A105 (6)
v • d • e


LER-2018-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
2932018001R00 - NRC Website
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text

~Entergx March 5, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Renewed License No. DPR-35 LETTER NUMBER: 2.18.011

Dear Sir or Madam:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line, is submitted in accordance with Title 1 O Code of Federal Regulations 50.73.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (508) 830-7127.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

r

Manager, egulatory Assurance PJM/sc

Attachment:

Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line (3 Pages)

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station cc:

Mr. David C. Lew Acting Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Mr. John Lamb, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8C2A Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Letter No. 2.18.011 Page 2 of 2

Attachment Letter Number 2.18.011 Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00 Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line (3 Pages)

(

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017) httg://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

~- DOCKET NUMBER

. PAGE Pilarim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 1 OF3

4. TITLE Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR NIA 11\\.t/A 01 04 2018 2018

- 001 00 03 05 2018 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER N/A N/A
9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that applv)

N D 20.2201 (b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201 (d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D so.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

[8150.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71 (a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D so.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(s) 81 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D so.4e(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT rELEPHONE-NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Mr. Peter J. Miner-Regulatory Assurance Manager

~08-830-7127 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX C

FK y

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (ff yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

[gj NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On January 4, 2018 at approximately 1400 EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent core thermal power, Air Circuit Breakers 103 and 104 automatically opened due to a fault condition on 345KV Line 342.

The sustained loss of one incoming 345KV line due to weather related conditions requires a plant shut down. While assessing plant conditions, the operating crew reduced reactor power to approximately 81 percent core thermal power. Following these actions, it was determined that the loss of 345KV Line 342 was due to weather and a manual scram was initiated at 1409 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.361245e-4 months <br />.

This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System and automatic isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

rThere was no impact to public health and safety.

NRG FORM 366 (04-2017) (04-2017)

~*i'to~~

~

\\

I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3L)

APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020

, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LER NUMBER Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 YEAR 2018 BACKGROUND SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 001 REV NO.
- 00 The station preferred (offsite) Alternating Current (AC) power source provides AC power to all station auxiliaries required for startup and shutdown and is normally in use when the unit AC power source is unavailable. The preferred power source is that power supply which furnishes electric energy under accident or post-accident conditions. At Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), this is an Offsite Power Source (either of two 345KV lines) supplied to the Startup Transformer.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On January 4, 2018 at approximately 1400 EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent core thermal power, Air Circuit Breakers 103 and 104 automatically opened due to a fault condition on 345KV Line 342.

[rhe sustained loss of one the incoming 345KV lines due to weather related conditions defines an anticipated loss of offsite power (per PNPS procedure). Based on meeting established requirements, reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent core thermal power. Following these actions, a procedurally required manual scram was initiated at 1409. The manual scram resulted in all control rods being fully inserted. Primary Containment Isolation System Groups II, VI and Reactor Building Isolation System isolations occurred as expected. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-01 was entered when

~he reactor water level reached less than 12 inches of water due to the expected post scram reactor water level reduction. As a contingency, Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were manually started and placed on Emergency 4160V AC buses A5 and A6 per procedure.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause of the event was a static line supplied by others that failed and wrapped around all three phases of a 345KV tran~mission line (approximately 25 miles from the plant) causing the fault, during winter storm Grayson.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

rrhe Transmission Operator has removed the failed static wire which caused the line trip and has restored power to the 345KV Line 342. The Transmission Operator's Transmission Engineering Department is continuing to investigate the failure and will provide any additional details to the station. Page 2 of 3 (04-2017)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG: 1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3l)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LER NUMBER YEAR Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 2018

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 00"1 REV NO.
- 00 The actual consequences were a loss of one offsite transmission line which resulted in a procedurally required operator-initiated manual scram. There were no other actual consequences to general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, or radiological safety for this event.

!The risk from the actual event was considered minor as described above and the scram was considered uncomplicated as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02.

Had the manual scram not been initiated, the plant would have continued operating with only one 345KV line providing offsite power. This additional line remained in service during the storm.

rTherefore, based on the above information there was no adverse impact on the public health or safety.

REPORT ABILITY

!This event is reportable per the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System and automatic isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER 2015-001-00, Loss of 345KV Power Resulting in Automatic Reactor Scram During Winter Storm Juno LER 2013-009-00, Loss of Offsite Power and Reactor Scram LER 2013-003-00, Loss of Offsite Power Events Due to Winter Storm Nemo

REFERENCES:

CR-PNP-2018-00093 Page 3 of 3

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