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Wisconsin Electnc v
' POWER COMPANY -
Point Beoch Nucbar Plant (920) 755-2321.
6610 Nuclear Rd.. Iwo Rtvers WI 54241 NPL 98-0076 February 2,1998-Document Control Desk U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS3 ION Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D. C,20555 Ladies / Gentlemen:
DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 LICENSEE EVENT _REPORTJ8-001-00 MISSED SURVEILLANCES REOUIRED BY TIIE SECTION XI PRESSURE TEST PROGRAM CONSTITUTED AN OPERATION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
EDINT BEACil NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 Enclosed is Licensee Event Repcrt 98 001-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit I and Unit 2.
This report is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), an " operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications " This report describes the discovery that five 40 month Section XI pressure tests were not performed within the required time frame.
- Please coraact us ifyou r vire additionalinformatior..
Sincerely,.
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ouglas F. Johnson 1
Manager - Regulatory Services & Licensing Enclosure -
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NRC Resident inspector NRC Regional Administrator
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THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUFSY 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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- INDUSTRY, FORWARD COMMENTS RE GARDINO SURDEN ESilMATE TO THE INFORMATIOP AND (See reverse for required number of RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T 6 F33).
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NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSON. WA4mNOTON.
'l DC 20556 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION FHOJE CT P ACEfTY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMSER (2)
PA 3E (3)
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 1 OF 5 TITLE 141 Missed Surveillances Required by the Section XI Preasure Test Program Constituted an Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications l
EVEN) DATE (El l
LER NUMC'R ISI REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER F ACElTIES INVOLVI J (8)
SEQUENTIAL F4EVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAP NUMBER NUMBER MONT DAY YEAR Unit 2 05000301 H
I 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I1 001 00 02 02 93 05000 02 98 I OPERATING THIS REFORT IS SUSMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR E: ICheck one or enorel (til MODE (S)
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bo.73<aH2)uo 73.75 20.2203taH2)(io 20.2203taH4) 50.736al12)0vi OTHER 20.2203(aH2Han 60.36tcH1) 60.73(aH2Hv) so.edy in Abeweet blow
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CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONt.N T MANUFAFURER REPOR T ABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS TO NPROS l
SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 XPECTED YFAR l
YES SUSMISSION ttf yea, cornplete f XPECTED SUBMISSION DATEl.
X NO DATE (18)
ASaf RACT (Lirnet to 1400 spaces. 6 e., approstrnately 15 smgle-spaced typewritten bnes) (IS)
On January 2, 1998, while Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 was operating at 98 percent power and Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, Wisconsin Electric determined that five pressure tests required by the Gection XI pressure test program that had not been conducted were in fact missed surveillances. The pressure testing was completed on January 3, or prior to returning equipment associated with the tests to operable status.
The cause of the missed surveillances was inadequate procedural control to assure completion in accoraance with the requirements of the Pressure Test Program. Procedure changes will be completed to set test frequency requirements.
NRC FORM 3d6 (4 85) l
NRC FORM M4A U.S. LUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMi&&lON (4 961 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION F ACRRV NAME (U DOCK!T NUM8f R (21 (f M NUMBER (S)
FAOE (3)
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NU M V E 2 OF 5 001 00 98 it K1 Irf mate wece ne requeed, use addotenal casues of NRC f arm 3664) l1h 4
Event Description
^
On September 16, 1996 five ASME Section XI tests wers discovered which were not completed in accordance with the Pressure Test Program.
These were documented on a condition report (CR 96-840) at that time. As a recult of that condition report a corrective action was assigned to perform the tests prior to the end of the interval which ends for Unit 1 on November 30, 2000 and for Unit 2 on September 30, 2002.
On November 4, 1997 an additional condition report (CR 97-3730) was created to occument the operability of the systems associated with the original condition report. On January 2, 1998, while Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 was operating at 98 percent power and Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, Wisconsin Electric determined that the five pressure tests required by the Section XI pressure test program that had been identified in 1996 were in fact missad surveillances.
