05000259/FIN-2009008-03

Finding

Title

Safety-Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers

Description

The team indentified an Unresolved Item (URI) regarding safety-related molded-case circuit breakers (MCCBs) in safety-related applications. TVA had not implemented a test program to detect potential deterioration or to assure that all installed safety-related MCCBs would perform satisfactorily in service. TVA procedure 0-TI-395, Breaker Testing and Maintenance Program, required that critical molded case circuit breakers be subject to preventative maintenance (PM) activities. This included, in part, inspection for overheating, mechanical operation, enclosure inspection, overload trip testing, and instantaneous trip testing. The TVA program required that the testing and PM activities be performed every four to six years. UFSAR 8.6.4.1.1 stated, in part, that zero-resistance short circuits at the battery board or any point downstream can be cleared by the breakers operating within their ratings. To ensure this was satisfied by the installed equipment, degradation of breaker performance should have been detectable and acceptably controlled by periodic testing and preventive maintenance. Additionally, UFSAR 8.5.2.11 stated, in part, that the standby AC power system will meet or exceed the requirements of IEEE-308, Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems at Nuclear Generating Stations. This standard recommended that periodic tests be performed at scheduled intervals to detect deterioration of equipment and to demonstrate operability of components that are not exercised during normal operation. Four MCCBs on 250 VDC Battery Board 1 were selected by the team (breakers 607, 705, 712, 715) as part of the inspection sample. No records of PM activities were found on these four MCCBs. While addressing the extent of this condition, TVA identified a total of 622 safety-related MCCBs in both AC and DC applications for which no testing was being performed. As a result of the inspectors observations, TVA initiated PER 209095 and scheduled testing of the 622 safety-related MCCBs that were not being tested in accordance with the TVA PM program. As of December 28, 2009, TVA had successfully tested 30 of the 622 breakers. This represented a small sample of the total breaker population. The inspectors plan to review additional PM test results to determine if this performance deficiency is more than minor. This issue is unresolved pending further inspection to determine the extent of condition and impact of not implementing a test program to assure that all installed safety-related MCCBs would perform satisfactorily. (URI 05000259, 260, 296/2009008- 01, Safety-Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers

03
Site:	Browns Ferry
Report	IR 05000259/2009008 Section 1R21
Date counted	Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4)
Type:	URI:
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.21
Inspectors (proximate)	T Ross E Guthrie S Walker M Pribish J Hamman C Kontz C Fletcher P Niebaum R Williams J Eargle L Pressley W Deschaine J Wray L Jarriel C Stancilj Leivor Aiello R Berryman H Campbell C Even R Patterson B Desai J Kent
INPO aspect
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v • d • e

Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2009008

2(6)3(6)4(4)5(4)6(2)7(4)8(4)9(4)301(0)402(0)403(0)501(0)23(0)

IR 05000259/2009008: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2009Q4

CCA Matrix: 2009Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-02	2009Q1	P.2	Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Causes Loss of Unit 1 RHR System Safety Function (Section 1R22)
05000259/FIN-2009002-03	2009Q1		Unit 1 RPV Flange Leak Due to Lack of Prompt Identification and Resolution (Section 4OA2.3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-04	2009Q1	H.14	Main Generator Voltage Regulator Relay Failure Results in Unit 2 Reactor Scram (Section 4OA3)
05000259/FIN-2009002-01	2009Q2		Inappropriate Change to SSI Entry Conditions For Appendix R Fire Events (Section 1R15)
05000259/FIN-2009003-03	2009Q2	H.11 H.12	Failure to Comply with the Requirements of an RWP by Entering a Posted High Radiation Area
05000259/FIN-2009003-01	2009Q2	H.4 H.5	Failure to Assess and Manage Shutdown Risk Associated with Outage maintenance Activities
05000259/FIN-2009007-04	2009Q2		Categorization of Operator Manual Actions as Meeting Appendix R Section III.G.1 versus III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009007-03	2009Q2		Operator Manual Actions to Isolate Main Steam Safety Relief Valves for a Unit 2 Appendix R Fire Event
05000259/FIN-2009007-02	2009Q2		Containment Isolation Valves not Included in the Appendix R Separation Analysis
05000259/FIN-2009007-01	2009Q2		Suppression Pool Initial Temperature Assumed in the Appendix R Thermo-Hydraulic Analysis May not be the Most Limiting Value
05000259/FIN-2009003-05	2009Q2	P.3	Untimely Actions to Resolve Excessive IBC System Condensation Results in Unit 1 Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009003-02	2009Q2	H.7	Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment During Severe Weather Conditions
05000259/FIN-2009003-04	2009Q2		Inadequate Scoping of Risk Significant Systems For Online Risk Assessment
05000259/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q3		Unit 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Flow Oscillations
05000259/FIN-2009006-01	2009Q3	P.2	Standby Gas Treatment Subsystem A Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009009-02	2009Q4	H.5	Failure to Establish Adequate Compensatory Measures for an Out-of-Service Hose Station
05000259/FIN-2009005-03	2009Q4	H.7	Inadequate Operating Procedures Cause Partial Loss of Reactor Feedwater Which Results In Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2009005-04	2009Q4	P.1 P.1(a)	Unit 2 RCIC System Inoperable Beyond the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000259/FIN-2009008-01	2009Q4	P.5	Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for Failure to Develop Adequate Procedures to Ensure Tornado Depressurization Protection of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000259/FIN-2009008-02	2009Q4		Violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V for Inadequate Procedure for Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Flow Balancing
05000259/FIN-2009009-03	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Protect Cables of Systems Necessary to Achieve and/or Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Conditions for Fire Areas Subject to the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
05000259/FIN-2009009-01	2009Q4	H.5	Deficiencies with Emergency Lighting Units
05000259/FIN-2009008-03	2009Q4		Safety-Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers
05000259/FIN-2009009-04	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 for 20 Fire Areas
05000259/FIN-2009005-02	2009Q4	P.3	Failure to Report a Safety System Functional Failure Per 10 CFR 50.73
05000259/FIN-2009005-01	2009Q4	P.2	Failure to Report an Automatic RPS Actuation While Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50.73

Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)

	Q	Title
05000259/FIN-2009002-05	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009002-06	2009Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009003-06	2009Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-03	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009004-04	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009006-02	2009Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2009008-04	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Browns Ferry Findings full list]

05000259/FIN-2009008-03

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