Text

Attachment 11: Procedures and Training Material on Maintaining RPV Pressure Low
	ML18360A479
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Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	12/14/2018
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; NRC/RGN-III, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ATTACHMENT 11 Procedures and Training Material on Maintaining RPV Pressure Low Contents

1. CPS 4200.01, "Loss of AC Power," Rev 26

2. CPS 4411.09, "RPV Pressure Control Sources," Rev 6a

3. CPS 4306.01, "Extended Loss of AC Power/ Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink," Rev 1

4. EOP-1, "RPV Control," Rev 30

5. CPS 4306.01 P004, "FLEX Low Pressure RPV Makeup," Rev Oa

6. LP87552, "RPVControl (EOP-1)," Rev011 (6-10-15)

7. LP87594, "EOP Support Procedures," Rev 002

8. SE-EOP-01, "EOP-1 RPV Control Pressure Control Using Bypass Valves," Rev 003

9. SE-EOP-02, "EOP-1 RPV Control Pressure Control Without Bypass Valves," Rev 003

10. SE-EOP-03, "EOP-1 RPV Control Pressure Control Without Bypass Valves and SRVs,"

Rev 003

11. SE-EOP-04, "EOP-1 RPV Control Loss of Feedwater with High Pressure Makeup Available," Rev 004

12. SE-EOP-05, "EOP-1 RPV Control Loss of Feedwater with High Pressure Makeup Not Available," Rev 003

13. SE-EOP-06, "EOP-1 RPV Control Loss of All High Pressure Makeup," Rev 003

14. SE-EOP-07, "EOP-1 RPV Control Large Break LOCA Outside Containment", Rev 003

CPS 4200.01 LOSS OF AC POWER SCOPE OF REVISION:

Incorporated revisions 25 - 25b. Revision marks not retained.

© IR 04122939 EDITORIAL - Removed erroneous statement regarding Div III DG as an "alternate AC power source" from section 1.4. Converted all "CJr" statements to NOTEs. Added wording to step 4.2.5.2 for consistency with step 4.2.1.6.

Minor formatting adjustments - no revision marks used.

IR 04172512 EDITORIAL - Reworded step 4.1.1 for consistency with direction in section 4.4.

Affected Pages: 1, 3-15, 18-32, 40-50 I CONTINUOUS USE I

ORIGINATOR: Steven M. Frederick CLASS CODE: SNNN SQR: NIA APPROVAL DATE: 10/09/18 CURRENT CHANGES TO GENERAL REVISION Change# Dat;e List; of Affected Pages Rev. 26 Page 1 of 50

CPS 4200.01 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. 0 Symptoms 3 2.0 Automatic Actions 4 3.0 Immediate Operator Actions 5 4.0 Subsequent Actions 5 4.1 Global Subsequent Actions 5 4.2 Loss/Transfer of 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) [lCl] 6 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus 21 4.4 Station Blackout 25 5.0 Final Conditions 32 6.0 Discussion 32 APPENDICES APPENDIX A - Equip Control Switches To Be Placed In 38 PULL-TO-LOCK Or LOCKED APPENDIX B - Instrument Availability 39 APPENDIX C - Rad Monitor Trip Logic Power Supplies 41 APPENDIX D - Loss of Offsite Power Site Support Activities 42 APPENDIX E - Loss of Power Impact on Communications 47 Rev. 26 Page 2 of 50

CPS 4200.01 1.0 SYMPTOMS 1.1 Generic

1. Any interruption of power on an AC bus which results in:

1. Automatic transfer of the bus to any alternate source,

2. Loss of voltage, current and watts on the bus, or

3. Bus under voltage, auto transfer of feeder breaker, breaker tripped, breaker not available, and transfer blocked alarms on the bus(es).

1.2 4160V Bus lAl, lBl, and/or lCl (ECCS)

1. Loss of all operating AC equipment powered from ECCS bus, including partial lighting loss.

1.3 6900V Bus lA(lB) and/or 4160V Bus lA(lB) (Non-ECCS)

,' NOTE RC&IS Full Core Display will be lost shortly after the bus deenergizes. Failure to verify Shutdown Criteria before losing the Full Core Display will require alternate means of verifying rod position per CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram. <<CM-4>> *

1. Loss of all operating AC equipment, incl~ding:

RC&IS Full Core Display (Feed from 6.9KV Bus lA, Unit Sub O, MCC C):

Nuclear instruments (excluding APRMs)

Level indication (P678 - Standby Info Pnl)

RPV metal temperatures (P614 --NSSS Recorder Pnl) powered from the non-ECCS bus

Partial lighting loss

2. Reactor scram, turbine trip and Group 1 isolation.

Rev. 26 Page 3 of 50

CPS 4200.01 1.4 Station Blackout (SBO) <<CM-1>>

0 1. A total loss of offsite AC power sources (including main generator), and failure of Div 1 & Div 2 DG power sources.

1. Loss of all operating AC equipment including nuclear instruments, level indication and RPV metal temperatures powered from the ECCS and non-ECCS busses, and a loss of all AC lighting.

2. Reactor scram, turbine trip and MSIV closure.

3. As long as DC busses are available, instrumentation may be available where powered by UPS supplies, such as the NSPS ATMs.

1.5 Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)

1. A total and sustained (>1 hour) loss of both offsite and onsite AC power sources as a result of a postulated Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) which is expected to exceed the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months SBO coping period.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 2.1 4160V Bus lAl, lBl and/or lCl (ECCS)

1. The loss of voltage relays will trip RAT 'B' (ERAT),

and close in ERAT (RAT 'B'), if sufficient voltage exists on the standby bus.

2. After a 15 sec time delay with degraded voltage, the secondary under voltage relays will strip the 4.16KV Bus lAl (1AP07E), lBl (1AP09E), or lCl (1E22-S004), start the associated DG, and will tie the DG onto the bus within 12 seconds, even if the alternate off site source is available.

Loads will be automatically connected to the ECCS bus as required by ECCS initiation logic, if power is available.

3. If ECCS bus 1Bl is de-energized, the Emergency Seal Oil Pump, 1T008P and the Emergency Bearing Oil Pump, 1T005P will start.

Rev. 26 Page 4 of 50

CPS 4200 ..01 2.2 6900V Bus lA(lB) and/or 4160V Bus lA(lB) (Non-ECCS)

1. When the UAT is the lost bus and the RAT(s) are available, non-ECCS bus(es) on the UAT will transfer to the RAT(s) (6.9KV lA and lB to RAT 'A';

4.16KV lA to RAT 'B';

4.16KV lB to RAT 'C') ..

2. If one 6900V bus is available, the following 480V bus's cross-tie breakers auto close to re-energize the associated 480V busses.

480V Bus 10/lE, 1AP14E/15E

480V Bus lH/lI, 1AP18E/19E

480V Bus lL/lM,' 1AP24E/25E

480V Bus C/D, 0AP43E/44E

480V Bus 0/P, 0AP91E/92E

3. If both 6900V busses are NOT available or a bus under-voltage condition is reached, all associated bus load breakers will trip.

4. Reactor scram, turbine trip and Group 1 isolation may occur depending on which bus is de-energized.

5. If 6900V Bus lA(lB) is de-energized, then Diesel Fire Pump OFPOlPA(B) will start.

3.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Within a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the Shift Manager SHALL determine if an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) exists.

Rev. 26 Page 5 of 50

CPS 4200:01 NOTE 0 1. Throughout the use of this procedure, refer to as needed:

CPS Emergency Plan Annex (EP-AA-1003)

CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation

CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram

CPS 3514.0lCxxx, Bus/Unit Sub Outages checklists

CPS 3703.02C001, Irradiated Fuel Handling Checklist

ITS LCO section 3:8

LS-AA-1110 REPORTABLE EVENT SAF 1.51: Reporting of NERC Standard Requirements for applicability

2. During performance of CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation~

Local verification may be necessary.

Resetting of shunt tr.ips, especially TB MCC lM, is essential to system recovery actions.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS NOTE

1. Security SHALL be notified any time the 138 kV system, the 12kV system, or circuit switchers 4508/4538 are de-energized/re-energized and to evaluate for the implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with SY-CL-101-102 and SY-AA-101-102.

2. Ensure appropriate Security actions are taken for a loss of AC power.

[CA#4010227-60] <<CM-10>>

4.1 G1oba1 Subsequent Actions 0 1.. IF An ELAP exists (see step 1.5 for Definition)

THEN STOP executing Station Blackout actions AND Immediately execute CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of OHS.

2. IF 4160V Bus lAl OR lBl auto transferred to the alternate power supply and re-energized THEN Proceed quickly to section 4.2.1, 4160v lAl(lBl)

Dead Bus Transfer.

Rev. 26 Page 6 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.1 Global Subsequent Actions (Cont'd)

3. Deleted.

4. Determine which AC busses were transferred/lost and perform applicable sections below:

Loss/transfer of 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) 4.2

Loss of Non-ECCS Bus 4.3

Station Blackout (SBO) 4.4 4.2 Loss/Transfer of 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) 4.2.1 4160v lAl(lBl) Dead Bus Transfer NOTE This section is written assuming that, from normal plant conditions,- 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) has properly transferred to the other off site source or its respective DG (i.e., bus was dropped and picked up) .

1. Deleted.-

2. Verify status of Fuel Pool Cooling (FC):

IF FC has tripped, THEN Isolate the Upper Containment pools per CPS 3317.01, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup (FC).

AND Monitor Pool Temperature per CPS 3317.01, Abnormal section "High Temperature Spent Fuel Storage Pool."

Rev. 26 Page 7 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.1 4160v 1A1(1Bl) Dead Bus Transfer (Cont)

NOTE Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) should restart without operator action on the S.TANDBY fans if power is lost for less than ~6 seconds.

3. Verify running/restore Fuel Building Ventilation (VF).

1. Open/verify open 1VF04Y/9Y, Fuel Bldg Sply Outbd Isol Dmprs

2. Open/verify open 1VF06Y/7Y, Fuel Bldg Sply Inbd Isol Dmprs

3. Verify 1 VF04CA (B), Fuel Bldg Exh Fan running/starts

4. Verify 1 VF03CA (B), Fuel Bldg Sply Fan running/starts

5. IF Div l(Div 2) Sec CNMT Isolation Damper(s) has closed and can NOT be reopened, AND/OR VF fans do NOT start when the isolation dampers open, THEN Maintain secondary*containment dP using Standby Gas (VG) per CPS 3319.01 (VG).

NOTE (i) Running a VP train does NOT require Non-ECCS power available (IA, WS, etc.)

4. Verify status of Drywell Cooling (VP).

IF VP has tripped, THEN: 1) Control drywell pressure using Mixing Compressors per CPS 3316.01, CNMT Combustible Gas Control (HG).

2) IF Div 2(Div 1) ECCS Bus is energized, THEN Attempt to restore VP.

Rev. 26 Page 8 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.1 4160v 1A1(1B1) Dead Bus Transfer (Cont)

NOTE (l) VC fans should automatically restart approximately 40 seconds after the 480 V bus is reenergized. The control switch for 0VC03CA must remain in the Auto-After Start position for the fans to restart. The amber lights will NOT energize when the fans trip.

5. Verify status of Control Room Ventilation (VC).

IF The VC fans and/or chiller do NOT restart, THEN Start one train of VC per CPS 3402.01, CONTROL ROOM HVAC (VC) .

CAUTION.

1. The solenoid valves fail shut on loss of power.

2. The valves do NOT automatically reopen when power is restored.

3. The* FPM pumps restart when power is restored.

4. Failure to promptly reopen the valves or deenergize the FPM pumps may result in-pump damage. (ITS LCO 3.4.7.b impact)

6. Restore OR secure the Fission Product Monitor [CPS 3315.02 (LO)] per one of the following steps: <<CM-3>>

1) [CNMT 781'] Open/verify open 1E31-F014/15/17/18, LO Drywell Isol Valves.

OR

2) Deenergize FPM Pumps by opening following breakers at AB MCC 1Al-8C (1AP72E) AB 781' East [Dbl Bkrs]:

Ckt #43: Feed to 1E31-P001 Iodine-Noble Gas Sample Panel.

Ckt #47: Feed to 1E31-P002 Iodine-Noble Gas Sample Panel.

Rev. 26 Page 9 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.1 4160v lAl(lBl) Dead Bus Transfer (Cont)

NOTE 0 Aux Seal Injection Pump may NOT be available if LOCA shunt trips have occurred.

7. Verify status of the RR Pumps/seals.

IF An RR ~ump has tripped, OR Shows signs of degraded seals, THEN Take ~ctions per CPS 3302.01, Reactor Recirculation (RR).

8. Ensure that the Div 1(2) Battery Charger is operating or restart it per CPS 3503.01, BATTERY AND DC DISTRIBUTION (DC).

NOTE 0 Shunt Trips are to be expected due to the deenergization of the ECCS busses, especially if NSPS is NOT being supplied from its normal source(s). Resetting of shunt trips is essential to system recovery actions.

9. Shunt Trips <<CM-5>>

For the Div l(Div 2) bus(es),

1) Perform a walkdown of the Div l(Div 2) shunt trips using CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation, Table 1, SHUNT TRIPS.

2) Notify the CRS of any shunt trip breakers found in the tripped position.

3) Tripped breakers shall be reset per CRS direction.

10.Verify all MSIV Solenoids are still energized.

> 113 mA at MSIV Solenoid Current meters:

Outboard (1B2i-F028's meters 1B21-661/662 A~D) located in 1H13-P661A/C.

Inboard (1B2l-F022's meters 1B21~659/660 A-D) located in 1H13-P662B/E .

. 11.Verify no NSPS 'blind trips' exist.

lLl & 1L2 lights energized in 1H13-P661 Bay B, 1H13-662 Bay c, 1H13-663 Bay B, 1H13-664 Bay C Rev. 26 Page 10 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.1 4160v lAl(lBl) Dead Bus Transfer (Cont)

NOTE (j) During performance of CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation, local verification may be necessary.

12.Refer to as needed:

CPS Emergency Plan Annex (EP-AA-1003)

CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation

CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram

ITS LCO section 3.8

CPS 3514.0lCxxx, Bus/Unit Sub Outages checklists

LS-AA-1110 .REPORTABLE EVENT SAF 1. 54: Reporting of NERC Standard Requirements for applicability

13. Verify the status of Div l(Div 2) Shutdown Service Water (SX) [CPS 3211.01 (SX)]

14. Coordinate with Transmission Supply Services Dispatch) for switchyard status, and for restoration information/support.

15. As resources permit, verify in-servi~e/restore the CNMT SA Header per CPS 3214.01 (IA & SA): Pressurizing the CNMT and DW SA Header section ..

/

Rev. 26 Page 11 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.2 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) De-Energized

1. Deleted.

NOTE (l) Aux Seal Injection Pump may NOT be available if LOCA shunt trips have occurred.

2. Verify status of the RR Pumps/seals.

IF An RR pump has tripped OR Shows .signs of degraded seals, THEN Take actions per CPS 3302.01, Reactor Recirculation' (RR).

NOTE (l) Running a VP train does NOT require Non-ECCS power available (IA, WS, etc.).

3. Verify status of Drywell Cooling (VP).

IF VP has tripped, THEN: 1) Control drywell pressure using Mixing Compressors per CPS 3316.01, CNMT Combustible Gas Control (HG).

2) IF Div 2(Div 1) ECCS Bus is energized, L

. THEN Attempt to restore the VP train on the opposite bus to service.

4. Maintain secondary containment dP using Standby Gas (VG) per CPS 3319.01 (VG).

5. Verify status of Fuel Pool Cooling (FC):

IF FC has tripped, THEN Isolate the Upper Containment pools per CPS 3317.01, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup (FC).

AND Monitor Pool Temperature per CPS 3317.01, Abnormal section "High Temperature Spent Fuel Storage Pool."

Rev. 26 Page 12 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.2 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) De-Energized (Cont)

NOTE Loss of DC power significantly complicates plant operation.

Charger restoration and extending existing DC capability should be pursueq aggressively.

6. Reduce non-essential DC loads on the Div l(Div 2)

Battery as necessary to minimize battery discharge rate.

Use CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During A SBO.

CAUTION A loss of power to 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) with a concurrent loss of power to 125VDC MCC lA (lB) will cause 1IA005 and 1IA008 (1IA006 and 1IA007) to fail closed. Closure of.either set of valves will isolate the 3" instrument air ring headers in containment and the drywell, leading to gradual depressurization of the air headers and opening of scram valves at the hydraulic control units.

7. IF At any point during this procedure, IA to the Primary Containment is lost and can NOT be immediately restored, AND The reactor is critical, THEN: 1) Place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

2) Enter CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram.

NOTE During performance of CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation, local verification may be necessary.

8. Refer.to as needed:

CPS Emergency Plan Annex (EP-AA-1003)

CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation

CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram

ITS LCO section 3.8

CPS 3514.0lCxxx, Bus/Unit Sub Outages checklists.

LS-AA-1110 REPORTABLE EVENT SAF 1.54: Reporting of NERC Standard Requirements for applicability Rev. 26 Page 13 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.2 4160V Bus 1Al(1B1) De-Energized (Cont)

NOTE 0 Refer to CPS 3312.03 (RHR-SDC) for Alternate SOC Temperature Monitoring when necessary.

9. Determine remaining operable critical instrumentation per APPENDIX B, Instrument Availability.

10. Coordinate with Transmission Supply Services (Dispatch) for switchyard status, and for restoration information and support.

11. Record TRIP DATA on the appropriate TRIP DATA SHEET listed in section 8.0, DOCUMENTS.

12. As time and resources permit, de-energize rad monitor trip logic power supplies per APPENDIX C prior to restoring 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) to preveht inadvertent actuation/isolations. <<CM-2>>

13. IF* IA is lost to the Primary Containment and Drywell and can NOT be restored AND It is necessary to increase the ability to remove decay heat from the reactor (to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN or avoid lifting Safety Relief Valves, etc.).

THEN Consider gagging open IA to the Containment to allow reopening the MSIVs (reference IR 1630318 and EC 396365).

Rev. 26 Page 14 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.3 Re-Energizing 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Using RAT 'B' (ERAT)

1. Place breakers for the dead bus in PULL-TO-LOCK:

DG: DG lA(B) [CJ Output Bkr

RAT: 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Mn Bkr

ERAT: 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Res Bkr

2. Make the RAT 'B' (ERAT) and 1RT4 (1ET4) bus ready as appropriate for plant conditions per CPS 3505.01, 345

& 138 KV Switchyard (SY) and ERO recommendations.

3. (Local) For applicable Bus lAl(lBl) re-energization:

Verify Ckt 32 (RHR control) on DC MCC lA(lB) is re-energized if turned off by CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During A SBO.

4. (Local) Res.et any ECCS Bus and/or RAT 'B' (ERAT) lockouts.

NOTE (i) Reference to "RAT 1" is associated with all Plant 1 RATs, including RAT 'A', 'B' and 'C'.

5. Close RAT 1 (ERAT) Circuit Switcher 4.538 (B018).

6. Place 4160V. Bus lAl (lBl) [lCl] Mn (Res) Bkr Sync switch to ON.

CAUTION ECCS systems may auto start without an adequate fill & vent, resulting in potential water hammer damage and unavailability of the ECCS function. The systems will be restored/restarted as required after the bus is re-energized.

7. As resources are available, prevent the Divisional ECCS system(s) from starting by either:

Holding the ECCS pump switch in OFF OR

Pulling.the ECCS pump's control power fuses.

Div 1: RHR A [4160V Bus lAl ( 1AP07E) , 1AP07EG]

LPCS [ 4160V Bus lAl ( 1AP07E) , 1AP07EE]

Div 2: RHR B [ 4160V Bus lBl (1AP09E), 1AP09ED]

RHR C [ 4160V Bus lBl (1AP09E), 1AP09EF]

Div 3: HPCS: [HPCS Switchgear ESF Division 3, 1E22-S004, 1E22-C001]

Rev. 26 Page 15 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.3 Re-Energizing 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Using RAT 'B' (ERAT)

(Cont)

8. Re-energize the bus by holding the 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Mn (Res) Bkr in the CLOSE position, then return the breaker to the AUTO position.

9. Place 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) [lCl] Mn (Res) Bkr Sync switch to OFF.

10. Proceed to section 4.2.5, Actions After 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Reenergized.

Rev. 26 Page 16 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.4 Re-Energizing 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Using DG lA(lB) [lC]

1. Place breakers for the dead bus in PULL-TO-LOCK:

DG: DG lA(B) [CJ Output Bkr

RAT 'B': 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) [lClJ Mn Bkr

ERAT: 4160V Bus lAl (lBl) [lClJ Res Bkr

2. (Local) Place DG lA(B) [CJ Engine Maintenance Switch to LOCKOUT [MAINTENANCE - DG lCJ position.

3. Mak~-DG ready as ~ppropriate for plant conditions per CPS 3506.01,* Diesel Generator And Support Systems (DG) and ERO recommendations.

4. (Local) For-applicable Bus lAl(lBl) re-energization:

Verify Ckt #13 ( 14) [ DG lA ( lB) control J & Ckt #32 (RHR control) on DC MCC lA(lB) [1DC13(14)EJ are re-energiz~d if turned off by CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load S~edding During~ SBO.

5. (Local) Reset any ECCS Bus and/or DG lockouts.

6. Place DG lA(B) [CJ Output Bkr in AUTO*.

7. Place DG lA(B) [CJ Control in AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

8. For DG lA start during a SBO:

Stop the RCIC Gland Seal Air Compressor to ensure sufficient DG lA field flashing current on the DG lA start sequence.

CAUTION ECCS systems may auto start without an adequate fill & vent, resulting in potential water hammer damage and unavailability of the ECCS function. The systems will be restored/restarted as required after the bus is re-energized.

9. As resources are available, prevent the Division~l ECCS system(s) from staFting by ~ither:

Holding the ECCS pump switch in OFF OR

Pulling the ECCS pump's control power fuses.

Div 1: RHR A [ 4160V Bus lAl ( 1AP07E) , 1AP07EGJ LPCS [4160V Bus lAl ( 1AP07E) , 1AP07EEJ Div 2: RHR B [4160V Bus lBl (1AP09E), 1AP09EDJ RHR C [ 4160V Bus lBl (1AP09E), lAPO 9EFJ Div 3: HPCS: [HPCS Switchgear ESF Division 3, 1E22-

' S004, 1E22-C001J Rev. 26 Page 17 of 50

CPS. 4200.01 4.2.4 Re-Energizing 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Using'DG lA(lB) [lC]

(Cont)

10. (Local) Start D~ lA(B) [C] on*a bus under voltage signal by placing DG lA(B) [Cl Engine Maintenance Switch to OPERATE [AUTO - DG lC] position.

NOTE 0 1. If DG fails to start due to active trip signals, a manually initiated LOCA signal should be considered which will bypass most DG trip signals.

2. If SX pump failed to start, placing the SX pump C/S in AFTER-STOP may reset its logic to allow it to be started.

11. Verify DG auto start actions per CPS 3506.01 (DG) including SX pump start and lineup configuration.

<<CM-6>>

Rev. 26 Page 18 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.5 Actions After 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Re-Energized NOTE 0 Section 4.2.5 steps may be performed in any order or concurrently.

N/A steps which are NOT applicable to bus re-energization event/plant conditions.

1. CNMT/DW Instrument & Service Air (IA & SA)

1) At 1H13-P800 (Section 5041), verify open/re-open:

OW IA Hdr Inbd Isol Vlv, 1IA008.

CNMT IA Outbd Isol Vlv, 1IA005.

OW IA Outbd Isol Vlv, 1IA007.

CNMT IA Inbd Isol v1v; 1IA006.

2) As needed, perform any additional actions as described in CPS 3214.01 (IA & SA): Pressurizing the CNMT and OW IA Header section. (i.e., ADS) .

3) As resources permit, verify in-service/restore the CNMT SA Header per CPS 3214.01 (IA & SA):

Pressurizing the CNMT and OW SA Header section.

CAUTION

1. The solenoid valves fail shut on loss of power.

2. The valves do NOT automatically reopen when power is restored.

3. The FPM pumps restart when power is restored.

4. Failure to promptly reopen the valves or deenergize the FPM pumps may result in pump damage. (ITS LCO 3.4.7.b impact) 0 2. Restore OR secure the Fission Product Monitor [CPS 3315.02 (LO)] per one of the following steps. <<CM-3>>

1) [CNMT 781'] Open/Verify Open 1E31-F014/15/17/18, LO Drywell Isol Valves.

OR

2) Deenergize FPM Pumps by opening following breakers at AB MCC 1Al-8C (1AP72E) 'AB 781' East [Dbl Bkrs]:

Ckt #~3: Feed to 1E31-P001 Iodine-Noble Gas Sample Panel.

Ckt #47: Feed to 1E31-P002 Iodine-Noble Gas Sample Panel.

Rev. 26 Page 19 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.5 Actions After 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Re-Energized (Cont)

NOTE (l) 1. Restarting ECCS systems without a complete fill & vent may be required when ACC is NOT available p'er the EOPs.

2. Water hammer in the system should be expected.

3. ECCS room access may NOT be available for fill & vent due to radiation or temperature levels.

3. Perform applicable ECCS fill & vent surveillances.

Evaluate if any other surveillances.or lineups should

( be performed.

4. Re-energize appropriate DC loads which may have been shed by CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During A SBO.

NOTE (l) Shunt Trips are to be expected due to the deenergization of the ECCS busses and relay races upon ECCS bus reenergization.

\

5. Shunt Trips <<CM-5>>

For the affected divisional bus(es),

1) Perform a walkdown of the divisional shunt trips using CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation, Table 1, SHUNT TRIPS.

2) Notify the CRS of any shunt trip breakers found in the tripped position.

3) Tripped breakers shall be reset per the CRS direction.

6. Verify all MSIV Solenoids are still energized.

> 113 mA at MSIV Solenoid Current meters:

Outboard (1B21-F028's meters 1B21-661/662 A-D) located in 1Hl3-P661A/C.

Inboard (1B2l-F022's meters 1B21-659/660 A-D) located in 1H13-P662B/E.

Rev. 26 . Page 20 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.5 Actions After 4160V Bus lAl (1Bl). [lCl] Re-Energized (Cont)

7. Verify no NSPS 'blind trips' exist.

lLl & 1L2 lights energized in 1H13-661B/2C/3B/4C

8. Notify Chemistry of bus restoration (may impact Post Accident Sample Panel or other Chemistry sampling capabilities).

9. WHEN Loss of AC event is stabilized, and as resources allow (do NOT delay critical system restoration),

1) Restore ECCS bus power sources to the RAT 'B' (ERAT) per CPS 3506.01 (DG) and/or CPS 3501.01, High Voltage Auxiliary Power *system. <<CM-7>>

2) Perform:

a) A detailed MCR panel & alarm window walkdown to ensure no other unidentified issues exist.

b) A relay house walkdown, preferable concurrent with CPS 4200.0lDOll, Switchyard Trip Data Sheet.

c) CPS 9082.01, Offsite Source Verification d) CPS 9082.02, Electrical Distribution Verification Rev. 26 Page 21 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.2.5 Actions After 4160V Bus lAl(lBl) [lCl] Re-Energized (Cont)

10. System Restorations As applicable, verify/complete shutdown of affected systems, and as time/resources permit, recover the system ~er the CRS direction and system pro~edure.

This may include, but is NOT limited to:

NOTE (i) Concern - ECCS initiation on hi DW pressure.

Drywell Ventilation (VP) [CPS 3320.01 (VP)]

NOTE (i) May need to start VG [CPS 3319.01) until VF is restored to supp9rt Secondary CNMT dP.

Fuel Bldg Ventilation (VF) [CPS 3.404. 01 (VF)]

NOTE (i) FC Surge Tank will increase when FC trips. CNMT Upper Pool level will lower.

Fuel Pool Cleanup (FC) [CPS 3317.01,(FC)]

NOTE (i) RACS 5 VDC Power Supply may 'crow bar' - an OV/Spike protection feature which opens the supply ckt, but does NOT cause the power supply breaker to trip open. IMD support required to reset.

Rod Control via RC&IS / RACS [CPS 3304.01 (RC&IS)]

Main Control Room HVAC (VC) [CPS 3402. 01 (VC)]

DG Air Compressors [shunt trip item]

Containment Mani to ring a.nd Process Sampling /Post Accident Sampling (CM/PS/PASS) [shunt trip item]

Reactor Water Cleanup (RT) [CPS 3303. 01 (RT) J

E32/E51 Rosemount ACU Meter Gross Failures (reset)

NOTE (i) Should return to NORMAL To LOAD. Need EMD support to reset NSPS Latching Relay.

Loss of Sync to NSPS Inverters. [CPS 3509. 01 (IP)]

Shutdown Service Ws1ter (SX) [CPS 3211. 01 (SX)]

Rev. 26 Page 22 of 50

L CPS 4200.01 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus NOTE 0 Aux Seal Injection Pump may NOT be available if LOCA shunt trips have occurred.

1. IF. CRD pumps are NOT available, THEN Within one hour AND as resources permit, initiate Recirc Pump Auxiliary Seal Injection Pump

_Operation per CPS 3304.01, Control Rod Hydraulic

& Control (RD) .

2. IF Feedwater is unavailable or unnecessary, THEN Shut 1B21-F065A(B), RPV Inlet Vlvs.

3. IF CW is lost or reduced in flow, THEN Notify Security to implement compensatory measures in accordance with SY-CL-101-102 and SY-AA-1010-102.

4. Prepare affected busses for re-energization as follows:

1) Place equipment control switches in PULL-TO-LOCK or LOCKED for the de-energized busses per APPENDIX A (page 27) .

2) For 6900V Bus lA: 480V Unit Sub C or RW MCC.E only:

As time and resources permit, de-energize rad monitor trip logic power supplies per APPENDIX C prior to restoring the effected bus(es),

to prevent inadvertent actuation/isolations. <<CM-2>>

3) Prepare applicable de-energized 6900V bus(es),

4160V bus(es) or 480V unit sub-station(s):

a. Place Mn & Res Feed Brk(s) for the bus(es) in PULL-TO-LOCK.

b. If normal DC control power is NOT available,*

transfer DC control po~er at the associated bus(es) by inserting control power fuses to the reserve supply receptacles locally at the bus (es).

[Cubicles: 6900V lA: 1AP04EA; 6900V lB: 1AP05EK; 4160V lA: 1AP06EH; 4160V lB: 1AP08EL]

5. WHEN An offsi te electrical power source is available, THEN Energize the affected bus(es) per:

CPS 3505.01, 345 & 138 KV Switchyard (SY)

CPS 3501.01, High Voltage Auxiliary Power System

CPS 3502.01, 480 VAC Distribution Rev. 26 Page 23 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus (Cont)

NOTE

6. WHEN Fire protection jockey pump is restored, THEN Return Diesel Fire Pumps, OFPOlPA(B) to STANDBY per CPS 3213.01, Fire Detection And Protection.

NOTE

Charger restoration and extending existing DC capability should be pursued aggressively.

2. It is permissible to use CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During a SBO.

3. Per TG Engineer, a turbine cdast down take~ - 2.5 hrs, plus 30 min for bearing cooldown.

4. Use 3509.01C005 (3509.01C006) Appendix A for load list/impacts of UPS lA (UPS lB) load shedding. May be desired to 'keep PPC computers and DCS screens to provide MCR key informatjon as long as possible. UPS lA (UPS lB) still assumed to be secured within 90 minutes.

7. Reduce non-essential DC loads as necessary to minimize 1

battery discharge rate.

The following loads are assumed to be secured in noted time frame: <<CM-9>>

BOP lE: EBOP, 1T005P [30 minutes]

BOP lE: UPS lA, 1IP06E [90 minutes]

BOP lF: Erner Ltg Cab 162, 1LL62E [60 minutes]

BOP lF: UPS lB, 1IP07E [90 minutes]

NOTE BOP battery life is expected to be -2 hours; after which the EBOP

& ESOP will be lost, and hydrogen in the Turb Bldg will then be a concern.

8. Securing ESOP:

1) Vent HY from Generator per 3111.01 (HY) Emergency Generator HY Venting section

2) Secure ESOP.

9. Secure EBOP as soon as practical.

Rev. 26 Page 24 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus (Cont)

NOTE (i) 1. SOC Temperature recorders 1E12~R601, 1B33-R604 and 1B21-R643 are lost when 6900V Bus lA is lost.

2. Refer to. CPS 3312.03 (RHR-SDC) for Alternate SOC Temperature Monitoring when necessary.

10. Determine operable critical instrumentation per APPENDIX B, Instrument Availability (page 28).

11. Evaluate loss of power impact on communication needs*:

NOTE (i) 1. Step 4.3.11.1 is required to ~upport LAN router data links for EOF, State and EROS after UPS is discharged (- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ).

2. Security support is required to access Door 22: SB Basement Telephone Room.

1) Standard Telephone Service PCS Phone Service SBB LAN Core Routers (OCQ04E)

Upon Loss of 6900V Bus lA or CB MCC C (OAP22E):

In the SB Basement Telephone Room (Door 22):

Swap OCQ04EA, 208V Transfer Sw (on East Wall)

FROM Main Feed [OCQ07EA: CB MCC C-4BL (0AP22E)]

TO Reserve Feed [OCQ07EB: AB MCC 1Al-8B (1AP72E)].

2) IF PCS Phone system is NOT available, THEN Use Operations Radios for communication.

3) Refer to Appendix E- Loss of Power Impact on Communications for more information.

12. Coordinate with Transmission Supply Services (Dispatch) for switchyard status, and for restoration information/support.

13. Refer to APPENDIX D - Loss of Offsite Power Site Support Activities for actions that may be appropriate.

14. Record TRIP DATA on the appropriate TRIP DATA SHEET listed in section 8.0, DOCUMENTS.

15. Notify Chemistry of bus restoration (may impact Post Accident Sample Panel or other Chemistry sampling capabilities).

Rev. 26 Page 25 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus (Cont)

NOTE (l) 1. Sub-steps of 4.3.16 may be performed in any order or concurrently.

2. Step 4.3.16.1 is required to close 1CD039, SJAE Min Flow Valve, when condensate system is lost.

3. Notify security when CW is AVAILABLE and to evaluate removal of compensatory actions in accordance with SY-CL-101-102 and SY-AA-101-102. [CA 4010227-60] <<CM-10>>

16. Non-ECCS Bus Re-energized Actions WHEN Power is restored to a non-ECCS bus, THEN Perform the following:

1. Place 1B21-F304A and F304B, MS To SJAE lA(lB) in NEUTRAL/AFTER-CLOSED.

NOTE (l) Plant conditions may require restoring systems in a different order than listed. However, lE/lF BOP batteries/battery chargers (DC) should be restored first. Instrument Po~er from UPS lA/lB busses is needed to recover remaining systems.

CAUTION

1. Water hammer and lifting of relief valves is a concern during system restoration.

2. Fluid systems should be checked, filled, and vented prior to restoring to service.

(l) 2. Restore following plant systems to service:

lE/lF BOP batteries/battery chargers (DC)

Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Plant Servic~ Water (WS)

Service and Instrument Air (SA/IA)

Reactor Water Cleanup (RT): as needed to support RPV forced circulation/normal heat sink

Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (WT)

Control Rod Drive Hydraulics (RD)

Reactor Recirculation (RR): as needed to support RPV forced circulation/normal heat sink

Makeup/Cycled Condensate (MC/CY)

Plant Chill Water (WO)

Circulating Water (CW)

Feedwater/Condensa~e (FW/CB/CD)

Turbine and Generator Auxiliaries (TG)

HVAC systems Rev. 26 Page 26 of 50

CPS 4200~01 4.4 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) <<CM-1>>

NOTE 0 Executing CPS 4306.01, Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of OHS, takes precedence over attempts to restore offsite AC and/or DGs.

1. The Shift Manager shall conduct a continuous assessment of the prognosis for restoration of power to Div 1 and/or Div 2.

IF Within 1 HOUR of the Station Blackout, there has NOT been action taken that would provide a HIGH ASSURANCE of restoration of Div 1 and/or Div 2 power within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months SBO coping period, THEN STOP executing Station Blackout actions AND Immediately execute CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of OHS.

2. The Shift Manager shall continue to monitor SBO recovery actions.

IF While executing SBO actions, recovery actions prove to be unsuccessful THEN STOP executing Station Blackout actions AND Immediately execute CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of OHS.

3. TIME CRITICAL ACTIONS NOTE 0 1. Divisional Battery distribution panel load shedding should be comple~ed first followed by BOP lE/lF.

2. The one-hour time to complete load shedding begins at the onset of the SBO ..

CAUTION Equipment losses or malfunctions can occur when battery voltages are::;; 105 voe.

1. Initiate and complete within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During A SBO.

2. Bypass RCIC trips/isolations per CPS 4410.00COOl DEFEATING RCIC INTERLOCKS.

Rev. 26 Page 27 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.4 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) (Cont) <<CM-1>>

3. TIME CRITICAL ACTIONS (Cont)

NOTE The following actions for section 4.4.3.3 are referenced from section 8.2.4 of CPS 3101.01. Local manual valve operation may be necessary.

3. Place ADS Backup Air Bottles in service by performing the following:

a. Open 1IA012A - AB 7 62' East Gas Control Boundary

b. Open 1IA013A - FB 781' West above Div 1 H202 skid NOTE (i) Performance of steps 4.4.3.3.c - 4.4.3.3.d may be delayed if containment is inaccessible.

-c. Close/Verify Closed 1IA012B - Located AZM 50 -

788

d. Close/Verify Closed 1IA0l3B - Located AZM 240 -

C788 - Above BW Recv Tnk Room Rev. 26 Page 28 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.4 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) <<CM-1>>

3. TIME CRITICAL ACTIONS (Cont)

NOTE (i) 1. Preferred HPCS suction source for injection during a SBO is the suppression pool.

2. Minimize HPCS operations which pump the RCIC storage tank into

the suppression pool.

3. Preferred RCIC suction source is the suppression pool when utilized for level control.

4; RCIC isolations are bypassed per step 4.4.3.2.

5. Use of suppression pool as a RCIC suction source is limited to 197°F suppression pool temperature during a SBO.

4. Level Control Actions Control RPV water level Level 3 (8.9 in.) to Level 8 (52 in.) using HPCS or RCIC.

IF RPV level can NOT be stabilized, THEN Expand level band to -30 in. to +40 in. Wide Range with a target of O in. to +10" Wide Range.

Expanding the pressure band to 600 - 1065 psig will assist with pressure/level coordination efforts.

IF HPCS is available or in service THEN Secure RCIC (if running)

AND ENSURE RCIC DC Loads are secured within 10 minutes of event.

HPCS [preferred] (CPS 3309. 01 - HPCS)

RCIC [alternate] (CPS 3310.01 - RCIC, or (if required) CPS 4003.01C002, RSP - RCIC Operation)

Rev. 26 Page 29 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.4 .STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) (Cont) <<CM-1>>

3. TIME CRITICAL ACTIONS (Cont).

NOTE 0 Minimize depressurization to maximize RCIC availability and to minimize suppression pool heat-up.

5. Pressure Control Actions Stabilize RPV pressure below io65 psig using SRV's or RCIC.

SRVs (CPS 3101.01 - MS/SRVs)

[Ref. Fig 1, SRV DISCHARGE LOCATIONS, page 25]

Use non-ADS SRVs first, followed by ADS SRVs in a manner that:

0 Precludes uneven suppression pool heating, and 0

Avoids the running HPCS or RCIC pump suction.

RCIC (CPS 3310.01 or CPS 4003.01C002)

Maintain RPV pressure >"150 psig when using RCIC.

4. Additional Actions NOTE Some of the following actions may require support from the ERO and IMO. The CRS is expected to initiate these actions~

1. Initiate IMO actions to remotely monitor suppression pool, CNMT and OW temperatures per CPS 4200.01C003, Monitoring CNMT Temperatures During A SBO. <<CM-8>>

2. Initiate manual CNMT isolation actions per CPS 4200.01C004, Manual CNMT Isolation During A SBO.

3. Refer to step 4.3 Loss of Non-ECCS Bus, for action required to further reduce loads on BOP DC Busses.

4. To provide cooling to an operating Div 1 or 2 inverter, block open the inverter room door and the door from the cable spreading area to the insulation lay-down area.

Rev: 26 Page 30 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.4 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) (Cont) <<CM-1>>

4. Additional Actions (Cont)

NOTE

1. It is expected during a SBO that a High Drywell Pressure will occur. Performing an upper suppression pool dump at the one hour point is performing action that would be expected to occur if power were available.

2. The upper pool dump should be performed promptly at the one hour point; containment conditions are expected to degrade as time progresses.

5. IF CPS4306.0l Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of UHS has NOT been entered AND Entry is NOT anticipated.

THEN WHEN the SBO reaches the one (1) hour point, dump the upper containment pools by manually opening both of the valves in either set below:

l) 1SM001A AND 1SM002A (Containment 803' elev, AZM 45)

OR

2) 1SM001B AND 1SM002B (Containment 803' elev, AZM 315)

NOTE Portable lighting designated for fire protection should be used during the SBO.

6. Keep trying to make any power source available per:

CPS 4200.01, Section 4.2, Loss/Transfer of 4160V Bus 1Al/1Bl

Consider using 'Backfeed Using MPTs & UATS' per CPS 3501.01, High Voltage Auxiliary Power System.

Rev. 26 Page 31 of 50

CPS 4200.01 4.4 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) (Cont) <<CM-1>>

4. Additional Actions (Cont)

NOTE (i) 1. Habitability concerns are based on prolonged exposure to > 120*° F. Peak worst case MCR area temperatures are expected to be 107°F.

2. This action also includes deenergizing non-essential computer equipment in the computer room.

3. The DCS/PMS computer is left in-service until it has failed due to high heat conditions. DCS/PMS should be de-energized after it is no longer functioning.

7. When ERO support is available, initiate supplemental MCR cooling per CPS 4200.0lCOOl, MCR Cooling During A SBO.

8. CPS 4303.01P023, Cross Connecting Div 3 DG to Div 1(2) ECCS Electrical Busses, was written for extensive damage/beyond design basis events.

For extended SBO conditions, it should be referenced for strategies the ERO could employ to supply Div 1 or 2 ECCS busses from the Division 3 diesel generator to support decay heat removal.

Rev. 26 Page 32 of 50

CPS 4200.01 NOTE If pool level drops belov 18 ft 6 in .*

read pool te*perature on bulk locations.

f,. Relative Ther*ocouple Location llli--------lEI

... ECCS *Ring Header Suction -

L.ll.i Relative Suction Pipe Location Rev. 26 Page 33 of 50

CPS 4200.01 5.0 FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1 Affected bus/busses have been re-energized.

5.2 Notify CMO Group to perform thermography on any recently closed .and energized:

1. SY Disconnect (4501/4503, 4505/4507, 4509/4511, 4513/4515, 4517/4519, 4521/4523, 4520, 4525).

2. Circuit Switcher 4538 (RAT) & B018 (ERAT) if transformer assumed any significant loading.

5.3 Restoration activities being developed by the Emergency Plan Recovery Phase.

6.0 DISCUSSION 6.1 SBO: Switchyard Concerns Contact the Transmission Services Operator for information on grid restorations and priorities.

It will assist the TSO to provide them information regarding plant electrical status (such as diesel status and switchyard status) and plans for use of site power when restored (would we tie on emergency buses if grid is still degraded?) .

If the grid is degraded, site personnel may be requested to perform high voltage switching based on availability of transmission personnel and travel conditions.

See Appendix D.11 for more information.

6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary <<CM-1>>

1. All SBO actions are based on the Extended Power Uprate Report - Station Blackout EPU-T0903, which assures equipment ope~ability and adequate core cooling for a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months coping period.

Restoration of an offsite, or a Div 1 or Div 2 power source is expected within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months period.

The Report analyzes 2 cases:

SBO with only HPCS available (Cas~ 1)

.SBO with only RCIC available (Case 2)

The licensing analyzes are based on conservative worst case initial assumptions, and does NOT credit the RCIC Storage Tank, or operator responses prior to 10 mins.

Actual plant response should be well below any of the worst case conclusions listed below.

/

Rev. 26 Page 34 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

To avoid an unnecessary delay in taking actions for a ELAP, the SM must continually access recov~ry efforts.

If power can NOT be restored to Div 1 or Div 2 equipment capable of removing heat from the Containment in a timely manner, direction is provided to cease SBO directed actions and immediately commence actions IAW CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of OHS.

These actions parallel SBO actions through the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months assumed coping period. These actions will provide alternate power and water sources and allow Containment heat removal.

2. Level 3 to Level 8:

This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION .

Maintain consistent with EOP and Reactor SCRAM actions.

System leakage for a SBO, including RR pump seals

(- 38 gpm) and inventory loss from SRVs, is assumed to be - 100 gpm for the duration of the SBO.

RR Pump seals are expected to remain intact.

The analysis assumes an initial 19 gpm seal leakage per pump, which does NOT change during the SBO event.

However, seal failure may occur upon RR pump restart.

3. RPV Pressure This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION.

1) Below 1065 psig: consistent with EOP parameters.

2) > 150 psig when using RCIC: Analysis bounded at the ITS LCO 3.5.1 pressure for normal operability, while ensuring suppression pool temperature does NOT exceed 185°F in the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months coping analysis.

4. DC load shedding within 1 hour:

This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION.

Essential control circuits will be powered from station batteries.

Battery loads are reduced to insure a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months DC supply.

DC power is needed to maintain manual SRV control and RCIC operation.

5. Bypass RCIC LO logic:

This is a TIME SENSITIVE ACTION taken to prevent a RCIC turbine trip during SBO conditions, and to prevent an inadvertent isolation when power is restored.

Rev. 26 Page 35 of 50

CPS 4'200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

6. RCIC/HPCS suction on pool:

Preferred source to maximize RCIC water availability.

Maintains RCIC storage tank as a reserve supply of cool water for cooling the RCIC lube oil, thereby extending the survivability duration of the event beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

7. Supplemental MCR Cooling:

Habitability concerns are based on prolonged exposure to> 120°F.

Peak worst case MCR area temperatures are expected to be 107°F.

(SBO: Technical Bases Summary continued next page)

Rev. 26 Page 36 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

8. SBO Plant Parameter Responses:

Following Table summarizes the 'worst case' SBO analyses values (Case 1 - HPCS or Case 2 - RCIC)

This information should be used to help prioritize actions based upon actual plant response.

Item/Area Initial Value Worst Case SBO Value Limiting Value Outside Air Temperature 96°F NIA NIA Main Control Room 86°F 107°F 120°F MCR- Computer Area (4) l 76°F@ 60 minutes 86°F 120°F (DCSIPMSfailure is expected) 105°F @4 hours RCIC Pump Room (1) ll0°F 148°F 180°F RCIC Instrument Panel Room Area ll0°F l68°F 180°F Main Steam Tunnel I48°F - 250°F 300°F Suppression Pool Temp (2) 95°F - 177°F 197°F (3)

Drywell Pressure 1 psig 7.0 psig 23.2 psig (LOCA)

Containment Pressure 1 psig 3.7 psig 7 psig (LOCA)

Electrical Panel Areas l 78°F (short intervals)

Div 1/2 DC MCCs 95°F 104°F I22°F (continuous)

Battery Rms - Div 1/2 95°F 104°F Battery Rms - Div 3/4 95°F 95°F Analyses allows for Inverter Rms - Div 1/2 I04°F - 141 / - 139°F exceeding the Inverter Rms - Div 3/4 104°F - 108 / - 125°F continuous limit.