The following 40 month pressure tests were not performed within the required frequency and their last completion date prior to January 3, 1998 is listed:
Functional Test of the Gol Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System (February 7, 1990)
Functional Test of the G02 Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System (August 17, 1989)
Inservice Test of the Waste Gas System (Deceraber 7, 1991 and September 19, 1991) i Inservice Test of the Unit 1 Boric Acid Tanks and Transfer Piping (April 1, 1987 and April 15, 1987)
Functional Test of the Unit 2 RWST and Associated Piping (September 19, 1989)
The first three of the missed pressure tests were completed on January 3.
The remainder were tested prior to returning equipment associated with the tested systems to operable statua.
Causes
The cause of the missed surveillances was inadequate procedural control to assure completion in accordance with the requirements of the Pressure Test Program.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NSEIa E a" 3 OF 5
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Corrective Actionst 1.
The Functional Test of the Unit 2 RWST and Associated Piping was completed on November 6, 1997.
2.
An operarility determination addressing the romaining systems was complete.n accord 6nce
.ch the corrective action program and Generic Letter 91-18 on or about Nov6uber 6.,
- 1997, 3.
As discussed above, after determination that the missed tests were in fact missed surveillances, the pressure testing of the following systems wara completed on January 3, 1998:
7 Functional Test of the G01 Emergency Diesel Gcnerator Air Start System Inservice Test of the Waste Gas System Inservice Test of the Unit 1 Boric Acio Tanks and Transfer Piping The last two inspections were not completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of determining these tests were required, and appropriate systems were dec1cred inoperable.
No Technical Specification actions r-"ded to be entered.
4.
The Functional Test of the G02 Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System was completed on January 23, 1998.
5.
The procedures which control the frequency of those tests will be revised to include these pressure tests by June 1, 1998.
i 6.
The following procedures will be reviewed for revision to requ re the 40 month pressure testing to be performed in conjunction with IT-600, IT-17 and IT-1075 as discussed below.
These revisions or new procedures will be implemented by June 1, 1998.
Component and System Description The primary purpose of the G01 and G02 air start systems is to provide a tank with a nominal working pressure of 175 psi to the starting system for the emergency diesel generators.
Each unit has its cwn independent starting system, including two banks of three air storage tanks.
The pressure test for these systems is performed via a Preventive Maintenance / Surveillance Test "ork Order, li l
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Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000265
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nx1 af more om os requad, vee eHmonalreques of NRC form 36eN (17) 55 The viste gas system includes the gan decay tank and associated piping.
This test has been performed in the past by a now discontinued procedure.
The pressure test on this system will now be performed once each 40 months in conjunction with IT-600, " Waste Gas System Gaseous Leak Checks ( Annual). "
The Unit 1 boric acid tanks and transfer piping pressure tast was performed by a now discontinued procedure.
The test will. tow be conducted once each 40 months in conjunction with IT-17, Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)."
The functional tost of the Unit 2 RWST and associated piping was conducted by a now discontinued procedure.
The test will now be conducted in accordance with IT-1075, "40 month Functional Pressure Test of Refueling Water Storage Tank Piping."
Safety Assessment
Each of the systems ic a system required for the safe operation of Point Beach or response to an accident.
The pressure test program is designed to detect any evidence of leakage.
The frequency for each test in this case was 40 months.
The most recent tests showed no evidence of unacceptable Itakage.
Therefore, there was no probability of failure of these systems to perform their safety function during the period of failure to test.
None the less each of these systems would have exhibited some dagradation during their normal Technical Specification surveillances or preventctive maintenance.
No degradation of a type which would have been specifically sought out was discovered during the Technical Specification surveillances or preventative maintenance.
Therefore the haalth and safety of the public or plant personnel was not compromised by these missed surveillances.
System and Component Identifiers The Energy Industry Identification System component function identifier for eacn component / system referred to in this report are as follows:
Component / System Identifier EDG Air Start System TK Waste Gas System TK Transfer Pipe Pipe Acid Tanks TK Refueling Water Storage Tank TK FPC Fori5esA t4-esi
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION t
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DOCEET NUhetER (2)
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YEAR
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- REVISION PSint Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 wUweEn wuueER S OF-5 00 98 001 if ni tir more space se reeuemt. use essatenes coone or avec form sesAs s1n similar occurrences:
No recent reportable conditions caused by the miss of surveillances contained in a Section XI program have been found.
