05000259/FIN-2009009-02

Finding

Title

Failure to Establish Adequate Compensatory Measures for an Out-of-Service Hose Station

Description

The team identified a Green non-cited violation of Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 Operating License Conditions 2.C(13), 2.C(14), and 2.C(7), respectively, for the licensees failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The Fire Protection Report (referenced in the Final Safety Analysis Report) requires the licensee to establish adequate compensatory measures for degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment. The licensee failed to establish adequate compensatory measures for an out-of-service hose station, in that the staged additional lengths of hose connected to the closest inservice hose station, established as a compensatory measure, did not provide equal or better protection than the out-of-service hose station that it was replacing. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program and took immediate action to review all existing fire protection impairment permits for similar problems. The licensee removed the compensatory measure and restored the out-of-service hose station to service. The licensees failure to provide compensatory measures of equal or better protection for an out-of-service hose station is a performance deficiency because it did not meet the requirements of the approved fire protection program. The finding was more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, in that it impacted manual fire suppression (i.e., fire brigade) capability; and, affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. Since Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, does not provide guidance for assigning a degradation rating to manual fire suppression, this determination was made using qualitative methods which received NRC management review as provided for in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. Although the fire protection impairment permit had been implemented for an out-of-service hose station, the hose station was still functional at the time this issue was identified, because the water supply to the hose station had not been physically isolated. However, the team concluded the fire brigade would have experienced delays in initiating manual fire suppression for a fire in a fire area covered by the impairment. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that it was directly related to the licensee not planning and coordinating work activities, consistent with nuclear safety, to ensure that adequate compensatory actions were established for an out-of-service hose station (H.3 (a))

02
Site:	Browns Ferry
Report	IR 05000259/2009009 Section 1R05
Date counted	Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.05
Inspectors (proximate)	G Pick K Miller L Suggs M Thomas P Fillion P Qualls R Nease
CCA	H.5, Work Management
INPO aspect	WP.1
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2009009

2(6)3(6)4(4)5(4)6(2)7(4)8(4)9(4)301(0)402(0)403(0)501(0)23(0)

IR 05000259/2009009: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2009Q4

CCA Matrix: 2009Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-02	2009Q1	P.2	Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Causes Loss of Unit 1 RHR System Safety Function (Section 1R22)
05000259/FIN-2009002-03	2009Q1		Unit 1 RPV Flange Leak Due to Lack of Prompt Identification and Resolution (Section 4OA2.3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-04	2009Q1	H.14	Main Generator Voltage Regulator Relay Failure Results in Unit 2 Reactor Scram (Section 4OA3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-01	2009Q2		Inappropriate Change to SSI Entry Conditions For Appendix R Fire Events (Section 1R15)
05000259/FIN-2009003-03	2009Q2	H.11 H.12	Failure to Comply with the Requirements of an RWP by Entering a Posted High Radiation Area
05000259/FIN-2009003-01	2009Q2	H.4 H.5	Failure to Assess and Manage Shutdown Risk Associated with Outage maintenance Activities
05000259/FIN-2009007-04	2009Q2		Categorization of Operator Manual Actions as Meeting Appendix R Section III.G.1 versus III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009007-03	2009Q2		Operator Manual Actions to Isolate Main Steam Safety Relief Valves for a Unit 2 Appendix R Fire Event
05000259/FIN-2009007-02	2009Q2		Containment Isolation Valves not Included in the Appendix R Separation Analysis
05000259/FIN-2009007-01	2009Q2		Suppression Pool Initial Temperature Assumed in the Appendix R Thermo-Hydraulic Analysis May not be the Most Limiting Value
05000259/FIN-2009003-05	2009Q2	P.3	Untimely Actions to Resolve Excessive IBC System Condensation Results in Unit 1 Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009003-02	2009Q2	H.7	Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment During Severe Weather Conditions
05000259/FIN-2009003-04	2009Q2		Inadequate Scoping of Risk Significant Systems For Online Risk Assessment
05000259/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q3		Unit 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Flow Oscillations
05000259/FIN-2009006-01	2009Q3	P.2	Standby Gas Treatment Subsystem A Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009009-02	2009Q4	H.5	Failure to Establish Adequate Compensatory Measures for an Out-of-Service Hose Station
05000259/FIN-2009005-03	2009Q4	H.7	Inadequate Operating Procedures Cause Partial Loss of Reactor Feedwater Which Results In Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009005-04	2009Q4	P.1 P.1(a)	Unit 2 RCIC System Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009008-01	2009Q4	P.5	Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for Failure to Develop Adequate Procedures to Ensure Tornado Depressurization Protection of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000259/FIN-2009008-02	2009Q4		Violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V for Inadequate Procedure for Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Flow Balancing
05000259/FIN-2009009-03	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Protect Cables of Systems Necessary to Achieve and/or Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Conditions for Fire Areas Subject to the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009009-01	2009Q4	H.5	Deficiencies with Emergency Lighting Units
05000259/FIN-2009008-03	2009Q4		Safety-Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers
05000259/FIN-2009009-04	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 for 20 Fire Areas
05000259/FIN-2009005-02	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Report a Safety System Functional Failure Per 10 CFR 50.73
05000259/FIN-2009005-01	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Report an Automatic RPS Actuation While Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50.73

Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)

	Q	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-05	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009002-06	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009003-06	2009Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-03	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-04	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009006-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009008-04	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Browns Ferry Findings full list]

05000259/FIN-2009009-02

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