Div 1: 15.4% (Case 1)

Battery Capacity - Div 1/2 100% 5.3% (Case 2) NIA Div 2: 2.3% (Case 1/2)

Battery Capacity - Div 3/4 100% > 5% margin @ 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months NIA SRV Lifts (Air capacity) NIA 37 lifts w/o backup air 100 lifts (1) RCIC room temperature assumes the RCIC turbine gland seal air compressor is operating for the duration of the SBO. If the gland seal air compressor is NOT operating, steam leakage from the RCIC turbine gland seals will raise RCIC room temperature> 200°F.

(2) Suppression Pool Temperature will exceed the EOP-6 Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) at - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . However, for a SEO event, Emergency Depressurization is NOT required (EOP-6 allows for this) since the intent of HCTL is to mitigate an irreversible trend in pool temperature by blowing down before the pool condensing capability is lost. At the end of the SEO, suppression pool temperature is restored below the HCTL via RHR Suppression Pool Cooling.

(3) SEO analysis shows the pool temperature will NOT exceed 185°F (SP design limit),

however for continued RCIC operation, the EOP limit of 197°F (oil cooling) is used, thereby extending the survivability duration of the event beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

(4) Computer equipment is left running until heat induced failure occurs to maximize operator ability to respond to the SEO event using valid D_CS/PMS indications.

(DISCUSSION Section continued on next page)

Rev. 26 Page 37 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.0 DISCUSSION 6.3 For abnormal or emergency operations (EOPs, Off Normal, etc.), promptly notify Security to evaluate for the implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with SY-CL-101-102 and SY-AA-101-102.

Verify with Security that appropriate actions are taken.

(CA#4010227-60) <<CM-10>>

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 Licensing Basis Documents 7 .1.1 ITS LCO section 3.8 7 .1. 2 USAR 8.3.1, 8.3.2, 15.2.6.2.1.3; APPENDIX D, II, K.3.2.5 7.2 Procedures 7.2.1 CPS 3101.01, Main Steam (MS, IS & ADS) 7.2.2 CPS 3105.01, Turbine (TG, EHC, TS) 7.2.3 CPS 3109.01, Generator Seal Oil 7.2.4 CPS 3111.01, Generator Gas (HY, CO) 7.2.5 CPS 3211.01, Shutdown Service Water (SX) 7.2.6 CPS 3213.01, Fire Detection And Protection 7.2.7 CPS 3303,01, Reactor Water Cleanup (RT) 7.2.8 CPS 3304.01, Control Rod Hydraulic & Control (RD) 7.2.9 CPS 3304.02, Rod Control And Information System (RC&IS) 7.2.10 CPS 3309.01, High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) 7.2.11 CPS 3310.01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) 7.2.12 CPS 3317.01, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup (FC)

7. 2 .13- CPS 3319.01, Standby.Gas Treatment (VG)

7. 2 .14 CPS 3320.01, Drywell Cooling System (VP) 7.2.15 CPS 3402.01, Control Room HVAC (VC) 7.2.16 CPS 3404.01, Fuel Building HVAC (VF) 7.2.17 CPS 3501.01, High Voltage Auxiliary Power System 7.2.18 CPS 3502.01, .480 VAC Distribution 7.2.19 CPS 3505.01, 345 & 138 KV Switchyard (SY) 7.2.20 CPS 3506.01, Diesel Generator And Support Systems (DG) 7.2.21 CPS 3509.01, Instrument Power System (IP) 7.2.22 CPS 3512.03, 30 Monicore System 7.2.23 CPS 3514.01, Bus/Unit Sub Outages 7.2.24 CPS 4001.01, Reactor Scram 7.2.25 CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation 7.2.26 CPS 4003.01C002, RSP - RCIC Operation 7.2.27 CPS 4201.01, Loss Of DC Power 7.2.28 CPS 4410.0lCOOl, Defeating RCIC Interlocks 7.2.29 EP-AA-1003: CPS Emergency Plan Annex 7.2.30 LS-AA-1110 REPORTABLE EVENT SAF 1.54: Reporting of NERC Standard Requirements Rev. 26 Page 38 of 50

CPS 4200.01

7.0 REFERENCES

(Cont) 7.3 Design/Vendor/Print/Other 7.3.1 SOER 90-01, Rec. 5: Gnd Faults on AC Elec Dist Systems 7.3.2 HRA Cale A~l.94 DC Load Shedding Per CPS 4200.01 Not Successful, Calculation 19-D-42 7.4 Commitments 7.4.1 CM-1: Extended Power Uprate Report -

Station Blackout EPU-T0903 <<1.4, 4.4, 6.2>>

7.4.2 CM-2: CRl-89-02-034 <<4.2.2.11, 4.3.3.2, APP. c>>

7.4.3 CM-3: CRl-96-04-022 (FPM ITS impact) <<4.2.1.6, 4.2.5.2>>

7.4.4 CM-4: CRl-97-07-222 (RC&IS impact) <<1. 3. 1 1st bullet (ff'>>

7.4.5 CM-5: CRl-99-01.:..001 * (Tripped Shunt Trip Brks) <<4.2.1.8, 4.2.5.5>>

7.4.6 CM- 6 : EDS FI # 18 9 << 4 . 2 . 4 . 11 >>

7.4.7 CM-7: EDSFI #39 & #102 <<4.2.5.B>>

7.4.8 CM-8: IP Ltr Y-213978 <<4.4.3.2, C003>>

7.4.9 CM-9: EC 370851 (Cale 19-D-35/36) <<4. 3. 1. 6>>

7.4.10 CM-10: IR 4010227-60 (CA): Communication to Security-

<<4.11, Finger in 4.3.2, 6.3>>

8.0 DOCUMENTS CPS 4200.0lCOOl, MCR Cooling During A SBO CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load Shedding During A SBO CPS 4200.01C003, Monitoring CNMT Temperatures During A SBO <<CM-8>>

CPS 4200.01C004, Manual CNMT ~solation During A SBO CPS 4200.010001, Main Generator Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D002, RAT Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D003, ERAT Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200~01D004, 6900V Bus lA Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D005, 6900V Bus lB Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D006, 4160V Bus lA Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D007, 4160V Bus lB Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D008, Emergency Bus lAl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D009, Emergency Bus lBl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.0lDOlO, Emergency Bus lCl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.0lDOll, Switchyard Trip Data Sheet CPS 4303.01P023, Cross Connecting Div 3 DG to Div 1(2)

ECCS Electrical Busses, Rev. 26 Page 39 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX A Equip Control Switches To Be Placed In PULL-TO-LOCK Or LOCKED (for the applicable de-energized bus)

Page 1 of 1 NOTE

1. This list only identifies loads that may Auto Start on bus re-energization and loads which can be quickly attended to by the MCR crew.

2. A simple check of the other bus loads to verify components are tripped or stopped is sufficient.

6900V Bus* lA 6900V Bus lB None Reactor Feed Pump lC, lFWOlPC 4160V Bus lA 4160V Bus lB Plant Service Water Pump lA, lWSOlPA Plant Service Water Pump 18, lWSOlPB Plant Service Water Pump lC, lWSOlPC Service Air Compressor O, OSAOlC Service Air Compressor 1, lSAOlC Service Air Compressor 2, 2SA01C Condensate Pump lA, lCDOlPA Condensate Pump 18, lCDOlPB Condensate Pump 1c; lCDOlPC Condensate Pump 10, lCDOlPD cc Pump lA, lCCOlPA CC Pump 18, lCCOlPB CC Pump lC, lCCOlPC 480V Unit Sub lF (1AP16E) 480V Unit Sub lG (lAPl 7E)

Suppression Pool Cleanup Pump lA, lSFOlPA Suppression Pool Cleanup Pump 18, lSFOlPB Plant Chill Water Pump A, OW003PA Plant Chill Water Pump B, OW003PB Plant- Chill Water Pump C, OW003PC Plant Chill Water Pump D, OW003PD Plant Chill Water Pump E, OW003PE 480V Unit Sqb lJ (1AP20E) 480V Unit Sub lK (1AP21E)

EHC Fluid Pump lA, lEHOlPA EHC Fluid Pump 18, lEHOlPB Stator Cooling Water Pump lA, lGCOlPA Stator Cooling Water Pump 18, lGCOlPB Turb Bldg CCW Pump lA, lWTOlPA Turb Bldg CCW Pump lB, lWTOlPB Cyc Cond Xfer Pump OA, OCYOlPA Cyc Cond Xfer Pump OB, OCYOlPB Cyc Cond Xfer Pump oc, OCYOlPC Make Up Cond Xfer Pmp, OMCOlPA Make Up Cond Xfer Pmp, OMCOlPB Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump, lTOlOP -

Rev. 26 Page 40 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX B Instrument Availability Page 1 of 2 Parameter Bus lAl Bus lBl Non AC Dependent Equipment (SBO)

RPV Water Level B21-R623A (P601, 5064) B21-R623B (P601, 5065)'- B21-R604 (P678) Div 3 Wide Range B21-R610 (P601, 5065) Fuel Zone Meter B21-R615 (P601, 5064) C61-R509 (RSP)

Fuel Zone Recorder ATMs (NSPS Keypad)

C61-R010 (RSP) B21-N673C/D/G/H (HPCS) B21-N691A/B/E/F '(LPCS)

B21-N680A/B/C/D (RPS) B21-N692A/B/E/F (RCIC)

B21-N681A/B/C/D (NS4) B21-N693A/B (RCIC)

B21-N695A/B (ADS)

Reactor Power APRMs (P669-P672)

IRMs (Drive AC Power)

SRMs (Drive AC power, will indicate period)

GETARs (TT)

RPV Pressure B21-R623A (P601, 5064) B21-R623B (P601,. 5065) ATMs (NSPS Keypad) 1LR:-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) B21-N678A/B/C/D (RPS)

B21-N679A/B/C/D (NS4).

C61-R011 (RSP) C61-R510 (RSP) B21-N697A/B/E/F (LPCS)

Suppression Pool 1LR-CM240 (P601, 5067) 1LR-CM241 (P601, 5067) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 Temperature 1TR-CM334 (P678) 1TR-CM335 (P678) 1TR-CM017 (P638) 1TR-CM018 (P639)

Rev 26 Page 41 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX B In*s trumen t Availability Page 2 of 2 Parameter Bus lAl. Bus lBl Non AC Dependent Equipment (SBO)

Suppression Pool 1LR-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) ATM (NSPS Keypad)

Level 1LR-CM030 (P601, 5064) 1LR-CM031 (P601, 5066) E22-N655C/G (HPCS)

E51-N636A/E (RCIC) 1LR-CM240 (P601, 5067) 1LR-CM241 (P601, 5067) 1LI-CM260 (P601, 5063) 1LI-CM261 (P601, 5063)

C61-R504 (RSP) C61-R511 (RSP)

Containment 1LR-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) ATM (NSPS Keypad)

Pressure 1PR-CM256 (P601, 5066) 1PR-CM257 (P601, 5066) E12-N662A/B/C/D (RHR) 1LR-CM030 (P601, 5064) 1LR-CM031 (P601, 5066)

Containment Temperature 1PR-CM256 (P601, 5066) 1PR-CM257 (P601, 5066) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 Drywell Pressure 1PR-CM063 (P601, 5067) 1PR-CM064 (P601, 5067) ATMs (NSPS Keypad)

B21-N694A/B/E/F (LPCS)

E22-N667C/D/G/H (HPCS)

C71-N650A/B/C/D (.RPS.)

Drywell 1PR-CM063 (P601, 5067) 1PR-CM064 (P601, 5067) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 Temperature C61-R501 (RSP)

C61-R502 (RSP)

RCIC Pump E51-R601 (P601, 5063)

Flow/Discharge E51-R606 (P601, 5063)

Pressure

\ C61-R001-1 (RSP)

Rev 26 Page 42 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX C <<CM-2>>

Rad Monitor Trip Logic Power Supplies Page 1 of 1 CAUTION Inadvertent actuations and/or isolations can occur if the trip logic power is available when the rad monitor devices are re-energized.

1. As time and resources permit, open the trip logic power supply breaker associated with the bus that is to be re-energized.

Bus being restored Trip Logic Power Supply Monitors Impacted 4160V Bus lAl, or CB MCC E2-2B (0AP54EB) lRIX-PROOlA/C 480V Unit Sub A, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 24 1RIX-PR006A/C AB MCC lAl (CB 825', V-133) 1RIX-PR008A/C '

1RIX-PR009A/C 1RIX-PR042A/C 4160V Bus lBl, or CB MCC F2-1B (0AP55EB) lRIX-PROOlB/D 480V Unit Sub B, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 12 1RIX-PR006B/D AB MCC lBl (CB 825', V-128) 1RIX-PR008B/D 1RIX-PR009B/D 1RIX-PR042B/D 6900V Bus lA, or CB MCC D-3B (0AP23E) 1RIX-PR035 480V Unit Sub C, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 16 1RIX-PR041 RW MCC E (CB 825', Y-129)

2. Re-energize the applicable bus.

3. Shut the trip logic power supply breaker that was previously opened.

Rev 26 Page 43 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 1 of 5 NOTE

1. This Appendix serves as a checklist of activities the OCC and/or ERO should use to help minimize the site impact due to an extended Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)[> 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months s].

2. Evaluate and implement those items as necessary to achieve the desired objective.

1. Service Building (Loss of 12KV Power)

Service Building basement sump pumps will overflow without power.

Evaluate consequences and initiate appropriate actions.

Comments/Notes:

2. Security Equipment (Loss of Non-Safety and 12KV Power)

Implement contingency actions for processing site personnel and visitors.

Implement contingency actions for loss of security measures and BRE power supplies.

Reference CPS 3511.01, Security Electrical Distribution.

Comments/Notes:

3. Communications (in addition to step 4.1.5)

Establish a communication line with AmerenIP.

Establish a charging location for radio chargers and radio batteries so that the batteries will be able to be charged.

Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel for the LAN Central Server backup generator at the Nuclear Support Annex.

Comments/Notes:

4. Main Generator Perform an Emergency Generator Hydrogen Venting per CPS 3111.0l; Hydrogen Gas (HY, CO). See step 4.1.3.2.

Comment's/Notes:

5. DC Load Shedding - See step 4.1.3.2.-

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page 44 of 50

CPS 4200.01 5.0 FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1 Affected bus/busses have been re-energized.

5.2 Notify CMO Group to perform thermography on any recently closed and energized:

1. SY Disconnect (4501/4503, 4505/4507, 4509/4511, 4513/4515, 4517/4519, 4521/4523, 4520, 4525).

2. Circuit Switcher 4538 (RAT) & B018 (ERAT) if transformer assumed any significant loading.

5.3 Restoration activities being developed by the Emergency Plan Recovery Phase.

6.0 DISCUSSION 6.1 SBO: Switchyard Concerns Contact the Transmission Services Operator for information on grid restorations and priorities.

It will assist the TSO to provide them information regarding plant electrical status (such as diesel status and switchyard status) and plans for use of site power when restored (would we tie on emergency buses if grid is still degraded?) .

If the grid is degraded, site personnel may be requested to perform high voltage switching based on availability of transmission personnel and travel conditions.

See Appendix D.11 for more information.

6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary <<CM-1>>

1. All SBO actions are based on the Extended Power Uprate Report - Station Blackout EPU-T0903, which assures equipment operability and adequate core cooling for a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months coping period.

Restoration of an offsite, or a Div 1 or Div 2 power source is expected within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months period.

The Report analyzes 2 cases:

SBO with only HPCS available (Case 1)

SBO*with only RCIC available (Case 2)

The licensing analyzes are based on conservative worst case initial assumptions, and does NOT credit the RCIC Storage Tank, or operator responses prior to 10 mins.

Actual plant response ihould be well below any of the worst case conclusions listed below.

Rev. 26 Page 34 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

To avoid an unnecessary delay in taking actions for a ELAP, the SM must continually access recovery efforts.

If power can NOT be restored to Div 1 or Div 2 equipment capable of removing heat from the Containment in a timely manner, direction is provided to cease SBO directed actions and immediately commence actions IAW CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power/Loss of UHS.

These actions parallel SBO actions through the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months assumed coping period. These actions will provide alternate power and water sources and allow Containment heat removal.

2. Level 3 to Level 8:

This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION.

Maintain consistent with EOP and Reactor SCRAM actions.

System leakage for a SBO, including RR pump. seals

(- 38 gpm) and inventory loss from SRVs, is assumed to be - 100 gpm for the duration of the SBO.

RR Pump seals are expected to remain intact.

The analysis assumes an initial 19 gpm seal leakage per pump, which does NOT change during the SBO event.

However, seal failure may occur upon RR pump restart.

3. RPV Pressure This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION.

1) Below 1065 psig: consistent with EOP parameters.

2) > 150 psig when using RCIC: Analysis bounded at the ITS LCO 3.5.1 pressure for normal operability, while ensuring suppression pool temperature does NOT exceed 185°F in the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months coping analysis.

4. DC load shedding within 1 hour:

This is a TIME CRITICAL ACTION.

Essential control circuits will be powered* from station batteries.

Battery loads are reduced to insure a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months DC supply.

DC power is needed to maintain manual SRV control and RCIC operation.

5. Bypass RCIC LO logic:

This is a TIME SENSITIVE ACTION taken to prevent a RCIC turbine trip during SBO conditions, and to prevent an inadvertent isolation when power is restored.

Rev. 26 Page 35 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases.Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

6. RCIC/HPCS suction on pool:

Preferred source to maximize RCIC water availability.

Maintains RCIC storage tank as a reserve supply of cool water for cooling the RCIC lube oil, thereby extending the survivability duration of the event beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

7. Supplemental MCR Cooling:

Habitability concerns are based on prolonged exposure to> 120°F.

Peak worst case MCR area temperatures are expected to be 107°F.

(SBO: Technical Bases Summary continued next page)

Rev. 26 Page 36 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.2 SBO: Technical Bases Summary (Cont) <<CM-1>>

8. SBO Plant Parameter Responses:

Following Table summarizes the 'worst case' SBO analyses values (Case 1 - HPCS or Case 2 - RCIC)

This information should be used to help prioritize actions based upon actual plant response.

Item/Area Initial Value Worst Case SBO Value Limiting Value Outside Air Temperature 96°F NIA NIA Main Control Room 86°F 107°F 120°F MCR - Computer Area (4) 176°F @ 60 minutes 86°F 120°F (DCSIP MS failure is expected) 105°F @4 hours RCIC Pump Room (1) ll0°F 148°F 180°F RCIC Instrument Panel Room Area ll0°F 168°F 180°F Main Steam Tunnel 148°F - 250°F 300°F

) Suppression Pool Temp (2) 95°F - l77°F 197°F (3)

Drywell Pressure 1 psig 7.0 psig 23.2 psig (LOCA)

Containment Pressure 1 psig 3.7 psig 7 psig (LOCA)

Electrical Panel Areas 178°F (short intervals)

Div 1/2 DC MCCs 95°F 104°F 122°F (continuous)

Battery Rms - Div 1/2 95°F 104°F Battery Rms - Div 3/4 95°F 95°F Analyses allows for

Inverter Rms - Div 1/2 104°F - 141 / - 139°F exceeding the Inverter Rms - Div 3/4 104°F - 108 / - 125°F continuous limit.

Div 1: 15.4% (Case 1)

Battery Capacity - Div 1/2 100% 5.3% (Case 2) NIA Div 2: 2.3% (Case 1/2)

Battery Capacity - Div 3/4 100% > 5% margin @ 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months NIA SRV Lifts (Air capacity) NIA 37 lifts w/o backup air 100 lifts (1) RCIC room temperature assumes the RCIC turbine gland seal air compressor is operating for the duration of the SEO. If the gland seal air compressor is NOT operating, steam leakage from the RCIC turbine gland seals will raise RCIC room temperature> 200°F.

(2) Suppression Pool Temperature will exceed the EOP-6 Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) at - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . However, for a SEO event, Emergency Depressurization is NOT required (EOP-6 allows for this) since the intent of HCTL is to mitigate an irreversible trend in pool temperature by blowing down before.the pool condensing capability is lost. At the end of the SEO, suppression* pool temperature is restored below the HCTL via RHR Suppression Pool Cooling.

(3) SEO analysis shows the pool temperature will NOT exceed 185°F (SP design limit),

however for continued RCIC operation, the EOP limit of 197°F (oil cooling) is used, thereby extending the survivability duration of the event beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

(4) Computer equipment is left running until heat induced failure occurs to maximize operator ability to respond to the SEO event using valid DCS/PMS indications.

(DISCUSSION Section continued on next page)

Rev. 26 Page 37 of 50

CPS 4200.01 6.0 DISCUSSION 6.3 For abnormal or emergency operations (EOPs, Off Normal, etc.), promptly notify Security to evaluate for the implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with SY-CL-101-102 and SY-AA-101-102.

Verify with Security that appropriate actions are taken.

(CA#4010227-60) <<CM-10>>

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 Licensing Basis Documents 7 .1.1 ITS LCO section 3.8 7 .1. 2 USAR 8. 3. 1, 8. 3. 2, 15. 2. 6. 2. 1. 3; APPENDIX D, .II, K. 3. 2. 5 7.2 Procedures 7.2.1 CPS 3101.01, Main Steam' (MS, IS & ADS) 7.2.2 CPS 3105.01, Turbine (TG, EHC, TS) 7.2.3 CPS 3109.0l~ Generator Seal Oil 7.2.4 CPS 3111.01, Generator Gas (HY, CO) 7.2.5 CPS 3211.01, Shutdown Service Water (SX) 7.2.6 CPS 3213.01, Fire Detection And Protection 7.2.7 CPS 3303.01, Reactor Water Cleanup (RT)

'7. 2. 8 CPS 3304.01, Control Rod Hydraulic & Control (RD) 7.2.9 CPS 3304.02, Rod Control And Information System (RC&IS) 7.2.10 CPS 3309.01, High Pressure Core*spray System (HPCS) 7.2.11 CPS 3310.01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) 7.2.12 CPS 3317.01, Fuel Pool Cooling And.Cleanup (FC) 7.2.13 CPS 3319.01, Standby Gas Treatment (VG) 7.2.14 CPS 3320.01, Drywell Cooling System (VP) 7.2.15 CPS 3402.01, Control Room HVAC (VC) 7.2.16 CPS 3404.01, Fuel Building HVAC (VF) 7.2.17 CPS 3501.01, High Voltag~ Auxiliary Power System 7.2.18 CPS 3502.01, 480 VAC Distribution 7.2.19 CPS 3505.01, 345 & 138 KV Switchyard (SY) 7.2.20 CPS 3506.01, Diesel Generator And Support Systems (DG) 7.2.21 CPS 3509.01, Instrument Power System (IP) 7.2.22 CPS 3512.03, 3D Monicore System 7.2.23 CPS 3514.01, Bus/Unit Sub Outages 7.2.24 CPS 4001.01, Reactor Scram 7.2.25 CPS 4001.02, Automatic Isolation 7.2.26 CPS 4003.01C002, RSP - RCIC Operation 7.2.27 CPS 4201.01, Loss Of DC Power 7.2.28 CPS 4410.0lCOOl, Defeating RCIC Interlocks 7.2.29 EP-AA-1003: CPS Emergency Plan Annex 7.2.30 LS-AA-1110 REPORTABLE EVENT SAF 1.54: Reporting of NERC Standard Requirements

(,

Rev. 26 Page 38 of 50

CPS 4200.01

7.0 REFERENCES

(Cont) 7.3 Design/Vendor/Print/Other 7.3.1 SOER 90-01, Rec. 5: Gnd Faults on AC Elec Dist Systems 7.3.2 HRA Cale A.1.94 DC Load Shedding Per CPS 4200.01 Not Successful, Calculation 19-D-42 7.4 Commitments

7. 4-.1 CM-1: Extended Power Uprate Report -

Station Blackout EPU-T0903 <<1.4, 4.4, 6.2>>

7.4.2 CM-2: CRl-89-02-034 <<4.2.2.11, 4.3.3.2, APP. C>>

7.4.3 CM-3: CRl-96-04-022 (FPM ITS impact) <<4.2.1.6, 4.2.5.2>>

7.4.4 CM-4: CRl-97-07-222 (RC&IS impact) <<1.3.1 1st bullet r:tr>>

7.4.5 CM-5: CRl-99-01-001 (Tripped Shunt Trip Brks) <<4.2.1.8,.

4.2.5.5>>

7.4.6 CM-6: EDSFI #189 <<4.2.4.11>>

\

7.4.7 CM-7: EDSFI #39 & #102 <<4.2.5.8>>

7.4.8 CM-8: IP Ltr Y-213978 <<4.4.3.2, C003>>

7.4.9 CM-9: EC 370851 (Cale 19-0-35/36) <<4. 3. 1 . 6>>

7.4.10 CM-10: IR 4010227-60 (CA): Communication to Security

<<4.11, Finger in 4.3.2, 6.3>>

8.0 DOCUMENTS CPS 4200.0lCOOl, MCR Cooling During A SBO CPS 4200.01C002, DC Load ~hedding During A SBO CPS 4200.01C003, Monitoring CNMT Temperatures During A SBO <<CM-8>>

CPS 4200~01C004, Manual CNMT Isolation During A SBO CPS 4200.0lDOOl, Main Generator Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D002, RAT Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D003, ERAT Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D004, 6900V Bus lA Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D005, 6900V Bus lB Trip Data Sh~et CPS 4200.01D006, 4160V Bus lA Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.010007, 4160V Bus lB Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D008, Emergency Bus lAl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.01D009, Emergency Bus lBl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.0lDOlO, Emergency Bus lCl Trip Data Sheet CPS 4200.0lDOll, Switchyard Trip Data Sheet CPS 4303.01P023, Cross Connecting Div 3 DG to Div 1(2)

ECCS Electrical Busses, Rev. 26 Page 39 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX A Equip Control Switches To Be Placed In PULL-TO-LOCK Or LOCKED (for the applicable de-energized bus)

Page 1 of 1 NOTE

1. This list only identifies loads that may Auto Start on bus re-energization and loads which can be quickly attended to by the MCR crew.

2. A simple check of the other bus loads to verify components are tripped or stopped is sufficient.

6900V Bus lA 6900V Bus lB None Reactor Feed Pump lC, lFWOlPC 4160V Bus lA 4160V Bils lB Plant Service Water Pump lA, lWSOlPA Plant Service Water Pump lB, lWSOlPB Plant Service Water Pump lC, lWSOlPC Service Air Compressor 0, OSAOlC Service Air Compressor 1, lSAOlC Service Air Compressor 2, 2SA01C Condensate Pump lA, lCDOlPA Condensate Pump lB, lCDOlPB Condensate Pump lC, lCDOlPC Condensate Pump 10, lCDOlPD cc Pump lA, lCCOlPA CC Pump lB, lCCOlPB CC Pump lC, .lCCOlPC 480V Unit sub lF (1AP16E) 480V Unit Stib lG (1AP17E)

Suppression Pool Cleanup Pump lA, lSFOlPA Suppression Pool Cleanup Pump lB, lSFOlPB Plant Chill Water Pump A, OW003PA Plant Chill Water Pump B, OW003PB Plant Chill Water Pump C, OW003PC Plant Chill Water Pump D, OW003PD Plant Chill Water Pump E, OW003PE 480V Unit Sub lJ (1AP20E) 480V Unit Sub lK (1AP21E)

EHC Fluid Pump lA, lEHOlPA EHC Fluid Pump lB, lEHOlPB Stator Cooling Water Pump lA, lGCOlPA Stator Cooling Water Pump lB, lGCOlPB Turb Bldg CCW Pump lA, lWTOlPA Turb Bldg CCW Pump lB, lWTOlPB Cyc Cond Xfer Pump OA, OCYOlPA Cyc Cond Xfer Pump OB, OCYOlPB Cyc Cond Xfer Pump oc, OCYOlPC Make Up Cond Xfer Pmp, OMCOlPA Make Up Cond Xfer Pmp, OMCOlPB Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump, lTOlOP Rev. 26 Page 40 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX B Instrument Availability Page 1 of 2 Parameter Bus lAl Bus lBl Non AC Dependent Equipment (SBO)

RPV Water Level B21-R623A (P601, 5064) B21-R623B (P601, 5065) B21-R604 (P678) Div 3 Wide Range B21-R610 (P601, 5065) Fuel Zone Meter B21-R615 (P601, 5064) C61-R509 (RSP)

Fuel Zone Recorder ATMs (NSPS Keypad)

C61-R010 (RSP) B21-N673C/D/G/H (HPCS) B21-N691A/B/E/F (LPCS)

B21-N6.80A/B/C/D (RPS) B21-N692A/B/E/F (RCIC)

B21-N681A/B/C/D (NS4) B21-N693A/B (RCIC)

B21-N695A/B (ADS)

Reactor Power APRMs (P669-P672)

IRMs (Drive AC Power)

SRMs (Drive AC power, will indicate period)

' GETARs (TT)

RPV Pressure " B21-R623A (P601, 5064) B21-R623B (P601, 5065) ATMs (NSPS Keypad) 1LR-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) B21-N678A/B/C/D (RPS)

B21-N679A/B/C/D (NS4)

C61-R011 (RSP) C61-R510 (RSP) B21-N697A/B/E/F (LPCS)

Suppression Pool 1LR-CM240 (P601, 5067) 1LR-CM241 (P601, 5067) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 Temperature 1TR-CM334 (P678) 1TR-CM335 (P678) 1TR-CM017 (P638) lTR-CMOlB (P639)

Rev 26 Page 41 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX B*

Instrument Availability Page 2 of 2 Parameter Bus lAl Bus lBl Non AC Dependent Equipment (SBO)

Suppression Pool 1LR-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) ATM

- - (NSPS Keypad)

Level 1LR-CM030 (P601, 5064) 1LR-CM031 (P601, 5066) E22-N655C/G (HPCS)

E51-N636A/E (RCIC) 1LR-CM240 (P601, 5067) 1LR-CM241 (P601, 5067) 1LI-CM260 (P601, 5063) 1LI-CM261 (P601, 5063)

C61-R504 (RSP) C61-R511 (RSP)

Containment 1LR-SM014 (P601, 5064) 1LR-SM016 (P601, 5066) ATM (NSPS Keypad).

Pressure 1PR-CM256 (P601, 5066) 1PR-CM257 (P601, 5066) E12-N662A/B/C/D (RHR) 1LR-CM030 (P601, 5064) 1LR-CM031 (P601, 5066)

Containment Temperature 1PR-CM256 (P601, 5066) 1PR-CM257 (P601, 5066) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 ~

r Drywell Pressure 1PR-CM063 (P601, 5067) 1PR-CM064 (P601, 5067) ATMs (NSPS Keypad)

B21-N694A/B/E/F (LPCS)

E22-N667C/D/G/H (HPCS)

C71-N650A/B/C/D (RPS)

Drywell 1PR-CM063 (P601, 5067) 1PR-CM064 (P601, 5067) Remote per CPS 4200.01C003 Temperature C61-R501 (RSP)

C61-R502 (RSP)

RCIC Pump E51-R601 (P601, 5063)

Flow/Discharge E51-R606 (P601, 5063)

Pressure C61-R001-l (RSP)

Rev 26 Page 42 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX C <<CM-2>>

Rad Monitor Trip Logic Power Supplies Page 1 of 1 CAUTION Inadvertent actuations and/or isolations can occur if the trip logic power is available when the rad monitor devices are re-energized.

1. As time and resources permit, open the trip logic power supply breaker associated with the bus that is to be re-energized.

Bus being restored Trip Logic Power Supply Monitors Impacted 4160V Bus lAl, or CB MCC E2-2B (0AP54EB) lRIX-PROOlA/C 480V Unit Sub A, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 24 1RIX-PR006A/C AB MCC lAl (CB 825', V-133) 1RIX-PR008A/C 1RIX-PR009A/C 1RIX-PR042A/C 4160V Bus lBl, or CB MCC F2-1B (0AP55EB) lRIX-PROOlB/D 480V Unit Sub B, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 12 1RIX-PR006B/D AB MCC lBl (CB 825', V-128) 1RIX-PR008B/D 1RIX-PR009B/D 1RIX-PR042B/D 6900V Bus lA, or CB MCC D-3B (0AP23E) 1RIX-PR035 480V Unit Sub C, or 208/120V Dist Pnl, Ckt 16 1RIX-PR041 RW MCC E (CB 825', Y-129)

2. _Re-energize. the applicable bus.

3. Shut the trip logic power supply breaker that was previously opened.

Rev 26 Page 43 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 1 of 5 NOTE

1. This Appendix serves as a checklist of activities the OCC and/or ERO should use to help minimize the site impact due to an extended Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) [> 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months s].

2. Evaluate and implement those items as necessary to achieve the desired objective.

1. Service Building (Loss of 12KV Power)

Service Building basement sump pumps will overflow.without power.

Evaluate consequences and initiate appropriate actions.r-Comments/Notes:

2. Security Equipment (Loss of Non-Safety and 12KV Power)

Implement contingency actions for processing site personnel and visitors.

Implement contingency actions for loss of security measures and BRE power supplies.

Reference CPS 3511.01, Security Electrical Distribution.

Comments/Notes:

I

3. Communications (in addition to step 4.1.5)

Establish a communication line with AmerenIP.

Establish a charging location for radio chargers and radio batteries so that the batteries will be able to be charged.

Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel for the LAN Central Server backup generator at the Nuclear Support Annex.

Comments/Notes:

4. Main Generator Perform an Emergency Generator Hydrogen Venting per CPS 3111.01, Hydrogen Gas (HY, CO). See step 4.1.3.2.

Comments/Notes:

5. DC Load Shedding - See step 4.1.3.2.

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page'44 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 2 of 5

6. Diesel Generators Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel (normally a 7 day supply is maintained on-site).

Comments/Notes:

7. Fire Pump Diesel Engine Pumps Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel i:o=secure one pump to conserve fuel while maintaining the FP header pressurized.

Comments/Notes:

8. Sewage Treatment Plant Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel for the STP generator.

Comments/Notes:

9 . MET Tower Initiate action~ to obtain additional propane supply for.the MET Tower Backup Generator.

MET Tower beacon lights will be out.

Refer to CPS 3323.01 (EM) for FAA Notifications.

Comments/Notes:

10. NRC/IEMA Support Initiate actions to obtain a portable diesel supply for the IEMA diesel generator on their stack monitoring system.

Verify NRC/IEMA phones functioning (part of Station Telephone System

- see 4.1.5.1), or establish alternate communications for them.

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page 45 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 3 of 5

11. Switchyard Switchyard DC loads will last 4 - 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Work with AmerenIP to evaluate the protective relaying in the Switchyard and initiate appropriate actions, including the installation of additional DC batteries.

The following information may be important to the restoration of off site power (IR 1137890, Lessons Learned From Joint Ameren Training) :

1. It is likely that the 138 KV source will be restored prior to the 345 KV source if large portions of th~ grid were lost.

Eff.orts should focus on the. ERAT being ready for restoration unless informed otherwise by Ameren.

2. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how much load will be picked up when the 138 KV line is energized.

With the Division 1, 2, and 3 busses either de-energized or on their respective Diesel Generators (DGs), this leaves the 12 KV loop, which is -4 MW load.

The town of DeWitt and other loads on the 138 KV line will have to be estimated by Ameren. ,

3. Once a source is restored, ECCS busses should stay on the DGs until the 138 KV source is deemed reliable enough that subsequent losses of ECCS busses are NOT likely (assuming proper DG operation).

3. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how long it will take to return CPS to service. Due to having to recover all BOP systems prior to plant startup, a time of 96 hours0.00111 days 0.0267 hours 1.587302e-4 weeks 3.6528e-5 months from return of the 345 KV source to the non-safety busses is reasonable (nuclear units are NOT part of Arneren's restoration strategy for this reason).

4. The switchyards should be physically walked down for status of components and for any damage and the results of these walkdowns conveyed to Ameren. Arneren's indication and control system may NOT be functional during these conditions.

NOTE

(!) This estimate will provide enough power to operate battery chargers, station lighting, and other relatively low power loads.

5. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how much load will be picked up when the RAT(s) is/are energized. An estimate of less than 10 MW should be conservative (large motors should be prevented from starting per Appendix A: Equip Control Switches To Be Placed In PULL-TO-LOCK Or LOCKED).

Rev 26 Page 46 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 4 of 5

11. Switchyard (cont'd)

6. CPS Operations should be prepared to perform switching orders at Ameren's direction due to Ameren's sources being dispatched to other restoration activities.

7. Once a source is restored, do NOT change load on that source signific_antly without permission from Ameren. Increasing load may cause a loss of the source, hampering further restoration activities.

8. Perform thermography as components are restored, especially if there has been any physical challenge to components from severe weather, seismic activity; etc.

Comments/Notes:

12. Station Vehicles Initiate actio~s to obtain a portable gasoline supply for station vehicles since the site pump will NOT be working.

Comments/Notes:

13. Drinking Water Initiate actions to obtain additional drinking water (normally a 3 day supply is maintained on-site).

Comments/Notes:

14. Food Initiate actions to obtain additional food for on-site personnel Comments/Notes:

15. Sleeping Initiate actions to cibtain on-site sleeping arrangements.

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page 47 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 5 of 5

16. Other:

Comments/Notes:

17. Other:

Comments/Notes:

18. Other:

Comments/Notes-:

Rev 26 Page 48 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX E LOSS OF POWER IMPACT ON COMMUNICATIONS Page 1 of 2 NOTE

1. Communications systems, both onsite and offsite are impacted by losses of power.

2. The following is a partial list. '

Some items are Safeguards Information and are NOT included.

3. Following ANY loss of power, plant communications systems are suspect until proven functional. Some systems have battery backup and will be initially available but suffer loss over time.

1.0 IF Aux Building MCC lAl(Division 1 AC)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate (ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.):

Main Control Room J

Control Building

Diesel Generator Building

Containment and Drywell

Screen House 2.0 IF Aux Building MCC lBl(Division 2 AC)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate {ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.)

Auxiliary Building

~adwaste Building 3.0 IF Turbine Building MCC lM (Division 2 AC or shunt trip)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate (ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.):

Turbine Building Rev 26 Page 49 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX E LOSS OF POWER IMPACT ON COMMUNICATIONS Page 2 of 2 4.0 Loss of power to the following busses *can impact radio capabilities within the plant. It is possible ihat some repeaters are lost, or base stations do NOT function. Be aware of possible radio use limitations on any loss of power due to the impact on repeaters:

Aux Building MCC lAl

Aux Building MCC lBl

Tech Support Center Load Center OAPOBE

Control Bldg MCC C Rev 26 Page 50 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 2 of 5

6. Diesel Generators Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel (normally a 7 day supply is maintained on-site).

Comments/Notes:

7. Fire Pump Diesel Engine Pumps Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel

&'Secure one pump to conserve fuel while maintaining the FP header pressurized.

Comments/Notes:

8. Sewage Treatment Plant Initiate actions to obtain additional diesel fuel for the STP generator.

Comments/Notes:

9. MET Tower Initiate actions to obtain additional propane supply for the MET Tower Backup Generator.

MET Tower beacon lights will be out.

Refer to CPS 3323.01 (EM) for FAA Notifications .

. Comments/Notes:

10. NRC/IEMA Support*

Initiate actions to obtain a portable diesel supply for the IEMA diesel generator on their stack monitoring system.

Verify NRC/IEMA phones functioning (part of Station Telephone System

- see 4.1.5.1), or establish alternate communications for them.

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 , Page 45 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 3 of 5

11. Switchyard Switchyard DC loads will last 4 - 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Work with ArnerenIP to evaluate the protective relaying in the Switchyard and initiate appropriate actions, including the installation of additional DC batteries.

The following information may be important to the restoration of off site power (IR 1137890, Lessons Learned From Joint Ameren Training) :

1. It is likely that the 138 KV source will be restored prior to the 345 KV source if large portions of the grid were lost.

Efforts should focus on the ERAT being ready for restoration unless informed otherwise by Ameren.

2. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how much load will be picked

.up when the 138 KV line is energized.

With the Division 1, 2, and 3 busses either de-energized or on their respective Diesel Generators (DGs), this leaves the 12 KV loop, which is -4 MW load.

The town of DeWitt and other loads on the 138 KV line will have to be estimated by Ameren.

3. Once a source is restored, ECCS busses should stay on the DGs until the 138 KV source is deemed reliable enough that subsequent losses of ECCS busses are NOT likely (assuming proper DG operation).

3. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how long it will take to return CPS to service. Due to having to recover all BOP

' systems prior to plant startup, a time of 96 hours0.00111 days 0.0267 hours 1.587302e-4 weeks 3.6528e-5 months from return of the 345 KV source to the non-safety busses is reasonable (nuclear units are NOT part of Arneren's restoration strategy for this reason).

4. The switchyards should be physically walked down for status of components and for any damage and the results of these walkdowns conveyed to Ameren. Arneren's indication and control system may NOT be functional during these conditions.

NOTE

(!) This estimate will provide enough power to operate battery chargers, station lighting, and other relatively low power loads.

5. Ameren may ask for an estimate of how much load will be picked up when the RAT(s) is/are energized. An estimate of less than 10 MW should be conservative (large motors should be prevented from starting per Appendix A: Equip* Control Switches To Be Placed In PULL-TO-LOCK Or LOCKED).

Rev 26 Page 46 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 4 of 5

11. Switchyard (cont'd)

6. CPS Operations should be prepared to perform switching orders at Ameren's direction due to Ameren's sources being dispatched to other restoration activities.

7. Once a source is restored, do NOT change load on that source significantly without permission from Ameren. Increasing load may cause a loss of the source, hampering further restoration activities.

8. Perform thermography as components are restored, especially if there has been any physical challenge to components 'from severe weather, seismic activity, etc.

Comments/Notes:

12. Station Vehicles Initiate actions to obtain a portable gasoline supply for station vehicles since the site pump will NOT be working.

Comments/Notes:

13. Drinking Water Initiate actions to obtain additional drinking water (normally a 3 day supply is maintained on-site)

Comments/Notes:

14. Food Initiate actions to obtain additional food for on-site personnel J

Comments/Notes:

15. Sleeping Initiate actions to obtain on-site sleeping arrangements.

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page 47 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Page 5 of 5

16. Other:

Comments/Notes:

17. Other:

Comments/Notes:

18. Other:

Comments/Notes:

Rev 26 Page 48 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX E LOSS OF POWER IMPACT ON COMMUNICATIONS Page 1 of 2 NOTE .

1. Communications systems, both onsite and offsite are impacted by losses of power.

2. The following is a partial list. Some items are Safeguards*

Information and are NOT included.

3. Following ANY loss of power, plant communications systems are suspect until proven functional. Some systems have battery backup and will be initially available but suffer loss over time.

1. 0 IF Aux Building MCC lAl(Division 1 AC)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate (ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.):

Main Control Room

Control Building

Diesel Generator Building

Containment and Drywell

Screen House 2.0 IF Aux Building MCC lBl(Division 2 AC)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate (ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.):

Auxiliary Building

Radwaste Building 3.0 IF Turbine Building MCC lM (Division 2 AC or shunt trip)is impacted THEN the following areas will lose Gai-Tronics speakers and/or stations, requiring Security to make announcements with bullhorns as appropriate (ERO announcements, hazards, protective actions, etc.):

Turbine Building Rev 26 Page 49 of 50

CPS 4200.01 APPENDIX E LOSS OF POWER IMPACT ON CO:MMUNICATIONS Page 2 of 2 4.0 Loss of power to the following busses can impact radio capabilities within the plant. It is possible that some repeaters are lost, or base stations do NOT function. Be aware of possible radio use limitations on any loss of power due to the impact on repeaters:

Aux Building MCC lAl

Aux Building MCC 1Bl

Tech Support Center Load Center OAPOBE

Control Bldg MCC C Rev 26 Page 50 of 50

CPS 4411. 09 RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES SCOPE OF REVISION:

0 Specific Revision 6a [Baker] EC 380150, EDITORIAL Updated procedure to reflect digital feedwater changes.

I REFERENCE USE I

ORIGINATOR: Lee Anderson CLASS CODE: SNlVD SQR: Matthew E. Baker APPROVAL DATE: 07/05/2012 CURRENT CHANGES TO GENERAL REVISION Change# Date List of Affected Pages 0 6a 10/26/13 1, 7

@ ~--------------------------

0.

0 ------

Rev. 6a Page 1 of 19

CPS 4411.09 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. 0 Entry Conditions 3 2.0 Operator Actions 3 2.1 Pressure Control Strategies 3 2.2 Normal System Lineup/Operation 2.2.1 Main Steam - Condenser/Bypass Valves/MSS Drains 4 2.2.2 SRVs 6 2.2.3 RFPTs 7 2.2.4 Shutdown Cooling 9 2.2.5 Head Vent 9 2.3 Abnormal System Lineup/Operation RCIC (Appendix A, 1. 0) 11 RCIC Steam Line (Appendix A, 2. 0) 12 RWCU (recirculation mode) (Appendix B, 1. 0) 13 RWCU (reject mode) -

To the Main Condenser (Appendix B, 2. 0) 16 RWCU (reject mode) -

To the Waste Surge Tank (Appendix B, 3. 0) 18 3.0 Final Conditions 9 4.0 Discussion 9 5.0 Responsibilities 9 6.0 References 9 Appendix A: RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL 10 Appendix B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL 12 Rev. 6a Page 2 of 19

CPS 4411.09 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure is entered when directed by the EOP/SAGs, and provides appropriate instructions for utilization of available RPV pressure control sources.

EOP events which require use of the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) shall default to the applicable CPS 4003.01 (RSP) series checklist for pressure control system procedure guidance.

2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 PRESSURE CONTROL STRATEGIES

1. Based on plant conditions, resource availability and EOP/SAG directives, select a method to perform RPV pressure control (STABILIZATION or DEPRESSURIZATION)

2. Utilize as many sources as required in order to perform the directed RPV pressure control actions.

3. Maximize the use of RPV pressure control methods which release the energy to outside primary CNMT.

4. Lowering RPV pressure early in the event.

will simplify long term RPV inventory control.

Evaluate using enti~e 100°F/hr range when lowering pressure.

5. Lower RPV pressure as necessary to:

Minimize effects from leaks.

Maximize available injection sources.

6. Lowering RPV pressure will deplete RPV inventory.

7. Lowering RPV pressure to make CD/CB injection available

(< 725 psig) will most likely be successful if adequate inventory (RPV level> Level 2, -45") and/or injection exists to support the depressurization.

CAUTION: Over injecting cold water may exceed 100°F/hr C/D.

NOTE: EOP-lA reactivity shutdown conditions (Pressure Leg WAIT) may prohibit this strategy due to initial ATWS stabilization band being above the CD/CB injection pressure (e.g., 800 - 1065 psig).

Unless required by plant conditions or event progression, a high pressure injection source should be in-service until the low pressure system is capable of maintaining RPV level.

A rapid pressure reduction (2 - 3 SRVs or BPVs) will use less RPV inventory in order to achieve the desired pressure, but may result in a more dramatic level transient.

Lower pressure steam removes more energy per

'lbm of steam than does steam at high pressure.

8. Lowering RPV pressure to make low pressure ECCS pumps available is not recommended due to the pote~tial challenge to the cooldown rate, and approach to TAF.

Long term fuel cooling is enhanced by delaying the time to BLOWDOWN at TAF for as long as possible.

Rev. 6a Page 3 of 19

CPS 4411.09 2.2 NORMAL MCR SYSTEM LINEUP/OPERATION NOTE This section is NIA if recovering MSL/Condenser per CPS 3101.01, Main Steam (MS, IS & ADS), or CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram.