NRC FORM 3664 (4 95)
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| 05000266/LER-1998-001, :on 980102,missed Surveillances Required by Section XI Pressure Tp Constituted Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Control.Procedure Changes Completed to Set Test Frequency Requirements |
- on 980102,missed Surveillances Required by Section XI Pressure Tp Constituted Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Control.Procedure Changes Completed to Set Test Frequency Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000301/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00,describing Mispositioning Event Which Resulted in SG Venting Steam Outside Containment During Plant Heatup.Commitments Are Encl in Rept in Italics | Forwards LER 98-001-00,describing Mispositioning Event Which Resulted in SG Venting Steam Outside Containment During Plant Heatup.Commitments Are Encl in Rept in Italics | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000301/LER-1998-001-01, :on 980202,SG Vent Mispositioned During Plant Heatup Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Coordination.Subject Vent Valve Was Closed Approx 0928 on 980202 |
- on 980202,SG Vent Mispositioned During Plant Heatup Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Coordination.Subject Vent Valve Was Closed Approx 0928 on 980202
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000266/LER-1998-002, :on 980108,failure of High Voltage Station Auxiliary Transformer Occurred Due to Ground in Low Voltage Side Bus Duct.Operability of 1X03 Was Restored & Verified to Be in Operation by Infrared Scan |
- on 980108,failure of High Voltage Station Auxiliary Transformer Occurred Due to Ground in Low Voltage Side Bus Duct.Operability of 1X03 Was Restored & Verified to Be in Operation by Infrared Scan
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000301/LER-1998-002, Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Serious Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Component Cooling Water Return Line Check Valve Which May Prevent Closure | Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Serious Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Component Cooling Water Return Line Check Valve Which May Prevent Closure | | | 05000301/LER-1998-002-01, :on 980313,discovered Serious Degradation of Reactor Coolant Cooling Water Return Line Check Valve.Caused by Service Related Wear.Valve Was Opened,Repaired & Returned to Service |
- on 980313,discovered Serious Degradation of Reactor Coolant Cooling Water Return Line Check Valve.Caused by Service Related Wear.Valve Was Opened,Repaired & Returned to Service
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000266/LER-1998-003-01, Forwards LER 98-003-01 Re Discovery That Flow Rates Were Outside Design Basis of Plant.Rept Revises Corrective Action Commitment Re Replacement of SW Piping to Unit 2 Fan Cooler Motor Heat Exchangers | Forwards LER 98-003-01 Re Discovery That Flow Rates Were Outside Design Basis of Plant.Rept Revises Corrective Action Commitment Re Replacement of SW Piping to Unit 2 Fan Cooler Motor Heat Exchangers | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000301/LER-1998-003-01, :on 980408,ASME Section XI Pressure Test Program Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Failure to Consult Latest Rev of Increased Frequency Surveillance List. Condition Rept Will Be Written to Document Requirement |
- on 980408,ASME Section XI Pressure Test Program Surveillance Was Missed.Caused by Failure to Consult Latest Rev of Increased Frequency Surveillance List. Condition Rept Will Be Written to Document Requirement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000301/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-00,describing Discovery That Vent Valve from Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Which Had Been Placed on Increased Frequency Surveillance for Stroke Time Was Not Tested in Time Frame Required.New Commitments in Ital | Forwards LER 98-003-00,describing Discovery That Vent Valve from Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Which Had Been Placed on Increased Frequency Surveillance for Stroke Time Was Not Tested in Time Frame Required.New Commitments in Italics | | | 05000301/LER-1998-004, Forwards LER 98-004-00,which Describes Operation of Unit W/Eight Hour Average Reactor Thermal Output in Excess of Licensed Limit.Commitments Made within Ltr Encl | Forwards LER 98-004-00,which Describes Operation of Unit W/Eight Hour Average Reactor Thermal Output in Excess of Licensed Limit.Commitments Made within Ltr Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000266/LER-1998-004, :on 980114,RCP LO Collection Sys Design Did Not Comply W/App R Section III.0.Caused by Design Mod Conducted in 1981-82 Did Not Rigorously Document Design Basis of Locs. Minor Maint & Matl Repairs Were Initiated & Are Complete |
