05000259/FIN-2010002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a for failure to follow surveillance procedure 3-SR-3.4.9.1(2), Reactor Vessel Shell Temperature and Reactor Coolant Pressure Monitoring during In-service Hydrostatic Leak Testing, to ensure all required Unit 3 temperatures were being monitored and verified to meet TS 3.4.9, RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits. Unit 3 reactor operators selected a wrong reactor pressure vessel (RPV) metal temperature to monitor, and the operator and Unit Supervisor (US) failed to recognize that the incorrect RPV temperature being monitored was outside the TS 3.4.9 limits. The licensee subsequently verified all required RPV temperatures were within TS 3.4.9 limits. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as problem evaluation report (PER) 222844. This finding was determined to be of greater than minor significance because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. More specifically, the lack of reactor operator attention, and US oversight, during the RPV in-service leak test, resulted in operator errors that adversely affected the operators ability to monitor and verify RPV metal temperatures were within TS Figure 3.4.9-2 limits to preclude a low temperature overpressure event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance according to Inspection Manual Chapter 609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because it did not actually exceed the TS limit or adversely affect any mitigating systems. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance and Error Prevention in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area, because human performance errors by the control room operators resulted in selecting the wrong RPV metal temperature to monitor and not recognizing this temperature exceeded TS limits [H.4.(a)] |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2010002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Stancil T Ross H Gepford E Guthrie R Baldwin K Korth M Coursey |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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