When using the Condenser as a 'heat sink' (i.e., EOP-lA) as opposed to a pressure control 'vent path', Circ Water and condenser vacuum is required.

2.2.1 MAIN STEAM - CONDENSER/BYPASS VALVES/MSL DRAINS Use sub-steps 2.2.1.1 - 2.2.1.9 to re-open the MSIVs.

Use sub-step 2.2.1.10 for Bypass Valve operation.

Use. sub-step 2.2.1.11 for MSL Drain operation.

1. IF This section was entered from EOP-2, EOP-3 or SAG-2, THEN 1) OK to defeat isolations per CPS 4410.00C007, Defeating RPV Vent Interlocks.

2) OK to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown.

2. Reset any cleared GROUP 1 isolations.

~ OK to position Div 1(2,3,4) Condenser Low Vacuum Bypass switches to BYPASS to clear Gr 1 interlocks.

3. Regardless if Circ Water (CW) is availa~le or not:

1) Establish vacuum.per CPS 3112.01, Condenser Vacuum (CA), or

2) If vacuum cannot be established, open 1CA007, Condenser Vacuum Breaker Valve.

4. Verify pressure set at least 15 psig > RPV pressure to prevent inadvertent BPV operation.

\

5. Shut/verify shut:

1) 1B21-F022B(D,A,C),

Main Steam Line B(D,A,C) Inbd MSIV.

2) 1B21~F016, MS. Orn & MSIV Byp Inbd Isol Valve.

3) 1B21-F019, MS Orn & MSIV Byp Outbd Isol Valve.

4) 1B21-F020, MSIV Byp Vlv For MS Line Warm Up. I

6. Open/verify open:

1) 1B2l-F098B(D,A,C), Main Steam Shutoff Valves.

2) 1B21-F028B(D,A,C), Main Steam Line Outbd MSIVs.

~ OK to open following drains to assist in the attempt.

0 1B21-F067B(O,A,C), MSL Outbd MSIV Before Seat Orn Vlvs.

0 1B21-F068, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Vlv.

0 1B21-F069, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Norm Orn Vlv.

Rev. 6a Page 4 of 19

CPS 4411.09 2.2.1 MAIN STEAM - CONDENSER/BYPASS VALVES/MSL DRAINS (cont'd)

7. Equalize around the Inbd MSIVs (F022s) to establish a ~P ~ 200 psid across the MSIVs by opening:

1) 1B21-F016, MS Orn & MSIV Byp Inbd- Isol Valve.

2) 1B21-F019, MS Orn & MSIV Byp Outbd Isol Valve.

3) 1B21-F020, MSIV Byp Vlv For MS Line Warm Up.

~ OK to shut following drains to assist in the dP attempt.

0 1B21-F015, MS Low Points Orn Shutoff Valve.

0 1B21-F021, Inbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Valve.

0 1B21-F033, Inbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Valve.

0 1B21-F068, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Vlv.

0 1B21-F069, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Norm Orn Vlv.

0 1B21-F070, MS Low Point Warm Up Orn Vlv.

0 1B21-F071, MS Low Point Normal Orn Vlv.

0 1TD-SV1(3,5,7), Mn Turb Stop Vlv #1(2,3,4) Orn Vlv.

~ TG needs to be reset per CPS 3105.01 (TG, EHC, TS) to shut. (OK to reset when the turbine speed is> zero.)

8. Re-verify pressure set at least 15 psig > RPV pressure to prevent inadvertent BPV operation when Inbd F022s open.

9. When< 200 psid dP is achieved, open 1B21-F022B(D,A,C), Main Steam Line B(D,A,C) Inbd MSIVs.

10. Bypass Valve Operation

1) If necessary, on the 1H13-P680 panel, Stm Bypass Control section, depress the COND VACUUM TRIP push-button to reset the COND VACUUM LOW TRIP.

2) Open Main Turbine Bypass Valves as necessary to esta.blish and maintain the desired pressure by using either of the following methods:

0 Depress Bypass Valve Opening Jack INCREASE push-button to open bypass valves as needed.

~ Fastest ~ethod, but no auto pressure control is available when,using the Jack.

When Pressure Set control is desired/

obtained, return the jack to full down.

0 Depress Pressure Set Point DECREASE push-britton and lower the setpoint to below RPV pressure.

~ Slower method, but provides auto pressure control.

Lowering Pressure Set maximizes Bypass Valve availability, and causes the SRVs to close.

Rev. 6a Page 5 of 19

CPS 4411.09 2.2.1 MAIN STEAM - CONDENSER/BYPASS VALVES/MSL DRAINS (cont'd)

11. Main Steam Line Drains Open following drains as necessary.

MSL Inboard Drains 0

1B21-F016, MS Orn & MSIV Byp Inbd Isol Valve 0

1B21-F019, MS Orn & MSIV Byp Outbd Isol Valve 0

1B21-F020, MSIV Byp Vlv For MS Line Warm Up 0

1B21-F021, Inbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Vlv (ff" Shut/Verify Shut breaker at: AB MCC lE (1AP28E) Cub lC 0

1B21-F033, Inbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Vlv MSL Outboard Drains (when any Inboard MSIV F022 is open) 0 1B21-F067B(O,A,C), MSL B(O,A,C) Outbd MSIV Before Seat Orn Vlv 0

1B21-F068, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Warmup Orn Vlv 0

1B21-F069, Outbd MSIV Before Seat Norm Orn Vlv MSL Downstream Drains (when any Inboard F022 and Outboard MSIV F028 pair is open, or 1B21-F016, F019 and F020 are open) 0 1B21-F015, MS Low Points Orn Shutoff Valve 0

1B21-F066B(O,A,C), Main Steam Line B(O,A,C) Low Point Orn Vlv 0

1B21-F070, MS Low Point Warm Up Orn Vlv 0

1B21-F071, MS Low Point Normal Orn Vlv 2.2.2 SRVs No unique lineups or operating modes e~ist when using the SRVs for pressure control.

Operate the SRVs per CPS 3101.01, Main Steam (MS, IS & .ADS) and within the guidelines specified in the entry EOP/SAGs.

SRVs may be operated-from the Remote Shutdown Panel per CPS 4003.01, Remote Shutdown and 4003.0lCOOl, RSP - Pressure Control, if needed to perform steps of the EOPs.

Rev. 6a Page 6 of 19

CPS 4411. 09 2.2.3 RFPTs

1. IF This step was entered from EOP-2, EOP-3 or SAG-2, THEN 1) OK to defeat isolations per CPS 4410.00C007, Defeating RPV Vent Interlocks.

2) OK to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown.

2. Regardless if Circ Water (CW) is available or not:

@= OK to position Div 1(2,3,4) Condenser Low Vacuum Bypass switches to BYPASS to clear Gr 1 interlocks.

1) Establish vacuum per CPS 3112.01, Condenser Vacuum (CA), or

2) If vacuum cannot be established, open 1CA007, Condenser Vacuum Breaker Valve.

0 3. Verify operation of one or both TDRFP's per CPS 3103.01, Feedwater (FW).

@=When< 20" vac, OK to bypass the RFPT Low Vacuum Trip by depressing Low Vacuum Trip Reset push-button (Low vacuum trip window indicates RESET PERM).

4. Open, as needed to support level control, either:

0 1FW002A(B), RFP lA(B) Disch Vlv, or 0

1FW003A(B), RFP Discharge Bypass Valve.

5. Open as necessary to assist with RFPT flow, 1FW014, HP Htrs 6A & 6B Bypass Vlv.

Rev. 6a Page 7 of 19

CPS 4411.09 2.2.3 RFPTs (cont.)

6. Control desired RPV pressure/level, cooldown rate, and TDRFP flow by any of the listed methods:

0 Adjust TDRFP lA(B) speed using Manual Speed Control.

0 Throttle lFWOlOA(B), RFP lA(B) Min Flow Vlv.

0 Shut/Verify Shut breakers for:

1) 1FW016, Flushing Line Inbd Isolation Valve TB MCC lI (1AP56E) Cub 3D

2) 1FW021, Flushing Line Outboard Isol Valve TB MCC lI (1AP56E) Cub 6B

3) Open 1FW016, and throttle as necessary, 1FW021, Flushing Line To Cdsr Vlvs.

0 Throttle 1B21-F065A(B), RPV Inlet Vlvs using RPV Inlet Vlv stop button after initiating valve operation.

r::ir The valves may need to be shut to prevent over-feeding the RPV.

0 Free spin the TDRFP lA(B) using any following lineup:

1) 1FW002A(B) shut; 1B21-F065A & B shut, -or

2) 1FW002A (B) shut; 1B21-F065A(B) open, or

3) 1FW002A (B) open; 1B21-F065A & B shut.

Rev. 6a Page 8 of 19

CPS 4411.09 2.2.4 SHUTDOWN COOLING No unique lineups or operating modes exist when using RHR in shutdown cooling mode for pressure control.

Operate the system in accordance with the normal operating procedure and within the guidelines specified in the entry EOP/SAGs.

0 Shutdown Cooling, CPS 3312.03, RHR - Shutdown*

Cooling (SDC) & Fuel Pool Cooling And Assist 0

Alternate SDC, CPS 3312.02, Alternate Shutdown Cooling Methods (A-SDC)

CAUTION This method vents directly into the drywell space. A drywell pressure increase should be expected.

2.2.5 HEAD VENT

1. (Local) At AB MCC 1F-2A (1AP41E),

place both breakers to ON for 1B21-F001, Rx Press Vessel Head Ventilation Valve.

(AB 762' East, X-119) (Need 3210 Key)

2. Open 1B21-F001, Rx Head To DW Locked Vent Valve.

(Key operated switch)

3. Open 1B21-F002, Rx Head To DW Vent Valve.

2.3 ABNORMAL SYSTEM LINEUP/OPERATION When directed by the EOP/SAGs, operate following systems per the instructions detailed in the listed appendix:

Page RCIC Append1x A, 1. 0 10 RCIC Steam Line Appendix A, 2.0 ll RWCU (recirculation mode) Appendix B, 1. 0 12 RWCU (reject mode) -

To ~he Main Condenser Appendix B, 2.0 15 RWCU (reject mode) -

To the Waste Surge Tank Appendix B, 3.0 17 3.0 FINAL CONDITIONS RPV*pressure control is established and maintained by existing system lineup/operation and per the EOP/SAGs.

Rev. 6a Page 9 of 19

CPS 4411.09 4.0 DISCUSSION

4.1 STABILIZATION

Establishing and maintaining a defined pressure control band below 1065 psig with the intent of keeping RPV pressure from changing until DEPRESSURIZATION is desired.

An initial band of 800 - 1065 psig is recommended, with a preferred 50 - 200 psig range as pressure is lowered.

Larger pressure bands (e.g., 600 - 1065 psig) may assist with pressure/level coordination efforts until conditions are stabilized.

The 50 - 200 psig band reflects the nominal SRV cycle range, *minimizes operator burden, and maximizes the efficient coordination of level/pressure control actions.

4. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION: The lowering of RPV pressure *to a new lower STABILIZATION band, or to cold shutdown conditions .

.OEPRESSURIZATION supports RPV cool down, maximizes injection sources, and minimizes pressure boundary leaks.

DEPRESSURIZATION also occurs when decay heat cannot maintain RPV pressure.

EOP-1 permits DEPRESSURIZATION once RPV pressure has been STABILIZED.

EOP-lA prohibits the intentional DEPRESSURIZATION until specific reactivity shutdown conditions have been established.

EOP-lA does not prohibit lowering RPV pressure if required due to a CRITICAL PARAMETER RESPONSE.

4.3 CRITICAL PARAMETER RESPONSE: An EOP flowchart directed action (e.g., EOP-2/3 BLOWDOWN, EOP-6 Fig P/Q) to lower RPV pressure to maintain within prescri9ed limits.

These EOP actions prevail over the current STABILIZATION band, and will require a new band to be established once the limit is no longer directing a pressure reduction.

5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES Operations Department Head shall be responsible for ensuring the proper implementation of the procedure.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 CPS 3101.01, Main Steam (MS, IS & ADS) 6.2 CPS 3103.01, Feedwater (FW) 6.3 CPS 3112.01, Condenser Vacuum (CA) 6.4 CPS 3203.01, Component Cooling Water 6.5 CPS 3303.01, Reactor Water Cleanup (RT) 6.6 CPS 3310.01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) 6.7 CPS 3312.02, Alternate Shutdown Cooling Methods (A-RHR) 6.8 CPS 3312.03, RHR-Shutdown Cooling (SOC) & Fuel Pool Cooling And Assist 6.9 CPS 4003.01 series: Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) 6.10 CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram 6.11 CPS 4403.01, EOP-2 RPV Flooding 6.12 CPS 4407.01, EOP-3 Emergency RPV Depressurization 6.13 CPS 4410.00COOS, Defeating RWCU Interlocks 6.14 CPS 4410.00C007, Defeating RPV Vent Interlocks 6.15 CPS 4702.01, SAG-2 RPV, Containment, And Radioactive Release Control Rev. 6a Page 10 of 19

CPS 4411.09 APPENDIX A: RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL Initial METHOD 1.0: RCtC (Page 10)

METHOD 2.0: RCIC Steam Line (Page 11)

NOTE RCIC operating limits and cautions specified on the EOP flowcharts take prece1ence over RCIC normal operating limits.

A. l. 0 RCIC A.1.1 If not already operating, manually start RCIC per CPS 3310.01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) to establish a flow path from tank to tank.

(ffr OK to clear RCIC Initiation signal (reset PB).

(ffr OK to defeat RCIC interlocks (4410.00COOl).

A.1.2 Control RPV depressurization/cooldown at the desired rate by means of manu~l control of the RCIC Pump Flow Cont, 1E51-R600.

A.1.3 If desired to initiate flow into the RPV to support level control and/or pressure control,

1. Open 1E51-F013, RCIC Pump Disch To Rx Outbd Isol Valve.

2. Slowly thrdttle shut 1E51-F022, RCIC Pmp First Test Valve To Stor Tank, until flow into the RPV is observed.

3. Control RPV depressurization/cooldown by throttling 1E51-F022 and/or by controlling the RCIC Pump Flow Cont, 1E51-R600.

A.1.4 When RPV injection is no longer desired,

1. Slowly throttle open 1E51-F022, RCIC Pmp First Test Valve To Stor Tank.

2. Shut 1E51-F013, RCIC Pump Disch To Rx Outbd_Isol Valve.

3. Control RPV depressurization/cooldown by throttling 1E51-F022 and/or by controlling the RCIC Pump Flow Cont, 1E51-R600.

Rev. 6a Page 11 of 19

CPS 4411.09 APPENDIX A: RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial NOTE RCIC operation per App. A, Method 1 is preferred ifpossible, since it provides better pressure control and it satisfies the intent of EOP-3 or SAG-2 listing of 'RCIC steam line' method.

A.2.0 RCIC STEAM LINE A.2.1 IF This step was entered from EOP-3 or SAG-2, THEN 1. OK to defeat isolations per CPS 4410.00C007, Defeating RPV Vent Interlocks.

2. OK to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown.

A.2.2 Shut 1E51-F045, RCIC Turb Stm Supp Shutoff Valve.

A.2.3 Open 1E51-F064, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp Outbd Isol Valve.

A.2.4 Open 1E51-F076, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp Warm Up Isol Valve.

A.2.5 Open 1E51-F063, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp Inbd Isol Valve.

A.2.6 Open 1E51-F025, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp First Drn Isol Valve.

A.2.7 Open 1E51-F026, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp Second Drn Isol Valve.

A.2.8 Open 1E51-F054, RHR & RCIC Stm Supp Drn Trap Byp Vlv.

Rev. 6a Page 12 of 19

CPS 4411.09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL Initial METHOD 1.0: RWCU (recirculation mode) (Page 12)

METHOD 2.0: RWCU (reject mode) - To the Main Condenser (Page 15)

METHOD 3.0: RWCU (reject mode) - To the Waste Surge Tank (Page 17)

NOTE RWCU (recirculation mode) pressure reduction can be enhanced by performing RWCU (reject mode) in conjunction with these actions.

This will allow for more head spray (injection) from RCIC (if running) which will provide for a faster pressure reduction.

B.1.0 RWCU (recirculation mode)

B.1.1 IF RWCU system isolations have occurred or are anticipated, THEN Perform CPS 4410.00C005, Defeating RWCU Interlocks.

B.1.2 Determine status of RWCU system.

0 If RWCU is operating, go to B.1.3. (Page 13) 0 If RWCU is shutdown, go to B.1.4. (Page 14)

Rev. 6a Page 13 of 19

CPS 4411.09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial RWCU (recirculation mode)

B.1.3 RWCU (recirculation mode) when RWCU Operating:

1. Open 1G33-Fl01, Bot Hd Orn Suet.

2. To prevent pump run-out while establishing control of RT flow:

3. Throttle shut 1G33-F042A(B), Regen Hx A(B)

Outlet Throt, while concurrently opening 1G33-F044, RWCU Filter/Demin Bypass.

CAUTION Monitor NRHX outlet temperature during recirculation. Maximum NRHX shell (Component Cooling Water) side outlet temperature shall not exceed 180°F.

4. Throttle 1G33-F107, Regen Heat Exch Bypass to control cooldown rate< 100°F/hr.

5. When 1G33-F107, Regen Heat Exch Bypass is fully open, shut 1G33-F042A(B) Regen Hx A(B)

Outlet Throt.

6. When RWCU (recirculation mode) is no longer required by the EOP/SAGs, return RWCU system to normal per CPS 3303.01, Reactor Water Cleanup (RT).

Rev. 6a Page 14 of 19

CPS 4411.09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial RWCU (recirculation mode) (cont'd)

B.1.4 RWCU (recirculation mode) when RWCU Shutdown:

1. Verify CCW operating per

.CPS 3203.01, Component Cooling Water (CC).

2. Shut:

1) 1G33-F042A, Regen Hx A Outlet Throt.

2) 1G33-F042B, Regen Hx B Outlet Throt.

3) 1G33-F028, Orn Flow Inbd Isol.

4) 1G33-F034, Orn Flow Outbd Isol.

3. Open:

1) 1G33-F001, RWCU Suet Inbd Isol.

2) 1G33-F004, RWCU Suet Outbd Isol Vlv.

3) 1G33-F039, RWCU Outbd Rtn Isol.

4) 1G33-F040, RWCU Inbd Rtn Isol.

5) 1G33-F053, Pump Disch Inbd Isol.

6) 1G33-F054, Pump Disch Outbd Isol.

4. Open 1G33-Fl01, Bot Hd Orn Suet.

5. Open 1G33-F044, RWCU Filter/Demin Bypass.

6. Start RWCU Recirc Pump(s), 1G33-C001A(B,C) per CPS 3303.01, Reactor Water Cleanup (RT).

CAUTION Opening valves JG33-F046, Drn Flow to Cdsr, or IG33-F041, Drn Flow to Cdsr Bypass with JG33-F035, Drn Flow to Rad Waste open will connect the Waste Surge Tank to the Main Condenser, causing a loss of vacuum.

7. Throttle open 1G33-Fl07, Regen Heat Exch Bypass to control cooldown rate< 100°F/hr. If unable to maintain> 70 gpm or< 180°F NRHX CCW Outlet, throttle open as necessary 1G33-F042A(B),

Regen Hx A(B) Outlet Throt.

8. When RWCU (recirculation mode) is no longer required by the EOP/SAGs, return RWCU system to normal per CPS 3303.01 (RT).

Rev. 6a Page 15 of 19

CPS 4411. 09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial NOTE RWCU (reject mode) pressure reduction can be enhanced by performing RCIC operations_in conjunction with these actions.

This will allow for more head spray (injection) from RCIC which will provide for a faster pressure reduction.

B.2.0 RWCU (reject mode) - To the Main Condenser

~ This section/line-up relies on RWCU Recirculation Mode being in operation prior to using this method.

B.2.1 IF Boron has been injected for power control, THEN STOP. This section is not authorized ,for use.

CAUTION Opening valves JG33-F046, or JG33-F041, with JG33-F035 open will connect the Waste Surge Tank to the Main Condenser causing a loss of vacuum.':

B.2.2 Shut:

1. 1G33-F035, Orn Flow To Rad Waste.

2. 1G33-F046, Orn Flow To Cdsr.

3. 1G33-F041, Orn Flow To Cdsr Bypass.

4. 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator.

5. 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

B.2.3 Open:

1. 1G33-F028, Orn Flow Inbd Isol.

2. 1G33-F034, Orn Flow Outbd Isol.

Rev. 6a Page 16 of 19

CPS 4411. 09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial RWCU (reject mode) - To the Main Condenser (cont'd)

NOTE Monitor NRHX outlet temperature during reject.

Do not exceed 120°F to the Waste Surge Tank.

Maximum NRHX shell (Component Cooling Water) side outlet temperature shall not exceed J80°F.

B.2.4 IF RPV pressure~ 50 psig, THEN 1. Open 1G33-F031, Drn Flow Orifice Bypass.

2. Open 1G33-F046, Drn Flow To Cdsr.

B.2.5 IF RPV pressur~ > 50 psig, THEN 1. Verify shut 1G33-F031, Drn Flow Orifice Bypass.

2. Open 1G33-F046, Drn Flow To Cdsr.

B.2.6 Initiate RWCU reject flow as follows:

1. Slowly open 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator, to control RPV cooldown rate< 100°F/hr.

NOTE*

Excessive JG33-F031 opening may result in JG33-F033 auto closure.

2. To maintain a stable reject flow rate, throttle open 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

B.2.7 When RWCU reject to the Main Condenser is no longer desired, shut the following valves:

1. 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator.

2. 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

3. 1G33-F028, Orn Flow Inbd Isol.

4. 1G33-F034, Orn Flow Outbd Isol.

5. 1G33-F046, Orn Flow To Cdsr.

6. 1G33-F041, Orn Flow To Cdsr Bypass.

Rev. 6a Page 17 of 19

CPS 4411. 09 APPENDIX B: RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial NOTE RWCU (reject mode) pressure reduction can be enhanced by performing RCIC operations in conjunction with these actions.

This will allow for more head spray (injection) from RCIC which will provide for a faster pressure reduction.

B.3.0 RWCU (reject mode) - To the Waste Surge Tank B. 3 .1. IF _Boron has been injected for power control, THEN STOP. This section is not authorized for use.

CAUTION Monitor NRHX outlet temperature during reject.

Do not exceed 120°F to the Waste Surge Tank.

Maximum NRHX shell (Component Cooling Water) side outlet temperature shall not exceed 180°F.

B.3.2 Shut:

1. 1G33-F035, Drn Fl9w To Rad Waste.

2. 1G33-F046, Drn Flow To Cdsr.

3. 1G33-F041, Drn Flow To Cdsr Bypass.

4. 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator.

B.3.3 Open:

1. 1G33-F028, Drn Flow Inbd Isol.

2. 1G33-F034, Drn Flow Outbd Isol.

Rev. 6a Page 18 of 19

CPS 4411. 09 APPENDIX B:* RWCU PRESSURE CONTROL (cont'd)

Initial RWCU (reject mode) - To the Waste Surge Tank (cont'd)

CAUTION Opening valves JG33-F046 or JG33-F041 with JG33-F035 open will connect the Waste Surge Tank to the Main Condenser, causing a loss of vacuum.

B.3.4 IF RPV pressure is~ 50 psig, THEN Open:

1. 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

2. 1G3J-F035, Orn Flow To Rad Waste.

B.3.5 IF RPV pressure is> 50 psig, THEN 1. Shut 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

2. Open 1G33-F035, Orn Flow To Rad Waste.

B.3.6 Initiate RWCU reject flow as follows:

Slowly open 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator, to control RPV cooldown rate< 100°F/hr.

B.3.7 When RWCU reject to the Waste Surge Tank is no longer desired, shut the following valves:

1. 1G33-F033, Drain Flow Regulator.

2. 1G33-F031, Orn Flow Orifice Bypass.

3. 1G33-F028, Orn Flow Inbd Isol.

4. 1G33-F034, Orn Flow Outbd Isol.

5. 1G33-F035, Orn Flow To Rad Waste.

Rev. 6a . Page* 19 of 19

ENTRY CONDITION CPS 4306.01 Extended Loss of AC Power / 1. Conwd<<lhe~toln-.ol<.t\50.S4(x)dllffl91hepnfamwnudth&proc:edure./4JO.J.OJP02Jf

2. tossofr,oonM~entbllonwil~blklllhepo1enti.llorlolrbomecont.lMWdoninlhepllnt. Rev 1

l. Plan! radlltlon monkan Id during* St1tlon !IIKlwut. S.ttNV ~ pom~ r.llltlr>n Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink monkortno ln*ln!merib mun be 11,ed to monltDr pl.Int rlodlologbl cundllons.

4. ~ I In rt.. p&.nt mly ~ul~ uP't.llnte toevKwlt d"" to the Ion ol lghtlno ind potenU,I lossolcomm11niutlon1. App rova l Ooctl m ent:ation on File

s. HIIM111l COfflfflllniutloni wkh the disjwtchH H tti!uncl dunng the nent.

6. Mllllmbe cydilg OC mQIOf opt,rlltdulves. Exc,eutve v.lYe ~!Ion mi,y elffl1ust bittH'\' , _

ca~dy.

ENTER 4200.01 Loss of AC Power, Section, 4.4

7. Thll!~IWH"W1l&expectl!dtoowrflow.ltl'rillnotbepoiill)le1D'°""""Su~Wl'IPool~ Station Blackout PHEOP-6Prirn,.ryC-onlllllmentControl .A

~

Do NOT continue In this pnx~u-e u,til directed by 4200.01. (OK ro tin-*tag,, eq1J1pmtnt}

A IRPV Water Level Control Systems

RC IC/4XJ6.0IPODS] I Perform steps cono..neitly I OelulRCIClntt'1ocb/4"10.00COOJ/:

RCIC ~

Temper1hn IIOl,,Uon Slgrwls RCX:S.:tb!Tf3fldtl" 1

~IOCStumSuPl)iyf'rftl,l,lftJsd.Mlon le¥elbo6111on RCX:ElcM11stOllphr11mtti9hPrflsu,e l l J l l

RCIClilghfwustl'!tisurtTrlp 81Kk 1Uf1 RO: f n << ~ (4XJ3.0IPOIJJ

( Safety Functions ) ( Electrical/ Water Restoration ) ( Infrastructure ) ( Balance of Plant ) Resources )

Sf{,f:J06.0IPOtH/

8.5.bPull1'!{4.J06.0/POtH/

UwC'fTWlf..,11111He B

fn l'nllectlon Syslem {4:J06.0JPOtH/

FtEXPllmp/4:KJ6.0JPOtH}

j RPV Pressure Control Syste ms CONTIIOL II.PY WIIH ""'8 per EOP I RP'/ C-onlrol.

U...Oo=bMA1ystems .

INHIIIT ADS.

PREPARE for law press...-e RP\' if;ection. /f306.0JPOt>f}

SFpumptotheLPCIWn-=~.

MONITOR lllPP!'HWl'I pool, {Ol'ltlJnmenl and drywelltemper1ture1./f200.0JCOOJ}

Tl1 1! N The 1blltvtomonltoressentlllA.PV

ndJc.- contfflment ~meten Ill the HCJl k mt, MONITOR RPlf Level ind f'ressun,, Coll!Hlment Press11n,,SuppresslooPoolTemper1t11n,,1nd WHEN The miln turbine h.ls Caiiled to* *lop, THEN SECUR I! EmeqierKy lie.ring OH Pump, tTOOSP.

Vl!HT hyd~frumthemiln~or. /fJ06.0JPOZJ}

WHEN GeneratOfhyd~pressun,11,slowuunbe (ASAP] - -+ .

{ASAP] -+

Ol5PATCH IU1n$prompl:lyto complelereqllftd r U!ie the Resource M.ln~ement table below 11 aguide NOTlfY Secllfltyto:

I. Support<lpftallor1CCH11DR.f)(pump.

2. Disp,olch6SfMsto762Conll04111dgf0fc,blelndhose

SRVs

Clpentel"""outsldelhecontrolroomf (fShrs) _ ___, *

B.S.bpumpfromtheCYtank,if11Y1ilable.

MltkeuptotheRP\lwith1R.fXpump,ifnecen1,y.

(1 hr) - ~ *

~~=~~~ L~dShedda!g 0 S11pprM~looPoo1Le,,,i,lloc1llylfne<e1Hry.

ff.JOJ.OJPOIS}

THfN Khleved, Sl!CUR I! Ge11. Emerll"'flCY Sul OI Pump, !TOOBP.

cleplo,me11tundttOpsdlrecllDn,Waddltloollresoun:es1n,

.. RflN!lf!SfHsflnt11po10pleMT1w,humoffMfe.

neas,w,yf4J(JJ.0/POtHJ

RCIC{f:J06.0JPOOS}

COHTROl. llPV p,Hsure PH EOP I II.PY Control. f-1'*'" <r HlgllHt p,lorty k OC HCC IA (prese,ve II.C IC

PU.Cl! AOSOact11pAlr8ottleslllservke.

8 .. tvesandcontroll.,SRYIO!enokk,*ndNSPS

[fJ06.0JP009/ * ::U"'!:!. theNOOlh1t1nELAP/LUHS~entMs Oele1t RCIC ll1terlocks['U/O.OOCOO/ /:

UseDet;,118systems. Instrumentation) .

RC IC Aro Temper111111 lsolltlon Slg,,wll (lhrs) i-. ..- ()pen!Wll3Aflrst(78ifuel81dgWest,8fl. Phone; 630-6S7*220l P1i,er.8CJ0.-307-0S0

lfpossi)le,use-*AOSSR.Vsfnl, thenAOS llCICSloctblT~tt SII.Vslll1nwnnerllMll,ncludei;...-enpoolhNlln9, {ASAP) - ~

SUPPLY480VAC~tomlloa<kwlth (';;;\ ...- Use Iridu-n phones if MCR 1.tdite i'(ltem is t-RCk: SlurnSupi,trPrtiwn,1'.dlllon 1nd..-okktheRCCP11mp1M1Ction. (Deti1C) 1FlfXpen<<1tor./fJ06.0/POOJ/ ~

WHEN AOSlllckupAlr8ottles1n,exll.'lusted, unav.llil.llble.

le'fel8lklliticJn

~ :Must Di&ph,"*m High Prnsun,

COMMENC E a cooldown to 150 - 250 plig ur.lng SRVs

UM4l06.0!COO t fl0:EtECTRICAL SUPPLY ADS1Jr fromthelnstalled0GSt1rtin9AJr

isTAl!IUS H communlt1tlon1wlthtMT5C1ndEOF.

1 at.<100 .F/hr. CON NECTIONS HAAO CARDS and 111y ***ilablo, Recelven.f<IJ06.01P009} [4306.0JPOll}

RCICHighEIONl"'tl'n!mittTrlp personneltoauktdeplo,/llw;lelecolc:1lubles.

8&1d< si.wt aoc

n<<es&MY f.fxn.omn.11 (ASAP) - -+ . COMMf.NCl! jftpllra,toryKlionslopl,,ce*

S11PPfHH11lPoo1Clean11p1ndTranster (Sf)pump

nd 11.ttRtt>(lllsul)pfessbn poolcoollng.

i

Akem1teStr11tegr-supplJUnRS11b 18,UnllSubD.

ESTABLISH eflectNf! commu11k:1tlonmethod swlthlll th e plan1. /f:J06.0JPOJ2}

Opsbdios 8u1Homs Q

PERFORM lnllll dlml9'l *>>enment. {006.0JCODJ} p

{<IXJ&.OJPOtll}

WHEN A C ~ ii ***a.blio to 1SHOOIA/2A(la/28)

SuppPoo1Mll e-UpSys011mp ShutoffV1lves,

{5.5hr] - - - +

U111lSub IL i nd Unit Sub lfOf l G ENEIIG12Elheottt(orSofflg)8.ltte,yCba,ver*nd suppl,, oc HCC IA.

SOund*pa,,erl!d F,ce-10-fau, (5.5 hr) - ---+

[8hr) -

TIIEN OUMP theupper contalnme11lpooltoU,.,

suppr.,nlonpool.

_ . MAIHTAIN sllj)pl'Hsionpoollewl~

ll'O"and 23'9"./<IJ06.0JPlXJ6}

(ASAP) - -+

SUPPLY UHS to lhe 0G llulld91g FlEXM111lfold./f:J06.0JPOO:l} ,°:t:~- . _..

f l:tf, (6hrs)

ESTAIIUSH wnllatlonlllreqund11'Hl .

/'°°6.0JPOJO}

f----. : ~~~:O.":m ~tttf)'lloom FuelH,ndlillgAoor

lnvenerllcom

Switcl,.ge*rRoom WATERSUPP1.YHAROCAROS1nd1nyndable

WHEN AC~1ndSX*n,**d.oblelc.-flEX personnelto~deplo'finglloses.

Suppreulonl'oolCooling

[8hr) - - TIIEN PU.CEFlfXSu~PoolCoolinglfl w ,vke.

R.BTORI! the wlKll!d dh<klon ~ SX !Tom the 0G

ESTABLISH lighting as n<<eslafY in required

{430'i.OJPOOJ} 6'.Hldln!IFI.E)(M1nHold./fJ06.0JPOO:l} an,n. {4306.0JPOJJ) tfeededlor. <r flectrlral,trateglesrestoresomellghting

PERFORM m.1111111 COlllillmelll lsoliltloll. {<1100.0JOXH}

Div l-Control1nd0GSlll9s

Suppn!SslonPoolcoollng 1- - - - - - ' -

OBTAIN 1 $pellt Fuel Pool (SfP) le\<el ,.,l!d.ig/lrffld and [fl hrs] - __. *

SpentFuelPoolmakeup PRES SURIZE the LPCSOfRI HHln)ectloo he1dtrfrom

Dlv2-AuxandFuelllld,gs M ,U- DCl..:!I.,\ A&~W ~

IJ'CS-

- 1-

--==-:=:==

oPl ciew!TWletllellffdtollllU1 tefflmedlatem1b,upflowtothe SFP.[4J06.0JP007}

UM~doul:0111PlllSlA(Aux81dg762E1st)Of the 0G 8111111119 FlfX M111Wold. {<IJ06.0JPW2} (14hrs) - )

OBTAIN Nel .. lromtheffit.iledOGFuelOI Slorage bnb IS needed . [fJ06.0IP008}

0\

II\! ..:~= ~ 5-l {l l) -*- i- - - - - := ==1-_-*- +_-1-_-1

- Mt:,,,limelorEII.Oresource1toe1t.1bli.hthe

'-=-=========:=:

--1---.. .

IPLIISJll(Conlrol81dg762byWestsblrwiy).

-1.M.w/U~ ~ ~ a ~1/U oP*I....,_...

[ 11hr) - **

L ____::::::=:=:::::_____j OEPLOY SfPSprl,yhooes1ndnonlo!1whlleFuelBuidlllg

-+ * * .,. - - .1-- .....

--- --1-..:.~ - - :-: - - -

h..Jbl1blltyconditlon11ref**orable. /4J06.0JGJ02}

{12hr] - HAKEU P forSFPbolol1. /fJ06.0IP007} Pf.RfORM dewatefflg operatloM Ill 1n,,s lmp.lC!ed Q *~=-*--->==-* 0,..- - - - _,_ - - -

~~~=-*=+--:=

by 1ystem luQOl!. /fJ06.0IPOJ9} J;1 -- -- -- - 1- - - ~_.. __ ,._..,..,,_

"':.-...:.-= :;~- - - - - -,- - - - - - -

w1uun 1 hr Complete OC Load Shedding w1tmn

..-.1u,1n 2 nrs 5.5 hrs Place ADS p Air Bottles in service Sopply OC MCC lA from the FlEX gener-ator via the Div 1 or Swing Cha~r " I I 0

Wiuun 5.5 nrs Ot.lTlp the ~ r cont.a1rvnent pool 0 Within e hrs Have a FLEX PlfflP ready for RPV makeup (Jn~RCJCf~ <>

Within fS hrs R IC Room aoor5 :,

Wit111n 8 nrs Have FLEX Suppression Pool Cooling In service 0 Within 8 hrs Makeuo to the sion Pool with a FLEX oumo Within 11 hrs Deploy Sf P spray hoses and noz:n~

w1m1n 12hrs Makeup to nc Spent r-uct l"OOI With a FLEX punp :,

Within 14 hrs COl'M'leOCe FlEX Punp and Generator rerueiing operations Within 24hrs ckupair bottles

EOP-1 RPVCONTROL

(

[Al RPV Water Level Instruments (4411.07) l RPVwaterlevel belowlevel3(881n)

I ENTRY CONDITIONS RPVpressure abow1065ps1g I Drywe11pressure above1.6Bpsig Reactor power above5%orunknown l'otienscramrequrred J

RPI/water level Instruments may be tmrefrable dua to bo~"'EI in l

!heinstrument!egslfdry,yellg..ccontainmenttemperaturolsabove Fig 8, RPVSatura~onTemperatura

DoI121useanR?Vwater!evelinstrumel'lli!f..-eJis~

FigC. M,nimum U,;able Levels

Use tho fuelZonelns!rument~theWlde Range instrument lsunava,lable ENTERATWSRPVCONT,OL

~~~?: -+ EnterEOf'.!A.

