05000259/FIN-2009009-03

Finding

Title

Failure to Protect Cables of Systems Necessary to Achieve and/or Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Conditions for Fire Areas Subject to the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2

Description

The team identified an apparent violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, for the licensees failure to ensure one of the redundant trains of cables and equipment required for safe shutdown and located in the same fire area was free of fire damage. Specifically, cables associated with equipment required for safe shutdown had not been protected by one of the methods specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (i.e., use of spatial separation, passive barriers, and fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system). This apparent violation applies to Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, and resulted from review and closure of two unresolved items which were opened in previous inspections. The licensee entered this apparent violation into their corrective action program and posted additional compensatory measures while long term corrective actions are being implemented. Failure to protect one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve post-fire safe shutdown from fire damage, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e., fire). Failure to protect safe shutdown cables and equipment from fire damage affects the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team performed a significance determination process Phase 1 screening. Given the likely impact of the risk contribution arising from the assessment of multiple fire areas, Region II senior reactor analysts performed a Phase 3 significance determination, which resulted in a preliminary risk of Greater Than Green. The team determined that this apparent violation did not present an immediate safety concern because the licensee implemented compensatory measures while long-term corrective actions are being implemented. The compensatory measures included operator manual actions to mitigate or prevent damage to equipment necessary for safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensee also implemented fire watches as additional compensatory measures to mitigate the safety hazard. Subsequent to the onsite inspection, the licensee evaluated the most critical operator manual actions, and revised selected safe shutdown instructions to include steps for independent confirmation of operator manual actions in order to improve the likelihood of success of these steps, and thus reduce the risk associated with this apparent violation. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, in that the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the issue in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance (P.1 (d))

03
Site:	Browns Ferry
Report	IR 05000259/2009009 Section 4OA5
Date counted	Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4)
Type:	Violation: Yellow
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate)	G Pick K Miller L Suggs M Thomas P Fillion P Qualls R Neaser Neasev Mccree W Rogers C Evans E Guthrie J Hanna K Kennedy L Reyes M Thomas
CCA	P.3, Resolution
INPO aspect	PI.3
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v • d • e

Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2009009

2(6)3(6)4(4)5(4)6(2)7(4)8(4)9(4)301(0)402(0)403(0)501(0)23(0)

IR 05000259/2009009: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2009Q4

CCA Matrix: 2009Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-02	2009Q1	P.2	Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Causes Loss of Unit 1 RHR System Safety Function (Section 1R22)
05000259/FIN-2009002-03	2009Q1		Unit 1 RPV Flange Leak Due to Lack of Prompt Identification and Resolution (Section 4OA2.3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-04	2009Q1	H.14	Main Generator Voltage Regulator Relay Failure Results in Unit 2 Reactor Scram (Section 4OA3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-01	2009Q2		Inappropriate Change to SSI Entry Conditions For Appendix R Fire Events (Section 1R15)
05000259/FIN-2009003-03	2009Q2	H.11 H.12	Failure to Comply with the Requirements of an RWP by Entering a Posted High Radiation Area
05000259/FIN-2009003-01	2009Q2	H.4 H.5	Failure to Assess and Manage Shutdown Risk Associated with Outage maintenance Activities
05000259/FIN-2009007-04	2009Q2		Categorization of Operator Manual Actions as Meeting Appendix R Section III.G.1 versus III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009007-03	2009Q2		Operator Manual Actions to Isolate Main Steam Safety Relief Valves for a Unit 2 Appendix R Fire Event
05000259/FIN-2009007-02	2009Q2		Containment Isolation Valves not Included in the Appendix R Separation Analysis
05000259/FIN-2009007-01	2009Q2		Suppression Pool Initial Temperature Assumed in the Appendix R Thermo-Hydraulic Analysis May not be the Most Limiting Value
05000259/FIN-2009003-05	2009Q2	P.3	Untimely Actions to Resolve Excessive IBC System Condensation Results in Unit 1 Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009003-02	2009Q2	H.7	Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment During Severe Weather Conditions
05000259/FIN-2009003-04	2009Q2		Inadequate Scoping of Risk Significant Systems For Online Risk Assessment
05000259/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q3		Unit 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Flow Oscillations
05000259/FIN-2009006-01	2009Q3	P.2	Standby Gas Treatment Subsystem A Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009009-02	2009Q4	H.5	Failure to Establish Adequate Compensatory Measures for an Out-of-Service Hose Station
05000259/FIN-2009005-03	2009Q4	H.7	Inadequate Operating Procedures Cause Partial Loss of Reactor Feedwater Which Results In Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009005-04	2009Q4	P.1 P.1(a)	Unit 2 RCIC System Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009008-01	2009Q4	P.5	Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for Failure to Develop Adequate Procedures to Ensure Tornado Depressurization Protection of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000259/FIN-2009008-02	2009Q4		Violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V for Inadequate Procedure for Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Flow Balancing
05000259/FIN-2009009-03	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Protect Cables of Systems Necessary to Achieve and/or Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Conditions for Fire Areas Subject to the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009009-01	2009Q4	H.5	Deficiencies with Emergency Lighting Units
05000259/FIN-2009008-03	2009Q4		Safety-Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers
05000259/FIN-2009009-04	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 for 20 Fire Areas
05000259/FIN-2009005-02	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Report a Safety System Functional Failure Per 10 CFR 50.73
05000259/FIN-2009005-01	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Report an Automatic RPS Actuation While Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50.73

Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)

	Q	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-05	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009002-06	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009003-06	2009Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-03	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-04	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009006-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009008-04	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Browns Ferry Findings full list]

05000259/FIN-2009009-03

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