- on 980114,RCP LO Collection Sys Design Did Not Comply W/App R Section III.0.Caused by Design Mod Conducted in 1981-82 Did Not Rigorously Document Design Basis of Locs. Minor Maint & Matl Repairs Were Initiated & Are Complete
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000301/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980424,operations W/Reactor Core Power Level Was in Excess of 1518.5 Mwt.Caused by Failure to Return FT-466V Input Parameter to Off Scan.Input FT-446V Was Removed from on Scan at Approx 1452 |
- on 980424,operations W/Reactor Core Power Level Was in Excess of 1518.5 Mwt.Caused by Failure to Return FT-466V Input Parameter to Off Scan.Input FT-446V Was Removed from on Scan at Approx 1452
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-005, :on 980121,discovered That Control Rod Exercise Test Required Tech Specs Had Not Been Performed as Required. Caused Data Entry Error Into Computerized Maint Planning. Maint Planning Sys Revised |
- on 980121,discovered That Control Rod Exercise Test Required Tech Specs Had Not Been Performed as Required. Caused Data Entry Error Into Computerized Maint Planning. Maint Planning Sys Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-006, :on 980122,unanticipated Partial Svc Water Sys Isolation During Special Test Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.Procedure PBTP-77 Will Be Archived W/ Documentation of Deficiencies |
- on 980122,unanticipated Partial Svc Water Sys Isolation During Special Test Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.Procedure PBTP-77 Will Be Archived W/ Documentation of Deficiencies
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000266/LER-1998-007, :on 980123,determined That Relay Installed in 1P-29 turbine-driven Auxiliary Fdw Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Circuitry Possessed Incomplete Solder Connection.Caused by Incomplete Solder Connection.Circuitry Replaced |
- on 980123,determined That Relay Installed in 1P-29 turbine-driven Auxiliary Fdw Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Circuitry Possessed Incomplete Solder Connection.Caused by Incomplete Solder Connection.Circuitry Replaced
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-008, :on 980203,EDG Air Start Motor Solenoid Valves W/Spring Not in Accordance W/Design Occurred.Caused by Use of 275 Psig Solenoid Valve Which Does Not Meet Minimum DC Voltage Available.Solenoid Valves Modified |
- on 980203,EDG Air Start Motor Solenoid Valves W/Spring Not in Accordance W/Design Occurred.Caused by Use of 275 Psig Solenoid Valve Which Does Not Meet Minimum DC Voltage Available.Solenoid Valves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1998-009, :on 980203,inadequate TS Surveillance of under- Voltage Relay Contacts in Safeguards Sequence Circuitry,Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Adequately Test Relay Circuitry.Required Surveillance Testing Completed |
- on 980203,inadequate TS Surveillance of under- Voltage Relay Contacts in Safeguards Sequence Circuitry,Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Adequately Test Relay Circuitry.Required Surveillance Testing Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-010-01, Forwards LER 98-010-01,re Containment Spray Channel Functional Testing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 98-010-01,re Containment Spray Channel Functional Testing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1998-010, :on 980213,inadequate TS Surveillance of Containment Spray Logic Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Verify Switch Position.Bistable Switch Continuity Was Verified within 24 H of Determining Testing Was Inadequate |
- on 980213,inadequate TS Surveillance of Containment Spray Logic Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Verify Switch Position.Bistable Switch Continuity Was Verified within 24 H of Determining Testing Was Inadequate
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1998-011, :on 980214,missed TS Surveillance of Radiation Monitor Prior to Discharge Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adhere to Procedures Based on Failure to Recognize.Thorough Root Cause Evaluation Performed |
- on 980214,missed TS Surveillance of Radiation Monitor Prior to Discharge Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adhere to Procedures Based on Failure to Recognize.Thorough Root Cause Evaluation Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-012, :on 980330,discovered That twenty-seven Containment Penetration Pressure Tests Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Inadequate Program Monitoring & Mgt. Submitted Relief Request & Initiated Root Cause Evaluation |