[ID RPV Saturation Temperature

~~~

I Enter410~.o.1, 0 Reaci.orScram,"

wh1lecont,nu,nghue

,i.

I/ I I

I OK

( RPVWATER LEVEL \ (

+

RPV PRESSURE )

I-~~.~;.::!~J I

\ RPVpressure~heckOeta,IA.

100 150 I IF THEN RPVPressure(pslg)

Crywelpr8Sureabova1.68psig ~R?Vpressureclropsto4nps1g.

preventLPCSandLPCllnjecbonnotneeded

~ Minimum Usable Levels (in.) °"" .~M*

forcorecoohng(441l.02).

V,*y "'""'

lsolaticms Anbcipate At~g blowdown (EOP-3) Oepressurila R?V rapidlv using main lulbina I-

~ !

~ I

ECCSstart

Dieselgeneratorssta,t I RPVdepressurizatlonwlllMl.rasultinlass cflnJl>Cb:lnnudedforcorecoohng bypassva!vo1(4411.09l

- OKIQ1xceedlOO'F/hrc<>0ldown ENTER A TWS RPV CONTROL:

Leavetnl1pra.:edure ~ EnterEOP-11\..

IF THEN Rf'Vwaterlevelunknown(4411.07)

Leavett,bproceduOI ~ EntorEQP.2at@

s.tabllizeRPVpressurebelow1oaspslguslngmainturbinebypassvalves I Lcssc~i~ecbcnlsanticipated High RPVwater IEFVel;,; naded fer use of Alternate lnJectionSy!ill!ms(Det!.alE)orShutdcwnCooling Ccntro!RPVwaterlevel-162ln.(TAF)to1011n I - Usea!l'lermetha<l1bolowlnet<!fd(44l1.Q9).

SRVs . .milic.l(suppression poollevetisabo~a81t.

Ca Mot stay below fig D. Pnmary Containment Stop addin11waterlrom outside primary containment - US1prelerreduquenc1Uycucan.

Pivssu111Limlt notneededforcorecoofing

- IIIAloSRVal*lost.tumaDswltctieotoOFF.

- 0Ktodefeat1Almertock!(441000CCOJJ

- CAUTION: Excudln~Nl>SN/VartexUrnlts(OetallZ) maydamagoRCIC.

CAUTION: E*cudlng NPSH/Vortex Limits (OttallZJ may damage or CAUTION: Elevatedcon1alnmerdp,.Huromey\tlp systems. RCIConhlghexllauS'lprusur ...

Control R?Vwater level Lcr,,e!3 (8.9 II J to Lewi 8 (521n.) usu,; anr cftt,1 - RCICL,jecb>nwllllrip=n\UltJineandTDRFP11.

Prefeffl!<llnj&,;1Jo11Systems(4411.03J*

- Us1ROC110r:1.getank1ut0on~youcan.

- RPVwaterle,ellndlcatloMareaffoCledbylnstrum1ntlllgtempor:i.!UmS1ocl RPVpr1S*ure*ChlckOet1.1IA. - OK!OdefeatRCIClnt&OOck1(441000COOl~

[Q] Primary Containment Pressure_l;Jmit - OK!OtM>ttlltECCS(ttit.04)

TORFPs

MSLclra1ns

RWCU(recirculaUonmoda)

- eypass,agonHXandM:lr/oomlns.

- 0Klode!ea!RWCUlntel1Dck!(441DOOCOOS)

~ 30-l--t---t---+-+---+-+---+----i ... CAUTKIN: ElevatodCGll!aln.montp ..Hu .. may\tlp RCICCPllhlghuhaUl'lp .. HUf"I,

RWCU(rejectmoda)

SRVsfrom1em:1tashutdownpanel(4003.01CXI01) ...Mb'...!f suppressionpoolleve11sabcve81t.

~

i 20-t--t--+---+-+---+-+---+----i ! :

SRVsfromcutsidethacontro!room(430301P004J ... !2D.b£..jf

.8

~;~:::~:::~::::o:::ORFP9 suppresslonpoo!levelr.iabove81t.

& - OK1Dc1treatROC~rlc>W(4410.0CIC001J

.E OK f *Hec8 10+--+-+--+-+--+-+---+----i I

LPCS UseRCICIIOJ3!)1tal'lk9\ICIIOnllrouun.

OKto(lc!H!HPCSWllllrlc>Cb(4410.CIOC002~

IF THEN R?V depressu,iza!IOn WII resuR in loss of Control R?V pressure as Iowas passable injectionneededforcoreeocing whd1maintainingadaquatecorecool1ng (150-250ps1g).

LPCI

-Resotandlnhobf!AOSl......,..ary Primary Containment Water level {ft) (310101/MS).

!:!HRthroughshutdowricool,ng

- UseHXs11,oona,youcan.

- OKto<lefeallE12-R153~00CU(~'10.00C009J Oepressunz,DleRPV.

[ID Alternate Injection Systems IF Cannot get RPV water ievol back lllEN ControlRPVwatertavelabcve - ll'IAloSRV1lost.mln!m1Z1nu1nberolSRV~cln t,qtw,,enl11Vel3(8.91n.)and -162m.(T.Ar). - Ol(todft~IIAkllterleck!(UICCOC003}

Lave18(52in)andholdl!Dlore

1nstal11deleclrlcpcw,,rrequ1red(4411.03) - Uw-ma!&lnjK11DnSyslm1 lfnel<led(Oeta!E).

RC1Cfrom n,mota shutdown panel (4003.01C002J - llpermlttedbyEOP-1!.start lgn,1&1"11ndmbce11(<<11.11~

SLC(testorstoragelilnkJ

'k

SXlhroughRHRB

ECCS wa!ar leg pumps tttlnstaUedeledllcpawer D

Cooldown10co1d$hu!downusing1hlftdowncoot,ng

)

B5bpumpfromCftank{4303.01PCOn {3312.03/RHR-SOC)

B.5.bpumpfromFP~osehouse(430301P007) - OaC21u,eRHRpump,youllffdl'orhold1ngRPVwa~,ie-,11

FLEX pump le LPCS (430601P004) aticvelevel3(891n.).

FlEXpllmp!ORHR.C (4306 OIP004) BLOW DOWN:

RCICblackstart(4303.01C001)

FLEXdloselgeneratar I EnterEOP-3W1!,le contll\lllngltol"O.

Shu1dc:M-ncoohngdoesnot Hcl:1RPVpress.urabelcw

FlEXsuppress.ionpoolcool1ngtoLPCl(4306.01P003) l .....:,11((3312.03/RHR-SOC) shutooY.ncoor11g1nterklck

{t04psig)uW!gother~ssure CAUTION: ExceedlngNPSH/Vortullmllll!DebllZJ contro1systems{441UJ9).'

may damage systems.

Mumizeinjectionustf'gPrefeJTedA!lllPJ!emai.lnjeocbonSystems (Oeta,!EJ(4411.03).

~ NPSH I Vortex Limits IF THEN cannotll81Rf'Vwaterleve1 1bow-187in.anclhokl1tt111ra NOTE. Llm~s apply onlvwhen suction rJ, from suppression pool H?CS, LPCS, RHR limits:

~

M,nlmumsupp;eulanpaollava!

M,n,mumsupprenllnpacllaval .............- .. t1ft

Maxlrnumsupprgs.. cnpooltemperaturo ....... 1S7'f

MaxlrnumROCllow....... . ............ 700g;m

~--------~ CLINTON POWER STATION RPVCONTROL 4401.01

CPS 4306.01P004 FLEX LOW PRESSURE RPV MAKEUP SCOPE OF REVISION:

New procedure to support FLEX strategies.

. o Specific Rev [Dodds] Provided clarifying information for phone jack locations; amplified instructions for providing water from CY tank to B.5.b pump and updated Tools and Equipment; provided instructions to supply RHR-C from B.5.b pump

I CONTINUOUS USE I

ORIGINATOR: P.K. Ryan CLASS CODE: SNND1 SQR: Ken Leffel APPROVAL DATE: 05/06/2015 CURRENT CHANGES TO GENERAL REVISION Change # Date List of Affected Pages 0 Oa 05/09/16 1 2, 3, 4, 5 6 e -----

8 0-----

Rev. Oa Page 1 of 9

CPS 4306'.01P004 FLEX Low Pressure RPV Makeup 1.0 Purpose

1. 1 The purpose of this procedure is to establish low pressure RPV make~p capability to be utilized when RCIC is no longer a viable RPV makeup source.

2.0 Requirements 2.1 Tools and Equipment Tool/ Equipment Location 02.1.1 Door Stops DG Bldg 762' FLEX Gang Box 02.1.2 Wrenches for Capped Storz Couplings DG Bldg 762' FLEX Gang Box 02.1.3 6" Spanner Wrench D_G Bldg 762' FLEX Gang Box 02.1.4 3" NPT to 6" Storz Adapter DG Bldg 762' FLEX Gang-Sox / Aux Bldg 737' FLEX Tool Box 02.1.5 Ladder for RHR-C Connection Vicinity of RHR-C Connection 02.1.6 6" to 5" Storz Transition Piece DG Bldg 762' FLEX Gang Box / Aux Bldg 737' FLEX Tool Box B.5.b Equipment (if available) 2.1.7 B.5.b pump Warehouse 3 2.1.8 B.5.b Hose Trailer Warehouse 3 02.1.9 3" Storz to 2 V2' NST Rigid Connections B.5.b Pump Cabinet 02.1.10 (2) 3" by 100' hose B.5.b Trailer 02.1.11 Rigid Hose Stand B.5.b Trailer 02.1.12., 8" by 10' Hard Suction Hose B.5.b Trailer 02.1.13 Suction Strainer B.5.b Trailer 02.1.14 5000 gallon portable tank B.5.b Trailer 02.1.15 1 3/16' socket/ 1 3/16" wrench B.5.b Trailer 3.0 Contents 4.1 RPV Makeup fro.m Suppression Pool with SF Pump (Preferred) .............................................................. 3 4.2 RPV Makeup from the CY Tank (if available) ............................................................................................. 4

4.3 RPV Makeup from Fire Protection (if FP header is pressurized) .............................................................. s .

4.4 RPV Makeup from the UHS ........................................................................................................................... 6 4.5 RPV Makeup from the Div 2 SSW to RHR Crosstie .................................................................................... 7 Rev. Oa Page 2 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 4.0 Procedure NOTE:

OThe MCR will be patched in to the sound-powered phone jacks listed below. Phone kits are staged in the DG Bldg 762' FLEX Gang Box.

' \

Jack Jack Location

Station F17 1PL04J SF Pump Instrument Panel (707 Aux Bldg, LPCS Room)

Hl8 1PL65JB Swgr Heat Removal 1B Control Panel (781 Aux Bldg .west) 0116 1PL65JA Across from Swgr Heat Removal lA Control Panel (781 Aux Bldg East)

]14 1PR39S SX Effluent Rad Monitor (702 Control Bldg)

OG18 1H22-P043 Behind 1H22P043, FW Temperature Monitoring Inst Rack (737 Aux Bldg Under Steam Tunnel)

L18 1PL12JA Div 1 DG Control Panel (737 DG Bldg)

MS P680/161 Main Control Room 0016 OPL72JA Adjacent to Control Room HVAC System Train A (825 Control Bldg West) 0018 OPL72JB Adjacent to Control Room HVAC System Train B (825 Control Bldg East) 006 1PR37S CCW Rad Monitor (762 Control Bldg) 009 1PL55J DG Bldg HVAC System Panel (762 DG Bldg)

OF16 1F16 Wall outside RCIC room (adjacent to 1PL62J) 4.1 RPV Makeup from Suppression Pool with SF Pump (Preferred)

NOTE:

The presence ofa LPCI initiation signal may have caused a LPCI lineup to be established automatically when the associated MCCs were repowered.

4.1.1 PLACE Suppression Pool Cooling in service per 4306.01P003, FLEX SUPPRESSION POOL D COOLING.

('ff' OK to continue in this procedure before* RHR HX tube side (SX side) flow is established.

4.1.2 OPEN/VERIFY OPEN 1E12-F027A(B) RHR Pump lA(lB) LPCI Inj Shutoff Valve. D

('ff' If a LPCI initiation signal is not present, 1E12-F042A(B) and 1E12-F028A(B) have to be shut in order to open 1E12-F027A(B).

('ff' Open this valve manually if required (1E12-F027A - Aux Bldg 762' East Side of Gas Boundary Room, 7' up, 1E12-F027B - RHR B HX Room 737' SW Corner on Mezz) 4.1.3 MAKE 1E12-F042A(B), RHR Pump lA(B) LPCI Inj Spray Valve throttlable per 4411.04, D THROTTLING ECCS FLOW.

Rev. Oa Page 3 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 4.1.4 THROTTLE OPEN 1E12-F042A(B) as needed to feed the RPV at the required rate. D

- May need to throttle shut 1E12-F024A(B) RHR Pump 1A(B) Test Ret To Sup Pool Valve or further reduce RPV pressure to achieve the required bP.

r::tr Maintain total SF flow as high as possible to ma~imize suppression pool cooling.

4.2 RPV Makeup from the CY Tank (if available)

NOTE:

OTwo B.5.b connection nozzles are provided on the CY tank in the annular space between the water storage tank and the second'?ry containment tank. These valves are accessible via the manway on the west side of the outer tank and requires manways bolts to be removed ..

4.2.1 IF B.5.b equipment is available THEN SUPPLY the LPCS or RHR-C injection header from the CY Tank as follows:

04.2.1.1 CONNECT 2 V2" to 3' rigid connections to the CY Tank pipe connections downstream of D OCY162A and OCY162B, B.5.B Connection Valves.

04.2.1.1.1 Route two (2) hoses from from B.5.b connections to the 5000 gallon portable storage D tank and OPEN OCY162A and OCY162B 04.2.1.1.2 ESTABLISH suction to B.5.b by connecting suction strainer to B.5.b pump utilizing the D hard suction hose supported by the hose stand 4.2.1.2 ROUTE a 5" hose from the B.5.b pump to the LPCS injection header (Fuel Bldg 755' D elevation). '

r::tr Use the Unit 2 DG vent fan opening to route the hose into the plant.

CAUTION:

Fuel Handling Floor habitability will be challenged after rvll hours and the pool begins to boil.

Do NOT fully block open the airlock doors when routing the hose into the Fuel Building. Protect the hose with foam pipe insulation staged in the Control Building 781' Lagging Storage Area. Use sections of the insulation to fill in the door opening to keep the heat from the SFP from migrating into the Aux Building.

04.2.1.2.13 REMOVE the pipe cap and CONNECT the 6" Storz connection on the LPCS CY flush line. D r::tr Storz connection stored in the FLEX tool box on 762' DG Building.

04.2.1.2.24 CONNECT a Storz 5" to 6" transition piece to the LPCS connection and connect the 5" D hose from the B.5.b pump.

- Storz transition piece stored in the FLEX tool box on 737' Aux Building 04.2.1.2.3 START the B.5.b pump and pressurize the discharge hose. D 04.2.1.2.4 OPEN 1E21-F374 LPCS FLEX Water Inject to RPV and Suppression Pool to pressurize the D LPCS injection header.

4.2.1.2.5 OPEN 1E21-F005 to feed the RPV as required. D 04.2.1.2.6 MAKE 1E21-F005, LPCS Injection Shutoff Valve throttlable per 4411.04, THROTTLING D ECCS FLOW.

04.2.1.3 ROUTE a 5" hose from the,B.5.b pump to the RHR-C injection header (Fuel Bldg 737' D elevation).

r::tr Use the Unit 2 DG vent fan opening to route the hose into the plant.

Rev. Oa Page 4 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 04.2.1.3.1 REMOVE the 3" pipe cap downstream of1E12-F088 FLEX Water Inject to RPV and D Suppression Pool on 737' Fuel Building west side (ladder required).

04.2.1.3.2 INSTALL the pre-staged 3" female NPT x 6" Storz coupling in place of the pipe cap. D 04.2.1.3.3 CONNECT a Storz 5" to 6" transition piece to the LPCS connection and connect the 5" D hose from the B.5.b pump.

cJr Storz transition piece stored in the FLEX tool box on 737' Aux Building 04.2.1.3.4 START the B.5.b pump and pressurize the discharge hose D 04.2.1.3.5 OPEN 1E12-F088 RHR-C FLEX Water Inject to RPV and Suppression Pool to pressurize D the LPCS injection header.

04.2.1.3.6 . OPEN 1E12-F042C, RHR Pump lC LPCI Inj Spray Valve to feed the RPV as required D 04.2.1.3.7 MAKE 1E12-F042, RHR Pump lC LPCI Inj Spray Valve throttlable per 4411.04, D THROTTLING ECCS FLOW.

04.2.1.4 CONSIDER sluicing water from the MC tank to the CY tank per 4303.0lPOlO D EMERGENCY MAKEUP TO THE CY TANK to maintain a clean source of RPV makeup water.

cJr Take into account the resources needed to implement other FLEX strategies.

4.3 RPV Makeup from Fire Protection (if FP header is pressurized) 4.3.1 IF B.5.b equipment is available, THEN SUPPLY the LPCS or RHR-C injection header from fire protection as follows:

4.3.1.1 CONNECT the B.5.b pump suction to a fire hydrant south of the DG Building using a 5" D suction hose.

CAUTION:

Fuel Handling Floor habitability will be challenged after "'11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months and the pool begins to boil.

Do NOT fully block open the airlock doors when routing the hose into the Fuel Building. Protect the hose with foam pipe insulation staged in the Control Building 781' Lagging Storage Area. Use sections of the insulation to fill in the door opening to keep the heat from the SFP from migrating into the Aux Building.

4.3.1.2 ROUTE a 5" hose from the B.5.b pump to the LPCS injection header (Fuel Bldg 755' D elevation). I cJr Use the Unit 2 DG vent fan opening to route the hose into the plant.

04.3.1.2 .. 1 REMOVE the pipe cap and CONNECT the 6" Storz connection on the LPCS CY flush line. D cJr Storz connection stored in the FLEX tool box on 762' DG Building 04.3.1.2.2 CONNECT a Storz 5" to 6" transition piece to the LPCS connection and connect the 5" D hose from the B.5.b pump.

cJr Storz transition piece stored in the FLEX tool box on 737' Aux Building.

04.3.1.2.3 START the B.5.b pump and pressurize the discharge hose. D 04.3.1.2.4 OPEN 1E21-F374 LPCS FLEX Water Inject to RPV and Suppression Pool to pressurize the D LPCS injection header.

04.3.1.2.5 OPEN 1E21-F005 to feed the RPV as required. D Rev. Oa Page 5 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 04.3.1.2.6 MAKE 1E21-F005, LPCS Injection Shutoff Valve throttlable per 4411.04, THROTTLING 0 ECCS FLOW.

04.3.1.3 ROUTE a 5" hose from the B.5.b pump to the RHR-C injection header (Fuel Bldg 737' D elevation).

(i}"' Use the Unit 2 DG vent fan opening to route the hose into the plant.

04.3.1.3.1 REMOVE the 3" pipe cap downstream oflE12-F088 FLEX Water Inject to RPV and D Suppression Pool on 737' Fuel Building west side (ladder required).

04.3.1.3.2 INSTALL the pre-staged 3" female NPT x 6" Storz coupling in place of the pipe cap. D 04.3.1.3.3 CONNECT a Storz 5" to 6" transition piece to the RHR-C connection and connect the 5" D hose from the B.5.b pump.

(i}"' Storz transition piece stored in the FLEX tool box on Aux Building 737' elevation 04.3 .1.3.4 START the B.5.b pump and pressurize the discharge hose D 04.3.1.3.5 OPEN 1E12-F088 RHR-C FLEX Water Inject to RPV and Suppression Pool to pressurize D the LPCS injection header.

04.3.1.3.6 OPEN 1E12-F042C, RHR Pump lC LPCI Inj Spray Valve to feed the RPV as required 0 04.3.1.3.7 MAKE 1E12-F042, RHR Pump lC LPCI Inj Spray Valve throttlable per 4411.04, 0 THROTTLING ECCS FLOW.

4.4 RPV Makeup from the UHS

~ I--L---1-IH

[;J - -----+

8lxkhl\.sd1pictparman1n1 pl 1nt1tquipm1nl Redlinescepic1 HEXmocliroc:a1,ons Doll ed lillf!s depic t m1nu1lly deployed hoses 4.4.1 PRESSURIZE the LPCS or RHR-C injection header per 4306 .01P002, FLEX UHS D WATER SUPPLY.

(i}"' Use the cleanest water available.

Rev. Oa Page 6 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 4.4.2 ENSURE RPV pressure is lower than the* LPCS or RHR-C injection header pressure. D r,r Use ATM 1E21-N654 for LPCS r,r Use ATM 1E12-N655C for RHR-C CAUTION:

The following steps create the *potential for pressurizing the hose supplying LPcS or RHR-C from the RPV (only a check valve in the flowpath). Do not allow RPV pressure to rise above 100 psig with the injection valve open.

4.4.3 IF LPCS is being used for RPV makeup, 4.4.3.1 THEN OPEN 1E21-F005 to feed the RPV as required. D 4.4.3.2 MAKE 1E21-F005, LPCS Injection Shutoff Valve throttlable per 4411.04, THROTTLING 0 ECCS FLOW.

4.4.4 IF RHR-C is being used for RPV makeup, 4.4.4.1 THEN OPEN 1E12-F042C to feed the RPV as required. D 4.4.4.2 MAKE 1E12-F042C, RHR Pump lC LPCI Inj Spray Valve throttlable per 4411.04, D THROTTLING ECCS FLOW.

4.5 RPV Makeup from the Div 2 SSW to RHR Crosstie 4.5.1 PRESSURIZE Div 2 SX per 4306.01P002, FLEX UHS WATER SUPPLY. D 4.5.2

OPEN 1E12-F094 RHR/SSW Cross Tie Valve D 4.5.3 OPEN 1E12-F096 RHR/SSW Cross Tie Valve D 4.5.4 MAKE 1E12-F042B, RHR Pump 18 LPCI Inj Spray Valve throttlable per 4411.04-, D

.THROTTLING ECCS FLOW.

4.5.5 THROTTLE OPEN 1E12-F042B as needed to feed the RPV at the required rate. D 5.0 Discussion

5. 1 RCIC should be used for RPV makeup for as long as possible or until conditions allow the plant to transition into the recovery phase. This procedure establishes low pressure RPV makeup capability to be utilized when RCIC is no longer a viable RPV makeup source.

5. 2 The procedure covers several methods that may be available. These prior,ties should be applied to the method chosen:

1. Ability to achieve the required RPV' makeup flow before core uncovery occurs (Refer to Appendix A, Required Vessel Inventory Makeup Rate vs. Decay Heat)

2. Water quality. - this is a concern because boiling in the RPV can potentially cause fouling of the heat transfer surfaces and overheating of the fuel.

Rev. Oa Page 7 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 5.3 The preferred method for low pressure RPV makeup is available once 480 VAC power is available to a Suppression Pool Cleanup and Transfer (SF) Pump. The SF pump can supply a sufficient amount of suppression pool water to the RPV via LPCI or the shutdown cooling return line to makeup for boil-off and system leakage. The RPV leakage rate assumed in the computer analysis (MAAP) is 100 gpm initially from RR pump seals. The leakage rate will diminish as RPV pressure is reduced.

The suppression pool initial water quality is good and will only gradually degrade if lake water is used to maintain suppression pool level while tnere is system leakage into the drywell basement.

5.4 . The are several alternate methods for low pressure RPV makeup to consider:

1. A B.5.b pump,and clean water source, if available, can supply the LPCS and/or RHR injection .line hose connections from a dedicated hose connected to the B.5.b pump.

Water sources to consider include: '

CY tank

RCIC Storage Tank

MC Tank (consider sluicing the MC tank to CY tank per 4303.0lPOlO Emergency Makeup To The CY Tank)

Filtered Water Storage Tank

Clearwell Tank

2. A FLEX pump connected to the UHS and supplying the LPCS and/or RHR injection line hose connections can makeup to the RPV via the LPCS/RHR-C injection lines.

3. A FLEX pump connected to the UHS and supplying Div 2 SX can makeup to the RPV via 1E12-F094 and 1E12-F096, RHR/SSW Cross Tie Valves.

Rev. Oa Page 8 of 9

CPS 4306.01P004 Appendix A Required Vessel Inventory Makeup Rate vs. Decay Heat Required Vessel Inventory Makeup Rate (gpm)'

1979 ANS 5.1 Bounding Decay 1000 Z<ioo *3000 3473 Time (hr) Heat Fraction MWt* MWt MWt MWt 0.0000 1.000E+OQ . 7400, 14800 22200 25700 0.0222 3.327E-02 246 492 739 856 0.0278 3.194E-02 236 473:

709 ' 821 0.0417 2.962E-02 21,9 438 658 762 0.0556 2.810E-02 208 416 624 722 0.0833 2.610E-02 193 386 579 670 0.1111 2.474E-02 183 3.66 549 636 0.1667 2.282E-02 ,169 338 507 587 0.2222 2.142E-02 is9 317 476 551 0.2778 2.029E-02 150 300 450 521

~- - -

0.4167 1.823E-02 i3s "i?Q 405 469 0.5000 1.728E-02 128 256 384 445 0.5556 1.675E-02. 124' 248 372 431 0.8333 1.478E-02 109 21,9 328 380 1.1111 1.353E-02 ' 100 200 300 347 1.3333 1.280E-02 !;15 189' 284 329 1.67 1.200E-02 89 178 766 308 2.22 1.llOE-02 82 164 246 285

2.78 1.048E-02 78 155 2:33 270 4.17 9.489E-03 70 140 211 244 5.56 8.866E-03 66 131 197 228 8.33 8.054E-03 60 119 179 207 11.11 7.516E-03 56. 111 167 193 16.67 6.788E-03 50 100 151 175 22.22 6.288E-03 47 93. 1,40 162 24.00 6.155E-03 46 91 137 159 27.78 5.909E-03 44 87 131 152 41.67 5.242E-03 39 78 116 134 48.06 5.0llE-03 37 74 111 129 50.00 4.948E-03 37 73 110 127 Rev. Oa Page 9 of 9

~ Exelon Generation" NIA

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'mat¢.( NIA I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 A. REVIEW OBJECTNES ........................................................................................................... ..................................................... 1 B. OVERVIEW OF TRAINING SESSION .......................................................................................... ;................................................. 2 C. EVALUATION ........................................................................................................... ................................................................. 3 D. MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS ...................... : ........................................................................................................... .............. 3 II. PURPOSE OF PROCEDURE .............................................................................................................................. 4 A. THE PURPOSE OF EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, IS TO: ........................................................................................................... ............ 4 B. REVIEW 1005.09, EOP / SAG PROCEDURE USEAGE, SECTION 8.13 ......................................................................................... 4 III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURE ................................................................................................................ 5 A. ENTRY CONDITIONS ........................................................................................................... ...................................................... 5 B. LEVEL LEG OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... ............................................... 10 C. PRESSURE LEG OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... ........................................... 24 IV. OPERATING EXPERIENCE ....................................................................................................................................... 37

(Any other use or reproduction is expressly prohibited without the express permission of Exelon Nuclear.)

LP87552, Rev'. 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D. l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

__,,., Exelon Generation ..

OBJECTIVES Initial: From memory, unless otherwise stated, and with 100% accuracy, in accordance with the course reference materials and procedures, the trainee shall: be able to:

Continuing: Using normally available references, unless otherwise stated, and with 100% accuracy, in accordance with course reference materials and procedures, the trainee shall:

[;?;;ijj;:~tifii¢'.:f

.1.1 From memory, recall the plant x x *x conditions (parameters and setpoints) which require entry or reentry to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-1, RPV CONTROL per EOP-1.

without error.

.1.2 Given a diagram ofEOP-1:

.1 Describe the conditions for X X X 4 exiting/transferring from EOP-1 per CPS 1005.09 without error.

.2 Recall the bases for each X X X 5-36 individual step/action ofEOP.-1 per CPS EOP Technical Bases without error.

.3 State the minimum suppression X X X 29 pool water level required for the operation of SRVs per EOP-1 without error.

.4 From memory, recall the X X X 26 preferred and alternate methods that ~an be used to stabilize RPV pressure below 1065 psig as listed on EOP-1 without error.

.5 And given plant conditions X X X 10 involving elevated Drywell/Containment temperatures, determine RPV level instrument availability per Detail A, RPV Water Level Instruments, without error.

.6. And given plant con.ditions and X X X 26

a copy of 4411.09, identify which methods of pressure control are available for use per EOP-1 without error.

LP87552, Rev. 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D. l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. ii

~ Exelon Generation" 1f:Ji~i1:~~tti~rtk)i ~r ,;;;;:,;j\\f?::~:tit1t'. ~:iij~iJiiiui~rs)?t:<\:~:ri {:;sfi.o{ :/1tio);,: ?:Ntct;? i :s:::s~i:: .*::.:::i~/ii?d

.1.3 From memory, recall the importance of X X X 11 verifying that the appropriate automatic actions occur as required per the EOP Technical Bases without error.

.IA From memory, recall the reason(s) for X X X 29 having a wide pressure control band when controlling RPV pressure with the Safety Relief Valves (SRV's) per EOP-1 without error.

.1.5 From memory, recall three (3) methods X X X 29 of determining SRV position, based on using three (3) different parameters (one method or parameter' may have more than one type of control room display) per CPS 3103.01, MAW STEAM (MS) without error.

.1.6 Given a set of EOP flowcharts, recall 4 X X X 4 of the rules for using the EOP flowcharts, in accordance with CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE PROGRAM section 8.13 without error.

.1.7 Given specified plant conditions and a diagram of EOP-1, be able to properly implement the following inserts per EOP-1 without error:

.1 Detail A, RPV Water Level X X X 10 Instruments.

.2 Detail E, Alternate Injection X X X 18 Systems.

.3 Detail Z, NPSH/Vortex Limits . X X X 16,17, 22,31,

. 32

.4 Figure B, RPV Saturation X X X 10 Temperature.

.5 Figure C, Minimum Usable X X X 10 Levels.

.6 Figure D, Primary Containment X X X 12 Pressure Limit.

LP87552, Rev. 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D.ll 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in depar.tment for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. iii

/

~ Exelon Generation,.

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.1.8 Given specified plant conditions and a diagram ofEOP-1, be able to properly prioritize and implement the following actions for EOP-1 without error:

.1 Verifying needed auto actions. X X X 11

.2 Establishing an initial level X X X 14 band.

.3 Establishing an initial pressure X X X 27 band.

.4 Deciding when you may X X X 25 anticipate Blowdown, and when you should perform Blowdown

.5 Determining the appropriate X X X 34 time to start to depressurize the reactor.

.1.9 Given plant conditions, correctly , X X X 35 determine which equipment would be available for core cooling, based solely on available power supplies without error.

.1.10 Without references, be able to recall the X X X 15 key features of injection systems, including a functional description of the procedures and equipment needed to cross-connect all available sources of makeup or cooling water under emergency conditions per 4411.03.

without error. '

.1.11 Given plant conditions, a diagram of X X X 35 EOP-1 and a copy of CPS 4411.09, evaluate those conditions and determine whether or not to use the normal Shutdown Cooling mode per EOP-1 without error.

.1.12 Given plant conditions and a copy of X X X 5-36 the EOPs, evaluate those conditions and determine the appropriate actions for those conditions per EOP-1 without error.

LP87552, Rev. 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. iv

~ Exelon Generation.,

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.1.13 Given plant conditions and without error, evaluate those conditions and determine whether or not to reset a TRDFP for the purpose:

.1 Level Control per 4411.03. X X X 14

.2 Pressure Control per 4411.09. X X X 33 LP87552, Rev. 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ I Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. v

Evaluation Method & Passing Criteria:

Pass a written exam with at least 80% score

References:

CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (BOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS No. 3103.01, MAIN STEAM (MS)

CPSNo.4100.01, REACTORSCRAM

CPS No. 4401.01, RPV CONTROL

CPS No. 4403.01, RPV FLOODING

CPS No. 4404.01, ATWS RPV CONTROL

CPS No. 4407.01, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION

CPS No. 4410.00, DEFEATING SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4410.00COOl, DEFEATING RCIC INTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4410.00C002, DEFEATING HPCS INTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4410.00C003, DEFEATING IA INTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4410.00COOS, DEFEATING RWCU INTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4410.00C009, DEFEATING INJECTION/FLOODJNG JNTERLOCKS

CPS No. 4411.02, TERMINATJNG AND PREVENTING INJECTION

CPS No. 4411.03, JNJECTION/ FLOODING SOURCES

CPS No. 4411.04, THROTTLJNG ECCS FLOW

CPS No. 4411.07, RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION

CPS No. 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (BOP) TECHNICAL BASES

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2000-01: OPERATIONAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN BOILJNG WATER REACTOR TRIP AND TRANSIENT

SOER 10-02, ENGAGED, THINKING ORGANIZATIONS

IER 11-3, WEAKNESSES lN OPERATOR FUNDAMENTALS Commitments: None LP87552, Rev Oll SRRS 3D.126.3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. vi

LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DATE DESCRIPTION 0-6 Unknqwn Unknown 7 11/04/04 Updated format. A large amount of technical content in the Training Guide has been added from the Clinton EOP Technical Bases. Corrected LP as needed.

8 09/27/06 Incorporated TRACER 2006-04-0140A. Removed EOP-7 from LP due to deletion.

9 04/04/08 Incorporated TRACER 2007-09-0l 16A to update to match revision 28 of the EOP's. Also, incorporated TRACER 2007-03-0079A to ensure remaining references to EOP-7 have been removed.

10 03/11/13 Ineorporated changes to update the LP to match revision 29 of the EOP's.

Added other enhancements.

11 05/29/14 Incorporated 01401784-77; RPV Control (EOP-1) LP87552 enhancement from LORT 13-02 feedback. (Page 30)

LP87552, Rev 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life oflnsurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. vii

Instructional Methods:

lecture/discussion

activities

simulations

small group activities

)

Media:

PowerPoint

white board

flip charts

handouts

trainee text LP87552, Rev 011 SRRS 3D.126.3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ I Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. viii

Content/Skills

Activities/Notes I. Introduction A. Review objectives

1. RPV CONTROL (EOP-1) gives procedural direction for Before class:

controlling reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level and pressure.

Review Instructor Lesson Plan If normal pressure and level control systems are available,

Make student copies of Lesson EOP-1 directs their use. If conditions degrade, EOP-1 Plans including figures directs the use of other systems and directs the operator to *

Obtain transparencies and/or procedures that govern the operation of those systems. EOP- PowerPoint 1 also provides transition points to other EOPs if conditions

Check the INPO web page for warrant. Familiarity with EOP-1 will aid the operator in any current SOERs, SERs or dealing with a wide variety of transients successfully. SENs. If any applicable information is found include that information in the presentation.

*

Persistent search for applicable OPEX to EOP utilization has not yielded credible examples.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 1 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes B. Overview of training session Before class:

Obtain and test required

1. RPV Control is entered whenever any of its entry conditions equipment for transparency occur; it is exited when an emergency no longer exists. The and/or PowerPoint viewing absence of entry conditions does not necessarily mean that an

Put items on board emergency no longer exists, however. Nor does the

Jnstructor Name continued presence of an entry condition necessarily mean

Discipline (OPS) that an emergency does exist.

Program (ILT, NLO, LORT, etc.)

a. RPV Control (EOP-1) gives procedural direction for

Subject controlling reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level and

Current Date pressure. If normal pressure and level control systems are available, EOP-1 directs their use. If conditions At the start of class, if appropriate, degrade, EOP-1 directs the use of other systems and introduce yourself and establish directs the operator to procedures that govern the rapport with the class.

operation of those systems. EOP-1 also provides.

transition points to*other EOPs if conditions warrant.

Familiarity with EOP-1 will aid the operator in dealing with a wide variety of transients successfully. Remind observers and evaluators to turn off personal communications

2. RPV Control is entered whenever any of its entry conditions devices.

occur or when a branch in another procedure specifically requires entry. It is exited when an emergency no longer exists or when a step requires a transfer to another EOP

3. The initial steps of RPV Control verify that the reactor is shutdown. If the reactor is not shutdown, control of the three key parameters transfers to EOP-lA, ATWS RPV Control. If the reactor is shutdown, the scram procedure is executed concurrently with EOP-1.

4. The remainder of RPV Control comprises two major branches, one addressing RPV water level, the other .

addressing RPV pressure. The water level control actions establish adequate core cooling. The pressure control actions first stabilize RPV pressure to help in controlling RPV water level, then cool down the RPV to cold shutdown conditions.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page2of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes C. Evaluation Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture (PSNSC)

1. A check for understanding of objectives will be evaluated by provide behaviors and actions one or more of the following: that support a culture of safety in all aspects of plant

a. The instructor periodically throughout the presentation in operation. The cornerstones of the form of an interim summary. these principles are:

b. A written examination with minimum score of 80%.

Everyone is personally respo~sible for nuclear

c. The instructor throughout the presentation using safety.

questions. ,

Leaders demonstrate.

commit~ent to safety D. Management Expectations

Trust permeates the organization.

1. Safe nuclear power plant operation is based upon the principle that each individual accepts the unique and grave.

Decision~making reflects safety first.

responsibility inherent in using nuclear technology.

Nuclear technology is recognized as special

2. When operations personnel are faced with unexpected or and unique.

anomalous syst~rn behavior, they are expected to take conservative action to place the system/plant in a safe

A questioning attitude is cultivated~

condition.

Organization learning is

3. A thorough understanding of EOP-1 is desired for an embraced.

operator to recognize the actions required, that are designed

Nuclear safety to restore the parameter values to within normal operating undergoes constant bands. examination.

In addition, SER 03-05, IER 11-3 and SOER 10-02 discuss weaknesses in operator fundamentals which have led to many significant industry events. The Operations Fundamentals (as outlined in HU-AA-1081-F-05) provide .

specific guidance on how to address the weaknesses identified in SER 03-05, IER 11-3 and SOER 10-02 to help ensure a safe nuclear culture.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page3 of42

Content/Ski! Is Activities/Notes II. PURPOSE OF PROCEDURE A. The purpose of EOP-1, RPV Control, is to:

Maintain adequate core cooling through core submergence.

Cool down the RPV to cold shutdown conditions

Ensure that the reactor is shutdown

1. Three key parameters ar~ controlled:.

RPV water level

RPV Pressure

Reactor Power B. Review 1005.09, EOP / SAG Procedure Useage, section 8.13 .1.6, .1.2

1. Review Section 8.13, "EOP/SAG Procedure Usage," in CPS Ask the students what the

No. 1005.09, Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) and advantages are of having the Severe Accident Guideline (SAG) Program." EOPs as flowcharts instead of regular text procedures.

Easier to see what possible actions are to be performed next.

Easier to implement overrides.

Easier to see what actions have been taken.

Provides a surface to write and trend data.

Several parameters can be

tracked and controlled more easily.

Easier for someone to back up the Control Room Supervisor's actions.

Others that the students come up with.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page4 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Ill. General Overview of Procedure A. Entry Conditions .1.1 I. EOP-1, Part A Have student follow path thru flow chart and along in CPS EOP Technical Bases.

ENTRY CONDITIONS RPV water level RPV pressure Drywell pressure Reactor power below Level 3 (8.9 in.) above 1065 pslg above 1.GS pslg above 5% or unknown wl1en roram required Turn mode switch to SHUTDO\/iJN.

ENTER ATWS RPV CONTROL:

No I UnknoYln LeavB this ~ Enter EOP-1A.

procedure Enter 4100.01, ~Aeaotor Saram," .1.

while continuing here. ..,.

a. Entry Conditions

1) The RPV Control entry conditions are symptomatic of an emergency affecting the RPV or a condition that could become an emergency. The specified parameters are the same as the key parameters controlled by the procedure or are closely related to them. The specified setpoints have been chosen to be operationally significant, unambiguous, readily identifiable, and familiar to operators. In general, they are also setpoints for scrams, alarms, trips, and ECCS initiation.

LP87552, Rev 011 Pages of 42

Content/$ kills Activities/Notes While each of the entry conditions requires a scram (or causes a trip of the RPS logic), a scram by itself is not an entry condition for the procedure.

2) The RPV water level entry condition corresponds to the low RPV water level scram setpoint (Level 3, or 8.9 inches Narrow Range). A low RPV water level is a symptom of events which may jeopardize adequate core cooling, including:

Loss of coolant

Loss of feedwater

3) The RPV pressure entry condition corresponds to the high RPV pressure scram setpoint (1065 psig). A high RPV pressure is a symptom of events which may jeopardize RPV integrity (and thereby adequate core cooling) such as:

SRV failure

Turbine trip with bypass failure

MSN closure

ATWS

4) The drywell pressure entry condition corresponds to the high drywell pressure scram setpoint (1.68 psig).

Although drywell pressure is not directly controlled by EOP-1, a high drywell pressure is a symptom of a break in the drywell, and thus of events which may jeopardize adequate core cooling.

5) The reactor power entry condition is defined to be a power above the APRM downscale setpoint (5%) or unknown when a reactor scram is required. This condition includes both ATWS events and operational situations in which technical specifications, administrative procedures, or plant .

policies require a manual scram. Control of reactor power is addressed in the initial steps of EOP-1 which ensure that the reactor is shutdown.

j LP87552, Rev 011 Page 6 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

6) If power is "unknown," it must be assumed to be above 5% artd ATWS RPV Control must be entered.

Loss of direct power indications does not necessarily mean that reactor power is unknown, however. Other parameters*, such as reactor period, steam flow, RPV pressure, SRV position, and suppression pool heatup rate, provide indirect indications of reactor power.

These indications may also be used to determine whether power is above the APRM downscale setpoint.

7) RPV Control must be entered at the beginning of the flowchart whenever any entry condition occurs, or clears and then occurs again, even if the procedure is already being executed.

b. "Turn mode switch to SHUTDOWN" Question: What actions are required of the A CRO when

1) Placing the reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN is Shutdown Criteria is NOT met?

'the normal method of performing a manual scram at Clinton. In RPV Control, the action has two purposes: Answer: Insert a Manual Scram\

and ARI in attempts to insert all a) It trips the RPS logic. If a scram signal already rods per the SCRAM procedure.

exists but a scram has not occurred, the manual scram may obviate entry of EOP- lA, ATWS RPV Control. If a scram signal does not already exist (i.e., RPV Control was entered because another procedure required a scram),the desired scram is initiated.

b) It bypasses the MSIV closure on low RPV pressure, thus avoiding possible loss of the preferred heat sink.

2) RPV Control must be r~entered if an entry condition clears and then reoccurs. The mode switch scram does not have to be repeated, however. This allows the scram accumulators to recharge and the scram discharge volume to drain after the scram is reset.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 7 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

c. "Shutdown criteria met?"

1) Procedure 4100.01, Reactor Scram, lists the

.Ar,t1,offll1o*"'"0t,.>criteria (cycle specific) for evaluating whether the *reactor is shutdown and will remain 1f};2:, G/,uk~

p-(M,, 5. j.J< ck<,~.

p.v [62- ,t,4:- 'J-3I Step b) cf,/, x.s. '. 8~

2) The first criterion gives the best confirmation that the _* ., /;LL,.-

.A,tci reactor will remain shutdown; Position ~the -,r10 ,:,fiOf~

Maximum Subcritical Banked Withdrawal Position, defined to be the greatest banked rod position at which the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions. If no more than one rod is out past position~nalyses prove that sufficient shutdown ~- ,{t"/15/"

margin is still available ifall other rods are at position

00. Other rod patterns must be evaluated by a qualified reactor engineer, as specified in the third ,

criterion. Note that the evaluation must address not only whether the reactor is shutdown, but whether the reactor will remain shutdown under worst-case conditions following the cooldown prescribed in the Pressure branch of RPV Control.

d. "Enter ATWS RPV Control"

1) If the shutdown criteria are not met, there is a possibility that the reactor could return to criticality as the RPV cools down:EOP-lA, ATWS RPV Control, prescribes appropriate control methods for

RPV water level, RPV pressure, and reactor power under these conditions.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 8 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

e. "Enter 4100.01, 'Reactor Scram"'

1) If one or more of the shutdown criteria are met, the reactor will remain shutdown and further efforts to control reactor power are unnecessary. The scram procedure is then executed concurrently with the Level and Pressure branches of EOP-1.

f. Concurrent branch

1) The thermodynamic relationship between RPV pressure and RPV water level requires that these parameters be controlled concurrently. RPV water level cannot be stabilized if RPV pressure is oscillating, since pressure transients induce level shrink and swell. Similarly, RPV pressure cannot be stabilized if RPV water level is cycling, since level transients may result in system initiations and isolations that directly affect RPV pressure.

1 *

2) The symptom-onented structure of the EOPs precludes any advance definition of the relative priorities of the Level and Pressure branches. Rather, the importance of individual steps and the priority with which they_should be performed must be judged based on observed parameter values and trends, the availability of plant systems, and an overall assessment of plant conditions.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 9 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes B. Level Leg Overview Have student follow path thru flow chart and along in CPS

1. EOP-1, Part B Level/ Automatic Actions EOP Technical Bases.

LEVEL Level indications are affected by instrument leg temperatures and RPV pressure. Check Detail A.

Verify needed auto actions:

Isolations

ECCS start

Diesel generators start

a. LEVEL

1) The primary objective of the Level branch of RPV Control is to keep the core submerged and thus adequately cooled. Initial steps define preferred and alternate level control bands and specify the systems to be used. Later steps provide contingency actions if level cannot be maintained within the prescribed bands.

b. "Check Detail A" .1.2.5, .1.7.1, .1.7.4, .1.7.5

1) Decisions which must be made in later steps of the Level branch require knowledge of the value and trend of RPV water level. RPV water level instruments, however, are sensitive to changes in RPV pressure, drywell temperature, and containment temperature. "Detail A" defines conditions under which water level indications may be unreliable or must be considered invalid due to these effects.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 10 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

c. "Verify needed auto actions" .1.3, .1.8.1

1) The verification of automatic actions prescribed in this step is intended to be a relatively quick confirmation of proper system operation. Time consuming valve lineup checks and manual initiation procedures are not appropriate at this point in the procedure.

, 2) "Isolations" terminate any loss of reactor coolant through a break. All required isolations of lines connected directly to the RPV and penetrating the drywell should be verified.

3) "ECCS start" ensures that emergency injection sources are available. "Start" means that all pumps, valves, and auxiliary equipment are properly lined up for existing plant conditions; a given system may or

may not be injecting. Later steps in RPV Control provide more detailed ECCS operating il!structions, including authorization to shut down a system that automatically starts but is not needed.

4) '~Diesel generators start" ensures that electrical power is available for operating injection systems.

5) All automatic actions do not have to be verified in this step, only those most important to RPV water level control. "Verify" means to confirm that necessary responses occur and that appropriate system states exist., Actions that should have occurred but did not should be manually performed.

)

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 11 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

2. EOP-1, Part C Level Overrides

" lF THEN RPV water level unknown {4411.07) FLOOD THE RPV:

Leave this procedure ~ Enter EOP-2 at@.

Cannot stay below F1g D, Primary Stop addlng ,Nater from outside prtmary Containment Pressure Limit containment not needed for core cooling.

I

a. "RPV water level unknown (4411.07)" If RPV water Review CPS No. 4411.07..

level is "unknown," there is no assurance that the core is Stress that elevated Drywell or submerged. The RPV must then be flooded to ensure that Containment temperatures the core remains adequately cooled. Both level and require increased attention on pressure control transfer to EOP-2, RPV Flooding. the part of the operator

b. "Unknown" in this step means that the value of RPV water level cannot be determined relative to a prescribed .1.7.6 limit or action level. Detailed guidance on evaluating the usability of available level indications is provided in 4411.07.

c. "Cannot stay below Fig D, Primary Containment Question When is Fuel Zone Pressure Limit" The Primary Containment Pressure Used?

Limit is a function of primary containment water level and is defined to be the lesser of: Answer: When level is below

'YideRange

1) The pressure capability of the primary containment.

2) The maximum containment pressure at which vent valves sized to reject all decay heat from the containment can be opened and closed.

3) The maximum containment pressure at which SRVs can be opened and will remain open.

4) The maximum containment pressure at which RPV vent valves can be opened and closed.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 12 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

d. If an unisolable break exists inside the drywell, continued RPV injection from sources external to the primary containment will increase primary containment water level after RPV water level reaches the elevation of the break. The increasing primary containment water level will, in tum, increase the hydrostatic pressure over submerged components and compress the primary containment airspace, thereby increasing the atmospheric pressure. The combinatton of these effects tends to decrease the margin to the Primary Containment Pressure Limit as the water level rises.

e. If the core will remain adequately cooled, continuing injection above the Primary Containment Pressure Lirnjt is unnecessary. Injection is therefore terminated to preserve containment integrity and operability of SRVs and pneumatic vent valves.

f. Injection needed for core cooling is not terminated. The Drywell/Containment Pressure branch of EOP-6 vents the containment to control pressure below the Primary Containment Pressure Limit. Containment pressure can thus exceed the Primary Contain~ent Pressure Limit

only if the capacity of available vent paths is less than the rate of heat addition to the primary containment.

Terminating injection under.these conditions cannot preclude primary containment failure. Injection needed to maintain the core adequately cooled is therefore continued. Otherwise, both core and containment integrity could be challenged.

g. Note that this override terminates injection only from sources outside the primary containment. fujection from the suppression pool need not be terminated.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 13 of 42.

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

3. EOP-1, Part D Level Control Systems Review *cps No. 4411.03, "Injection/Flooding Sources,"

CAUTION: Ex<:eeding NPSH./ Vortex Limits (Detail Z} may damag:e for instructions for Preferred

$ystems. and Alterna~e Systems Control RPV water level Levef3 (8.9 in.) to Level 8 {52 in.) uoing any of the Preferred lajection Systems (4411.03}: .1.13

,.... Leva indications atl! affecled by im;trument leg lemperaiuras iilld RPV pressures. Cllec}c De.I.ail A..

..- OK lotllro!tle ECCS{44H.04).

I

Feedwater

Condensate J Cond~nsate Booster

CRD

RClC

,... RCIC mj,ecti,;in will trrp* main turbine and RFPTs *

..,. Use- RCIC storage' tlmk suction if you can*

..,. OK to defeat RCIC interlocks (4410.000001 )*

..- Use RC!C storages tar,k suction if you can.

w OK to defeat HPCS interlocks (44*111.0DC002}.

LPCS

LPCI

U~ HXs as soon as you can.

RHR through shutdown cooling

..,. Use HXs as. soon as. yoo ca.n.

,.,.. OK fu defeat 1E12-F053 interlocks (441i0.!JOC009).

/

IF THEN

Cannot get level back above level 3 Hald level above-162 in. (TAF).

{8.9 ln.} and hold it there or UseA[temate lrij,eclion Systems if needed (De!ail E}.

lf permitted by EOP-6. sm.rt ignilers and n.ixers (4411.11 }.

\_

a. "Control RPV water level Level 3 to Level 8 ... " .1.8.2

1) If possible, RPV water level should be maintained Question: What auto actions between Level 3 (8.9in.) and Level 8 (52 in.) using occur at Level 8?

the Preferred Injection Systems. This control band Answer:

provides assurance of adequate core cooling while

Main Turbine Trips avoiding unwarranted demands on the control room

Feedwater Pumps Trip operators. Controlling RPV water level above Level 3

Reactor Scram (mode permits the scram to be reset and allows later use of dependent) shutdown cooling. Controlling RPV water level

RCIC cycles off

. below Level 8 preserves the availability of feedwafer,

HPCS cycles off.

RCIC, and the main turbine bypass valves and avoids LP87552, Rev 011 Page 14 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes moisture carry-over into the main steam lines.

Water hammer caused by filling hot steam lines with cooler water could damage the SRVs, main steam piping, or steam line isolation valves.

b. " ... using any of the Preferred Injection Systems" .1.10

1) Most of the preferred injection systems start and/or Review and discuss Attachment A operate automatically, and in many cases verifying system lineups will be the only action required in this step . If, for example, RPV water level is low due to shrink following a turbine trip, the feedwater system is capable of restoring water level automatically. If a break occurs with the RPV at high pressure, the high pressure ECCS is designed to automatically inject.

2) As a transient progresses, the most effective modes of system operation may change. For example, all ECCS pumps may inject f~llowing a large pipe break, but a single pump may be sufficient once RPV water level is restored within the specified range. Continued adjustment of system lineups and injection flows may thus be required in order to remain within the preferred RPV. water level control band. Note that this step may also be reached when a high RPV water level condition exists. In this situation, RPV water

level would have to be lowered by appropriate control of the listed systems. ,

3) The preferred injection systems include both those used for RPV water level control during normal plant operations and those* categorized as emergency ,,,-

makeup. Since the EOPs must address a full spectrum of initial plant conditions and postulated transients, .

individual systems are not prioritized. Pump capacities, water quality, power availability, suction location, RPV pressure, and systems operating characteristics should be considered, however, when deciding which injection sources to use.

c. "Check Detail A"

1)

The reference to Detail A is repeated to emphasize its significance and continued applicability to the prescribed actions.

d. "OK to throttle ECCS" LP87552, Rev 011 Page 15 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes 1 ) Throttling ECCS flow to control RPV water level Review CPS No. 4411.04

could be problematic following an ECCS initiation signal. Detailed instructions for doing so are Review CPS No. 4410.00, provided in 4411.04. "Defeating System Interlocks,"

and 4410.00 C002 for defeating

e. "CRD" HPCS interlocks.

1) CRD is a relatively low capacity injection source, but Review 4410.00C009, is normally operating and supplies high quality water. "Defeating Injection/Flooding Following an isolation or a small break, it may by Interlocks," instructions for itself be sufficient to maintain level. Both pumps can defeating 1E12-F053A(B) be started to maximize flow, as specified in interlocks.

I>rocedure 4411.03.

f. "RCIC" Review CPS No. 4410.00, "Defeating System Interlocks,"

a

1) A supplementary instruction provides reminder that and 4410.00COOl for defeating RCIC initiation will trip the main turbine and RFPTs RCIC interlocks.

if they are still on-line. Since the trips may complicate RPV water level and RPV pressure control, RCIC initiation should be avoided when the RFPTs are in use or the main turbine is on-line.

\

2) The preferred suction source for RCIC and HPCS is .1.7.2 the RCIC storage tank. This source provides higher quality water than the suppression pool, is at a higher elevation, and is not affected by containment heatup.

NPSH, vortex, and component cooling limitations are therefore not of concern. If necessary, the RCIC high suppression pool water level suction transfer may be defeated to permit continued use of the RCIC storage tank suction as suppression pool water level rises. If the RCIC storage tank is unavailable, RCIC and

. HPCS suctions may be aligned to the suppression pool, but NPSH and vortex limits (Detail Z) must then be considered.

3) The RCIC storage tank may be considered to be "unavailable" if an event-specific off-normal procedure (e.g., Station Blackout) requires the use of suppression pool suction over RCIC tank suction as part of the licensing design bases mitigation response.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 16 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

4) The RCIC low pressure isolation may be bypassed to permit RCIC operation even after the RPV has been depressurized. The system can sustain some flow so

long as pressure is above the value at which the turbine will stall.

g. NPSH/Vortex Limits 1.7.3

1) NPSH and vortex limits are defined for RCIC, HPCS, LPCS, and RHR. The limits apply, however, only when pump suctions are lined up to the suppression pool.

2) The NPSH Limit is defined to be the highest suppression pool temperature which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps talcing suction from the suppression pool. The Vortex Limit is the lowest suppression pool water level at which air entrainment is not expected to occur in the suction of pumps aligned to the suppression pool.

h. "LPCI I RHR through shutdown cooling"

1) The "RHR through shutdown cooling. flowpath is comparable to LPCI in flow and reassure capabilities.

RHR may therefore be lined up through either LPCI or shutdown cooling in this step. The two flowpaths cannot be used concurrently, however.

i. "Use HXs as soon as you can"

1) Directing RHR flow through the RHR heat exchangers as soon- as possible minimizes suppression pool heatup and prolongs the availability

of the suppression pool as a heat sink. (The phrase "as soon as you can" means' the earliest practicable time within the constraints imposed by system conditions, valve control logic, and concurrently required operator actions.) Although the heat exchangers introduce an additional pressure drop across the RHR system, the resulting decrease in flow rate is small. Thermal stresses which result from injecting through the heat exchangers have been considere.d in the design of the RHR System and are within acceptable limits.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 17 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes J. "Cannot get level back above Level 3"

1) If RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above Level 3, an alternate control band with a lower limit of the top of the active fuel is defined. The expanded RPV water level control band provides

added operational flexibility, allowing additional time to line up injection systems, while still keeping the

.core adequately cooled by submergence. The wider band also accommodates breaks between Level 3 and the top of the active fuel when break flow cannot be overcome by injection flow.

2) Expanded Level Band-CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram, provides guidance to use a.wider level band in

