05000259/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Adequately Test Molded Case Circuit Breakers |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to establish a preventive maintenance (PM) test program for safety-related molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) to demonstrate these breakers would perform satisfactorily upon demand. Since initial startup of all three units, the inspectors found that the licensee had not included 612 critical MCCBs, many of them safety-related, in their PM program which resulted in the MCCBs receiving no planned maintenance or testing. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as problem evaluation report (PER) 209095. The licensees corrective actions included: identifying all critical MCCBs that required preventive maintenance, developing test procedures for these MCCBs, performing testing for all affected MCCBs, and conducting an extent-of-condition review of all safety-related components potentially excluded from the PM program. This finding was determined to be of greater than minor significance because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events, such as fire, that challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the lack of a PM program for safety-related MCCBs resulted in no periodic planned maintenance or testing being performed since original installation, which in most cases was over thirty years. Based on operating experience, this could result in a breaker being slow to trip or sticking in the on position after an over-current condition. In accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to require a Phase 3 analysis since the finding represented an increase in the likelihood of a fire caused by an electrical fault at the MCCB compartment with the breaker not opening. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst conducted a Phase 3 SDP analysis, which concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross cutting aspect of Appropriate Corrective Actions in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, because the licensee did not adequately implement corrective actions to resolve the deficiencies previously identified by PER 131875 regarding certain Westinghouse MCCBs that were not in the PM program P.1(d). |
Site: | Browns Ferry |
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Report | IR 05000259/2010004 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Ross E Guthrie S Walker M Pribish J Hamman C Kontz C Fletcher P Niebaum R Williams J Eargle L Pressley W Deschaine J Wray L Jarriel C Stancil |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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