- on 980330,discovered That twenty-seven Containment Penetration Pressure Tests Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Inadequate Program Monitoring & Mgt. Submitted Relief Request & Initiated Root Cause Evaluation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-013, :on 980416,discovered That Discharge Pressure Indicator Root Valves for Containment Spray Pumps Were Not Shut as Required.Caused by Failure to Maintain Adequate Configuration Control.Shut Subject Root Valves |
- on 980416,discovered That Discharge Pressure Indicator Root Valves for Containment Spray Pumps Were Not Shut as Required.Caused by Failure to Maintain Adequate Configuration Control.Shut Subject Root Valves
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-014, :on 980417,ESF Actuation Automatic Start of Swp Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedure That Failed to Provide Info on Expected Start of Swps P32A & P32B.Revised Procedure Iwp 95-048-02 to Provide Necessary Info |
- on 980417,ESF Actuation Automatic Start of Swp Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedure That Failed to Provide Info on Expected Start of Swps P32A & P32B.Revised Procedure Iwp 95-048-02 to Provide Necessary Info
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-015, :on 980420,containments Fan Cooler Test Results Were Outside Acceptance Criteria.Cause Is Still Being Evaluated.Pressure Washing of Air Side of Cooling Coils for All Four Unit 1 CFCs Has Been Completed |
- on 980420,containments Fan Cooler Test Results Were Outside Acceptance Criteria.Cause Is Still Being Evaluated.Pressure Washing of Air Side of Cooling Coils for All Four Unit 1 CFCs Has Been Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1998-015-01, Forwards LER 98-015-01 Re Containment Fan Cooler Test Results Outside Acceptance Criteria.Addl Info Re Corrective Actions Taken,Provided.No New Commitments,Made | Forwards LER 98-015-01 Re Containment Fan Cooler Test Results Outside Acceptance Criteria.Addl Info Re Corrective Actions Taken,Provided.No New Commitments,Made | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1998-016, :on 980427,refueling Sys Interlock Testing Did Not Match That of FSAR Description.Caused by More Literal & Restrictive Interpretation of Description in Fsar.Revised ORT-15 to Include Items Discussed in FSAR Section 9.5 |
- on 980427,refueling Sys Interlock Testing Did Not Match That of FSAR Description.Caused by More Literal & Restrictive Interpretation of Description in Fsar.Revised ORT-15 to Include Items Discussed in FSAR Section 9.5
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1998-017, :on 980512,discovered Deficient Welds on B Loop Rrtd Piping Pipe Whip Restraint.Caused by Support Being Cut & Partially Removed During Plant Mod MR 84-284.Deficient Welds Were Repaired,Inspected & Confirmed to Perform |
- on 980512,discovered Deficient Welds on B Loop Rrtd Piping Pipe Whip Restraint.Caused by Support Being Cut & Partially Removed During Plant Mod MR 84-284.Deficient Welds Were Repaired,Inspected & Confirmed to Perform
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1998-018, :on 980528,missed Surveillances for App J Testing of Containment Electrical Penetrations Occurred. Caused by Valve Discovered on Electrical Penetrations Inside Containment.Electrical Penetration Vent Valves Modified |
- on 980528,missed Surveillances for App J Testing of Containment Electrical Penetrations Occurred. Caused by Valve Discovered on Electrical Penetrations Inside Containment.Electrical Penetration Vent Valves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-019, :on 980615,discovered That Containment Hydrogen Monitors Lacked Environmentally Qualified Coating on Terminal Strips.Caused by Terminal Strips Being Disturbed W/O Subsequent Reapplication of Coating.Replaced Coating |
- on 980615,discovered That Containment Hydrogen Monitors Lacked Environmentally Qualified Coating on Terminal Strips.Caused by Terminal Strips Being Disturbed W/O Subsequent Reapplication of Coating.Replaced Coating
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-020, :on 980701,identified Group of Cables in Cable Spreading Room Which May Not Meet Licensee Fire Protection Commitments.Caused by Failure to Fully Implement Certain Requirements.Fire Watch Established Twice Per Shift |
- on 980701,identified Group of Cables in Cable Spreading Room Which May Not Meet Licensee Fire Protection Commitments.Caused by Failure to Fully Implement Certain Requirements.Fire Watch Established Twice Per Shift