acknowledgement of not being able to maintain L3 to L8 while cycling SRV;s. Shrink and swell due tci SRV operation'is about thirty inches. Therefore, if level is above about +20", opening an SRV will cause LS to be,reached. If level is below about +40", SRV closing will cause L3 to be reached. Therefore, 4100.01 allows a band of-30" to +40" on Wide Range to be used until pressure can be stabilized (which will probably require reopenipg the MSIV's or Main Steam Line Drains. Meanwhile, the scram should NOT be reset. The Scram procedure directs the operator to the Control Rod Drive operating procedure for guidance on how to reduce rpd drive flow without resetting the scram if needed 'to control RPV level.

k. "Use Alternate Injection Systems if needed" .1.7.2

1) The Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are those Review and discuss Attachment A of lower capacity or which require more complex lineups than the preferred systems. Detailed instructions for aligning and using the alternate systems are provided in the identified system operating procedures. ,

2) Any one, or combination of the listed systems may be used as necessary to maintain RPV water level above the top of active fuel.Poor quality sources should generally be injected as a last resort, since their use could complicate plant recovery following the emergency. If RPV water level continues to decrease, all available injection sources should be employed in an attempt to reverse the level trend.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 18 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Low pressure systems will inject, however, only if RPY pressure is below their shutoff heads. Since the preferred RPV water level control band (Level 3 to Level 8) and the alternate RPV water level control band (from the top of active fuel to Level 8) are both contained in the same element, RPV water level should be restored to and maintained within the preferred band if possible.

1. Inhibit ADS -Not performed any more! Note: With Rev 29 to the EOPs, we no longer ADS is no longer Inhibited in BOP-I. This changed inhibit ADS initiation.

in Rev 29 to the EOPs and improves our Core Damage Frequency (CDP) margin for these events.

If the conditions for an automatic ADS initiation are present, it will be allowed to automatically occur.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 19 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

m. "Start igniters and mixers"

1) If hydrogen production is anticipated, the igniters and mixers should be started as soon as possible, while the hydrogen concentration is still low. The

. Drywell/Containment Hydrogen branch of EOP-6 therefore requires that the igniters and mixers be started "before" RPV water level drops to the top of the active fuel. Supplementary instructions are provided in the RPV water level control paths of EOP-1, EOP-lA, and EOP-2 as a reminder to start and operate the igniters and mixers in accordance with EOP-6 as level approaches the top of the active fuel. *

4. EOP-1, Part E Level Control BLOWOOWN:

EnlerEOP*S wl'ile 1_

cx:11tinuirg here. ,..

CAUTI.ON1 Ex,;eod[ng HPSH/\'ortoxLimits {OotaUZ) may damag.1:1 sysfoms.

Maximize in]e.::tloo using Preferred and Af!emata Injection Systems (Dalail E) (4411.03).

IF THEN Cannot get leval above -1 B7 in. FLOOD OONTAIN1~\ENT:

a.nd hold it there Bcitl1ll. EOP ...3.. Enter .i!ll SAG Hat1charls .~ HciA"Charts

a. "WAIT until level drops to -162 in ../ BLOWDOWN"

1) If RPV water level can be maintained above the top of the active fuel, no further action is required in the Level branch. If the decreasing RPV water level trend LP87552, Rev 011 Page 20 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes cannot be reversed before RPV water level drops to the top of the active fuel, however, core cooling by submergence can no longer be ensured. A blowdown is then performed to maximize available,injection flow and minimize break flow.

2) The blowdown is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to the top of the active fµel because:

Adequate core cooling through submergence exists so long as RPV water level remains above the top of the active fuel.

The time required for RPV water level to decrease to the top of the active fuel can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend.

3) The blowdown should be performed even if RCIC is the only source of RPV injection. Defeating the low RPV pressure isolation permits use of RCIC even after the RPV has been depressurized. The system can sustain some flow so long as pressure is above the value at which the turbine stalls.

4) No alternate RPV water level control band extending below the top of the active fuel is defined in EOP-1 for the following reasons: *

The Clinton Wide Range RPV water level instrument range does not extend down to the top of the active fuel and the Fuel Zone instruments are calibrated for an RPV pressure of Opsig with no jet pump flow. Any flow through the jet pumps, including that caused by SRV actuation, will result in erratic Fuel Zone indication. Since no installed RPV water level instrument provides reliable indication below the top of the active fuel under pressurized conditions, steam cooling strategies establishing level control bands below the top of the active fuel with the RPV pressurized cannot be defined at Clinton.

If RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the top of the active fuel with available injection systems, it is unlikely that

.efforts to avoid a blowdown by maintaining level within a wider band would be successful.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page21 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. "Maximize injection using Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems"

1) All available injection sources should have been aligned in accordance with Part D before the RPV blowdown. If RPV pressure were high, however, injection from low pressure systems would not have been possible. Following the blowdown, injection into the RPV is maximized at the lower pressure using all available preferred and alternate systems.

Low pressure injection will commence as soon as RPV pressure drops below the shutoff head for each of the listed systems.

~) The Preferred Injection Systems are listed earlier in the Level branch (Part D). The Alternate Injection Systems are listed in Detail E. Since some of the listed systems share common pumps or injection paths, all cannot be used simultaneously. The direction to "maximize injection" clarifies that the combination of available injection sources that provides the highest total flow should be aligned.

c. NPSH/Vortex Limits .1.7.2

1) The Detail Z NPSH and vortex limits (see Part D) remain applicable to operation of RCIC, HPCS, LPCS, and RHR with suction from the suppression pool. The limits should be observed if possible, but may be exceeded if necessary to establish and maintain adequate core cooling. A judgment as to whether system operation beyond NPSH and vortex limits is warranted should consider such factors as:

The availability of other systems

The current trend of plant parameters

The anticipated time such operation will be required

The degree to which the limit will be exceeded

The sensitivity of the system to operation beyond the limit1

The consequences of not operating a system beyond the limit Operation beyond the NPSH and vortex limits is not expected to result in im~ediate or catastrophic pump failure.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page22 of 42

)

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

d. "FLOOD CONTAINMENT"

1) If all attempts to submerge the core.through RPV injection prove unsuccessful, the only remaining option is to flood the containment. The EOPs are then exited and the SAGs entered. If a primary system break exists, flooding the containment will backfill the RPV through the break. While flooding will be

-possible only if a primary containment fill system of sufficient capacity is avaiiable, immediate transfer to the SA Gs is prescribed in anticipation of possible core geometry changes and so that appropriate instructions will be in effect when the necessary injection or fill systems are available. The specified level of -187 in. is the "Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level," defined to be the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to preclude any clad temperature in the uncovered portion of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

e. Wait until level is above ~162 in. and increasing"

1) If RPV water level is above the top of the active fuel and increasing, efforts to reverse the decreasing trend have been successful and adequate core cooling by submergen~e has been restored. Level control then loops back to the step defining the preferred control band (Level 3 to Level 8; Part D).

I Interim Summary:

1. What are the entry conditions for EOP-1? l. Hi Drywell press-1.68#

2. Low RPV Level - 8.9"

3. High RPV Pressure - 1065#

4. Rx Power> 5 % or unknown and a scram is required

2. What are the key parameters controlled in EOP-1? 1. Power, Pressure, Level LP87552, Rev 011 Page23 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes C. Pressure Leg Overview Have student follow path thru flow chart and along in CPS

1. EOP-1, Part F Pressure Control EOP Technical Bases .

C .....___ _.

PRESSURE r

IF THEN Drywell pressure above 1..,68 psig Before RPV pressure drops to 472 pslg, prevent LPCS and LPCI injection not needed tor core cooling {4411.02}.

Ant[cipate doing blowdown (EQP..:3) Depressurize RPV rapidly using main turbine bypass valves (4411,09). *

,.. OK to exceed 100?F/hr cooldown.

Reactor is critJcal ENTER ATWS RPV CONTROL:

Leave this procedure ..+ Enter EOP~iA.

a. PRESSURE

1) _The Pressure branch first stabilizes RPV pressure below the high RPV pressure scram setpoint and then depressurizes and cools down the RPV to cold shutdown conditions. Discharging steam to the main condenser using the main turbine bypass valves is the preferred method for controlling RPV pressure.

Alternate methods are identified should the bypass valves or main condenser not be available. ,.

b. "Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig"

1) LPCS and LPCI initiate automatically on high drywell pressure (1.68 psig) and automatically inject when RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff head of the pumps. If these systems are not needed for core cooling, injection may be prevented to facilitate RPV water level control.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page24 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

2) Procedure 4411.02 contains detailed instructions for Review CPS No. 4411.02 preventing LPCS and LPCI injection. The subsequent use of these systems is not prohibited by this override statement if plant conditions change such that system operation is required to assure adequate core cooling.

c. "Anticipate doing blowdown" .1.8A

1) As conditions which will require a blowdown are approached it is appropriate to rapidly reject as much heat energy as possible from the RPV to a heat sink other than the suppression pool. Such action preserves the heat capacity of the suppression pool for as long as possible, until a requirement for a blowdown actually exists.

2) Once the decision to "anticipate doing blowdown" Stress the direction provided in has been made and the depressurization has begun, "Anticipate doing blowdown",

the depressurization should continue until the RPV is which states that depressurized even if the initiating condition has depressurization, once begun, cleared. must continue until the RPV is depressurized, even if the

3) Discharging reactor steam to the main condenser . initiating condition has cleared.

through the main turbine bypass valves is the most The actual BLOWDOWN may viable method of rapidly reducing RPV pressure or may not be performed, without adding heat to the suppression pool. Other depending on whether or not the mechanisms have less heat removal capacity or take parameter of concern exceeds longer to establish. Use of the turbine bypass valves the associated limits.

requires the following:

The MSIVs must be open.

The main turbine bypass valves must be operational.

The main condenser must be available.

4)

Defeating isolation interlocks is not authorized by Point out that depressurizing this override. Exceeding the 100°F/hr. cooldown rate the RPV with Bypass Valves in is authorized since rapid depressurization of the RPV anticipation of Blowdown is talces precedence over limiting the cooldown rate of not performed for the purpose the RPV to the maximum permitted by Technical of "lowering RPV pressure to Specifications. make low pressure systems available" (4411.09, Section

d. "Reactor is critical" 2.1). The CRS may set the RPV pressure band at a point

1) Part A of EOP-1 required an evaluation of the low enough to accommodate shutdown criteria in Procedure 4100.01. If one of the CD/CB injection (4411.09, criteria was met, the reactor should stay shutdown Section 2.1).

during the cooldowi1 prescribed in the pressure path.

If the reactor returns* to criticality, the determination LP87552, Rev 011 ~age25 of42

Content/Ski I Is Activities/Notes that the reactor would remain shutdown under all conditions must have been incorrect. RPV water level, RPV pressure, and reactor power should then be controlled in accordance with EOP-lA, ATWS RPV Control.

2. EOP-1, Part G Pressure Control Systems .1.2.4, .1.2.6

~1:ilize RPY' pre5SUre below 10SS psig u.ing main turbine b'ypass 11al11es.

,.. Use othi.!rrrelh:ds belcw ii n2eded (4411.09).

SRVs ...on)'I* if suppreG'iiion pool lave! Is above 8ft.

1111' Use preferred sequeooe if ~\lu can.

_. If IA toSRV'sisbat tum all 5Wilchasto OFF.

OK lo dsfe.al IA nterlcdls (4410.00CCOO).

RCIC

.,- 'CAUTIONi E'.<Ceading tlPSH f Vortr,x Limits (Detail Z) may damage ROIO.

,r RCIC irjecti:t1 will trip main iurl:ine and RFPT&

<f' Usr, RCIC slOT'9?-lank.su::Uon If '.ll)U can.

OK tod:feat RCIC* ntedci:ks (4.i10.ooCoo1 ).

RFPTa

M.SL drains

RlNCU (recirculation mode)

Bypass.re;iai HXanHilierl'dernins.

- O_K: lo d:fi:a.t RWCU inlaiodai (441 O.c;;;Coo;).

RWCU (raject mode)

a. "Stabilize RPV pressure below 1065 psig" .1.8.3

1) RPV pressure is stabilized to facilitate control of Review CPS No. 4411.09 RPV water level. If pressure is allowed to oscillate, RPV water level may fluctuate due to the effects of shrink and swell. Pressure is stabilized below the high RPV pressure scram setpoint to avoid SRV actuation and to permit the scram logic to be reset (provided no other scram signal exists). No minimum value is specified since the RPV pressure at which the EOPs ate entered cannot be predefined. A target pressure should be selected close to the initial value and below the RPV pressure scram.setpoint that permits use of available injection systems. An initial adjustment to establish an appropriate target pressure is permitted, LP87552, Rev O11 Page 26 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes provided the target can be reached expeditio~sly and the 100°F/hr cooldown rate limit is not exceeded. A large pressure reduction, such as from an intermediate pressure of 400 psig to below the shutdown cooling RPV pressure interlock (104 psig), should not be required and is not considered a permissible adjustment even if the depressurization is Within the LCO cooldown rate.

2) "Stabilize" means to hold RPV pressure as constant as practicable within the constraints imposed by the

, nature of the event, the degree of control afforded by the systems used, and the availability of personnel to perform manual control functions. The intent is that pressure be held as constant as is practicable. The sp~cific actions required and the degree to which the ideal of a constant pressure can be approached will vary according to these constraints. For example:

a) If flow through a pressure control system is automatically regulated, the reactor is shutdown, and there is no break in the primary system, RPV pressure can usually be held within a fairly narrow 9ontrol band with little operator action.

b) If flow *through a large capacity pressure control system cannot be throttled, the RPV pressure control band will necessarily be relatively wide.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page27 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes c) If pressure is decreasing, it may be necessary to close SRVs, main turbine bypass valves, or the MSNs. In some scenarios, however, it may not be possible to terminate depressurization.

Inventory loss through a break or operation of steam driven injection systems may cause pressure to decrease.

d) Changing plant conditions may necessitate adjustments to the value at which pressure is initially stabilized. If the pressure control system in use becomes unavailable, an alternate system may not be capable of maintaining the same control band. Similarly, if an injection system in use becomes unavailable, pressure may need to be reduced to permit use of lower head systems.

e) Since BOP-I permits RPV depressurization immediately after pressure is stabilized, extended efforts to terminate a pressure decrease are usually not warranted.

3) Both the rate and the magnitude ofRPV pressure changes must be considered. A pressure that is slowly decreasing over a relatively wide control band may be more "stable" than short-period oscillations within a narrower control band. In general, the adequacy of steps taken to stabilize RPV pressure in EOP-1 must be judged by the effect of any continuing pressure variations on RPV water level and by whether additional actions are possible or likely to afford better control capability. If pressure variations are not interfering with RPV water level control actions, or cannot be stopped, pressure may be considered stabilized. If continuing pressure oscillations are complicating efforts to control RPV water level, or if the existing pressure prevents use of available injection systems, additional effort is warranted.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page28 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. " ... using main turbine bypass valves"

1) The main turbine bypass valves are .the preferred means of controlling RPV pressure, s1nce they provide good control capability, are of relatively large*

capacity, and do not add heat to the suppression pool.

The direction to use the bypass valves implicitly permits opening the MSIVs and placing the main condenser in service if such actions are necessary and conditions permit. It does not, however, constitute authorization to defeat any MSIV isolation interlocks.

c. "Use other methods below if needed"

1) If the main turbine bypass valves cannot be used to

control RPV pressure; or if the available capacity of the main turbine bypass valves is less than that required to control RPV pressure, additional systems must be employed to augment RPV pressure control.

No prioritization of the listed RPV pressure control systems is specified since the EOPs must

accommodate a foll spectrum of initial plant conditions and event scenarios.

d. "SRVs" .1.2.2 Question: How much shrink

1) The SRVs may be used to augment RPV pressure and swell occurs when cycling control only if suppression pool water level is above SRVs?

8 feet, the minimum indicated suppression pool water level. An on-scale indication is required to ensure that Answer? With a full group one the actual suppression pool level is above the top of isolation, history shows that level the SRV discharge device. If the SRVs were opened may swing from thirty to fifty with the discharge devices exposed, steam would pass _ inches due to shrink and swell.

directly into the containment airspace, bypassing the suppression pool. This direct discharge of steam could damage equipment needed for the safe shutdown of the plant and result in excessive containment pressures.

2) If SRVs are being used for pressure control in EOP-1, * .1.4, .1.5 then the pressure band should be widened to minimize SRV lifts. Refer to Attachment B of Lesson Review the section in the Scram Plan for additional information concerning SRV procedure concerning a wider position indications. level and pressure control band.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page29 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

3) Expanded Pressure Band -CPS 4100.01, Reactor Refer to Attachment B Scram, provides guidance to use a wider Pressure band, 600 to 1065# in acknowledgement of not being able to maintain L3 to L8 while cycling SRV's.

Shrink and swell due to SRV operation is about thirty inches. Therefore, 4100.01 allows a level band of 30" to +40" on Wide Range to be used until pressure can be stabilized (which will probably require reopening the MSIV's or Main Steam Line Drains.

e. "Use preferred sequence ... "

1) SRVs, if used, should generally be opened manually.

Manual operation affords direct, positive control over valve operation. The preferred SRV opening sequence should be used if possible to distribute the .

heat load uniformly around the suppression pool and equalize the number of actuations among the SRVs.

f. "If IA to SRVs is lost..."

1) Loss of the Instrument Air supply to the SRVs limits SRV control switches on P-601 the number of times that an SRV can be cycled. If all andP-642.

the IA supplies to the SRVs are lost (as defined below), all control switches must be placed in "OFF" to conserve pneumatic pressure in case a blowdowp is later required. Even though the SRV accumulators contain a reserve pneumatic supply, leakage through in-line valves, fittings, and actuators may deplete the reserve capacity, leaving no assurance as to the number of SRV operating cycles remaining. With the control switches in "OFF," if RPV pressure cannot be maintained below the lowest SRV lift setpoint, SRVs will still lift at their Safety Valve setpoint.

2) IA supply to the SRVs is normally via the non-safety

. related service air compressors or from at least one of NOTE:

the Div 1/2 bank of ADS backup air bottles Div 1 B/U air bottles supply (automatically or manually placed in service). Loss

SRVs F047A, F051C, F041G, of IA to the SRVs is defined as either F047C and F051G.

(3-ADS, 1-LLS, & 1-ADS/LLS) a) NONE of the three .(3) IA air supplies is available to the SRVs. IA supply to the SRVs is normally Div 2 B/U air bottles supply via the SA Compressors m: from at least one of SRVs F041B, F041F, F041D the Div 1/2 bank of ADS backup air bottles andF051D.

(automatically or manually placed in service).

(3-A..DS & 1-LLS)

LP87552, Rev O11 , Page30 of 42

Content/Ski Ils Activities/Notes b) Low ADS IA air pressure is indicated on 1H13-P601 (<140 psig) on the Division 1 (2) indicators 1PI-IA078 (1PI-IA079). Supporting alarms include 5040-6F and 5067-'lL).

3) Defeating IA interlocks, if necessary, promotes more . Review CPS No. 4410.00C003, stable pressure control should the SRVs be required "Defeating IA Interlocks."

to augment pressure stabilization. This action may be performed prior to or after the system isolation dependent upon time, manpower, and the need or anticipated need for SRV use.

g~ "RCIC" Review CPS No. 4410.00COOS, "Defeating RWCU Interlocks."

1) A supplementary instruction provides a reminder that RCIC initiation will trip the main turbine and RFPTs if they are still on-lin.e. Since the trips may complicate RPV water level and RPV pressure control, RCIC initiation should be avoided when the RFPTs are in use or the main turbine is on-line.

2) The preferred suction source for RCIC is the RCIC storage tank. This source provides higher quality water than the suppression pool, is at a higher elevation, and is not affected by containment heatup.

NPSH and vortex limits are-therefore not of concern.

If the RCIC storage tank is unavailable, RCIC suction may be aligned to the suppression pool, but NPSH and vortex limits must then be considered.

3) The NPSH Limit is defined to be the highest suppression pool temperature which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction from the suppression pool. The Vortex Limit is the lowest suppression pool water level at which air entrainment is not expected to occur in the suction of pumps aligned t~ the suppression pool.

4) Parameter values bounding the RCIC NPSH and .1.7.3 vortex limits are listed in Detail Z. The restrictions are specified in a caution rather than as explicit operating limits to provide necessary event-specific flexibility and to avoid potential conflicts between parallel parameter control paths:

a) It is difficult to define in advance exactly when NPSH and vortex limits should be observed and when .pumps should be operated irrespective of the limits.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 31 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes b) Since RCIC operation may be prescribed in both the Level and Pressure branches, an explicit restriction in one path could conflict with contingency actions in other paths in which operation beyond NPSH and vortex limits may be appropriate.

c) Prohibiting pump operation below the bounding

suppression pool water level may be overly restrictive in some situations.

5) Although the caution does not expressly prohibit use .1.7.3 of RCIC beyond NPSH and vortex limits, operation outside the Detail Z restrictions should be considered only if the risk of equipment damage is warranted by the nature of the event. A judgment as to whether system operation is appropriate should consider such factors as:

a) The availability of other'systems b) The current trend of plant parameters c) The anticipated time such operation will be required

<;I) The degree to which the limit will be exceeded e) The consequences of not operating a system beyond the limit

6) Operation of RCIC beyond- the NPSH and vortex limits is not expected to result in immediate or catastrophic pump failure.

h. "RWCU"

1) RWCU may be operated in either the recirculation mode or the reject mode in EOP-1. Since the shutdown criteria are satisfied, boron removal through the reject mode is not of corn;:ern.

2) In the recirculation mode, the RWCU regenerative I

heat exchanger is bypassed to increase the inlet temperature to the non-regenerative heat exchanger and maximize the heat energy removed by the system. The filter/demineralizers are bypassed to prevent chemical breakdown of the demineralizer resins while operating with elevated temperature to

the non-regenerative heat exchanger.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 32 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

i. "RFPTs / MSL drains" .1.13.2 The reactor feed pump turbines and main steam line drains may also be used to augment RPV pressure control. The main condenser must be available for use of either of these systems.

)

, LP87552, Rev O11 Page 33 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

3. EOP-1, Part H Depressurize the RPV Depressurize the RPV.

.- Hotd cooldown rate below 10ocF1hr.

.,. It IA to SRVs is lost,, minimize number of SR\f cycles .

.,. OK to defeat lA fntertoc.ks (4410.00COOS).

a. "Depressurize the RPV" .1.8.5 Review CPS No. 4411.09.

1) After RPV pressure has been stabilized, one or more Stress thatEOP~l ALWAYS pressure control systems are used to depressurize the drives us to cold shutdown if we RPV and cool down to shutdown conditions. stay in it.

2) All associated restrictions and limitations continue to apply. The maximum allowable cooldown rate is that allowed by Technical Specifications ( I00°F/hr). No low pressure limit is set; the RPV is depressurized to \

a pressure which allows the initiation of shutdoV{n cooling (less than 104*ps1g).

b. "If IA to SRVs is lost" l

1) If instrument air is lost while the SRVs are being used, the valves should be operated in a manner which conserves pneumatic pressure in case a blowdown is later required. Although the I00°F/hr cooldown rate limit must still be observed, the cooldown can be taken in larger steps, thus minimizing the number of SRV cycles.

2) Defeating IA interlocks, if necessary, promotes more stable pressure control should the SRVs be required to augment pressure stabilization. This action may be

performed prior to or after the system isolation dependent upon time, manpower, and the need or anticipated need for S;R.V use.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page34 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

4. EOP-1, Part I Depressurize the RPV WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure Interlock

.clears (104 psig).

Cool down to cold shutdown using shutdown cooling

. (3312.03/RH-SDG).

_,,. Do not use RHR pumps you need for ho'lding RPV water level above Level 3 {R9 in.).

Hold aoo]down rate below 1oo~F/hr.

JF THEN Shutdown cooling does not .Hold pressure below shutdown work (33"12 ..03/RH-SDC) cooling interlock (104 psig) using other pres~ure controt systems (4411.09).

a. "Cool down to cold shutdown" .1.9, .1.11

1) Shutdown cooling is the normal method of conducting a controlled cooldown of the RPV to cold shutdown conditions. It is placed in service when the RPV pressure shutdown cooling interlocks clear (104 psig). However, only those RHR pumps not required to maintain RPV water level above Level 3 by operation in the LPCI mode may be used.

b. "Shutdown cooling does not work"

1) If shutdown cooling cannot be established, continued RPV depressurization and cooldown may be accomplished using any combination of the systems listed in Step G. As RPV pressure and temperature decrease, it may be necessary to re-evaluate the most appropriate method for performing the cooldown.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page35 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

2) The direction to "hold pressure below the shutdown cooling interlock" permits, but does not require, continued cooldown below the interlock pressure. If no RPV blowdown requirement exists, continued pressure reduction is expected to be of little benefit.

Summary:

1. How can RWCU be used to control RPV pressure? 1. In the Recirc mode with F/Ds off service or the reject mode.

2. What are the typical level and pressure bands following a scram from power?

2. Level 3 to level 8 and 800 to

3. What is the shutoff head for various injection sources? 1065 psig.

4. Explain when we are allowed to break 100 degrees per hour cooldown rate? 3. TDRFP-1950 psig MDRFP-1780 psig CB-725 psig CD-250 psig LP-350 psig RH-250 psig HP->1265 psig

4. When Anticipating BID due to conditions requiring a BID are being approached.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 36 of 42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes IV. Operating Experience NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2000-01: Have students review the Hatch event and compare it to what OPERATIONAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN BOILJNG WATER could happen at CPS:

REACTOR TRIP AND TRANSIENT The only part of the event that cannot happen at CPS is the Description of Circumstances failure of the SRV indication due to the presence of water.

On January 26, 2000, at Hatch Unit 1, the reactor automatically However, there are other failure scrammed on low reactor water level after a partial loss of feed water mechanisms r for acoustic occurred. One of two main feedwater lines was isolated when a valve monitors, such as loss of power.

unexpectedly closed in the feedwater flow path to the reactor. The Stress the importance of:

licensee later determined that the valve closed because of a problem

1. Controlling RPV level as it with the valve control switch. As a result of the valve closure, . goes above level 8, being feedwater flow was significantly decreased; therefore, reactor water aggressive to avoid the MSL level decreased, and the reactor automatically scrammed as expected.

lines.

The high-pressu~e coolant injection (HPCQ system and the reactor

2. Always verify automatic core isolation cooling (RCIC) system automatically actuated and actions, such as injection injected water into the reactor as desigm1d. These systems, along with sources shutting down on the feedwater system, increased reactor water level rapidly. The , high level.

feedwater and RCIC systems tripped on high level as expected.

3. Verify SRV position by However, the HPCI system did not immediately trip as designed on multiple indications. Even high level and continued to inject water into the reactor for about 1 with the MSL's flooded, minute before tripping. Reactor water level increased to the point that MSL line flow should water entered the main steam lines. The licensee closed the main indicate the status of the

steam isolation valves (MSIVs) in accordance with the emergency SRV.

operating procedure. 4. If it appears that RPV level will approach the MSL's, the Pressure in the shutdown reactor began to slowly increase because of inboard MSIV's should be

, decay heat. A licensee operator attempted to open a safety relief valve closed to protect downstream to control reactor pressure but did not receive the expected indications components.

on the control panel. The operator then actuated the control switches for other safety relief valves until he received the expected open indication on one valve. Subsequently, several safety relief valves were operated satisfactorily to control re*actor pressure. Later, the licensee determined that the safety relief valves had opened properly when actuated. Safety relief valve tailpipe temperature indications, available on a control room back panel recorder," clearly indic~ted the valves had operated. Reactor pressure reached a maximum value slightly above,normal operating pressure and did not approach an operational safety limit. *. -

LP87552, Rev 011 Page37 of42

Content/Skills Activities/Notes The licensee controlled the reactor water level using HPCI and RCIC.

Although initial attempts to restart RCIC were unsuccessful, the Discuss the 5 Operator licensee was able to use the system later in the event. HPCI was Fundamentals from IER 11-3 manually operated several times for water level control and the and SER 3-05 and how they licensee observed that it tripped properly at the high-level setpoint apply to this event.

twice during the recovery.

1. Monitoring plant On January 30-February 5, 2000, the NRC conducted an augmented indications and conditions team inspection (AIT) of the circumstances of this event. The closely objectives of this inspection were to (1) determine the facts of the 2. Controlling plant event, (2) assess the licensee's response to the event, (3) assess the evolutions precisely licensee's event review and recovery actions, and (4) assess any 3. Operating the plant with a generic aspects of the event. conservative bias

4. Working effectively as a Safety Relief Valves team

, The licensee's investigation into the response of the safety relief valves 5. Having a solid focused on the valve's position indication, the effect water has on the understanding of plant operation of the safety relief valve, and the effect that water passing design, engineering through the safety relief valve has on the tailpipes, tailpipe vacuum princtples, and sciences breakers, and tailpipe pressure switches. The licensee was assisted by the nuclear steam supply system vendor, General Electric (GE), and the safety relief valve vendor, Target-Rock, in conducting this investigation and assessment. The licensee concluded that the safety relief valves operated each time the control switches were actuated in the control room. However, the operators were unaware that the safety relief valves were open because they did not receive the expected indicating light on the control panel. A pressure switch located in each safety relief valve tailpipe actuates due to increased tailpipe pressure when the safety relief valve is opened and, in turn, actuates an indicating light on the control panel. During this event, pressure in the tailpipes did not increase sufficiently to actuate the pressure switches while the safety relief valve was passing water. The licensee sent CPS does not use a pressure several of the safety relief valve control assemblies (topworks) to a switch for SRV position valve test facility for testing and inspection. No abnormalities as a indication, but a loss of Division 1 result of this event were identified. The -licensee conducted inspections AC or other problems could of the safety relief valve tailpipes and other plant components that may render the Acoustic Monitor have been subjected to the water in the steam lines and did not identify unavailable. Steam flow could any adverse conditions that resulted from this event. still be used as an indicator of SRVstatus.

Feedwater Valve Handswitches The partial loss of feedwater occurred when a valve in the main At CPS, FW system valves on feedwater flow path to the reactor closed unexpectedly. Later, the P870 are this type.

licensee determined that the valve closed because of a malfunction of a GE Type CR 2940 control switch. In 1977, GE issued Service Information Letter No. 217, which indicated that this model control switch was overly sensitive during positioning and that the switch contacts may close prematurely from the slightest movement of the selector switch.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page 38 of 42

List of Attachments Attachment A INJECTION SYSTEMS Attachment B USE OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LP87552, Rev 011 Page 39 of 42

Attachment A INJECTION SYSTEMS Preferred Injection Systems

a. Feedwater, Condensate, Condensate Booster Pumps MDRFP not available if power lost to 6.9KV Bus lB (motor power), or to TB MCC lM, which supplies power to the Aux Oil Pump and hydraulic control for 1FW004 (TB MCC IM is shunt-tripped on a Div 2 LOCA signal).

TDRFPs will not be available if MSN s are shut, or if CB pumps are lost. A loss of IA results in 1FW003A(B) initially failing "as is." They may eventually be forced open by CB Pump discharge pressure as the reactor depressurizes.

CD/CB pumps will not be.available if non-safety-related power (4.16Kv Buses lA/lB) is lost.

Loss of CB pumps will also result in loss of RFPs.

b. CRD CRD pumps are not available if non-safety 4.16Kv Buses lA(B) are lost (pump power supplies).

When TB MCC lM shunt-tripped on Div 2 LOCA signal, power to Recirc Aux Seal Injection Pump is lost.

Div 1 Level 2 or High DW Pressure signal shunt trips 1Cll-F370, Recirc Aux Seal Pump Valve.

c. ECCS: RCIC, HPCS, LPCS, LPCI and RHR thru Shutdown Cooling Since these systems are powered from safety-related buses they should remain available through all but blackout conditions (RCIC should be available even in blackout)

LP87552, Rev 011 Page40 of42

Attachment A (Continued)

INJECTION SYSTEMS Alternate Injection Systems

a. SLC Since SLC is powered from safety-related buses it should remain available through all but blackout conditions .

.b. Fire Protection Due to use of diesel fire pumps and, RHR valves, FP should be available in all but blackout conditions.

c. SX thru RHR B Since SX and RHR are safety-related systems, this method should be available under all but blackout conditions. *

d. FC FC pumps powered from 4.16Kv Buses !Al and lBl, and should be available as long as buses powered by RAT/ERAT. In event that DG picks up bus on undervoltage, FC pump(s) are load shed.

e.

ECCS Water Leg Pumps ECCS water leg pumps powered from lE buses and should be available when power available to ECCS busses.

f. CY CY will not be available if power lost to non-safety 480 Volt Unit Subs 1J or lK (power supplies to motors).

LP87552, Rev 011 Page41 of42

Attachment B USE OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVES

1. If SRVs are befog used for pressure control in EOP-1, then the pressure band should be widened to minimize SRV lifts.

2. The following methods may be used to determine SRV position:

Solenoid status

Acoustic monitors

Tailpipe temperatures

Indirect indications

a. Solenoid status is directly displayed on P601 for both "A" and "B" solenoids; on P642 for "B" solenoids only.

Disadvantage: Indicate status of opening/closing solenoids, n,ot of valve.

DCS screen 7B receives its SRV status signals from the "A" solenoids.

b. Acoustic monitors consist of accelerometers on SRV discharge piping; preamplifiers; flow and alarm modules (MCR, P866). Indicators are LED bar graphs. Input to common annunciator SRV MONITORING TROUBLE.

Disadvantage: Acoustic monitors are subject to cross-talk; may indicate more SRVs open than actual number.

Acoustic.monitors input to SPDS SRV count display, and to DCS screen 2H.

C. Individual SRV tailpipe temperatures displayed on recorder on Panel P614.

Disadvantages: Slow response. Tailpipe temperature may be high due to leaking SRV, or because SRV was previously open. *

d. Indirect indications of SRV status:

Main Steam Line flow Most reliable indication: each MSL should indicate an amount of flow which corresponds to the number of open SRVs on that line.

- Suppression Pool temperature Disadvantage: Slow response; may be affected by RCIC operation; can't determine number of SRVs open.

RPV pressure Disadvantage: Can't determine number of SRVs open.

- RPV water level Disadvantage: Can't determine number of SRVs op~n.

LP87552, Rev 011 Page42 of 42

Exelon.M Nuclear Course/Program: ILT/NLO/LORT Module/LP ID: LP87594 Titl~: ©EQP Support Procedures Course Code: NIA Author: R. L. Price ' Revision/Dat~: 02 I 1/4/07

. Prerequisites: NA Revision,By: GD Setser Est. Teach Time: 8.0 hour~

TABLE _OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 A. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................*............................................................. :.................................. 1 B. PRESENTATION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1 C. OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................... :...................................................................................... 1 D. EVALUATION ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1-II. INSTRUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................ :........ 2 A. BASICS (CPS 1005.09) .......................................................*............................................. ;..................................................... 2 B. PROCEDURE .HIERARCHY .............................................................................................................................. :........................... 3 III. PROCEDURES ................................................................................................................................................................. 5 A. CPS 4410.00, DEFEATING SYSTEM INTERLOCKS .......................................................................................................... 5 B. CHECKLISTS ............................................................................................................................................................................. 7 C. CPS 4411.02, TERMINATING AND PREVENTING INJECTION ...................................................................:................. 27 D. CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES ........ :.. :................................................................................................ 34 E. CPS 4411.04, TIIROTTLING ECCS FLOW ......................................................................................................................... 43 F. CPS 4411.05, HIGH CONTAINMENT POOL LEVEL PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ............................................................. 45 G. CPS 4411.06, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING, PURGING, AND VACUUM RELIEF ........... ;.................... .47 H. CPS 4411.08, AL TERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION ............................................................................................... 51 I. CPS 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES :...................._.*.......................................... :........................... ,........ 56

. J. CPS 4411.10, SLC OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 62 K. CPS 4411.11, H)'DROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATIONS (HARD CARD) ...................................... ;*************:***** .... 66 L. CPS 4412.00, CHEMISTRY SAMPLING****************************************************************************************************:*********************** 70 IV. OPEX ............................................................................................................................................................................... 73 A. AN INVALID Rx VESSEL WATER LEVEL EVENT LED TO THE FOLLOWING: ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF)

ACTUATIONS: REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ACTUATION AND PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS)

ACTUATION, ALSO, A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECH SPECS AND ALoss OF SAFETY FUNCTION OCCURRED DURING THE EVENT..................... _............................................................. *'................................................................................................. 73

(Any other use or reproduction is expressly prohibited without the express permission of Exelon Nuclear.)

7-LP87594-02.doc

Exelon.M Nuclear V. CONCLUSION/LESSON

SUMMARY

............................................:....................................................... ;........................ 74.

A. THE GOALS: ..........*..............*.............................*...........................*..**.....*****.*..**...***.*.*****...******..******:************************************* 74 B. REVIEW THE OBJECTNES ...*.*...........*..***.*..**...****...*****....***..**..**...**..**.*.**************...*..*..**.**..*****.*.*......****.**.**....*.***............*.*.. 75 7-LP87594-02.doc ii

Exelon.M Nuclear OBJECTIVES While working in the plant, or on an exam, the trainee shall, in accordance with referenced plant procedures and training materials:

i Objective_# _____Ob~tive_ D;c;i~ti~-------~------ -SRO-----RO -N,LO _ _ STA-- ---Pg~#--J

.1.1 From memory, recall the relative X X X X 2 position of the EOPs in the hierarchy*of plant procedures .

.1.2 Given the SA-AA-129, Electrical Safety X X X X 5

procedure, recall the electrical safety practices applied to working on energized equipment during an emergency

.1.3 Given CPS 4410.00, recall;

.1 Documentation requirements for th_e X X X 7 checklist steps .

.2 What is an electrical jumper X X X 5

.3 Actfons to control exposed X X - X 5 conducting parts of a disconnected wtre

.4 Reason to control exposed X X X 5 conducting parts of disconnected wire

.5 Fastener tightening requirement X X X 5

.6 Precautions for manipulations X X X 6 performed iri the MCR panels*

.7 Techniques used to locate ATM X X X 7 modules/Pl connectors

.8 Consequences of improperly X X X 6 installing "backplane" jumpers 7-LP87594-02.doc iii

Exelon.M Nuclear Objective# Objective Description SRO RO NLO STA Pg.# ,

.1.4 Given the following procedures explain X X X the notes, cautions, tools, strategy and reasons for defeating interlocks.

.I CPS 4410.00COOI, DEFEATING X X X 8 RCIC INTERLOCKS

.2 CPS 4410.00C002, DEFEATING X X X 9 HPCS INTERLOCKS

.3 CPS 44IO.OOC003, DEFEATING X X X 11 IA INTERLOCKS

.4 CPS 44IO.OOC004, DEFEATING X X X 11 MSL/OG INTERLOCKS

.5 CPS 4410.00C005, DEFEATING X X X X 13 RWCU INTERLOCKS

.6 CPS 44IO.OOC006, DEFEATING X X X X 14 VP/WO INTERLOCKS

.7 CPS 44IO.OOC007, DEFEATING X X X 15 CNMT INTERLOCKS

.8 CPS 44IO.OOC008, DEFEATING X X X 17 MDRFP INTERLOCKS

.9 CPS 4410.00C009, DEFEATING X X X 18 INJECTION/FLOODING INTERLOCKS

.IOCPS 4410.00COIO, DEFEATING X X X 19 CNMT VENT INTERLOCKS

.11 CPS 4410.00COI 1, DEFEATING X X X 21 VF INTERLOCKS

.12CPS 44IO.OOC012, DEFEATING X X X 22 ATWS INTERLOCKS 7-LP87594-02.doc IV

Exelon.M Nuclear

--*- *--------~- --*-*, ---------------------- -------**- --------- - - - - -------

I Ob_jective # _ _ Objective Description _ _SRO RO NLO STA - P2.-# -]

.1.5 From memory, predict the X X X 28 consequences/impact on MDRFP and FW Injection Valve (1FW004) on an actuation of the Division 2 ECCS

.1.6 Given CPS 4411.02, explain notes, cautions, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken to terminate and prevent'injection for:

.1 HPCS X -x X 29

.2 LPCI X X X

.3 LPCS X X X

.4 RCIC X X X

.5 CD/FW X X X 32

,.1.7 Given CPS 4411.03, explain notes, cautions, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken to initiate injection and flooding sources for:

.1 FW X X X 35

.2 CD/CB X X X 36

.3 'Head Spray X X X 38

.4 RD X X X X Water Leg Pump for:

.5 HPCS X X X* ' 36

.6 RCIC X X X 39

.7 LPCS X X X 39

.8 LPCI X X X 39 Abnormal Lineups:

.9 RHR through shutdown cooling X X X 40

.10 SX through RHR B X X X 40

.11 SX through RHR B test return X X X 40

.12 SX through containment spray B X X X 40

.13 Fire Protection X X X X 40

.14 FC injection X X X X 41

.15 SLC injection X X X X 42 Suppression Pool Makeup/Cleanup

.16 Dump upper pools X X X 43

.17 Containment flood through SF X -X X X 43 using CP Cycled Condensate

.18 CY through ECCS fill path X X X X 43

.19 CY to SM X X. X X 43

.20 CY through SM/SF X X X X 43 7-LP87594-02.doc V

Exelon.M Nuclear

- - ----- ---------- -- - --* --- -----------* - ----------------------------. --------- --- ------------ ----*--- -----*-***--* - - - - - ----**1 Objective# Objective Description SRO RO NLO STA P2. # I

.1.8 Given CPS 4411.04, explain X X X X 45 precautions, conditional requirements, and describe which systems and actions must be taken to make ECCS injection valves throttleable.

.1.9 Given CPS 4411.05, explain X X X X 47 precautions, conditional requirements and protective actions taken for High Containment Pool Level conditions.

.1.10 Given CPS 4411.06 explain precautions, notes, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken for Emergency Containment Venting, Purging, and Vacuum Relief for: X X X 50

.1 Vent Using Hydrogen Purge Supply Path X X X X 50

.2 Vent to Condenser Using FC Return Header X X X X 50

.3 Vent To Condenser Using RHR CNMT Spray Spargers X X X X 50

.4 Vent To Spent Fuel Pool using FC Return Header X X X X 50

.5 Vent To Spent Fuel Pool Using RHR A CNMT Spray Sparger X X X X 50

.6 Vent Using CCP Supply Path Modification X X X 50

.7 CNMT Hydrogen Purge X X X 51

.8 Recovery X X X 51

.9 CNMT Vacuum Relief 7-LP87594-02.doc Vl

Exelon.M Nuclear Objective#

Objective Description SRO RO NLO STA Pg.#

--1

.1.11 Given CPS 4411.08 explain notes, cautions, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken for Alternate Control Rod Insertion for:

.1 Manual Scram X X X 53

.2 Manual ARI X X X 54

.3 RPS Scram Solenoids X X X X 54

.4 Manual Control Rod Insertion X X X X 54

.5 Individual Rod Scram X X X X 55

.6 Vent CRD Withdrawal Lines X X X X 55

. 1.12 Given CPS 4411.09 explain notes, . X X X cautions, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken for RPV Pressure Control Sources for:

.1 Main Steam X X X 59

.2 RFPT X X X 60

.3 Shutdown Cooling X X X 61

.4 Head Vent X X X X 61

.5 RCIC X X X 61

.6 RCIC Steamline X X X 62

.7 RWCU - Recirc Mode X X X 62

.8 RWCU -Reject to Condenser X X X 62

.9 RWCU-Rejectto Waste Surge X X X 62 Tank

.1.13 Given CPS 4411.10 explain notes, cautions, condition requirements and/or describe actions taken for SLC system operation for:

.1 SLC initiation X X X 64

.2 Plant actions for Alternate Boron X X X X 64

.3 Control room actions for Alternate X X X 64 Boron 7-LP87594-02.doc Vll

Exelon.;

Nuclear r----------- ~-* ,------------------------ * * - - - - ' . ----- --;*-

.. -**-:-::-1

! Ob.iective # _ . _ . Ob.ie~tive Description * . : _SR() RO NLO STA, . Pu..# i

.1.14 Given CPS 4411.11 explain notes, cautions, conditional requirements and/or describe actions taken for *-

Hydrogen Control System Operation for: X X X 67

.1 H2 /02 Monitor Operations X X X 61

.2 Hydrogen Igniters Operations X X X X 67

.3 Drywell/Containment Mixing Compressor Operations X X X X 67

.4 ' Hydrogen Recombiners Startup from theMCR f X X X X 67

.s Hydrogen Recombiners Emergency Shutdown X X X X 67

.6 Hydrogen Recombiners Startup from the Local Control Panel

.1.15 Given the procedure explain notes, X X X 70 cautions, conditional requirements* ~

and/or describe actions taken for Chemistry sampling per:

.1 CPS 4412.00

.2 CPS 4412.00COOl

.3 CPS 4412.00C002

) -

7-LP87594-02.doc viii

Exelon.M Nuclear

References:

CPS 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM SA-AA-129, Electrical Safety CPS 4410.00, DEFEATING SYSTEM INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00COOl, DEFEATING RCIC INTERLOCKS CPS 44IO.OOC002, DEFEATING HPCS INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00C003, DEFEATING IA INTERLOCKS CPS 44IO.OOC004, DEFEATING MSL/OG INTERLOCKS CPS 44IO.OOC005, DEFEATING RWCU INTERLOCKS CPS 44IO.OOC006, DEFEATING VP/WO INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00C007, DEFEATING CNMT VENT INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00C008, DEFEATING MDRFP INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00C009, DEFEATING INJECTION/FLOODING INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00COlO, DEFEATING CNMT VENT INTERLOCKS CPS 4410.00COl 1, DEFEATING VF INTERLOCKS CPS 44IO.OOC012, DEFEATING ATWS INTERLOCKS CPS 4411.02, TERMINATING AND PREVENTING INJECTION CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES CPS 4411.04, THROTTLING ECCS FLOWS CPS 4411.05, HIGH CONTAINMENT POOL LEVELS PROTECTIVE ACTIONS CPS 4411.06, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING, PURGING, AND VACUUM RELIEF CPS 4411.08, ALTERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION CPS 4411.09, RPVPRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES CPS 4411.10, SLC SYSTEM OPERATION

.CPS 4411.11, HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION CPS 4412.00, CHEMISTRY SAMPLING Operations Strategy Document 7-LP87594-02.doc IX

Exelon.M Nuclear LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DATE DESCRIPTION 00 08/01/03 New Lesson Plan 01 03/08/05 Changes incorporated new Electrical Safety procedure and change to 4410.00C004 (no longer allowed to defeat all Group 1 isolations).

02 1/4/07 Corrected B Column information.

7-LP87594-02.doc X

Exelon.M Nuclear Instructional Methods

Lecture/discussion Media:

white board

handouts

trainee text

power point 7-LP87594-02.doc Page xi

Content/Skills Activities/Notes I. Introduction A. Introduction This lesson will cover the EOP support procedures. These procedures provide guidanc~ in the response during EOP implementation. Your understanding of these is very important for the protection of public health and safety if a transient or epiergency should ever occur.

B. Presentation The student will learn this particular topic by 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of classroom instruction, composed of

1. Lecture/Discussion

2. Challenges in the form of questions C. Objectives

1. Objectives provide the foundation for learning on this topic.

2. Review the objectives to familiarize yourself and or the students with the knowledge necessary to attain mastery of this topic.

D. Evaluation ,

A check on understanding of objectives will be evaluated by the instructor periodically throughout the presentation in the form of an interim summary. Additionally, knowledge of objectives may be evaluated with a weekly and a comprehensive written exam with a minimum score of 80%.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes II. . INSTRUCTION A. BASICS (CPS 1005.09)

1. There are many EOP S4pport Procedures. These are issued .1.1 separately from the flowcharts. Use of these procedures is directed from within the EOP flowcharts and the Severe Accident Guidelines (SAG), when required. The Support Procedures contain detailed instructions for performing specific evolutions.

2. By the nature of the EOPs, every plant pro~edure shares an interrelationship with ~he EOPs. The EOP program, however, specifically utilizes two categories of support procedures. See Appendix A.

a. EOP Support Procedures are identified as CPS No. 44 lX and select 3XXX series procedures.

b. ECCS systems by design are intended for use 'during conditions prescribed in the EOPs. It is not necessary to incorporate these procedures into 44XX.XX series EOP Support Procedures.

c. There are other parallel support procedures which are used during EOP execution. These are plant procedures which provide normal guidance for operating e.quipment and systems, yet which may be reference4,(directly or indirectly) in support of EOP steps and actions.

3. The specific EOP Support 441X.XX series procedures are categorized in the following manner: *

a. CPS No. 4410.00 Series: Procedures and checklists which provide instruction and documentation for wire~

relay, jumper removal/installation, and Analog Trip Module (ATM) setpoint' adjustment. The individual checklists are performed during emergency conditions in which interlocks must be defeated to allow the continued operation of equipment to safely mitigate the consequences of degraded conditions. These interlocks consist of those specifically allowed for by the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), and those .,

specified in other EOP support procedures.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. CPS No. 4411.00 Series: Procedures, appendices, checklists, and line-ups which provide operators details that expand upon steps shown on the BOP flowcharts.

This series provides an orderly transition from a symptom-based flowchart to an event-controlled text based document, which directly supports the use of available systems and methods described in the EPGs.

4411.00 series may include checklist,s using the same procedure numbers sequence. These checklists follow the same guidelines as those for 4410.00 series.

c. CPS No. 4412.00 Series: Procedures and checklists which provide instructions for sampling and analyzing containment/drywell hydrogen or gaseous radioa~tivity concentration levels in the event the installed instrumentation is inoperative.

B. Procedure Hierarchy.

1. When entry to the BOP(s) is required, the BOP instructions assume priority over other plant procedures. Other event-specific procedures may be executed concurrently with the BOPs, but the actions specified in such procedures shall not contradict or "override" the actions specified in the EOPs.

2. The instructions in the BOPs also take precedence over actions specified in Technical Specifications while operating in accordance with the BOPs. The NRC recognizes (reference: 10CFR50.54(x)) that, in an emergency, operation beyond Technical Specification limits may be required in order to properly mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents. This does not imply that operation beyond Technical Specification limits is necessarily recommended.

3. BOPs address conditions beyond those assumed in Technical Specifications. For example, defeating isolation interlocks and opening primary containment isolation valves required to automatically isolate per Technical Specifications. The limits specified in the BOPs establish boundaries (the extreme) within which continued safe operation of the plant can be assured. Therefore, conformance with the BOPs does not ensure strict conformance with Technical Specifications or other licensing bases of the plant.

4. Once the emergency is over, LCOs need to be entered and recovery actions taken. These actions are to be taken once

'the plant is stable and resources available. CPS 1005.09C001 provides the necessary LCO recovery actions.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

5. Support procedures were also developed to provide

. necessary instructions for carrying out specific actions that are specified in the EOP flowcharts. Examples include:

a. Defeating trip logic.

b. Defeating isolation logic.

c. Defeating auto-start logic.

d. Alignment and operation of alternate systems/methods for injecting water into RPV.

e. Alignment and operation of alternate systems/methods for depressurizing the RPV.

f. Alignment and operation of an alternate boron injection method.

g. Venting containment directly to atmosphere.

Interim Summary

Once EOPs are entered, they are the controlling procedure *

441X Support procedures only used when in EOP/SAGs

Defeating interlocks is allowed based on the extent of an emergency

LCO actions entered once emergency is over LP87594-02 Page 4 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Ill. Procedures A. CPS 4410.00, DEFEATING SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

1. PURPOSE

a. Provide specific guidance for performing and documenting actions performed during performance of EOPs.

b. By performing such actions various interlocks are defeated to allow continued operation of selected equipment during EOP actions.

2. DISCUSSIONS/DEFINITIONS

a. Procedure use and checklist permitted as directed by EOPs and SAGs, only.

b. Exposed wiring shall hav~ the exposed conducting parts .1.3.3 & .1.3.4 taped or insulated to prevent inadvertent grounding or shorting ..

c.. ELECTRICAL JUMPER - A wire used to connect or .1.3.2 bypass a circuit or portion of a circuit.

d. SNUG TIGHT- Force necessary to bring fasteners into .1.3.5 contact/alignment and set the fastener so that it will not loosen by itself.

3.

PRECAUTIONS When working around or near energized electrical terminals, .1.2 wires, equipment, the following precautions should be adhered to as per SA-AA-129, Electrical Safety:

Review 4.1 for proper protective equipment.

Review 4.2 for electrical safety fundamentals.

Review 4.3 for work practices.

While performing the EOP Checklist be attentive to the proximity of exposed terminals/busses that you could contact.

a. Performing wire removal and/or jumper installation, follow applicable safety practices.

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Content/$ kills Activities/Notes

b. Wires loosened/removed during lifting leads and/or installing jumpers shall be tightened/terminated snug tight before performing the next step.

c. When entering the NSPS backplane, take extreme caution to prevent shorting and/or physically damaging the backplane pin*s.

4. Checklist Applications

a. Checklists direct and document the following during EOP/SAG performan"6e:

1) Lifting and landing of leads.

2) Installation of electrical jumpers.

3) Removal of relays.

4) Relay blocked.

r

5) Some equipment manipulations.

6) Adjustment of A TM setpoints.

b. MCR actions are performed by an SRO/RO .

C&I Tech/Electricians as directed by an SRO.

or qualified .

c. Completion of Checklists

1) Some checklists may duplicate actions of other steps or checklists.

2) When a step is already performed, only verify the action is complete and does not need to be performed again.

3) When installing backplane jumpers, Pins 1 & 2 act as common ground and pins 3 & 4 act as the + 12 V source. Remaining pin completes the trip circuit.

An inadvertent trip signal could occur across any .1.3.8 two pins if the jumper accidentally touches a wrong pin.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

Minimize this possibility by connecting the jumper first to the trip circuit pin (i.e., 27, 35) and last to the common ground/voltage pin (Pins 1, 2, 3 or4).

Place keeping by filling in blanks for the .1.3.1 checklist documents what actions have been performed to modify the plant for an emergency situation. The SM/CRS will review each checklist upon completion. From these, plant status will be determined, LCO's entered and recovery actions identified. (CPS 1005.09C001)

I

Procedure provides guidance on how to monitor the ATM being adjusted.

5. Location of ATM Modules/Pl Connector .1.3.7 B. Checklists NOTES These notes apply t'o each Checklist of the 4410.00 series:

Permission to perform these actions does not imply that the operation needs to be performed under all plant conditions.

Perform only those items necessary for the degraded plant conditions, and to support EOP/SAG mitigation actions.

Controlled procedures, tools, & equipment are located in the EOP Supply Cabinet (Computer Room just off MCR).

All ATM Trip Circuit SET adjustment screws are either turned CLOCKWISE or COUNTERCLOCKWISE 26 full turns. Once completed, the setpoint is beyond the ATM's instrument range preventing actuation.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

1. 4410.00COOl, DEFEATING RCIC INTERLOCKS (EOP-1 .1.4.1 Level Leg & EOP-lA Level Leg)

a. Bypassing RCIC Area Temperature Isolation Signals bypasses RCIC Group 5 and 6 isolation and its associated RCIC turbine trip.

Supports pressure control and RCIC injection.

2 *switches placed in "Bypass"

b. Defeating RCIC Suction Transfer (EOP-6 SP Level) to allow usage ofRCIC storage tanks cleaner water.

2 A TM Trip Circuit adjustments preventing automatic opening of 1E51-F031, RCIC Pump Suppression Pool Suction Valve on high suppression pool level. 1E51-F031 will still open on a RCIC Storage Tank low level.

c. Defeating Low RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Isolation (EOP-1 & EOP-2)

Supports pressure control and RCIC injection.

2 ATM Trip Circuit adjustments for the Low RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Isolation, thus preventing automatic closure of Group 5 & 6 valves and preventing a RCIC turbine trip when RPV pressure

< 60 psig.

d. Defeating RCIC Level 8 Isolation (EOP-2, RPV Flooding)

This action will prevent instruments failed upscale from stopping injection.

This a~tion is not recommended unless Adequate Core Cooling is challenged or can be challenged.

2 A TM Trip Circuit adjustments preventing High RPV water level RCIC shutdown, which prevents 1E51-F045 from auto closing, which in turn allows 1E51-F013, RCIC Pump Disch To Rx Outbd Isol Valve to remain open.

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Content/Skills Activiti"es/Notes

e. Defeating RCIC Isolations to Support Alternate 'Boron Injection Mode

This action is not recommended unless specifically directed by CPS No. 4411.10.

Install 2 backplane jumpers defeats RCIC Isolations to Support Alternate Boron Injection Mode. *

Once installed 1E51-F031 will not automatically open on high suppression pool level or low RCIC storage tank level. 1E51-F022/59 will not automatically close on a system initiation logic signal.

2. CPS No. 44IO.OOC002, DEFEATING HPCS INTERLOCKS .1.4.2

a. Defeating HPCS Suction Transfer (EOP-6, SP Level) to allow using RCIC Storage tanks cleaner water source. \

2 ATM Trip Circuit adjustments preventing Div. 3 suppression pool high water level ATM trip, thus preventing automatic open'ing of 1E22-F015, HPCS Suppr Pool Suction Valve on high suppression pool level. 1E22-F015 will still open on a RCIC Storage Tank low level.

b. Defeating HPCS Level 8 Isolation (EOP-2, RPV Flooding)

This action will prevent instruments failed upscale from stopping injection.

This action is not recommended unless Adequate Core Cooling is challenged or can be challenged

2 ATM Trip Circuit adjustments preventing Divisions 3 & 4 High RPV water level HPCS Isolation ATMs trip, thereby preventing 1E22-F004, HPCS To CNMT Outbd Isln Valve closure on RPV Level 8.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

c. Defeating HPCS Isolations to Support Alternate Boron Injection Mode (4411.10)

1) This action is not recommended unless specifically directed by 4411.10.

2) Allows HPCS to establish and maintain a suction on the RCIC storage tank when in alternate boron injection mode, and prevents automatic close function on recirc valves back to the storage tank.

Install 2 backplane jumpers to Support Alternate Boron Injection Mode.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

3. CPS No. 4410.00C003, DEFEATING IA INTERLOCKS .1.4.3 (EOP-1, Pressure Control, EOP-IA Pressure Control &

EOP-3) ,

remove 2 steel jumpers RPV Level 1 Instrument Air valves 1IA005, 1IA006, 1IA007, and 1IA008 isolation signal defeated. Allows.

instrument air (IA) supply to the MSIVs and SRVs to be re-established or maintained.

4. CPS No. 44IO.OOC004, DEFEATING MSL/OG .1.4.4 INTERLOCKS .

Perform the first two sections (quickest action to support ATWS level control strategy), then as time and resources permit, perform the last section.

a. Defeat,the IA isolations

Remove 2 steel jumpers

IA supply to the containment can be re-established or maintained

b. Defeating RPV Level 1 Isolation Only (Supports maintaining the MSIV's Open) 4 ATM Trip Circuit adjustments preventing Divs 1 - 4 Low RPV water level A TM trip, thus preventing MSIV Group 1 isolation on RPV Level 1

c. Defeating Off-Gas Isolation IN66-F060 is failed open to allow continued use of main condenser as a heat sink during ATWS conditions.

CAUTION -This step will defeat the HIGH radiation auto closure signal on 1N66-F060, Off Gas Vent Disch Isol Viv.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes There is no manual isolation capability during this time period, therefore the potential for an off-site release in excess of limits exists.

Monitor Off Gas Pre- and Post-treatment levels frequently when 1N66-F060 is defeated.

Requires:

Obtain Station Emergency Director's authorization to defeat

Pull fuse, resulting in a loss of 1N66-F060 valve indication

Monitor 1RIX-PR035/41, Off Gas Post-Treatment approaches 1N66-F060 'auto closure' setpoint of 7

µCi/cc

Obtain Station Emergency Director's authorization to continue to have the 1N66-F060 defeated when> 7

µCi/cc.

Steps to restore fuse to allow isolation.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

5. CPS No. 4410.00C005, DEFEATING RWCU .1.4.5 INTERLOCKS (EOP-1, Pressure Control)

a. Defeat COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) interlocks will result in all Group 8/15 isolations being defeated by performing 3 actions in both Divisions 1 &

2:

1) Defeat relay by removing cover and contact plate upper stop arm, reposition contact plate and insert a blocking wedge under the contact plate to maintain contact position.

2) Lift and tape a lead.

3) Install a jumper.

4). Open CC supply and return isolations.

b. Defeat REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU)

Interlocks.

Installing 3 backplane jumpers in divisions 1 & 2 defeats all RWCU isolations.

)

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

6. CPS No. 4410.00C006, DEFEATING VP/WO .1.4.6 INTERLOCKS (EOP-6, DW/CT Temperature Legs)

a. Lift and tape 2 leads and install 1 jumper in Divisions 18l2. . .

These actions prevent closure of 1SX020A8lB from MCR.

b. Open the supplemental cooling isolations to restore cooling to the drywell.

c. When the RPV Level 1, High Drywell Pressure, or a Divisional ECCS Manual Initiation has occurred:

Required to reset applicable shunt trips per Table 1.

The DW Clg Fans lA-lD, 1VPOlC,A-D will still indicate running with a red light even though one of the two circuit breakers has shunt tripped and will start when reset.

d. Re-open 1SX020A(B), Drywell Chiller IA (lB) Inlet Viv.

Chill water recovery concerns:

Whenever the drywell is> 212°F, the potential for damaging water hammer exists when initially unisolating the drywell WO and VP penetrations.

Whenever possible, the VP/WO drywell isolations should not be reopened until the following minimum conditions are established, thereby preventing the formation of vapor cavities and water hammer:

VP: DW Chilled Water Tank 1VP05TA/B > 30 psig, and DW < 270°F.

WO: WO Chilled Water Tank 1W004TB > 40 psig, and DW < 285°F.

The ERO may provide alternate saturation temperatures/pressures based on plant conditions.

Water hammer is not a concern when the penetration is unisolated, only when reopening the valves.

e. Restore Containment Isolations 8l Drywell Cooling per CPS No. 3320.01, DRYWELL COOLING SYSTEM (VP).

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

7. CPS No. 44IO.OOC007, DEFEATING RPV VENT .lA.7 INTERLOCKS (EOP-3)

Allow continued use of various systems to depressurize the RPV in the event normal methods of reducing RPV pressure are ineffective or unavailable.

a. Defeating RCIC Group 5/6 Isolations

1) RCIC valves 1E51-F063, 64, 76 and 31 will not automatically shut on a Group 5/6 isolation.

2) RCIC turbine will not trip upon an automatic group isolation signal.

3) Defeated by installing 2 backplane jumpers.

b. Defeating RCIC 1E51-F045 Level 2 Auto Open Feature 1E51-F045 will not auto open on a Level 2 initiation signal, thereby allowing 1E51-F025/26 to be opened in s1:,1pport of establishing a RCIC vent path.

1) Defeat the RCIC 1E51-F045 Level 2 Auto Open Feature by 2 ATM trip circuit adjustments.

c. Defeat IA Isolation RPV Level 1 Instrument Air valves 1IA005, 1IA006, 1 1IA007, and 1IA008isolation signal will be defeated ..

1) Defeat IA Isolations by removing two steel jumpers.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

d. Defeating Entire Group 1 Isolation MSIV s/MSL Drains will not be automatically/interlocked shut on an automatic or manual Group 1 isolation signal. The MSIV contr.ol switches need to be verified in shut.

f) To defeat the MSIV/MSL Drains Group 1 Isolations requires the installation of _3 backplane jumpers in 2 .

divisions ofNSPS (total of 6 jumpers installed).*

~

e. Defeating Main Turbine Bypass Va.Ives Isolation Main Turbine Bypass Valves will not close on low condenser vacuum.

1) To defeat the Main Turbine Bypass Valves Isolation requires two actions; a) Lift and tape one lead.

b) On 1H13-P680, Steam Bypass & Pressure Regulation System panel, depress COND VACUUM TRIP push-button.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

8. CPS No. 4410.00C008, DEFEATING MDRFP .1.4.8 INTERLOCKS (EOP-2)

Allow the Motor Driven Reactor Feed Pump to flood the RPV when operating above RPV Level 8.

Defeated by;

a. Removal of a relay.

b. Install a jumper LP87594-02 Page 17 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

9. CPS No. 4410.00C009, DEFEATING .1-.4.9 INJECTION/FLOODING INTERLOCKS (EOP-1 & EOP-IA)

Defeat necessary RPV injection flow path isolation logic in support of CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES directed actions.

a. 1El2-F053A(B), All Isolation Logic

1) 1E12-F053A, RHR A To Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Viv

Also defeats auto isolation logic for 1E12-F008, Shutdown Cooling Outbd Suet Isol Viv and 1E12-F023, RHR B Supp To Rx Head Spray Valve.

Install one backplane jumper

2) 1E12-F053B, RHR B To Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Vlv ,,

Also defeats auto isolation logic for 1E12-F009, Shutdown Cooling Inbd Suet IsolVlv.

Install one backplane jumper

b. 1El2-F027B, Seal-In Open Logic Also defeats auto isolation logic for 1E12-F021, RHR C Test Valve To Suppr Pool and 1El2-F028B, RHR B To CNMT Spray B Shutoff Viv.

After completion the 1El2-F027B - Injection signal seal-in. open logic is g.efeated, thereby allowing the valve to be shut manually in order to support various RHR EOP injection flow path line-ups. Also supports line-ups which require 1E12-F028B operation.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes After completion of the next three sections:

lSFOOl/2; 1CY016/17; OMC009/10 -Applicable Group 8 auto isolation signal is d~feated, thereby allowing valve operation in support of SF, CY or SLC injection/flooding line-ups.

c. lSFOOl, SPCU Rtm Line Outbd Isol Viv and 1SF002, SPCU Rtm Line Inbd Isol Viv, Group 8 Auto Isolation Logic

Lift and individually tape both leads from the same terminal.

Install one jumper.

d. 1CYO 16, CY CNMTOutbd Isol Valve and 1CYO 17, CY CNMT Inbd Isol Valve, GP 8 Auto Isolation Logic

Lift and individually tape both leads

Install one jumper.

e. OMC009, MC CNMT Outbd Isol Viv and OMCOlO, MC CNMT Inbd Isol Viv, GR8 Auto Isolation Logic

*Lift and individually tape both leads.

Install two jumpers

10. CPS No. 4410.00COIO, DEFEATING CNMT VENT .1.4.10 INTERLOCKS (EOP-6, DW/CT Pressure Leg)

Defeat necessary CNMT vent path isolation interlocks and trips in support of CPS No. 4411.06, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING, PURGING, AND VACUUM RELIEF directed actions.

a. VENT USING HYDROGEN PURGE SUPPLY PATH Div 1and Div 2 each

Remove one relay.

Install one jumper.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. VENT TO CONDENSER or SPENT FUEL POOL USING FC RETURN HEADER

Remove relay.

Install one jumper NOTE- Following steps will cause 1FC008, FC CNMT Outlet Outbd Isol Viv to open.

Div 1:*

Lift and tape lead.

Install one jumper.

c. VENT TO CONDENSER or SPENT FUEL POOL USING RHR CNMT SPRAY SPAR.GERS IF CPS No. 4411.06 Section 2.6, Vent To Spent Fuel Pool Using RHR CNMT A Spray Sparger is being used, THEN perform steps 3.3.a*- d only.

1) Div 1: RHR A Vent Path a) Lift and tape one lead.

b & c) -Install two jumpers.

d) Lift and tape one lead.

If venting to condenser, this step is also required; e) Install one backplane jumper

2) Div. 2: RHR B Vent Path f & g) Lift and tape two leads.

h & i) Install two jumpers.

j) Install one backplane jumper.

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Content/Skills . Activities/Notes

d. VENT USING CCP SUPPLY PATH MODIFICATION

1) IA Isolations I

Remove steel jumpers.

2) CCP Isolations

Lift and tape four leads.

e. VACUUM PUMP MSL HIGH RADIATION TRIP Main Condenser Vacuum Pump A & B {OCAOlPA & B)

Lift and tape a single lead

Install one jumper

11. CPS No. 4410.00COl l, DEFEATING VF INTERLOCKS .1.4.11 (EOP.:8)

Allow restart/continued use of Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) after isolation and when VF Exhaust< 10 mR/hr.

a. Remove two relays

b. The RPV Level 2 and High Drywell Pressure

. Isolation/Trips will be defeated:

.VF Exhaust Fans, 1VF04CA/B

VF Supply Fans; 1VF03CA/B

Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers,. 1VF04Y, 1VF06Y, 1VF07Y, and 1VF09Y

c. Standby Gas Treatment (VG) Automatic Initiation on Level 2 and High Drywell Pressure will be defeated.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes

12. CPS No. 4410.00C012, DEFEATING ATWS .1.4.12 INTERLOCKS (EOP-lA)

When directed by CPS No. 4411.08, ALTERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION, defeat isolations/trips.

. a. Defeating IA Isolations Allows instrument air (IA) supply to the containment to be re-established or maintained.

1) Defeating IA Isolations

Remove two steel jumpers

b. Defeating RPS Logic Trips Allow the scram to be reset, the scram discharge volume drained, and the CRD accumulators recharged for subsequent manual scram attempts. This action bypasses Div. 1 through 4 RPS automatic scram signals.

1) Defeating RPS Logic Trips

Install four backplane jumpers

c. Defeating Rod Pattern Controller Allows manual insertion of control rods irrespective of pattern and sequence constraints which would otherwise be imposed.

1) Defeat the Rod Pattern Controller by 2 ATM Trip Circuits adjustments.

d. Defeating ARI Logic Trips Allows ARI/RPT trip logic to be manually reset irrespective of automatic trip signals.

1) Defeating ARI Logic Trips

Trip both reactor recirculation pumps.

Place ARI/RPT SYSTEM 1 & 2 TEST keylock switches in TEST.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes After completion:

1Cll-F401A(B), Scram Valve Pilot Air Header Block Solenoid Valves open.

1Cll-F402-405A(B), Scram Valve Pilot Air Header Vent Solenoid Valves shut.

RR pump automatic ATWS trips defeated.

13. Interim Summary Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q When is use of the checklists of CPS No. 4410.00, DEFEATING SYSTEM INTERLOCKS permitted?

Q What types of actions are performed using CPS No. 4410.00 checklists?

Q Who can perform a CPS No. 4410.00 checklist?

Q What actions are to be taken when a duplicated step of a checklist is performed?

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q When installing backplane jumpers, what action could occur if the jumper accidentally touches a wrong pin?

Q Following a Reactor scram, all feedwater is lost. The SRO directs the IMDs to defeat all the RCIC Interlocks. What interlocks are bypassed?

Q What actions can be performed when checklist CPS No.

4410.00C003, DEFEATING IA INTERLOCKS is completed?

Q What is the strategy when performing CPS No.

4410.00C004, DEFEATING MSL/OG INTERLOCKS when directed by EOP-lA, ATWS CONTROL?

Q What are the concerns when defeating Off Gas Isolations per CPS No. 4410.00C004, DEFEATING MSL/OG INTERLOCKS?

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q What is the purpose of performing CPS No. 4410.00COOS, DEFEATING RWCU INTERLOCKS checklist?

Q A LOCA occurs causing Drywell Temperature (285°F) and Pressure. (4.7 psig) to rise rapidly. The CRS directs the IMDs to perform checklist CPS No. 4410.00C006, DEFEATING VP/WO INTERLOCKS. What should be of concern prior to performing this checklist?

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q When defeating RPS Logic trips per checklist CPS No.

4410.00C012, DEFEATING ATWS INTERLOCKS, what actions should be performed prior to subsequent manual scram attempts?

1. This completes the section that covers the checklists that defeat the various interlocks and isolation signals.

2. 4411.:XX procedures are next.

Equipment manipulations Plant operation As directed by EOP-SAG LP87594-02 Page26 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes C. CPS 4411.02, TERMINATING AND PREVENTING INJECTION

1. This procedure is entered when directed by:

EOP-lA Level Leg

EOP-2.Flooding with ATWS

EOP-3 Emergency Depressurization with Shutdown Criteria not met NOTE A manual ECCS initiation will block DG protective devices with the exception of generator differential current and overspeed.

2. Removal of 'QS Relay [HARD CARD at P601]

[Prevents TB MCC IM shunt trip which maintains MDRFP availability.]

1FW004, MDRFP Feed Reg Valve Concerns a, Removing relay 1UAY-AP567B (QS) in steps 2.1 and

2. 7 .1 prior to depressing LPCI FM RHR B & C MANUAL INITIATION push-button, assures hydraulic control for 1FW004, MDRFP Feed Reg Valve, and RFP IC Aux Oil pump are not lost due to a TB MCC IM shunt trip signal.

b. When the FW controllers are in MANUAL/minimum, .1.5 the 1FW004, MDRFP Feed Reg Valve hydraulic pump needs one of these conditions satisfied in order to run and supply hydraulic pressure to shut the valve:

1) 1FW024, RFP Bypass Viv open, or

2) lFWOlPC, Motor Driven RFP IC running, or

3) RFP 1C Aux Oil Pump running.

c. Operator error and/or other events can result in a loss of hydraulics to the 1FW004 valve.

The accumulator should under normal conditions provide for one valve stroke before the valve hydraulics are' totally lost, and the valve will then remain in its last position.

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Content/Skills Activities/Notes IF Div 2 LPCI B/C initiation has not occurred,

. [Manual or Automatic (Level 1/Hi DW

pressure)],

THEN At backpanel 1H13-P851 (Div 2), Bay B:

Remove relay

Require pushing spring clip off of relay

Grab and work relay side - to - side as it slowly extracts.

If cover comes off, gently slide it back onto relay and try again.

3. HPCS - Initiation Signal NOT Present [HARD CARD] .1.6.1

a. While holding control switch in CLOSE for 1E22-F004, HPCS To CNMT Outbd Isln Valve:

Arm and Depress HPCS MANUAL INITIATION push-button.

b. After starting current has decayed, stop HPCS Pump, IE22-C001.

c. Manual HPCS initiation starts Div 3 DG & SX Pump C and will need to verify they correctly start.

4. . HPCS - Initiation Signal Present [HARD CARD]

a. Stop HPCS Pump, 1E22-C001.

b. Shut 1E22-F004, HPCS To CNMT Outbd Isln Valve.

LP87594-02 Page28 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

5. RCIC [HARD CARD at P601]

a. Depress RCIC TURBINE REMOTE TRIP push-button.

b. Shut 1E51-C002, RCIC Turbine Trip Valve Stem

c. Shut 1E51-F013, RCIC Pump Disch To Rx Outbd Isol Valve.

NOTE: RHR A may already be running due to non-ECCS considerations. Performing the following steps might cause system valves to be realigned.

6. LPCS/LPCI A - Initiation of Signal NOT Present

[HARD CARD at P601]

a. Arm and Depress:

LPCS/LPCI FM RHR A MANUAL INITIATION push-button.

RPV pressure is normally greater than the open permissive pressure for these two valves.

b. Provide*a CLOSE signal to:

1E21-F005, LPCS To CNMT Outbd Isol Valve.

c. Provide a CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042A, LPCI Fm RHR A Shutoff Valve.

d. Shut 1E12-F053A, RHR A To Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Viv.

e. Start both DW/CNMT Mixing Compressors.

f. LPCS/LPCI FM RHR A MANUAL INITIATION starts Div 1 DG and isolates Drywell Cooling and needs verified.

LP87594-02 Page 29 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

7. LPCS/LPCI A - Initiation Signal Present [HARD CARD]

a. Provide a CLOSE signal to:

1E21-F005, LPCS To CNMT Outbd Isol Valve.

b. Provide a'CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042A, LPCI Fm RHR A Shutoff Valve.

c. Shut 1E12-F053A, RHR A To Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Viv.

d. Start DW/CNMT Mixing Compressors per P800 HARD CARD or 4411.11.

8. LPCI B/C - Initiation Signal NOT Present [HARD CARD]

a. Verify/remove relay.

b. Arm and Depress:

LPCI FM RHR B & C MANUAL INITIATION push-button.

c. P~ovide a CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042B, LPCI Fm RHR B Shutoff Valve.

d. Provide a CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042C, LPCI...__ Fm RHR C Shutoff Valve .

e. Shut 1E12-F053B, RHR B to Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Viv.

f. Shut 1EI2-F023, RHR B Supp to Rx Head Spray Valve.

g. Start DW/CNMT Mixing Compressors ..

h. LPCI FM RHR B & C MANUAL INITIATION starts Div 2 DG and isolates Drywell Cooling and needs verified._

LP87594-02 Page30 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

9. LPCI B/C-Initiation Signal Present [HARD CARD]

a. Provide a CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042B, LPCI Fm RHR B Shutoff Valve.

b. Provide a CLOSE signal to:

1E12-F042C, LPCI Fm RHR C Shutoff Valve.

c. Shut 1E12-F053B, RHR B to Feedwater SID Cooling Rtm Viv.

d. Shut 1E12-F023, RHR B Supp To Rx Head Spray Valve.

e. Start DW /CNMT Mixing Compressors per P800 HARD CARD or 4411.11.

10. CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER [HARD CARD] .1.6.5 r::ir' Recommended step sequence only - may be performed in any order based on existing plant conditions.

a. Place RFPT Flow Controller A/B, in MANUAL/min.

b. Shut 1FW004, MDRFP Feed Reg Valve by placing:

Flow Control RFPT C in MANUAL/min.

and

Start-Up Level Control in MANUAL/min.

r::iT' 1FW004 may not fully shut due to a loss of hydraulics.

Verify status via annunciator 5002-lM and DCS.

c. Shut 1FW002A/B, RFP lA/lB Disch Vlvs.

LP87594-02 Page 31 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

d. Shut 1FW003A/B, RFP Discharge Bypass Valves, by placing Flow Controller, FC-FW231 in minimum.

e. IF Feedwater flow cannot be terminated as above, THEN Using as necessary for plant conditions:

Shut 1B21-F065A/B, RPV Inlet Vlvs.

Stop running FW/CD/CB pumps.

INTERIM

SUMMARY

- Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q Why is the Q/S Relay removed prior to terminating Division 2 LPCI B/C?

Q While terminating HPCS with an initiation signal NOT present, when is the HPCS pump stopped?

Q Why does it take a two handed operation to terminate HPCS with an initiation signal NOT present?

Q If the LPCS/LPCI RHR A MANUAL initiation push button is depressed what actions occur?

LP87594-02 Page32 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q If Division 2 RHR was in Suppression Pool cooling and the LPCI FM RHR B/C MANUAL INITIATION PUSHBUTTON was armed and depressed, what effect (if any) would this have on Suppression Pool Cooling?

Q

When would you close the 1B21-F065A/B, RPV Inlet Valves, when terminating and preventing injection?

Q Concerning the shunt trip of TB MCC IM, how does this affect the Feedwater System?

Q What is required for the MDRFP Feed Reg Valve hydraulic pump to run and supply hydraulic pressure to operate the 1FW004 Valve?

LP87594-02 Page 33 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes D. CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES

1. Directed by the EOP/SAGs - align and operate available RPV injection and CT flooding sources. EOP-1, IA, 2 and SAG will all direct injection/flooding per CPS 4411.03.

2. Based on plant conditions, resource availability, and EOP/SAG direction_s, select one or more methods below to perform injection/flooding operations.

a. NORMAL MCR LINEUP/OPERATION .1.7.1

1) TDRFP(S)-Max RPV pressure for injection is

-1950 psig.

2) MDRFP - Max PRV pressure for MDRFP injection:

-1780 psig.

LP87594-02 Page34 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

3) CD/CB PUMP(S) a) Using this path places a minimum of one CD pump (CD/CB pump set) in service with the FW002A(B) closed and the FW024 valve open, opening/throttling the 1B21F065A(B) valve(s) c--

and controlling level using theStartup, 1FW004 Flow or 1FW003A(B) Controllers.

When EOP 1 directs to maximize injection for preferred and alternate systems opening 1FW002A&B would be allowed to restore core cooling. Other action to raise injection rate:

Startup CB pump if one isn't running

Startup an additional CD/CB pair u b) It is possible to feed through the 1FW002A(B) valves although this path does not provide any throttling capability for flow rate. This flowpath requires throttling the 1B21-F065A(B) to control flow.

4) CRD .1.7.5 a) To use the CRD Pumps to inject requires opening both 1Cll-F116 and Fll 7, Suet Filt Byp.

Valves, placing the CRD Hydraulics Flow Control in MANUAL, and starting one or two CRD pumps.

b) Injection to the vessel is performed by alternately throttling open 1C 11-F002A(B) and 1Cl 1-F003A(B) to maximize injection then starting the RCRC Aux Seal Injection Pump.

LP87594-02 Page 35 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

5) ECCS SYSTEMS (RCIC, HPCS, LPCS, LPCI)

NOTE No unique lineups or operating modes exist when using these systems in the normal operating mode.

Operate the systems in accordance with the normal operating procedures and as directed by the EOPs.

a) RCIC, CPS 3310.01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) b) HPCS, CPS 3309.01, High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) .

c) LPCS, CPS 3313.01, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) d) LPCI, CPS 3312.01, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) .

6) HEAD SPRAY .1.7.3 NOTE Head spray is only permitted when in SAG-I, PRIMARY CONTAfNMENT FLOODING for recirculation use when suppression pool water level is to be held above 61 ft 11 in. Head spray operation does not add to the CT water inventory.

a) Start LPCI B per RHR procedure.

b) Open 1E12-F023 (Head Spray Valve).

7) ECCS WATER LEG PUMPS a) HPCS .1.7.5 HPCS Water Leg pump has a maximum injection

.pressure of - 29 psig, with pump runout pressure of - 6 psig RPV pressure and a flow rate of- 50 gpm.

LP87594-02 Page36 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

If needed to raise RPV level above Level 8

defeat HPCS Level 8 isolation interlocks .

. Align injection by opening either 1E22-F001 or F015, start the WLP and open 1E22-F004 b) RCIC .1.7.6 NOTE F013 will not open ifF045 is shut.

RCIC Water Leg pump has a maximum injection pressure of - 29 psig; with pump runout pressure of - 6 psig RPV pressure and a flow rate of - 50 gpm. ,r

OK to defeat RCIC isolations and reset RCIC

turbine to. open F045.

Align injection by opening the 1E51-F045, RCIC Turb Stm Supp Shutoff Valve then opening either 1E51-F010 or 1E51-F031, starting the RCIC WLP and opening 1E51-F013.

c) LPCS/RHR A .1.7.7 RHR A/LPCS Water Leg pump has a maximum injection pressure of - 55 psig, will not run-out or trip and a flow rate of- 50 gpm.

Align injection by opening 1E21-F001, starting the LPCS & RHR A WLP and opening either1E21-F005 and/or 1E12-F042A.

d) RHRB/C .1.7.8 RHR B/C Water Leg pump has a maximum injection pressure of - 55 psig, will not run-out or trip and a flow rate of- 50 gpm.Align injection by opening 1E21-Fl05, starting the RHR B/C WLP and opening either1E21-F042B and/or 1E12-F042C.

LP87594-02 Page37 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. ABNORMAL LINEUP/OPERATION

1) RHR Through Shutdown Cooling (App. A, 1.0) .1.7.9

If RPV level is < Level 3 or pressure is > 104 psig defeat 1E12-F053A(B) isolation logic.

Align injection by starting RHR Pump A(B),

throttling open 1E12-F053A(B) to maintain RPV

level and shutting 1E12-F042A(B).

2) SX Through RHR B (App. A, 2.0) .1.7.10

3) SX Through RHR B Test Return (App. A, 3.0): .1.7.11

4) SX Through Containment Spray B (App. A, 4.0) .1.7.12

5) Fire ProtectionJApp. B) .1.7.13 a) ERO Prioritization/Resource Guidance

b) Perform injection path lineups:

Lineup #1, MCR Valves

Lineup #2: Critical Path Field Valves

Lineup #3: Non-Critical Path Field Valves c) Locally remove internals of 1FP036.

d) Locally start all available fire pumps.

LP87594-02 Page38 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes e) Locally commence injection by slowly opening IFP035.

f) Monitor FP flow on the RHR Pump B Flow indicator.

g) Maintain RPV level as required using IEI2-F096.

h) If 1EI2-F042B cannot be opened and CT spray is not required then inject FP via the shutdown cooling return line, 1EI2-F053B.

i) Summary of FP Injection:

(I) Require extensive amount of field manipulations to:

Lineup valves

Remove check valve disk (IFP036)

(2) The Diesel Fire Pump(s) flow lake water to the T.B. ring header where the WS cross-connect has the internal disk removed. The WS system is aligned to SX B only at the screenhouse and flows water to the RHR 'B' cross.-connect 1E12-F096 & F094. The RHR 'B' loop injects to the RPV through the RHR injection 1E12-F042B or 1E12-F053B.

6) Fuel Pool Cooling (App. C) .1.7.14 LP87594-02 Page39 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

7) SLC (test or storage tank) (App. D) .1.7.15 Method 1.0: SLC Test Tank LP87594-02 Page 40 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

8) Method 2.0 SLC STORAGE TANK (Hard Card)

Start both SLC Pumps A and B (Record start time).

c. Suppression Pool Makeup/Cleanup (App. E)

1) DUMPUPPERPOOLS .1.7.16

2) CNMT FLOODING THROUGH SF USING CP .1.7.17

d. Cycled Condensate (App. F)

1) CY THROUGH ECCS FILL PATH .1.7.18 a) Start all available CY pumps.

b) Inject using any of the following CY fill paths:

HPCS.

LPCS.

LPCIA.

LPCIB.

LPCIC.

c) CNMT Flooding - CY Through SM/SF Option 1 - CY-SM .1.7.19 Option 2 - CY to SF - This flow path gravity .1.7.20 drains the CY tank to the suppression pool.

LP87594-02 Page 41 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes INTERIM

SUMMARY

-Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q When using Feedwater as an injection source to the RPV what guidanc.e is there for maintaining hotwell level?

Q When using CD or CD/CB pumps for injection into the RPV, what is the shutoff head for these conditions?

Q When using CD/CB to inject to the RPV, what is used to throttle injection?

Q What could occur by running both CRD pumps with a suction from the CY tank and the scram not reset?

Q When would the HPCS Level 8 interlocked be defeated?

Q What are some of the decisions that must be addressed before Fire Protection is lined up to inject theRPV?

LP87594-02 Page 42 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q What important consideration must be made to line up SLC Test Tank to inject to the RPV?

E. CPS 4411.04, THROTTLING ECCS FLOW .1.8

1. ENTRY CONDITIONS EOP-1 Level Control Leg EOP-2 RPV Flooding This procedure provides instructions for defeating the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection valves' seal-in open/close circuits, thereby allowing the valves to be throttled from MCR.

2. OPERATOR ACTIONS

a. Special Equipment/Tools Required

b. Instructions for defeating Seal-in Logic.

1) Place breaker in OFF.

2) Open breaker front and side doors as necessary to access terminal boards.

3) CUT specified jumpers near each terminal lug, and remove the excess wire.

Unique cutting directions are provided for 1E22-F004, HPCS PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE, step 2.2.1.

4) Shut breaker doors.

5) Place breaker in ON.

6) Notify MCR that valve may now be throttled.

C. HPCS Pump Discharge Valve, 1E22-F004. - Unique and different from rest of the valves.

d. LPCS Injection Shutoff Valve, 1E21-F005.

J LP87594-02 Page 43 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

e. RHR Pump lA LPCI Injection Spray Valve, 1E12-F042A.

f. RHI\ Pump lB LPCI Injection Spray, 1E12-F042B.

g. RHR Pump lC LPCI Injection Spray, 1E12-F042C.

INTERIM

SUMMARY

-Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q When throttling with ECCS equipment, what does the light on the valve going out mean?

Q What valves can be throttled by performing 4411.04, Throttling ECCS Flow?

LP87594-02 Page 44 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes F. CPS 4411.05, HIGH CONTAINMENT POOL LEVEL .1.9 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

1. ENTRY CONDITIONS EOP-6 Primary Containment Control - Pool Level High

2. OPERATOR ACTIONS Discuss equipment to be secured prior to containment water level reaching;

a. Table 1: CNMT Level 23 '9" DW Clg Fan, lVPOlCA DW ClgFan, lVPOlCB DW Equip Drain Sump Pump DW Floor Drain Sump Pump

b. Table 2: CNMT Level 25' CNMT Equip Drain Sump Pumps CNMT Floor Drain Sump Pumps TIP Drive Mechanisms C. Table 3: CNMT Level 40' CGCS Hydrogen Recombiner 1 and shut its containment isolation valves lHGOOl & 4.

d. Table 4: CNMT Level 43' Rod Gang Drive Cabinet RRHPUs Open 1B21-F0l6, MS Dm & MSIV Byp Inbd Isol Valve All RPS Scram Solenoid Breakers CNMT Bldg Mezz Fir Air Hdlg Unit Fans LP87594-02 Page 45 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

e. Table 5: CNMT Level 50' Secure CGCS Hydrogen Recombiner 2 and shut its containment isolation valves 1HG005 & 8.

f. Table 6: CNMT Level 66' Fission Product Monitor

. DW Cooling Fans (6)

SLC Pumps (2)

RWCUFilter/Demin Holding Pumps CNM1: Bldg Above Mezz Fir Air Hdlg Unit Fns Comb Gas Control Sys Supply Fan INTERIM

SUMMARY

- Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q What components are secured at 23'9"?

Q As water level rises, when are the components required to be deenergized?

Q What equipment is de-energized at 40', action taken and why?

LP87594-02 Page 46 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes G. CPS 4411.06, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING, PURGING, AND VACUUM RELIEF

1. ENTRY CONDITIONS EOP-6 DW/Containment Pressure Leg, Figure N exceeded.

2. OPERATOR ACTIONS

a. Advantages/Disadvantages of Vent and Purge Path, Table A.

Review the Entry Conditions and its associated decision making Chart, *1.0 to 2.1.3.

1) Which flowpath is chosen will depend on the plant conditions at the time venting must be performed.

Variables/questions include, but are not limited to:

a) Is CNMT venting of a priority that it justifies abandoning core cooling?

The EOP/SAGs give clear direction on this variable.

b) Is the condenser available?

CNMT venting may have to be performed at a rate that exceeds the vacuum pumps' capacity which would result in condenser over pressurization.

In this case, throttling of the path to the condenser while lin'irtg up a second flowpath not to the condenser would be proper.

C) Can radioactivity release rates be minimized?

The limit envelopes are large enough such that immediate venting actions are not always necessary or prudent.

The ERO should make recommendations on when to vent based on the event conditions, weather conditions, and risk to plant personnel and the public.

LP87594-02 Page 47 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes d) For lineups requiring local valve operations, can the area,s be accessed in a timely manner, safely?

If not, another path must be chosen.

2) Once successfully venting, the amount vented should be minimized, if possible, to limit radioactivity releases and to prevent CNMT pressure from going negative due to temperature dropping or other reasons.

3) There are fewer CNMT vacuum reliefflowpath options than venting flowpaths due to the existence of check valves and water seals in the venting paths.

The path chosen will depend upon plant conditions

. and resources available.

Review each section's Advantages/Disadvantages as each section is reviewed.

Use a copy of 4411.06 and move into the associated portion of the text.

b. Vent Using Hydrogen Purge Supply Path, section 2.2. .1.10.1

c. Vent to Condenser Using FC Return Header, section 2.3. .1.10.2

d. Vent To Condenser using RHR CNMT Spray Spargers, .1.10.3 section 2.4

e. Vent to Spent Fuel Pool Using FC Return Header, .1.10.4 section 2.5.

Approximately 20 psig differential pressure is required to relieve through this path.

f. Vent to/spent Fuel Pool Using RHR A CNMT Spray .1.10.5 Sparger, section 2.6.

Approximately 20 psig differential pressure is required to relieve through this path.

g. Vent Using CCP Supply Path Modification, section 2.7. .1.10.6

h. CNMT Hydrogen Purge, section 2.8. .1.10.7 LP87594-02 Page 48 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

1. Recovery- Isolating Vent Paths, section 2.9. .1.10.8 Review the recovery chart for actions -and cautions.

Review the isolation vent paths of 2.9.

Each lineup vent is secured but the lineup is not restored to normal. With the extensive portion of a vent path's lineup completed the vent can be re-used if 4411.06 is re-entered or if vacuum relief is needed.

J. ** CNMT Vacuum Relief, section 2.10. .1.10.9 Review 2.10 for containment vacuum relief actions CNMT ultimate strength pressure is -11 psig. MCR indications lower range is -5 psig.

INTERIM

SUMMARY

- Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q Before initiating a vent path, who must be

notified?

Q State the methods. that can be used to vent the containment.

r LP87594-02 Page 49 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q Describe the operating strategy that will prevent exceeding the ultimate containment strength pressure during venting operations when MCR recorders read to-5 psig?

Q When venting to the main condenser why is it necessary to control the vent rate to the condenser?

Q Which vent paths conflict with core cooling?

Q Which vent paths are filtered prior to release?

LP87594-02 Page 50 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes H. CPS 4411.08, ALTERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION

1. This procedure .is entered when directed by the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) or CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram, and is used for initiating alternate control rod insertion methods.

2. OPERATORACTIONS '

a. Guidelines Initiate methogs based on potential success.

RETRY, methods as plant conditio*ns change ..

REPEAT, methods until all rods are full in or cannot be moved inward.

When directed from CPS 4100.01, Reactor Scram, the ATWS Interlocks listed in CPS 4410.0()C012 shall not be defeated.

b. Manual Scram .1.11.1 LP87594-02 Page 51 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

c. Manual ARI Initiation .1.11.2

d. RPS Scram Solenoids . .1.11.3

e. Manual Control Rod Insertion .1.11.4 LP87594-02 Page 52 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

f. Individual Rod Scram .1.11.5

g. Venting CRD Withdrawal Lines .1.11.6 LP87594-02 Page 53 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes INTERIM

SUMMARY

-Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q Why is IA restored to the containment to assist with; Resetting RPS?

Reset ARI?

Manual Control Rod Insertion?

Individual Rod Scram?

LP87594-02 Page 54 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q How long a wait is required for resetting ARI system?

Q When venting CRD withdrawal lines, where is the water being vented to?

Q If all the breakers in the both NSPS 120 VAC Solenoid Power distribution panels are turned off instead of just the ones for rod insertion, what would be the impact?

Q What is isolated when 1Cl 1-F034, Charging Water Header Isolation is closed?

LP87594-02 Page 55 ~f77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes I. CPS 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES

1. This procedure is entered when directed by the EOP/SAGs, and provides appropriate instructions for utilization of available RPV pressure control sources.

EOP-1 EOP-lA EOP-2 2~ SYSTEM SELECTION

3. Pressure Control Strategies/Concerns LP87594-02 Page 56 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

4. Normal MCR System Lineup/Operation

a. Main Steam - Condenser/Bypass Valves/MSL Drains .1.12.1 Re-open the MSIVs Bypass Valve operation MSL drain operation 1.

2.

LP87594-02 Page 57 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. SRVs (Hard Card)

c. RFPTs .1.12.2 LP87594-02 Page 58 of77 *

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

d. Shutdown Cooling .1.12.3

e. HEADVENT .1.12.4

5. ABNORMAL SYSTEM LINEUP/OPERATION

a. RCIC .1.12.5 LP87594-02 Page 59 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

b. RCIC Steam Line .1.12.6

c. RWCU (recirculation mode) .1.12.7

d. RWCU (reject mode)-To the Main Condenser .1.12.8

e. RWCU (reject mode)-To the Waste Surge Tank .1.12.9 LP87594-02 Page 60 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

6. DISCUSSION

a. STABILIZATION

b. DEPRESSURIZATION Q What is the quickest way to open the bypass valves?

Q What are reasons for lowering RPV pressure early?

LP87594-02 Page 61 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes J. CPS 4411.10, SLC OPERATIONS

1. This procedure is entered when directed by the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), and is used for shutting down the reactor by injecting boron via the SLC system or via a mixed boron solution in the RCIC storage tank utilizing HPCS or RCIC injection.

2. OPERATOR ACTIONS Inject boron using SLC system, or if SLC system is not available, using alternate boron injections.

a. SLC INITIATION [HARD CARD] .1.13.1

b. ALTERNATE BORON INJECTION .1.13.2

c. Recirculating RCIC Storage Tank using HPCS (Preferred method)

d. Recirculating RCIC Storage Tank using RCIC (Alternate method)

e. Injecting Boron Solution using HPCS (Preferred method) .1.13.3

f. Injecting Boron Solution using RCIC (Alternate method)

3. DISCUSSION REQUIRED EQUIPMENT LP87594-02 Page_ 62 of 77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes INTERIM

SUMMARY

- Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q When the SLC pumps start what action is required?

Q If a loss of IA to the containment occurs how is SLC tank level maintained above pump suction if it was started due to an A TWS condition?

Q How does the operator verify that SLC is injecting to the RPV?

Q When are the mixing heaters and the operating heaters deenergized for SLC operations?

Q What support is needed to add chemicals to the RCIC tank?

Q If using RCIC or HPCS to inject boron into the vessel what precaut_ions_must be adhered to?

LP87594-02 Page 63 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q When is SLC injection stopped?

Q Why are the RCIC storage tank heaters energized by setting the controller to 95°F?

LP87594-02 Page 64 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q What happens to the temperature when borax and boric acid are combined?.

LP87594-02 Page 65 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

K. CPS 4411.11, HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATIONS (Hard Card)

In 1979, an accident occurred at Three Mile Island which resulted in reactor water level dropping to below the top of active fuel. When this occurred, Hydrogen was generated due to high cladding temperature, thus causing a Zirconium-water chemical reaction. The Hydrogen generated with a subsequent release to the Containment resulted in a Containment Hydrogen concentration of greater than 8%. This concentration later under went Hydrogen deflagation resulting in a Containment pressure of 26 psig and equipment damage due to high temperature/fire.

The purpose of this training is to provide training on the CPS

4411.11, HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION.

To prevent a similar event at CPS, the hydrogen control systems are placed in service to monitor and control hydrogen concentration in both the drywell and containment. Improper or application failure to use the hydrogen control systems may result in the loss of the integrity of the containment.

1. When directed by the EOP/SrA.Gs:

Provides guidance for the operation of the H2/02 monitors and the containment combustible gas control system (CGCS).

2. OPERATOR ACTIONS

a. H2/02 Monitors .1.14.1

b. Hydrogen Igniters .1.14.2 C. DW/CNMT Mixing Compressors .1.14.3

d. Hydrogen Recombiners - Startup from MCR .1.14.4

e. Hydrogen Recombiners - Startup from Local Control .1.14.6 Panel

f. Hydrogen Recombiners - Shutdown Emergency .1.14.5 (EOP directed)

LP87594-02 Page66 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes INTERIM

SUMMARY

CPS No. 4411.11, is entered when directed by EOP-6, "Primary Containment". This procedure is used to align the appropriate systems to monitor/control Hydrogen concentration in both the Drywell and Containment.

Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q During an accident condition, how is Hydrogen generated?

I Q When will the H2/02 monitors isolate?

LP87594-02 Page 67 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q How long does it take to warm up a Hydrogen/Oxygen monitor?

Q What is the minimum hydrogen concentration that can be detected by the hydrogen/oxygen monitors.

Q How long does it take to warm up hydrogen igniters? -

Q What is the maximum Containment pressure that a Hydrogen recombiner can be operated at?

LP87594-02 Page 68 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes Q How long does it take for a Hydrogen recombiner to reach the normal operating temperature of 1325°F?

LP87594-02 Page 69 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes L. CPS 4412.00, CHEMISTRY SAMPLING .1.15

1. Provide specific guidance for performing and documenting of liquid and gaseous sampling when directed by EOPs.

2. DISCUSSION/DEFINITIONS

3. CPS 4412.00COOl, SAMPLING CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL FOR HYDROGEN

4. CPS 4412.00C002, SAMPLING CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PRIOR TO VENTING LP87594-02 Page 70 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes INTERIM

SUMMARY

-Ask questions to assess student achievement of objectives/knowledge.

Q During performance of CPS No. 4412.00, CHEMISTRY SAMPLING, what actions should be taken if normal sampling methods are not available?

Q Following a transient, if both MCR H2 Monitors do not. work, what conditions are needed to consider Drywell and Containment H2 levels known?

Q What are two challenges when using an alternate sample method for Drywell and Containment H2 Sampling?

Q Following sampling of Primary CT atmosphere, results show that Dose Equivalent I-131 is 4.1 E-03 µCi/cc. Can Containment venting be performed?

LP87594-02 Page 71 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes LP87594-02 Page 72 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes IV. OPEX A. An invalid Rx vessel water level event led to the following:

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuations: Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Actuation, also, a Condition Prohibited by Tech Specs and a Loss of Safety Function occurred du~fog the event.

The cause of the invalid reactor water level was the failure of the packing gland follower on the variable leg root valve that resulted in the depressurization of the variable leg to various instruments. As a result, the reactor scram signal could not be reset to allow the RPS logic and the secondary containment isolation signal to be reset and allow the standby gas treatment system to be secured and restore normal ventilation to the secondary containment.

With normal ventilation to the secondary containment shutdown, secondary containment temperatures began to increase. The EOP directed the crew to enter a supplemental procedure, which directed overriding the low reactor water level and high drywell pressure initiation signals to standby gas treatment and

secondary containment isolation valves. Once the initiation signals were overridden, the procedure directed the crew to secure the standby gas treatment fans and restore reactor building ventilation to its normal configuration.

With the plant in hot shutdown (mode 3), technical specifications require two standby gas treatment subsystems to be operable.

With the initiation signal for high drywell pressure and low reactor water level overridden, the plant did not have two standby gas treatment trains operable as required by technical specification for mode 3. This placed the unit in LCO 3.0.3.

Entry into LCO 3.0.3 constitutes placing the unit in a condition prohibited by technical specifications. ,

This event is NOTEWORTHY because an equipment failure resulted in a reactor SCRAM and due to this event, secondary containment temperatures increased requiring entry into an EOP that required actions that placed the unit in a condition prohibited by technical specifications.

Each checklist that overrides interlock will in some way result in inoperability. Technical Specification requirements will eventually need to be addres~ed.

LP87594-02 Page 73 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes V. Conclusion/Lesson Summal'.'Y A. The goals:

Covered all the 4410.00 checklist procedures Recognize procedure usage requirements Importance of carefully documenting what actions have been performed LCO required actions upon plant stabilization Recognize procedure hierarchy Review of isolations and interlocks defeated in an emergency Overview of procedure guidance Recognize that the following are also EOP support procedures

a. ECCS

b. RCIC

c. SRVs Discussed SRO/RO and qualified IM technicians are the only ones authorized to perform MCR actions in 441 O.OOCX:XX procedures.

QS relay is authorized to be removed supporting EOP IA activities.

EOPs provide instructions to:

a. Defeat trip logic.

b. Defeat isolation logic.

c. Defeat auto-start logic.

d. Alignment and operation of alternate systems/methods for injecting water into RPV.

e. Alignment and operation of alternate systems/methods*

for depressurizing the RPV.

LP87594-02 Page 74 of77

Content/Skills Activities/Notes

f. Alignment and operation of an alternate boron injection method.'

g. Venting containment directly to atmosphere.

Electrical Safety requirements Hardcard and when allowed to be used Procedure placekeeping All actions self checked, peer check not required Procedure guidance, notes & cautions for:

a. Termination and prevention of injection

b. Injection/Flooding sources

c. Making ECCS systems throttleable

d.

Protective actions on High Containment pool levels

e. Emergency Containment Venting, purging and vacuum relief

f. Alternate control rod insertion

g. RPV pressure control sources

h. SLC injection

i. Hydrogen control system operation J. Chemistry sampling B. Review the objectives.

LP87594-02 Page 75 of77

List of Attachments Attachments None Figures None LP87594-02 Page 76 of77

Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-01 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL USING BYPASS VALVES REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: ------------'C=a=-r=--=IL=e=ac=-h,...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: --------=D=an=ie=l-=S"'"'"no=o=k'---'-'/S=-/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: - - - - - - - - ~ N = / A ~ - - - - - - - - - - - -

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: NIA Minor Revision DLS /S/ / 02/21/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to introduce ILT Students to EOP-1, RPV Control.

2. This is a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3. Risk Conditions do not change.

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator.

5. Scenario initial conditions (to include initial plant Risk level). Full power, middle of core life, no equipment out of service with Risk Conditior:is Green.

6. Turnover Information:

a. The unit is operating at rated power, middle. of core life. There is no equipment out of service and no LCOs in effect. The online risk level is GREEN.

7. Event narratives

a. The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life. There is no equipment out of service and no LCOs in effect. The online risk level is GREEN.

b. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, following a turbine trip with no additional equipment failure, using normal pressure and level control sources and normal system operation.

c. A main turbine trip occurs from full power and initiates a reactor scram. The turbine bypass valves operate normally and control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure initially increases when the turbine trips, then approaches the EHC pressure set value following the scram and as decay heat is removed.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions.

e. The crew verifies normal RPV pressure control with turbine bypass valves and RPV level control with

. Feedwater. The crew then begins normal RPV depressurization and establishes a cool-down rate of

<100°F/hr.

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls. None

9. EAL/PAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation). None

10. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions should be included as they have occurred. None SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