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-021, :on 980702,discovered That ASME Section XI Inservice Stroke Tests Were Not Performed on Four Valves within Required Time Frame.Caused by Personnel Error.All 4 Valves Were Subsequently Tested & Found to Be Satisfactory |
- on 980702,discovered That ASME Section XI Inservice Stroke Tests Were Not Performed on Four Valves within Required Time Frame.Caused by Personnel Error.All 4 Valves Were Subsequently Tested & Found to Be Satisfactory
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1998-022, :on 980714,TS LCOs for Safety Injection & RHR Operation Occurred.Caused by Unplanned Equipment Inoperability.Duty & Call Superintendent Handbook Procedure Has Been Approved to Provide Operators Guidance |
- on 980714,TS LCOs for Safety Injection & RHR Operation Occurred.Caused by Unplanned Equipment Inoperability.Duty & Call Superintendent Handbook Procedure Has Been Approved to Provide Operators Guidance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | | 05000266/LER-1998-023, :on 980718,circulating Water Pumphouse Roof Was Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Consideration of Structural Requirements.Operability Determination to Evaluate Effect of Condition Was Completed |
- on 980718,circulating Water Pumphouse Roof Was Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Consideration of Structural Requirements.Operability Determination to Evaluate Effect of Condition Was Completed
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-024, :on 980721,inadvertent EDG Start Was Noted. Caused by Installation of Electrical Jumper Wire.Removed Temporary Jumper Wire & Revised Operating Procedure |
- on 980721,inadvertent EDG Start Was Noted. Caused by Installation of Electrical Jumper Wire.Removed Temporary Jumper Wire & Revised Operating Procedure
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-025, :on 980731,determined That Operation of CR Smoke Exhaust fan,W-13C,could Prevent Maintaining Positive Pressure in Cr.Caused by Oversight in Initial Mod Project. Administrative Controls Implemented for Operation of Fan |
- on 980731,determined That Operation of CR Smoke Exhaust fan,W-13C,could Prevent Maintaining Positive Pressure in Cr.Caused by Oversight in Initial Mod Project. Administrative Controls Implemented for Operation of Fan
| | | 05000266/LER-1998-026, :on 980914,determined That Operation of Potential Dilution in Progress Alarm Was Not Controlled IAW Ts.Caused by Failure to Address Plant Heatup Procedures. Revised Procedure OP-1A, Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown |
- on 980914,determined That Operation of Potential Dilution in Progress Alarm Was Not Controlled IAW Ts.Caused by Failure to Address Plant Heatup Procedures. Revised Procedure OP-1A, Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1998-027, :on 981013,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of non-essential Svc Water Isolation Logic,Was Identified. Caused by Failure of Existing Test Procedure to Adequately Consider All Postulated Failure Modes.Procedures Changed |
- on 981013,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of non-essential Svc Water Isolation Logic,Was Identified. Caused by Failure of Existing Test Procedure to Adequately Consider All Postulated Failure Modes.Procedures Changed
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1998-028, :on 981113,surveillances Required by Section XI Pressure Test Program Were Missed.Caused by Failure to Take Timely Action on & Implement Corrective Actions for ASME Program Problems.Completed 40 Month Pressure Test |
- on 981113,surveillances Required by Section XI Pressure Test Program Were Missed.Caused by Failure to Take Timely Action on & Implement Corrective Actions for ASME Program Problems.Completed 40 Month Pressure Test
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1998-029, :on 981227,discovered That Automatic Start Feature for Train B Svc Water Pumps Was Not Functional. Caused by Failure to Recognize Full Significance of Deenergizing Safeguards Relay Racks.Equipment Reenergized |
- on 981227,discovered That Automatic Start Feature for Train B Svc Water Pumps Was Not Functional. Caused by Failure to Recognize Full Significance of Deenergizing Safeguards Relay Racks.Equipment Reenergized
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1998-030, :on 981124,determined That Safety Related Battery Charges Should Be Reclassified as Hot Shutdown Equipment.Caused by Incorrect Assumption.Mod Will Be Installed to Provide Manual Switches |
- on 981124,determined That Safety Related Battery Charges Should Be Reclassified as Hot Shutdown Equipment.Caused by Incorrect Assumption.Mod Will Be Installed to Provide Manual Switches
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition |
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