11. Scenario termination criteria: The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level are being controlled within the designated bands and the crew has established normal RPV cooldown conditions, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor

12. Approximate Scenario Runtime.30 minutes, then students and have each SRO candidate be CRS for this scenario.

13. Related OPEX : See Attachment 1.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.1 l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE87551, Scenario 1.

01 Revised to update task links per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Revised to update tasks for updated task list. Rebuilt booth actions for Simulator Guide. Added standard turnover sheet.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor revision.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 5 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

CPS 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CPS 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES

CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM'

2. CPS 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Managem_ent.

Page 6 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Training Scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

- Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation (< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OBEs), an exam set typically .

consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE). An QBE may have as few c!_S zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT

Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (OBE).

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Pa.ge 7 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective #. Position Requirement Met From the Main Control Room respond to a turbine trip at power 410001.01 CRS in accordance with CPS 4101.01, REACTOR SCRAM ARO BRO From the Main Control Room and given entry condition into 440101.01 CRS EOP-1, control RPV power, pressure and level in accordance 440101.02 with EOP-1 100509.03 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 From the Main Control Room and given entry conditions in 441103.01 CRS EOP-1 enter EOP-1 and control RPV level in accordance with 441103.09 CPS 4411.03 440101.03 ARO From the Main Control Room, given CPS 4411.09, EOP RPV 441109.01 CRS PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES, perform RPV Pressure Control using Normal System Lineup/Operation in accordance BRO with CPS 441109.01.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES The IL T Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping-OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover- OP-AA-112-101 Clearance & Tagging.-OP-AA-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-Assessment/Continuous Improvement- LS-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence - HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness- OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety - SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management-WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101 Security - SY-AA-101-130 Regulatory Compliance- OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-AA-125 Radiological Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111 /112 Training and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 .

Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With. and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-01.

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-1.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: None

9. Equipment out of service: NONE

10. Non-standard paperwork required: NONE

11. Surveillances to provide: NONE

12. Flagging to be placed: NONE

13. Other: NONE SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL USING BYPASS VALVES INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Initialize to an IC at rated power, middle of core life. CREW:

Place the simulator in RUN. Cl Walks down panels and conducts a shift turnover.

Open and execute simulator lesson SE-EOP-1. ARO:

Provide the turnover sheet to the crew. Cl Completes Scram Choreography When the crew has taken the shift

Announces reactor scram TRIGGER Remote 1:

Announces EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/L low)

YP _XMFTB_4983, Turbine Trip - TRUE Cl Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions (410101.01)

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN

!* Verifies reactor power is lowering

- Verifies shutdown criteria are met

.. Controls RPV/L Level 3 (8.9 in.) to Level 8 (52 in.)

Verifies turbine and generator trip BRO:

Cl Completes Scram Choreography Cl Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, an~ performs immediate actions (41001.01)

Announces reactor scram

-

Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation

Verifies all control rods full in SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 15 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL USING BYPASS VALVES (Continued)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

o Completes Scram Choreography.

Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM.

o Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL and directs: (440101.01, 440101.02.

100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.04, 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07)

RPV/P control 800 - 1065 psig. (441109.01)

RPV/L Level 3 to Level 8 with FW (441103.01, 441103.09) o Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts.

The instructor should watch for band control. If a crew member goes out of band on a parameter, an out of band report should be made including what actions are being made to return to the assigned band. When the crew member returns the parameter to the assigned band, a report should ARO:

be made that the parameter is now in. band. o Controls RPV/P 800 - 1065 using turbine bypass valves. (441109.01) o Controls RPV/L L-3 to L-8 using CD/CB/FW. (441103.01 & 441103.09)

CRS:

o Directs establishing a cooldown rate of <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass

- valves in accordance with CPS 3006.01, UNIT SHUTDOWN.

When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being ARO:

controlled within the designated bands, place the simulator or upon o Begins normal cooldown at <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass valves.

direction of Floor ln.structor in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training has control". CRS:

o Declares the EAL Classification Facilitate a short crew self critique. Note any deficiencies for future None training. Also monitor for signs of improvement in the remaining scenarios.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 15 OPEX Power Reactor Event Number: 48673 Facility: GRAND GULF Notification Date: 01/14/2013 Region: 4 State: MS Notification Time: 22:04 [ET]

Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] Event Date: 01/14/2013 RX Type: [1] GE-6 Event Time: 18:05 [CST]

NRC Notified By: HARDY FARRIS Last Update Date: 01/14/2013 HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY Person (Organization):

10 CFR Section: MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO) 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL SCRAM Current Unit Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode PWR Current RX Mode 1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

- - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIB4TION***

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FROM 1000fo POWER DUE TO A TURBINE/GENERATOR TRIP "Actuation of RPS [Reactor Protection System] with reactor critical. The Reactor Scram occurred at 1805 [CST]

01/14/13 from 100% CTP [Core Thermal Power]. The cause of scram appears to be a Turbine Generator Trip.

"05-S-01-EP-2 RPV Control, Reactor Scram ONEP [Off Normal Event Procedure] 05-1-02-I-1, and Turbine and Generator Trips ONEP 05-1-02-1-2 were entered to mitigate the transient with all systems responding as designed. No loss of offsite or ESF power occurred. No ECCS initiation signals were reached and no ECCS or Diesel Generator initiation occurred.

"All control rods are fully inserted. MSIVs remained open and SRVs lifted and reseated as designed. Currently, reactor water level is being maintained by the Condensate and Feedwater system in the normal band and reactor pressure is being controlled via Main Turbine Bypass valves to the main condenser. There are no challenges to Primary or Secondary Containment at this time."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 of 15 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life.

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment: None

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect:None

6. Surveillances/ Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs Maintain Power(List here to include when planned to commence.)

8. Risk Level: Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram.

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.*

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l ll: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 15 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time

'fime of Management Notification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State &,Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRC Notification Time Expected Time for NRC Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-M-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 3D.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-01, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. I I I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

ExelonSM Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-02 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _C~a~rl~L~e=ac~h~-----------

REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: --------=Da=n=ie=-1-=S..:..:..no=o=k----=--=/S"'-/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: ---------"'-N""'"/A..____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: N/A Minor Revision DLS /S/ / 02/21/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train ILT Students on EOP-1, in particular alternate methods of RPV pressure control in accordance with CPS 4411.09.

2. This is a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3. If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario sho_uld have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. N/A *

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator.

5. Scenario initial conditions: The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life, with Bypass Valve EHC pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. No LCOs are in effect. The online risk level is GREEN

6. Turnover Information: The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life, with Bypass Valve EHC pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. No LCOs are in effect. The online risk level is GREEN.

7. Event narratives :

a. The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life, with Bypass Valve EHC pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. No LCOs are in effect. The online risk level is GREEN.

b. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, following a turbine trip with bypass valve failure, using alternate pressure control methods. Feedwater remains available to provide makeup to the reactor vessel.

c. A main turbine trip occurs from full power and initiates a reactor scram. The turbine bypass valves fail to open to control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure increases when the turbine trips and SRV(s) open to limit the reactor pressure rise. RCIC is operated to assist in RPV/P control and RPV makeup is from the MDRFP.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions.

e. The CRS enters CPS No. 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES, and directs crew actions to control RPV pressure using alternate pressure control methods (SRVs, RCIC, RFPTs, MSL Drains, and RWCU). The crew identifies failure of the turbine bypass valves to control RPV/P and performs actions as directed by the CRS to stabilize RPV/P using alternate pressure co_ntrol methods.

f. When the Main Turbine Bypass Valve EHC is returned to service, the crew establishes RPV/P control using Turbine BPVs. RCIC operation is no longer required for RPV/P control and is shut down. The crew then begins normal RPV depressurization and establishes a cool-down rate of <100°F/hr.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls. None.

9. EAUPAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation): None

10. If this is a training scenario and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required. None

11. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions should be included as they have. occurred. None

12. Scenario termination criteria; The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level is being controlled within the designated bands and the crew has established normal RPV cool down, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor.

13. Approximate Scenario Runtime.45 Minutes 14: Related OPEX: See Attachment 1 SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans .

.May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management

\

Page 4 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE87551, Scenario 2.

01 Revised to update task links per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Revised to include tasks from the updated tasks list. Added turnover sheet. Rebuilt simulator lesson.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.11 l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

, Page 5 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR.EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

2. CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL

3. CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 6 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Training Scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry 1

Abnormal events

)-

Major transients

l EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OB Es), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (OBE). An QBE may have as few as zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to .occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE).

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives*

Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, tfre trainE?e shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met From the Main Control Room perform RPV Pressure Control , 441109.02 CRS using Abnormal System Lineup/Operation in accordance with CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL ARO SOURCES From the Main Control Room, respond to a Reactor Pressure 440101.01 CRS Control Emergency, in accordance with CPS 4401.1, RPV '

Control. 440101.02 ARO 440101.03 100509.03 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 441109.03 From the Main Control Room, place RCIC in pressure control, ARO in accordance with CPS 4411.09.

BRO From the Main Control Room, place MSL Drains in pressure 441109.05 ARO control, in accordance with CPS 4411.09.

441109.07 From the Main Control Room, place SRVs in pressure control, ARO in accordance with CPS 4411.09, From the Main Control Room, place a RFPT in pressure 441109.06 ARO control, in accordance with CPS 4411.09.

From the Main Control Room, control RPV water level with 441103.09 ARO Feed water, in accordance with CPS 4411.03.

441103.01 From the Main Control Room, perform a Manual RCIC Initiation 331001.03 ARO with Logic Operable, in accordance with CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RI),

From the Main Control Room, manually operate a Safety Relief 310101.06 'ARO Valve in accordance with CPS No. 3101.01, MAIN STEAM (MS, IS & ADS).

From the Main Control Room, perform a Manual RCIC Startup 331001.05 ARO with Flow from Tank to Tank , in accordance with CPS No.

3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RI).

From the Main Control Room, perform RCIC System Shutdown 331001.06 ARO with Initiation Signal Clear in accordance with CPS No.

3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RI).

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES The ILT Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11.: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. -

Page 9 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following -human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping - OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover- OP-AA-112-101

'clearance & Tagging - OP-AA-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-Assessment/Continuous Improvement- LS-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence - HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness- OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001.

Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management-WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101 Security - SY-AA-101-130 Regulatory Compliance- OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-AA-125 Radiological Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111 /112 Training and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

I

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-02.

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-02.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: NONE

9. Equipment out of service: .NONE

10. Non-standard paperwork required: NONE

11. Surveillances to provide: NONE

12. Other: List here: NONE SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.*

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE lnitialize,to an IC at rated power, middle of core life. Crew:

Place the simulator in RUN. Q Walks down panels and conducts a shift turnover.

Open and execute simulator lesson SE-EOP-2. RO:

Provide the turnover sheet to the crew. Q Performs Scram Choreography (410001.01)

Reports reactor scram

Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/P high and/or RPV/L low as When the crew has taken the shift: applicable)

TRIGGER Remote 1:

Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions VP _XMFTB_4983, Turbine Trip - TRUE, 40-sec. TD

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN YP_XMFTB_4986, Loss of EHC Hydraulics (BPVs) - TRUE

- Verifies reactor power is lowering

- Verifies shutdown criteria are met

Controls RPV/L Level 3 (8.9 in.) to Level 8 (52 in.)

Verifies turbine and generator trip

Reports turbine bypass valves are not functioning BRO:

Q Performs Scram Choreography (410001.01)

Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

- Announces reactor scram

- Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation

!* Verifies all control rods full in SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

(

Page 12 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES (Continued)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

EOP direction is to stabilize RPV/P below 1065 psig. D Performs Scram Choreography (410001.01)

);>- Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions:

D Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL and directs: (440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07)

RPV/P control 800 - 1065 psig (441109.02)

'

RPV/L Level 3 to Level 8 with FW (441101.02, 440401.03 & 441103.09)

May direct RPV/L control -30" to +40" (target O" to 1O") in accordance wit~ CPS No. 4100.01, Reactor Scram D Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts D Enters CPS No. 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES, and directs actions to control RPV/P 800 - 1065 psig using alternate pressure control methods from any of the following:(441109.02)

The instructor should watch for band control. If a crew member goes out of band on a parameter, an out of band report should be made including

RCIC _in Tank to Tank (441109.03) what actions are being made to return to the assigned band. When the crew member returns the parameter to the assigned band, a report

SRV's (441109.07) should be made that the parameter is now in band.

MSL Drains (441109.05)

RFPT's (441109.06)

BRO:

D Controls RPV/P 800 -1065 using SRVs (in the preferred sequence)

(441109.07 & 310101.06)

D Places RCIC in service for RPV/P control as directed

~ Starts RI with flow tank to tank (441109.03, 331001.03, 331001.05)

Observe the RO's communications allow them to m*aintain positive control of RPV/L and RPV/P. ARO Verify the crew actuates the SRVs in*the preferred sequence. D Controls RPV/L L-3 to L-8 using CD/CB/FW (441101.01, 441103.09)

Observe the crew monitors and controls RPV/P to avoid uncontrolled overfeed to the RPV from the CD/CB system at RPV/P <650 psig SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for*life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department'for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES (Continued)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Restore Turbine Bypass EHC to operable CRS:

DELETE MALFUNCTION by triggering Remote 3: *o Directs controlling RPV/P using Turbine BPVs YP_XMFTB_4986, Loss of EHC Hydraulics ~ Prescribes RPV/P control band o Directs RCIC shutdown

a. Report as the FS, "The BPV EHC trouble has been repaired o Directs re-establishing RPV/L to normal band (if lowered previously) and the pump restarted."

ARO:

The instructor should watch for band control. If a crew member goes out of band on a parameter, an out of band report should be made including o Controls RPV/P within the prescribed band using Turbine BPVs what actions are being made to return to the assigned band. When the crew member returns the parameter to the assigned band, a report should be made that the parameter is now in band. BRO:

o Shuts down RCIC as directed in accordance with CPS No. 3310.01 (331001.06)

CRS:

o Directs establishing a cool down rate of <100°F/hr. using alternate pressure control methods When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being ARO:

controlled within the designated bands, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training has control". Direct CRS to make EAL o Begins normal cool down at <100°F/hr. using alternate pressure control declaration'. methods as directed '

Facilitate a short crew self critique. Note any deficiencies for future CRS:

training. Also monitor for signs of improvement in the remaining o Declares the EAL Classification: None scenarios.

Rotate students and re-run scenario to allow all to place various systems in pressure control.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.11 I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 of 16 OPEX Date: 19 Apr 1989 16:38:1.1 EST

Subject:

MAIN TURBINE BYPASS VALVES DRIFT OPEN DUE TO ERRATIC OPERATION OF BYPASS VALVE OPENING POTENTIOMETER UNIT: QUAD CITIES UNIT ONE DOC NO/LER NO: 50-254/89-003 EVENT DATE: 04/12/89 NSSS/A-E: GE/SARGENT & LUNDY RATING: 833 MWe DATE OF COMMERCIAL OPERATION: FEBRUARY 18, 1973 On 04/11/89 at 2321 hours0.0269 days 0.645 hours 0.00384 weeks 8.831405e-4 months with the unit at 750 MWe in the run mode, U1 bypass valves drifted open. Upon further investigation, the Instrument Maintenance Technicians found the 1000 ohm bypass valve opening bias pot (MD 711) to be very erratic and difficult to adjust for a .5 VDC bias to the bypass valve amplifier card.

The potentiometer was readjusted to give the correct voltage signal to the amplifier card, reclosing the bypass valves. The potentiometer was readjusted several times over the next 11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months as the bypass valves repeatedly drifted open.

At 1042 hours0.0121 days 0.289 hours 0.00172 weeks 3.96481e-4 months as the bypass valves continued to open, recirc flow was reduced and rods were inserted in an attempt to cause the bypass valve to close. At 1126 hours0.013 days 0.313 hours 0.00186 weeks 4.28443e-4 months , all 9 bypass valves were open, the reactor was at 75% power, while the generator load was 250 MWe. At 1136 hours0.0131 days 0.316 hours 0.00188 weeks 4.32248e-4 months , the unit was manually scrammed because all 9 bypass valves were open, control valves were slowly closing and reactor pressure was increasing.

It was later determined that the cause of the event was a failing operational amplifier (A-64) in the maximum combined flow limit circuit which is gated with the control valve signal causing* the control valves to slowly drift closed.

Quad Cities uses a GE EHC system and turbine.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.ll l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 16 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life.

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment: "A" Steam Bypass EHC Pump out of service for 2 days should be returned in 4 days.

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: None

6. Surveillances / Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs: None

8. Risk Level: Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram.

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

/

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.1 l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 16 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed

by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management Notification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRG Notification Time Expected Time for NRG Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-M-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 3D.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-02, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. ll l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-03 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES AND SRVS REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ ______;C=a=rlc..:L=e=ac=h=---------------

REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: -------=D=an=ie=-1-=S-'-'-no=o=k----'-'/S=-/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ , _ N = / A - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: N/A Minor Revision DLS /S/ / 02/21/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train the ILT Student on EOP-1 in particular controlling RPV pressure using alternate pressure control systems.

2. This is a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3. If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario should have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. N/A

\

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator.

5. Scenario initial conditions:

a. The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life, with BPV EHC pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. The online risk level is GREEN.

6. Turnover Information:

a. The unit is operating at rated power, middle of core life, with BPV EHC pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. The online risk level is GREEN.

7. Event narratives :

a. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, following a turbine'trip with bypass valve and SRV failure, using alternate pressure control methods. Feedwater remains available to provide makeup to the reactor vessel. *

b. A main turbine trip occurs from full power and initiates a reactor scram. The turbine bypass valves fail to open to control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure increases when the turbine trips and initially the crew controls RPV/P using SRVs. RCIC may also be started and used for pressure control. However, if RCIC injection occurs, the TDRFPs trip and makeup to the RPV is from the Motor Driven Feedwater pump.

c. When Div. 1 and Div. 2 125 VDC buses trip, the SRVs and RCIC become unavailable for RPV/P control.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions.

e. The crew identifies failure of the turbine bypass valves and SRVs to control RPV/P and performs actions as directed by the CRS to stabilize RPV/P using additional alternate pressure control methods.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.11 I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

f. 'The CRS enters CPS No. 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES, and directs crew actions to control RPV pressure using alternate pressure control methods (RFPTs, MSL Drains, and RWCU). RWCU system interlocks may be defeated in accordance with CPS No. 411 O.OOC005, DEFEATING RWCU INTERLOCKS, to allow use of the RWCU system for pressure control.

g. The crew begins normal RPV depressurization and establishes a cool-down rate of <100°F/hr.

The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level is being controlled within the designated bands and the crew has established normal RPV cooldown, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls: None

9. EAUPAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation). None

10. If this is a training scenario and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required. None

11. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions should be included as they have occurred. N/A

r

12. Scenario termination criteria:

The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level is being controlled within the designated bands and the crew has established normal RPV cooldown, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor

13. Approximate Scenario Runtime: 45 minutes

14. Related OPEX: See Attachment 1 SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE87551, Scenario 3.

01 Revised to update task links *per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Revised to include updated Tasks. Rebuilt simulator scenario file.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 5 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM . ,

CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamental~

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

2. . CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL

3. CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in depa£1ment for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 6 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OBEs), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE). An OBE may have as few as zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to* LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE).

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Given CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL 441109.01 CRS SOURCES, perform RPV Pressure Control Sources using Abnormal System Lineup/Operation (441109.02) ARO BRO Given CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL 441109.03 ARO SOURCES place RCIC in pressure control.

BRO Given CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL 310101.06 ARO SOURCES use SRV for pressure control 441109.07 BRO Given CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL 441109.06 ARO SOURCES place RFPT in pressure control BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.03 ARO COOLING (RI), perform a Manual RCIC Initiation with Logic Ooerable BRO Given CPS No. 4411.09, EOP RPV PRESSURE CONTROL 441109.05 ARO SOURCES place MSL Drains in pressure control.

BRO Given EOP-1 respond to a Reactor Pressure Vessel 440101.01 CRS emergency event. 4401109.04 441000.04 ARO 441000.06 100509.03 BRO 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 Control RPV water level in accordance with CPS 441103 while 441103.01 ARO in EOP-1.

441103.09 440101.03 SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy*+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS, and COMPETENCIES The ILT Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-BOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

CPS identified scenario dependent crew critical tas~s are in BOLD FACE.

1. Perform immediate operator actions on a reactor scram.

2. Verify shutdown criteria are met.

3. Use normal injection methods to control RPV/L in the designated band.

4. Use alternate RPV pressure control methods to control RPV/P in the designated band.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of ~TAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-M-102-102 Log Keeping-OP-M-111-101 Shift Turnover- OP-M-112-101 Clearance & Tagging - OP-M-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-M-101 Self-AssessmenUContinuous lmprovemer.it- LS-M-126 Teamwork - OP-M-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-M-1211 Procedural Adherence.:.. HU-M-104-101 Control Board Awareness - OP-M-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-M-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-M-101-111-1001 Reactivity Management - OP-M-300 Work Management-WC-M-101-, OU-M-101 Security- SY-M-101-130 Regulatory Compliance - OP-M-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-M-125 Radiological Safety- OP-M-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-M-101-111 /112 Training and Qualification OP-M-101-111 Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-M-10 Technical Human Performance HU-M-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-133 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-03

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-03.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: None

9. Equipment out of service: A _Bypass EHC Pump

10. Non-standard paperwork required: NONE

11. Surveillances to provide: NONE

12. Flagging to be placed: NONE

13. Other: NONE SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.U 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES AND SRVS INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Initialize to an IC at rated power, middle of core life. CREW:

Place the simulator in RUN. o Walks down panels and conducts a shift turnover.

Open and execute simulator lesson SE-EOP-03. ARO:

Provide the turnover sheet to the crew. o Performs Scram Choreography (410001.01) o Reports reactor scram o Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/P high and/or RPV/L low as applicable)

When the crew has taken the shift: o Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions TRIGGER Remote 1:

o Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN o Verifies reactor power is lowering YP_XMFTB_4983, Turbine Trip - TRUE, 40-sec. TD o Verifies shutdown criteria are met YP_XMFTB_4986, Loss of EHC Hydraulics (BPVs) - TRUE o Controls RPV/L Level 3 (8.9 in.) to Level 8 (52 in.) (441103.09, 441101.01) o Verifies turbine and generator trip o Reports turbine bypass valves are not functioning BRO:

o Performs Scram Choreography (410001.01) o Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions.

!* Announces reactor scram

!* Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation

!* Verifies all control rods full in SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES AND SRVS (Continued)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

EOP direction is to stabilize RPV/P below 1065 psig. CJ Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions (440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.06, 100509.07)

Observe the RO's communications allow them to maintain positive control Cl Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL and directs:

of RPV/L and RPV/P.

RPV/P control 800 - 1065 psig (441109.01)

RPV/L Level 3 to Level 8 with FW (441103.09)

Verify the crew actuates the SRVs in the preferred sequence. CJ Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts Cl Enters CPS No. 4411.09, RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SOURCES, and When the crew is controlling RPV/P using SRVs after the first SRV is directs actions to control RPV/P 800 - 1065 psig using alternate pressure cycled, or at the discretion of the Floor Instructor: control methods.

SRVs(441109.07)

TRIGGER MALFUNCTION (Remote 2):

May direct RCIC manually started (initiated) (441109.03)

YP_XMFTB_4041, 125 VDC Bus 1A Over current - TRUE YP_XMFTB_4042, 125 VDC Bus 1B Over current - TRUE

MSL Drains (441109.05)

Loss of 2 divisions of DC su_ggests some common mode failure

RFPT(441109.06)

BRO:

CJ Controls RPV/P 800 - 1065 using SRVs (in the preferred sequence)

(310101.06, 441109.07)

Cl Places RCIC in service for RPV/P control as directed (331001.03, 441109.03) ,

Cl Places MSL Drains in service for pressure control (441109.05)

CJ Reports 125 voe Bus 1A and 125 voe Bus 1B trip CJ Dispatches NLO to investigate 125 VDC Bus 1A and 1B trip CREW:

Recognizes SRVs and RCIC is no longer available for RPV/P control SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.1 l 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 17 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL WITHOUT BYPASS VALVES AND SRVS (Continued)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE If directed to defeat RWCU interlocks: CRS:

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE o May direct IMO to defeat RWCU Interlocks in accordance with CPS No.

4410.00C005, DEFEATING RWCU INTERLOCKS (441000.06)

YP_XREMT_737,EP105, RWCU Isolations - TRUE, 5-min. TD

a. After the time delay times out, report as IMO:

o Directs establishing a cool down rate of <100°F/hr. using alternate pressure control methods from the following systems if not previously used:

"The RWCU Interlocks in accordance with CPS No.

>,_ RFPT 4410.00COOS."

> RWCU The instructor should watch for band control. If a crew member goes

> Main Steam Line Drains out of band on a parameter, an out of band report should be made including what actions are being made to return to the assigned band:

When the crew member returns the parameter to the assigned band, a report should be made that the parameter is now in band_.

ARO:

Observe the crew monitors and controls RPV/P to avoid uncontrolled D Controls RPV/L L-3-to L-8 using CD/CB/FW (441103.09) overfeed to the RPV from the CD/CB system at RPV/P <650 psig _

o Begins normal cool down at <100°F/hr. using alternate pressure control Remind Crew SRV's will still open on Safety Function. methods as directed from:

Direct the CRS to declare the EAL classification. > RFPT (44110_9.06)

When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being > RT (441109.04) controlled within the designated bands, or at the discretion of the Floor Instructor, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training > Main Steam Line Drains has control".

Facilitate a short crew self critique. Note any deficiencies for future CRS:

training. Also monitor for signs of improvement in the remaining scenarios. D Declares the EAL Classification: None SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, 1

then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 of 17 OPEX Quad Cities Unit 1

1996-08-25 4:47 AM #161146 Bypass Valves Open Unexpectedly During HPCI and RCIC Testing and Result in Manual Reactor Scram Status: OE - No Equipment Involved - Event, Final Complete Last Updated: 1997-03-41:58 PM Significance: Noteworthy Event Abstract:*

Bypass Valves Open Unexpectedly During HPCI and RCIC Testing and Result in Manual Reactor Scram

Recommended for Review By:

Lessons Learned Summary:

Work Practices - Work Group Unspecified/ Unknown Training / Qualification - Control Room Operator Procedures a~d Documents - Control Room Operator Event Summary:

Bypass Valves Open Unexpectedly During HPCI and RCIC Testing and Result in Manual Reactor Scram On August 25, 1996, with Unit 1 operating in startup at 4 percent power, the turbine bypass valves automatically opened unexpectedly decreasing reactor pressure and increasing reactor level. With reactor level increasing toward a previously discussed level for manually scramming the reactor, the operators inserted a manual reactor scram. All plant equipment responded normally to the transient. The operators had stopped increasing power with reactor pressure indicating approximately 115 psig in order to conduct high pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling turbine overspeed testing. At the same time, the mechanical vacuum pump was operating to establish a' vacuum in the main condenser. The procedure for the overspeed tes-ting directed the EHC pressure regulator be set to control reactor pressure less than 150 psig. It was assumed that control below 150 psig (the low-end of the pressure regulator scale) was possible because the regulator had a motor stop below the scale (150 psig) but above 130 or 135 psig. Actually, control below 150 psig indicated was only possible because of calibration limitations (inaccuracies) at low pressure. Consequently, the operators set the EHC pressure regulator "below" 150 psig (ran it down to the low peg and held the lower control for several more seconds). At the same time, the actual reactor pressure was greater than 115 psig, *

as indicated (more so on one channel than the other). As a result, the pressure regulator was set to control less than reactor pressure and bypass valves opened when sufficient vacuum was established in the main condenser to* satisfy a bypass valve permissive. When bypass valves

. opened, reactor pressure decreased and reactor vessel level increased. In their pre-evolution briefing, the crew had discussed manually scramming the reactor if vessel level increased to 44 inches, and they took this action when plant conditions warranted.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.i26/3D.I I I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. *

. Page 15 of 17 OPEX (Continued)

The procedure assumed the EHC pressure regulator would control below 150 psig, and simulator training with the procedure reinforced that assumption. When some of the operators questioned why the procedure "worked," they were not told about the calibration inaccuracies. This event is NOT SIGNIFICANT. The operators were following an approved procedure and performing the test with the appropriate administrative controls. The event is NOTEWORTHY because the basis for

observed plant behavior was not understood by the operators nor by the majority of *station personnel involved with the test procedure or training on the test procedure.

Cause Summary:

Corrective Action Summary:

Event Type:

Operational Consequence - Scram or Plant Transient International Severity - 0. No Safety Significance Regulatory Reporting Consequence - Licensee Event Report (LER)

/

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 17 TURNOVER

1. Power, xenon and time in life: Full power middle, stable xenon, and middle of core life

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment:

a. BPV EHC Pump A OOS to replace the pump impeller.

b. RCIC suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool to support work on the RCIC Storage Tank suction piping. The online risk level is GREEN.

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: None

6. Surveillances / Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs: None

8. Risk Level: Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram.

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 17 of 17 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

/

Task Time Comments Time Conditio_n Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM J

Time Independent Peer Check of EAL ca11 *obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time

~

of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management Notification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration + 15 miri)

NRC Notification Time Expected Time for NRC Notification (Declaration+ 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, ,'

Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator) f

- Reference TQ-AA-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 3D.100 Destroy at option. /

SE-EOP-03, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.11 l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Exelon Generation Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-04 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL LOSS OF FEEDWATER WITH HIGH PRESSURE MAKEUP AVAILABLE REVISION 004 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _R~u~s~s~B~e=df~or~d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

REVIEWED / APPROVED BY: _ _ _ ___,D=a=-n=ie'-'--1-=-Sn=o=o""'"k-.:....::/S"-/----'-/__,0=6"-'/0=5-'-'/1'-'-4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: ------------'-'N=/A..,___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: N/A Minor Revision Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the;-Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 .

SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train ILT students on the use of EOP-1, in particular the level leg when Feedwater in not available for injections.

2. This is a TRAINING OR EVALUATION SCENARIO.

3. If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario should have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. N/A

4. If the scenario is used as a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is used as a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator.

5. Scenario initial conditions: Full power, middle of core life with no equipment out of service and Risk level is Green.

6. Turnover Information: Full power, middle of core life with no equipment out of service.

7. Event narratives:

a. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, following a loss of Feedwater, using normal pressure control methods and preferred injection systems (other than Feedwater).

b. The turbine bypass valves operate normally and control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure initially increases when the turbine trips, then approaches the EHC pressure set value following the scram and as decay heat is removed. * *

c. A simultaneous trip of all running Condensate pumps, resulting in a total loss of Feedwater and a reactor scram due to low RPV/L.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions.

e. The CRS directs crew actions in accordance with the LEVEL leg of EOP-1 to restore and control RPV/L using any of the available preferred injection systems. When RCIC is started, it trips. The crew has the RCIC Turbine Trip reset and then aligns RCIC for injection.

f. When RPV/L and RPV/P have been stabilized within the designated control bands the crew begins normal RPV depressurization and establishes a cool-down rate of <100°F/hr.

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls. None.

9. EAL/PAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation). None

10. If this is used as a training scenario and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required. None SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

'May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

11. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that exipting in the initial conditions should be included as they have occurred. None

12. Scenario termination criteria: The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level are being controlled within the designated bands. .

13. Approximate Scenario Runtime: 45 minutes

14. Related OPEX: See Attachment 1 SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE r_eplaces SE87551, Scenario 4.

01 Revised to up date task links per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

l.

02 Revised to add tasks. Rebuilt Simulator File. Removed the leak on the RCIC turbine to eliminate conflict with EOP-8, which the crew may not have been trained on yet. The focus for this scenario is EOP-1. Rebuilt the simulator file.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

004 Revised to allow use as an Evaluation scenario. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 5 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERANCE

CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM r

CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

2. CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l ll: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 6 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunction.s that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients I

EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV ~ontrol (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control*

(EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OBEs), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (OBE) or other evaluations. An OBE may have as few as zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE) or other evaluations.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Given CPS No. 3309.01, HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 330901.02 ARO (HPCS), perform Manual HPCS Initiation with Logic Operable BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.03 ARO COOLING (RI), perform a Manual RCIC Initiation with Logic Operable BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.09 ARO COOLING (RI), Redirect RCIC Flow to the RCIC Storage Tank BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.07 ARO COOLING (RI), perform RCIC System Shutdown with Initiation SiQnal Present (331001.07) BRO Given a loss of Feed water event control the RPV in 440101.01 CRS accordance with EOP-1 440101.02 ARO 440101.03 BRO 100509.03 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 Given a loss of Feed water and Condensate control RPV water 441103.01 CRS level in accordance with CPS 4411.03.

441103.11 ARO BRO Given and EOP-1 condition throttle ECCS flow in accordance 441104.01 CRS with CPS 4411.04 Given lowering RPV water level and entry into EOP-1 verify 100509.09 CRS automatic isolations.

Given lowering RPV water level and entry into EOP-1 verify 100509.10 ARO automatic ECCS Pump starts BRO SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES The ILT Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

CPS identified scenario dependent crew critical tasks are in BOLD FACE.

1. Perform immediate operator actions on a reactor scram.

2. Verify shutdown criteria are met.

3. Use preferred injection systems to control RPV/L in the designated band.

4. Use normal RPV pressure control methods to control RPV/P in the designated band.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS

operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping - OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover- OP-AA-112-101 Clearance & Tagging~ OP-AA-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-Assessment/Continuous Improvement - PI-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence- HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness- OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 .

Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management-WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101 Security-SY-AA-101-130 .

Regulatory Compliance- OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - PI-AA-125 Radiological Safety - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111/112 Training and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 lnto.lerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-04.

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-04.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation', start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: None

9. Equipment out of service: None

10. Non-standard paperwork required: None

11. Surveillances to provide: None

12. Flagging to be placed: None

13. Other: None SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LOSS OF FEEDWATER When the crew has taken the shift ARO:

TRIGGER MALFUNCTION: (Remote 1) to trip all Condensate Q Reports all CD pumps tripped, loss of all Feed water Pumps:

Q Reports RPV/L rapidly lowering YP_XMFTB_4068 1 -trips "A" CD Pump Q Inserts a manual scram, OR, reports reactor scram YP_XMFTB_4069 1- trips "B" CD Pump, Q Performs Scram Choreography YP_XMFTB_4070 1- trips "C" CD Pump Q Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/L low)

YP_XMFTB_4071 1- trips "D" CD Pump Q Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN

!* Verifies reactor power is lowering

!* Verifies shutdown criteria are met

!* Verifies turbine and generator trip BRO:

Q Performs Scram Choreography ,

Announces reactor scram

Verifies all control rods full in CRS:

Q Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions Q Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL:(440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07)

Directs ARO to control RPV/P 800 - 1065 psig using bypass valves

Enters CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES, and directs B RO to control RPV/L L3 to L8 using available preferred injection systems (RCIC/HPCS) (441103.01, 440101.03)

Q Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE CRS:

Watch for Crew's ability to maintain band control with RPV Water Level o Directs automatic isolations and ECCS pumps starts verified. (100509.09

& 100509.1 b)

ARO:

o Verifies turbine bypass valves are automatically controlling RPV/P 800 -

1065 psig When asked reset RCIC turbine trip TRIGGER REMOTE 2:

CRS:

YP-XMFTB_4960 0 o Directs HPCS made throttable in accordance with CPS 4411.04 and report, "The RCIC turbine has been reset." (441104.01)

If asked to throttle HPCS Injection valve TRIGGER FROM THE BRO:

PENDING PAGE:

o Attempts to manually start RCIC (331001.03) .and/or HPCS (330901.02)

VP_XREMT 755 HPCS injection valve throttlable and controls RPV/L L3 to L8 as directed If asked to bypass RD suction filters and cycle RD Pump discharge

Cycles HPCS Injection Valve to assist RCIC in level control and valve close and open TRIGGER FROM PENDING PAGE. controls level using RCIC

Recognizes RCIC trip and dispatches NLO to reset the trip

Redirects RI flow to the RI storage tank as necessary (331001.09) o Verifies automatic isolations and ECCS Pump starts (100509.09 &

100509.10)

CRS:

o Directs RD lined up for injection in accordance with CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES (441103.11) o Directs establishing a cool down rate of <100°F/hr. using o turbine bypass valves in accordance with EOP-1 o Directs establishing a cool down rate of <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass valves in accordance with EO SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.1 l 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 16 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE ARO:

o Begins normal cool down at <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass valves CRS:

When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being o Declares the EAL Classification: None controlled within the designated bands, or at the discretion of the Floor Instructor, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training has control".

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 .of 16 OPEX Diablo Canyon Unit 1 1990-02-20 5:30 AM #91063 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPING DUE TO UNKNOWN CAU$E Status: OE - No Equipment Involved - Event Final Complete Last Updated: 1995-10-02 9:35 AM Significance: Noteworthy Event .

Abstract:

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPING DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSE Recommended for Review By:

, Lessons Learned Summary:

Work Practices - l&C Maintenance Event Summary:

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPING DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSE BACKFIT EVENT

,oN FEBRUARY 20, 1990, AT 0530 PST, WITH UNIT 1 OPERATING AT 100 PERCENT POWER, PLANT OPERATORS INITIATED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER BOTH MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS ( MFPS) HAD TRIPPED. PLANT OPERATORS INITIATED ACTIONS PER PLANT PROCEDURES AND STABILIZED THE UNIT IN MODE 3 ( HOT STANDBY) AT 0600 PST. A DETAILED INVESTIGATION WAS PERFORMED USING INFORMATION FROM ALL EVENT RECORDERS AND INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL INVOLVED. THIS INVESTIGATION CONCLUDED THAT THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS ALL MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES TRIPPING SHUT WHICH CAUSED BOTH MFPS TO TRIP ON HIGH DISCHARGE PRESSURE. THE INVESTIGATION CONCLUDED THAT THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE VALVES TRIPPING CLOSED WAS EITHER A NON-REPEATABLE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM ( SSPS) CARD FAILURE OR AN INADEVERTENT ACTUATION CAUSED BY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ( l&C)

TECHNICIANS WORKING IN THE SSPS RACKS. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED EXTENSIVE TESTING AND INSPECTION OF THE SSPS TO DETERMINE THE ROOT CAUSE , REPLACEMENT OF THE TWO SUSP!=CT SSPS CARDS AND A CAUTIONARY TAILBOARD OF l&C TECHNICIANS REGARDING THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH SSPS TESTING.

A SSPS CARD FAILURE OR AN INADVERTENT ACTUATION CAUSED BY 18C TECHNICIANS CAUSE ALL MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES TRIPPING SHUT WHICH CAUSED BOTH MFPS TO TRIP.ON HIGH DISCHAGRE PRESSURE AND A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP INITIATED. THE FAILED CARD HAVE BEEN REPLACED AND THE 18C TECHNICIANS TRAINED.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004

~ SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 16 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life.

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment: None

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: None

6. Surveillances / Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs: None

8. Risk Level : Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram.

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

[Vlay be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 16 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management Notification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to E;:RO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRC Notification Time

~

Expected Time for NRC Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-AA-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 3D.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-04, Rev. 004 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-05 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL LOSS OF FEEDWATER WITH HIGH PRESSURE MAKEUP NOT AVAILABLE REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: ------------'C=a=r=--=IL=e=ac=h'-------------

REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: --------=D=an_,_,_ie=l-=S..:.:.no=o:..:..:k:........:..:/S"""/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED / APPROVED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______,_N=/A-'--------------

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: N/A Minor Revision DLS /S/ / 02/21/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life*of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train ILT Students on EOP-1 in particular controlling RPV water level with alternate injection systems. *

2. This is a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3. If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario should have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. .N/A

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator. *

5. Scenario initial conditions: Full power, middle of core life, with D CD pump out' of service and Risk Conditions are*

Green.

6. Turnover Information: Full power, D CD Pump out of service, Risk Conditions are Green.

7. Event narratives:

a. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, following a,loss of Feedwater, using normal pressure control methods and preferred injection systems to control RPV/L. *

b. A simultaneous trip of all running Condensate pumps, resulting in a total loss of Feedwater and a reactor scram due to low RPV/L. The operator may insert a manual scram before RPV/L reaches the scram setpoint. *

c. The turbine bypass valves operate normally and control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure initially increases when the turbine trips, then approaches the EHC pressure set value following the scram and as decay heat is removed.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. In performing the immediate scram actions the operator identifies and reports one control rod did not fully insert.

e. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions in accordance with the LEVEL leg of EOP-1 to restore and control RPV/L using any of the available preferred injection systems. Starting the standby CRD pump and opening the suction filter bypass valve maximize CRD injection.

f. When preferred injection systems are used, RCIC fails to automatically start and when manually started the RCIC turbine trips. The HPCS pump fails to automatically start. When it is manually started the pump uncouples. Attempts to manually initiate RCIC and HPCS should be performed before lowering RPV/L reaches to Level 2.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

g. After the crew maximizes CRD injection and injects with SLC the RCIC turbine trip is reset. The operator manually starts the RCIC. system. The HPCS injection valve breaker is reset and the operator cycles the injection valve as necessary to assist the RCIC and CRD systems in maintaining RPV/L within the designated band. *

h. When RPV/l and RPV/P have been stabilized within the designated control bands the crew begins normal RPV depressurization and establishes a cool-down rate of <100°F/hr.

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls: None

9. EAL/PAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation): None .

10. If this is a training scenario and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required: None

11. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions should be included as they have occurred. None

12. Scenario termination criteria: The scenario may be terminated when RPV pressure and level are being controlled withi_n the designated bands and the crew has established normal RPV cooldown conditions, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor.

13. Approximate Scenario Runtime: 45 minutes

14. Related OPEX: See Attachment 1 SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE8"7:551, Scenario 5.

01 Revised to update task links per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Revised to add new tasks. Rebuilt Simulator File.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 5 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERANCE

CPS No. 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

2. CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 6 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Scenarios Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercis.ed (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), .One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OB Es), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario ..

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE). An QBE may have as few as zero"(O) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (OBE).

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.02 ARO COOLING (RI), respond to RCIC System Automatic Initiation BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.03 ARO COOLING (RI), perform a Manual RCIC Initiation with Logic NOT Operable BRO Given CPS No. 3309.01, HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 330901.02 ARO (HPCS), perform Manual HPCS Initiation with Logic Operable BRO Given CPS No. 3310.01, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION 331001.08 ARO COOLING (RI), perform RCIC Restart with Initiation Signal Present (331001.08) BRO Given CPS No. 3309.01, HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 330901.03 ARO (HPCS), manually .initiate HPCS with Logic NOT Operable (330901.03) BRO Given a loss of Feed water event control the RPV in 440101.01 CRS accordance with EOP-1 440101.02 ARO 440101.03 BRO 441103.01 100509.03 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 100509.11 Given a loss of Feed water and Condensate control RPV water 441103.11 ARO level in accordance with CPS 4411.03 using CRD.

BRO Given and EOP-1 condition throttle ECCS flow in accordance 441104.01 CRS with CPS 4411.04 Given lowering RPV water level and.entry into EOP-1 verify 100509.09 CRS automatic isolations ARO BRO SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Given lowering RPV water level and entry into EOP-1 verify 100509.10 CRS automatic ECCS Pump starts ARO

]BRO Given lowering RPV water level and entry into EOP-1 verifies 100509.11 CRS automatic start of DGs.

BRO SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES The IL T Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the .

SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

CPS identified scenario dependent crew critical tasks are in BOLD FACE.

1.. Perform immediate operator actions on a reactor scram

2. Verify shutdown criteria are met

3. Use preferred injection systems to control RPV/L in the designated band*

4. Us~ normal RPV pressure control *methods to control RPV/P in th~ designated band SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126i3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Managemen't.

Page 10 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping - OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover- OP-AA-112-101 Clearance & Tagging- OP-AA-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-Assessment/Continuous Improvement - LS-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence - HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness - OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management-WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101 Security- SY-AA-101-130 Regulatory Compliance- OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-AA-125 Radiological Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111/112 Training and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-05

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-05

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: D Condensate Pump

9. Equipment out of service: D Condensate Pump

10. Non-standard paperwork required: None

11. Surveillances to provide: None

12. Flagging to be placed: None

13. Other: None SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SOURCES (FW, RI, HP)

INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE

- When the crew has taken the shift ARO: -

TRl~GER MALFUNCTION: (Remote 1): CJ Reports all CD pumps tripped, loss of all Feed water.

FW01A (8, C, D), Condensate Pump 1A, (8, C, D) Trip - TRUE CJ Repo,rts RPV/L rapidly lowering.

Rod 20-25 Stuck at Current Position Cl Inserts a manual scram, OR, reports reactor scram.

CJ Performs Scram Choreography

' CJ Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN

(

!* Verifies reactor power is lowering

t Verifies shutdown criteria are met

- *!* Report one control rod notfully inserted (rod ID and position)

- Verifies turbine and generator trip

!* Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/L low)

BRO:

CJ Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

Announces reactor scram

Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation and MDRFP may start CJ Confirms one control rod is not fully inserted (rod ID and position)

CRS:

CJ Enters CPS No. 4100.0.1, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions

Directs ARO to attempt to insert/scram the stuck control rod in accordance with CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM V

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 .

SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department fortwoyears, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

o Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL: (440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04,* 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07)

Directs ARO to control RPV/P usin_g bypass valves

Enters CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES, and directs B CRO to control RPV/L L3 to L8 using available preferred injection systems (RCIC and HPCS) (441103.01) 440101.03)

Directs crew to verify needed automatic actions o Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts CREW:

Ensure Crew maintains RPV Level in and given by CRS and reports o Verifies needed automatic actions anytime outside the band.

Isolations (100509.09)

ECCS Start (100509.10)

Diesel Generato_rs Start (100509.11) o Dispatches NLO to verify proper operation of the DGs ARO:

o Verifies turbine bypass valves are automatically controlling RPV/P <1065 psig (or as directed by the CRS) o Attempts to insert/scram the stuck control rod in accordance with CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, as directed SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. Maybe retained in department for two years, tl1en forwarded to Records Management. .

Page 14 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE

!* RI and HP should be initiated before RPV/L reaches L2 BRO:

!* HP Injection Valve fails when 1E22-F004 red status light comes on CJ Initiates HPCS and cycles Injection Valve to assist RCIC in level control and OR when its control switch is placed in OPEN. controls level using RCIC (330901.02)

This is a key RO action for level restoration!

Reports HPCS injection valve will not open

!* Observe BRO holds the RCIC initiation pushbutton depressed for 6

Dispatches NLO to investigate sec.

CJ Manually initiates RCIC (331001.03)

!* As_ the NLO report:

Holds RCIC Initiation Button depressed for 6 sec. until steam supply "The HPCS Pump appears to be uncoupled." valve starts open

!* RI Turbine trips when 1E51-F013 green status light extinguishes.

Reports RCIC turbine trip BRO:

!* As the NLO report: CJ Dispatches NLO to investigate RCIC turbine trip "The RCIC turbine mechanical over speed trip device is tripped." CJ If directed by CRS, directs NLO to reset the RCIC turbine trip

!* If directed to reset the RCIC turbine trip CJ If RCIC and HPCS are not manually initiated before RPV/L low L2, reports:

TRIGGER MALFUNCTION/REMOTE: (Remote 2):

RCIC failed to a.utomatically start (331001.02)

RI02, RCIC Turbine Trip - FALSE (DELETE)

HPCS pump failed to start RCIC Turbine Mechanical Reset - TRUE, 10-sec. TD *!* Manually starts HPCS.(330901.03) *

>- Report as the NLO: CJ Reports the injection valve (1 H22-F004) will not open "The RCIC Turbine trip is reset." CRS:

Directs maximizing CRD injection in accordance with CPS No. 4411.03, .

INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES (441103.11)

!* When directed to open the CRD Suction Filter Bypass valves BRO:

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE CJ Starts s~cond CRD pump (441103..11)

LC107, CRDH Suction Filters - TRUE

As time permits, dispatches NLO to verify proper operation of the CRD

>- As NLO report:

pump just started "The CRD Suction Filter Bypass valves are open."

CJ Directs NLO to open the CRD Suction Filter Bypass Valves SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 19 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

D Directs BRO to start RCIC after RCIC turbine is reset D May direct SLC injected to RPV

!* Observe the operator does not change the 600-gpm set point until BRO:

after RCIC flow stabilizes at 600 gpm.

D Starts RCIC as directed (331001.08)

- If IMO is directed to defeat RCIC Interlocks, CRS:

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE:

D May direct IMO to defeat RCIC Interlocks (if necessary) in accordance with EP107B, RCIC Isolations -TRUE, 5-min. TD CPS.No. 4410.00C001, DEFEAT RCIC INTERLOCKS

}- After time delay times out, report as IMO: D May direct IMO to defeat HPCS RPV high level isolation interlock in "RCIC isolation interlocks are defeated." accordance with CPS No. 4410.00C002, DEFEATING HPCS INTERLOCKS

- D May direct resetting the HPCS F004 valve breaker .

- If IMO is directed to defeat HPCS Interlocks, BRO:

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE:

D Directs the NLO to reset the HPCS F004 valve breaker EP109, High RPV Level HPCS Isolation -TRUE, 5-min. TD

}- After time delay times out, report as IMO:

"HPCS High RPV level interlock is defeated

!* If directed to couple the HPCS Pump DELETE MALFUNCTION for HPCS Pump uncoupled.

}- Report as the Maintenance: "HPCS Pump is coupled."

CRS:

D Directs using HPCS to aid in controlling Reactor level SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 19

. CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE BRO:

CJ Cycles HPGS Injection (F004) valve to assist in RPV level control and controls RPV level using RCIC and CRD CJ May direct making HPCS F004 valve throttlable. (441104.01)

CRS:

CJ Directs establishing a cool down rate of <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass valves in accordance pressure leg of EOP-1.

' ARO:

Begins normal cool down at <100°F/hr. using turbine bypass valves When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being controlled within the designated bands, or at the discretion of the Floor CRS:

Instructor, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training CJ Declares the EAL Classification: None has control".

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 17 of 19 OPEX Power Reactor Event Number: 48696 Facility: NINE MILE POINT Notification Date: 01/23/2013 Region: 1 State: NY Notification Time: 22:03 [ET]

Un it: [ ] [2] [ ] Event Date: 01/23/2013 RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 Event Time: 15:16 [EST]

NRC Notified By: MARK GREER Last Update Date: 01/23/2013 HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY Person (Organization):

10 CFR Section: MARC FERDAS (R 1DO) 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) -ACCIDENT MITIGATION SCRAM Initial Current Unit Code RXCRIT PWR Initial RX Mode PWR Current RX Mode 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

- - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION ***

CONCURRENT LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEMS CAPABILITY On 1/23/2013 at 1516 [EST], Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) had a failure of a Reactor B_uilding General Area temperature trip unit occur resulting in the closure of an isolation valve on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system steam supply line. Concurrent with this failure, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was inoperable for planned surveillance testing.

With both the RCIC and HPCS systems inoperable, NMP2 entered a Technical Specification Required Action to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . At 1550, the HPCS system was restored to OPERABLE. Based on the concurrent loss of the high pressure reactor makeup capability of these two systems, it was determined that the condition is reportable under section 50.72(b)(3)(v) as the following safety functions were impacted: (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; and (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

NMP2 remains in 'a stable condition at rated power. The offsite grid is stable with no restrictions or warnings in effect.

\

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 .

SRRS 3D.126/3D.l ll: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 18 of 19 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life:

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment: D CD Pump motor replacement expected back in service in 2 days

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: None

6. Surveillances / Jobs in progress: None *

7. Upcor;ning Jobs: None

8. Risk Level: Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram:

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 19 of 19 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management Nqtification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRG Notification Time Expected Time for NRG Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-AA-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 30.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-05, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records_ Management.

ExelonSM Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-06 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL LOSS OF ALL HIGH PRESS.URE MAKEUP REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: ~----------'C=-=a=rl'-"L=e=ac=-h,....__ _ _ _ _ _ _- ' - - - - - -

REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: ----~---=-Da=n=ie=l-=S""'"no=-=o=k'---'-'/S=-/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: - - - - - - - - ~ N = / A - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: N/A Minor Revision DLS ISi I 02/21/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A". ~

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of fnsurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be _retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 21 -,

CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train ILT students on the use of EOP-1 and EOP-3 for RPV level that goes below TAF and allows them to blow down and restore RPV level with low pressure ECCS Systems.

2. This is a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3. If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario should have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. N/A

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs.; Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the

initiator.

5. Scenario initial conditions (to include initial plant Risk level). Full power, no equipment out of service. Risk Conditions are Green

6. Turnover Information: .Full power, middle of core life, no equipment out of service With Risk Conditions Green.

7. Event nc:irratives:

a. This scenario aHows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, and EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION (BLOWDOWN), following a loss of all high pressure injection sources. Normal pressure control methods are used to control RPV/P. Preferred and alternate injection systems are used to control RPV/L.

b. The running CRD pump trips and, when attempted, the standby CRD pump cannot be started.

c. A simultaneous trip of all running Condensate pumps, resulting in a total loss of Feed water and a reactor scram due to low RPV/L. The operator may insert a manual scram before RPV/L reaches the scram set point.

d. The turbine bypass valves operate normally and control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure initially increases when the turbine trips, then approaches the EHC pr~ssure set value following the scram and as decay heat is removed.

e. The crew enters and performs the,actions of CPS 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM.

f. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions in accordance with EOP-1 to restore and control RPV/L using any of the available preferred injection systems. When preferred injection systems fail the CRS makes preparation to use alternate injection systems. *

g. RCIC fails to automatically start. When manually started the turbine trips and damage to the trip mechanism prevents resetting the turbine trip. HPCS automatically starts then trips due to breaker failure.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 _,

SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

h. The CRS directs aligning alternate injection systems to supply makeup to the RPV. The crew is unable to restore RPV/L and RPV/L drops below-162" (TAF). When RPV/L drops below TAF, the crew enters EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUIRZATION (SLOWDOWN).

i. When the RPV is depressurized injection from preferred and alternate injection systems restores RPV/L to the normal operating band. Two ADS Valves fail to open and the crew is forced to open two additional SRV's The scenario may be terminated when RPV blow down has been performed and RPV/L is restored to normal band, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor. *

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls: None

9. EAL/PAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation): None 1o: If this is a training scenario and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required. None

11. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions,should be included as they have occurred. None

12. Scenario termination criteria The scenario may be terminated when RPV blow down has been performed and RPV/L is restored to normal band, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor.

13. Approximate Scenario Runtime: 55 minutes

14. Related OPEX: See Attachment 1 SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.11 l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE87551, Scenario 6.

01 Revised to include update of tasks per TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Revised to add tasks. Rebuilt Scenario File, which removed the steam le'ak. Removed the alternate path Emergency Depressurization this was used for a new scenario.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management. '

Page 5 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

HU-AA-104-101, PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERANCE

CPS 1005.09, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) AND SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE (SAG) PROGRAM

CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV CONTROL

CPS 4407.01, EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION (SLOWDOWN)

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

2. CPS 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL

3. CPS 4407.01, EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION (SLOWDOWN)

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 6 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients

I EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

, Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), !=mergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3),. RPV Flooding (EOP-2), <;:>ne scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OBEs), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE). An QBE may have as few as zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation.(OBE).

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l I 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Given CPS 3312.01, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR), 331201.02 ARO respond to a LPCI Automatic Initiation BRO Given CPS 3313:01, LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (LPCS), 331301.01 ARO respond to an Automatic Initiation of the LPCS System (331301.01) BRO Given CPS 3101.01, MAIN STEAM (MS, IS & ADS), perfor,m a 310101.07 BRO manual ADS Initiation (310101.07)

Given CPS 4407.01, perform an Emergency RPV 440701.01 CRS Depressurization (440701.01)

ARO BRO Given CPS 3312.01, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR), 331201.05 ARO perform a LPCI Shutdown (3_31201.05)

BRO Given CPS 3313.01, LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (LPCS), 331301.04 ARO perform a LPCS Shutdown with Initiation Signal Clear (331301.04) BRO Respond to a Reactor Pressure Vessel Control Emergency in 440101.01 CRS accordance with EOP-1 440101.02 100509.03 ARO 100509.04 100509.05 BRO 100509.06 100509.07 100509.08 Given a condition with a failure of high pressure makeup 440101.03 CRS systems determine when to initiate RPV injections with Alternate Injection Systems in accordance with EOP-1.

Given a condition with a failure of high pressure makeup 440701.03 CRS systems and RPV water level going below Top of Active Fuel, 440701.06 perform non-ATWS Emergency Depressurization in ARO accordance with EOP-1 and EOP-3.

BRO Given a condition with a failure of high pressure makeup 441103.07 CRS systems, maximize injection to the RPV in accordance with 441103.01 EOP-1. ARO BRO Inject to the RPV with RHR in accordance with CPS 4411.03. 441103.12 AROP BRO Inject to the RPV with SLC in accordance with CPS 4411.03. 441103.13 ARO SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

_/

Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met Start Hydrogen lgniters in accordance with CPS 4411.11. 441111.02 BRO Start DW/CMT Mixing Compressors in accordance with CPS 441111.03 BRO 4411.11.

Given RPV water level lowering to TAF verifies automatic 100509.09 CRS actions and isolations in accordance with EOP-1. 100509.10 100509.11 ARO BRO SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES

.The ILT Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

CPS identified scenario dependent crew critical tasks are in BOLD FACE.

1. Perform immediate operator actions on a reactor scram.

2. Verify shutdown criteria are met.

3. Use preferred injection systems to restore RPV/L to the normal operating band

4. Use alternate injection systems to control RPV/L in the designated band.

5. Use normal RPV pressure control methods to control RPV/P in the designated band.

6. When RPV/L reaches TAF, enter EOP-3 and depressurize the RPV

\..

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping *

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping-OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover..:. OP-AA-112-101 Clearance & Tagging - OP-AA-109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-Assessment/Continuous Improvement- LS-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence- HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness - OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101~111-1001 Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management - WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101

( Security- SY-AA-101-130 Regulatory Compliance - OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-AA-125 Radiological Safety- OP-AA-101--111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111 /112 training _and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/lnterpr~t Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings, Understand Plant and System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards

Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel.

Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor s~ould review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 ,

SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR E~ERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-06.

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-06.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: NONE

9. Equipment out of service: NONE

10. Non-standard paperwork required: NONE

11. Surveillances to provide: NONE

12. Flagging to be placed: NONE

13. Other: NONE SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

14. LOSS OF ALL HIGH PRESSURE MAKEUP WITH A SMALL BREAK INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE When the crew has taken the shift BRO:

TRIGGER MALFUNCTION (Remote 1): o Reports CRD pump B trip LCOSB, CRD Pump 8 Trip - TRUE CRS:

Report as the NLO: o Directs BRO to start CRD pump A "When CRD pump A tried to start there was a puff of smoke from the. motor there is no fire. The motor is not running. There is no BRO:

indication of sustained fire at this time."

"CRD pump A breaker tripped on a ground fault."

o Dispatches NLO to prepare to start CRD pump A o Dispatches NLO to investigate cause of CRD pump 8 trip "When asked to investigate B RD Pump report the breaker tripped on over current." o Reports CRD pump A tripped when started and directs the NLO to investigate If asked to bypass CRD Suction Filters activate from the Pending Page:

LC107-True ARO:

IF asked to close and open A CRD Pump Discharge Valve o . Reports all CD pumps tripped, loss of all Feedwater ACTIVATE these actions from the Pending Page o Reports RPV/L rapidly lowering o Inserts a manual scram, OR, reports reactor scram ,

After the crew attempts to start A.CRD Pump, TRIGGER o Performs Scram Choreography MALFUNCTION: (Remote 1):

o Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions FW01A (B, C, D), Condensate Pump 1A, (8, C, D) Trip - TRUE

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN

!* Verifies reactor power is lowering

!* Verifies shutdown criteria are met

!* Verifies turbine and generator trip

!* Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/L low SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr.for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INS"'PRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe BRO performs immediate scram actions. BRO:

o Performs Scram Choreography o Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

- Announces reactor scram

- Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation

- Confirms all control rods are fully inserted CRS:

Observe CRS directs performance of scram actions and enters EOP-1 o Enters CPS 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions

- May direct a manual scram before RPV/L reaches scram setpoint D Enters EOP-1 RPV CONTROL: (440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07, 100509.08)

- Directs RPV/P control using bypass valves (prescribes pressure band)

- Enters CPS 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES, and directs BRO to control RPV/L L3 to L8 using available preferred injection systems (RCIC and HPCS)

- Directs crew to verify needed automatic actions (100509.09, 100509.10, 100509.11)

- Properly marks EOP-1 flowchart SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE RI and HP should be initiated before RPV/L reaches L2 ARO:

This is a key RO action for level restoration! o Verifies turbine bypass valves are automatically controlling RPV/P <1065 psig (or as directed by the CRS)

Observe BRO holds the RCIC initiation pushbutton depressed for 6 sec.

CREW:

As the NLO report:

o Verifies needed automatic actions "The breaker for the HPCS puinp is badly damaged. It looks like we had a small explosion in the breaker cubicle. We need the

Isolations (100509.09) ,

electricians to examine the breaker."

ECCS Start (100509.10)

As the NLO report:

Diesel Generators Start (100509.11)

"The RCIC turbine mechanical overspeed trip device is tripped."

!* Dispatches NLO to verify proper operation of the DGs If directed to reset the RCIC turbine trip BRO:

DO NOT DELETE MALFUNCTION RI02, RCIC Turbine Trip o Manually initiates HPCS

a. Report as the NLO

!* Reports HPCS pump tripped when started "The RCIC Turbine mechanical overspeed trip will not reset. There

!* Dispatches NLO to investigate has been some damage to the mechanism and it will not engage."

!* May contact EMD to investigate HPCS pump breaker o Manually initiates RCIC

!* Holds RCIC Initiation Button depressed for 6 sec. until steam supply valve starts open o Reports RCIC turbine trip ci'ispatches NLO to investigate RCIC turbine trip o If directed by CRS, directs NLO to reset the RCIC turbine trip o Reports RCIC turbine cannot be reset SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Attempts should have been made to manually initiate HP and RI before BRO:

RPV/L reached L2.

o If RCIC and HPCS are not manually initiated before RPV/L low L2, reports:

If not, place the simulator in FREEZE and discuss the event mitigation strategy. *:* RCIC turbine tripped

' OR *:* HPCS pump tripped when it started Discuss in scenario critique. CRS:

o Reviews Alternate Injection Systems, Detail E and directs starting SLC A and SLC B and injecting from the storage tank (440101.03) o Directs lgniters and Mixing Compressors Started o Reviews Alternate Injection Systems, Detail E and directs starting SLC A and SLC Band injecting from the storage tank (440101.03) o Directs lgniters and Mixing Compressors Started BRO:

o Starts SLC pumps A and B and injects from the storage tank (41103.13) o Starts lgniters (441111.02) o Starts Mixing Compressors (441111.03) o Reports RPV/L at L 1 and lowering CRS:

o Directs crew actions in response to RPV/L L1

!* Annunciator Response Procedures

!* Verify automatic actions occur

!* ADS inhibited SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe crew references procedures (Hard Cards) to verify isolations and CREW:

operation of LPCS and LPCI.

D Prioritizes response to annunciators J

D Verifies automatic actions

- Isolations

- Low pressure ECCS start (331201.02 & 331301.01)

CRS:

Observe CRS verifies all prerequisites for initiating blowdown D Frequently requests status of RPV/L D When RPV/L reaches TAF (-162 in.), enters EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION (SLOWDOWN) (440701.06 & 440701.Q6)

!* Verifies RPV/L at or below TAF

!* Directs containment evacuation\

- Verifies shutdown criteria are met *

!* Verifies Drywell pressure is below 1.68 psig

- Verifies SP/L above 8 feet Observe crew reports all parameters when requested by CRS *:*

CREW:

v D Enters EOP-3 and responds to CRS queries:

- Reports RPV/L and trend

!* Confirms shutdown criteria are met

!* Reports Drywell pressure <1.68 psig (and trend)

!* Reports SP/L CRS:

D Directs ADS initiated in accordance with CPS 3101.01 (331301.04)

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 17 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE BRO:

o Sounds alarm and announces containment evacuation o Initiates ADS in accordance with CPS 3101.01 or Hard Card (310101.07) o Confirms and reports 5 ADS valves are open CRS:

o Directs opening other SRVs until 7 SRVs are open BRO:

o Opens two other SRVs o Reports 7 SRVs are open

~ Opens two other SRVs o Reports 7 SRVs are open CRS:

If directed to defeat Shutdown Cooling interlocks: o Verifies 7 SRVs are open TRIGGER From the PENDING PAGE o Waits for Shutdown Cooling interlock to clear (EOP-3)

EP207, E12F008, F023, F053A Isolate - TRUE, 3-min. TD o Returns to EOP-1 OR *!* Directs maximizing injection with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems, in accordance with CPS 4411.03, EP208, E12F009, F053B Isolate - TRUE, 3-min. TD INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES (441103.07)

After the time delay times .out, report the task completed o May direct defeating Shutdown Cooling interlocks SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 18 of 21 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe operator references procedure (Hard Card). BRO:

o Maximizes injection using available preferred injection systems in accordance with CPS 4411.03 (441103.01)

!* LPCS

!* LPCI (441101.12)

!* RHR through Shutdown Cooling Make ECCS injection valves capable of being throttled as directed: CRS:

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE o When RPV/L is above -162 in., directs crew to restore and maintain RPV/L between L3 and L8 by throttling ECCS system per CPS 4411.04 EP201A, RHR A Injection Valve Seal In -TRUE, 10-min. TD CJ Directs low pressure ECCS injection valves made capable of being throttled EP201 B, RHR B Injection Valve Seal In - TRUE, 10-min. TD o Directs low pressure ECCS not needed to maintain RPV/L between L3 and EP201C, RHR C Injection Valve Seal In -TRUE, 10-min. TD L8 secured as RPV/L returns to normal EP201D, LPCS Injection Valve Seal In -TRUE, 10-min. TD After the time delay times out, report the task completed. BRO:

o Secures low pressure ECCS not needed to maintain RPV/L as directed (331201.05 & 331301.04)

Observe the crew restores and maintains RPV Water Level in band given by CRS. IF necessary take a snap shot before crew blows down and have each member of the crew restore and maintain RPV level CRS:

following Emergency Depressurization.

o Declares the EAL Classification: Site Area Emergency (FS1)

When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being.

controlled within the designated bands, or at the discretion of the Floor Instructor, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training has control".

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 .

SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 1 i': Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 19 of 21 OPEX Power Reactor Event Number: 48696 Facility: NINE MILE POINT Notification Date: 01/23/2013 Region: 1 State: NY , Notification Time: 22:03 [ET]

Un it: [ ] [2] [ ] Event Date: 01/23/2013 RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 Event Time: 15:16 [EST]

NRC Notified By: MARK GREER Last Update Date: 01/23/2013 HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY Person (Organization):

10 CFR Section: MARC FER DAS (R 1DO) 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO $AFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION SCRAM Initial Current Unit Code RXCRIT PWR Initial RX Mode PWR Current RX Mode 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

- - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION ***

CONCURRENT LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEMS CAPABILITY On 1/23/2013 at 1516 [EST], Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) had a failure of a Reactor Building General Area temperature trip unit occur resulting in the closure of an isolation valve on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system steam supply line. Concurrent with this failure, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was inoperable for planned surveillance testing.

With both the RCIC and HPCS systems inoperable, NMP2 entered a Technical Specification Required Action to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . At 1550, the HPCS system was restored to OPERABLE. Based on the concurrent loss of the high pressure reactor makeup capability of these two systems, it was determined that the condition is reportable under section

'50.72(b)(3)(v) as the following safety functions were impacted: (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; and (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

NMP2 remains in a stable condition at rated power. T~e offsite grid is stable with no restrictions or warnings in effect.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 20 of 21 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life

2. Status of Tagged Out Equipment: None

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: None

6. Surveillances/ Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs: None

8. Risk Level: Green

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 µcuries per gram.

10. Other: None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 21 of 21 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time to Declare (time of condJtion + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management Notification (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRG Notification Time Expected Time for NRG Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-AA-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 30.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-06, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Nuclear Clinton Power Station Licensed Operator Training Simulator Exercise Guide SE-EOP-07 EOP-1 RPV CONTROL LARGE BREAK LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT REVISION 003 REVISED/ DEVELOPED BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _C_a~rl_L~e=ac~h~-----------

REVIEWED / APPROVED BY: *-------=D=-=a=n=ie"--1S=n=o=o.,_,_k___,/=S"-/---'0=-=3"--'/0=-=6"-'/1=3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operations Training Manager REVIEWED/ APPROVED BY: ------------'-'N"""/A.,___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Emergency Planning (if required)

APPROVED BY: NIA Minor Revision DS / 03/06/13 Shift Operations Superintendent Date

Emergency Planning approval required if the scenario could be used for input to the Emergency Planning Performance Indicator. Otherwise mark "N/A".

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 2 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE

1. The purpose of this scenario is to train ILT students on EOP-1 with high pressure injection sources failing.

2. This a TRAINING SCENARIO.

3.

If a conditions changes such that it would be expected the crew would evaluate for a Risk Condition change, the scenario should have the necessary new risk level and protected equipment. N/A for ILT ~_cenarios

4. If the scenario is a training scenario it should contain the following:

If this is a training scenario, look for opportunities to emphasize the HU/THU Fundamentals. For example, during periods of heavy communications, freeze and question crew members on the content of communications, updates, or briefs. Emphasize the responsibility for the correct execution of the communication lies with the initiator.

5. . Scenario starts at full power with the following equipment out of service or tagged: Condensate Pump 1D, MSL D motor operated shutoff valve, and HPCS. Risk levels are Orange

6. Turnover Information: Full Power, middle of core life with the following tagged: 1D Condensate Pump, HPCS and D MSL Shutoff Valve (tagged open). Risk levels are orange.

7. Event narratives.:

a. The unit is operating at full power with Condensate Pump 1 D, MSL D motor operated shutoff valve, and the HPCS pump out of service. Ail LCO paperwork is completed. The online risk level is ORANGE.

b. This scenario allows the crew to perform EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, to control RPV/L following loss of CD/CB/FW and high pressure ECCS systems.

c. All Feedwater pumps trip and Main Steam Line D ruptures in the Turbine Building. The MSL D MSIVs fail to close and steam continues to be released into the Turbine Building.

d. The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No.

4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM. .

e. The CRS marks EOP Flow Charts and directs crew actions in accordance with the LEVEL leg of EOP-1 to restore and control RPV/L using any of the available preferred injection systems. Starting the standby CRD pump and opening the suction filter bypass valve maximize CRD injection. When RCIC is started the RCIC turbine trips.

f. A simultaneous trip of all running, Condensate pumps and Condensate Booster pumps occurs.

g. The turbine bypass valves operate to control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure continues to decrease as energy is released from the ruptured steam line. Reactor level continues to lower due to the inventory loss through the MSL rupture at a greater rate than makeup from the CRD system.

h. The low pressure ECCS pumps fail to automatically start. The operator manually starts LPCI and LPCS pumps and restores RPV/L to the normal band.

i. The scenario may be terminated when RPV/L is being controlled within the designated band and the crew has established normal RPV cool down conditions, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l I l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 3 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO OUTLINE (Continued)

The crew enters and performs the actions of CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL, and CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM.

8. Technical Specification/Reportability calls: None for this ~cenario other than the initial 3.5.1.

EAUPAR or any on-site protective action (such as site evacuation). N/A for ILT training scenarios.

9. If this is a training scena.rio and additional material is needed, detail what additional material will be required.None

10. Changes in equipment status or overall plant status which has changed plant Risk level from that existing in the initial conditions should be included as they have occurred. No~e

11. Scenario termination criteria:

The scenario may be terminated when RPV/L is being controlled within the designated band and the crew has established normal RPV cool down conditions, or, at the discretion of the Floor Instructor.

/

12. Approximate Scenario Runtime. 45 minutes

13. Related OPEX : See Attachement 1 SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: ~etain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 4 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN HISTORY PAGE REV. DESCRIPTION 00 Updated to new format. Incorporated Pen & Ink comments. Updated objectives and resolved missing Task to SE links. This SE replaces SE87551, Scenario 7.

01 Updated to include Tasks to satisfy TRACER 2004-05-0142A.

02 Added tasks. Rebuilt Simulator File.

003 Updated to latest template. Minor Revision.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l ll: Retain _approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 5 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REFERENCES

CPS No. 4100.02, CORE STABILITY CONTROL

CPS No.4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM

CPS No. 4008:01, ABNROMAL COOLANT FLOW

CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV Control

Technical Specifications

CM-1 CA 539389-11 Graph key parameters during validation

SOER 10-2, Engaged, Thinking, Organizations

SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals

IER L1-11-3, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. NONE.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwar~ed to Records Management.

Page 6 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE This section must be included if the scenario will be used as an EXAMINATION scenario. This section should be used for integrated plant type training scenarios. N/A for ILT Scenarios Quantitative Attributes Total malfunction inserted Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry Abnormal events Major transients EOPs used beyond primary response EOP (Note 1)

EOP contingency procedures used (Note 2)

Approximate scenario run time (Note 3)(Note 4)

EOP run time Crew critical tasks (Note 5)

Technical Specifications exercised (Yes or No)

Based on Low Power Operation(< 5%) (Yes or No)

Based on Dominant Accident Sequences (DAS) as determined by PRA/IPE Number of normal evolutions Note 1: Refers to BWROG top-level guideline EOPs, i.e., RPV Control (EOP-1), Primary Containment Control (EOP-6), Secondary Containment Control (EOP-8), and Radioactivity Release Control (EOP-9).

Note 2: Refers to BWROG EOP Contingencies i.e., ATWS RPV Control (EOP-1A), Emergency RPV Depressurization (EOP-3), RPV Flooding (EOP-2), One scenario of the set must use a contingency procedure.

Note 3: An exam set consists of two scenarios. For Out-of-the-Box Evaluations (OB Es), an exam set typically consists of only one scenario.

Note 4: Number of crew critical tasks required per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams.

There is no specific number of crew critical tasks required for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (QBE). An QBE may have as few as zero (0) crew critical tasks (typical for LORT Normal Operations scenarios) but otherwise will typically consist of 1 to 3 crew critical tasks.

Note 5: Number of malfunctions required after EOP entry per scenario or exam set applies only to LORT Annual Exams. There is no specific number of malfunctions which are required to occur after EOP entry for an Out-of-the-Box Evaluation (OBE).

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 7 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Simulator Performance Objectives Under simulated plant normal, abnormal and emergency conditions and in accordance with referenced plant procedures, the trainee shall:

Evolution Objective# Position Reauirement Met From the Main Control Room, perform Emergency Feed Using 310301.28 ARO CD/CB in accordance with CPS No. 3103.01 FEEDWATER (FW).

From the Main Control Room, perform a LPCI Manual Initiation 331201.04 ARO with Logic NOT Operable in accordance with CPS No. 3312.01, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL <RHR).

BRO From the Main Control Room, perform a Manual LPCS Initiation 331301.03 ARO with Logic NOT Operable (331301.03) in accordance with CPS No. 3313.01, LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (LPCS). BRO From the Main Control Room perform a manually ADS Initiation 310101.07 BRO in accordance with CPS No. 3101.01, MAIN STEAM (MS, IS &

ADS).

ARO From the Main Control Room, manually operate a Safety Relief 310101,06 ARO Valve in accordance with CPS No. 3101.01, MAIN STEAM (MS, IS & ADS).

From the Main Control Room, respond to a Reactor Pressure 440101.01 CRS Vessel Emergency RPV Depressurization (Slowdown) in '

accordance with CPS No. 4401.01, EOP-1 RPV CONTROL. 440101.02 ARO 100509.03 BRO 100509.04 100509.05 100509.06 100509.07 100509.08 From the Main Control Room Given CPS No. 3313.01, LOW 331301.05 ARO PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (LPCS), perform a LPCS Shutdown with Initiation SiQnal Present (331301.05)

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 8 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Evolution Objective# Position Requirement Met From the Main Control R,oom given RPV lowering water level, 441103.12 ARO and EOP-1 inject \/\(ith water to maintain level above TAF, in 441103.13 accordance with CPS 4411.03. 441111.02 441111.03 441103.07 441103.01 440701.06

"\

From the Main Control Room, given a condition requiring CRS emergency depressurization, emergency depressurizes the 440701.03 RPV in accordance with EOP-3 ARO BRO SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained. in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 9 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO CRITICAL TASKS and COMPETENCIES The IL T Lead Instructor has determined that the Scenario Critical Tasks and Competencies section is NOT applicable to the SE-EOP- series of Simulator Training Guides.

CPS identified scenario dependent crew critical tasks are in BOLD FACE . .

1. Perform immediate operator actions on a reactor scram

2. Verify shutdown criteria are met

3. Use preferred injection systems to re~tore RPV/L to the normal operating band

4. Use alternate injection systems to control RPV/L in the designated band.

5. Use normal RPV pressure control methods to control RPV/P in the designated band

6. When RPV/L reaches TAF, enter EOP-3 and depressurize the RPV

. SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 10 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE Human Performance Improvement During the course of this scenario, instructors should watch for the following human performance fundamentals and competencies and discuss at the appropriate freeze point or during the critique.

Briefs

Use of STAR when manipulating controls

First Check

Peer checks when appropriate

Proper use of procedures

Place keeping

Robust barriers when appropriate

Proper directed three part communications OPERATIONS STANDARDS AND FUNDAMENTALS Operator Rounds- OP-AA-102-102 Log Keeping- OP-AA-111-101 Shift Turnover - OP-AA-112-101 Clearance & Tagging - OP-AA~109-101 Human Error Prevention - HU-AA-101 Self-AssessmenUContinuous Improvement- LS-AA-126 Teamwork - OP-AA-101-111-1001 Briefs HU-AA-1211 Procedural Adherence - HU-AA-104-101 Control Board Awareness- OP-AA-103-102 Industrial Safety- SA-AA-0301 Reactor Safety- OP-AA-101~111-1001 Reactivity Management - OP-AA-300 Work Management -WC-AA-101-, OU-AA-101 Security - SY-AA-101-130 Regulatory Compliance - OP-AA-101-111 Condition Reporting and Resolution - LS-AA-125 Radiological Safety- OP-AA-101-111-1001 Personal Responsibility and Accountability OP-AA-101-111/112 Training and Qualification OP-AA-101-111 Intolerance for Unexpected Equipment Failure ER-AA-10 Technical Human Performance HU-AA-102 COMPETENCIES Reactivity Management Understand/Interpret Annunciator and Alarm Signals Diagnose Events/Conditions Based on Signals/Readings Understand Planfand System Response Compliance With and Use of Procedures and Technical Specifications Operate the Control Boards Communicate and Interact With the Crew and Other Personnel Direct Shift Operations (SRO ONLY)

Emergency Plan (If applicable)

Lessons learned captured for retention For LORT scenarios, the instructor should review the Fundamentals focus areas selected each training cycle.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l 1: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 11 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LESSON PLAN SPECIFIC SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Generic Simulator Setup complete.

2. Initialize to IC-01 or to an IC greater than 95% power.

3. Place the simulator in RUN.

4. Open simulator Lesson PlanSE-EOP-07 ..

5. Execute simulator Lesson Plan SE-EOP-07.

6. Compare simulator initial conditions to 1005.09M002, Cycle Operating Limits.

7. (CM-1) If this is an examination scenario or being run for validation, start a CHART to plot the critical parameters.

8. Place OOS Tags on: HPCS Pump control switch, D Condensate Pump, 1B21-F098D keylock switch

9. Equipment out of service: List here: HPCS, D CD Pumps, 1B21-F098D

10. Non-standard paperwork required: NONE

11. Surveillances to provide: NONE

12. Flagging to be placed: NONE

13. other: NONE SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 12 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE LARGE BREAK LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE When the crew has taken the shift . ARO:*

TRIGGER MALFUNCTION (Remote 1): o Reports trip of all Feedwater pumps FWOSA(B), Feedwater Pumps 1A, (B) Trip - TRUE o Reports RPV/L rapidly lowering FWOSC Feedwater 1C Trip, TRUE, 10-sec. TD o Inserts a manual scram, OR, reports reactor scram o Performs Scram Choreography o Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

Turns mode switch to SHUTDOWN

!* Verifies reactor power is lowering

!* Verifies shutdown criteria are met

!* Verifies turbine and generator trip

!* Reports EOP-1 entry condition (RPV/L low)

BRO:

o Performs Scram Choreography o Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM, and performs immediate actions

!* Announces reactor scram

!* Announces containment and RCIC room evacuation o Confirms shutdown criteria are met SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 13 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

D Enters CPS No. 4100.01, REACTOR SCRAM and directs crew actions D Enters E,OP-1 RPV CONTROL: (440101.01, 440101.02, 100509.03, 100509.04, 100509.05, 100509.06, 100509.07, 100509.08)

- Directs ARO to control RPV/P using bypass valves

!* Enters CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES, and directs B CRO to control RPV/L L3 to L8 using available preferred injection systems (RCIC)

!* Directs crew to verify needed automatic actions

- Properly marks EOP-1 flowcharts When scram actions have been complete and/or when directed by Floor Instructor TRIGGER Remote 2 to cause Steam Leak in the Turbine Building from "D" Main Steam Line. CREW: -

D Verifies needed automatic actions

- Isolations (100509.09)

!* ECCS Start (100509.1 O)

!* Diesel Generators Start (100509.11)

D Dispatches NLO to verify proper operation of the DGs Steam line break depressurizes RPV. ARO:

D Verifies turbine bypass valves initially control RPV/P <1065 psig (or as directed by the CRS)

D Reports RPV/P lowering SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.1 i I: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 14 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe crew references applicable annunciator response procedures. BRO:

o Reports sump high level alarms o Reports ste8;m tunnel high temperature alarms o Reports initiation of Group 1 isolation * "

o Reports incomplete Group 1 isolation, MSL D MSIVs not closed If EMO is contacted for status of 1B21-F098D, report: CR.S:

"The breaker is still in the shop. Expected return to service in about o Directs NLO and MMD to close MSL D outboard MSIV 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

o ,May direct cycling MSL D MSIV control switches in attempt to close the MSIVs o May investigate status of 1B21-F098D and direct expediting return to service RCIC should be initiated before RPV/L reaches L2 This is a key RO action for level restoration! BRO:

Observe BRO holds the RCIC initiation pushbutton depressed for 6 sec. o Attempts to close MSL D isolation valves as directed I

RCICTurbine trip initiates when the seal-in light comes on. o Manually initiates RCIC

!* Holds RCIC Initiation Button depressed for 6 sec. until steam supply valve starts open

!* Reports RCIC turbine trip o If RCIC auto initiates, reports RCIC turbine trip SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 15 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE As the NLO report: BRO:

"The RCIC turbine mechanical overspeed trip device is tripped." CJ Dispatches NLO to investigate RCIC turbine trip If direc~ed to reset the RCIC turbine trip CJ If directed by CRS, directs NLO to reset the RCIC turbine trip Report as the NLO "The RCIC Turbine trip will not reset. The trip mechanism is ARO:

bent and will not latch."

CJ Reports trip of all CD and CB pumps When RPV/P drops below 750 psig, trip of all CD pumps will auto-TRIGGER: CJ May dispatch NLO to investigate cause of trip FW01A (8, C, D), Condensate Pump 1A (18, 1C, 10) Trip -TRUE CRS:

CJ May direct maximizing CRD injection in accordance with CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES (441103.07)

CJ Directs injection with SLC (441103.13)

BRO:

If directed to open the CRD Suction Filter Bypass valves CJ Starts second CRD pump (441103.11)

TRIGGERFROM PENDING PAGE:

!* As time permits, dispatches NLO to verify proper operation of the LC107, CRDH Suction Filters-TRUE, 5-min. TD CRD pump just started After the time delay times out, report as NLO: *!* Directs NLO to open the CRD Suction Filter Bypass Valves "The CRD Suction Filter Bypass valves are open. CJ Starts SLC for injection If asked to close A RD Pump Discharge to start the pump ACTIVATE from the pending page and then cycle it open form same page.

NOTE:

RPV/P may drop to below LP ECCS shutoff head before RPV/L drops to L1.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l l l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 16 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe crew performs required actions when RPV/L drops below L 1 BRO:

o Reports RPV/L at L 1 and lowering Optional for CRS to isolate air to containment to close Inboard MSIV which will stop the level lowering due to stopping the inventory loss due to break in Main Steam Line. CRS:

o Directs crew actions in response to RPV/L L1

!* Annunciator Response Procedures

- Verify automatic actions occur

!* Inhibit ADS CREW:

o Prioritizes response to annunciators o Inhibit!? ADS o Verifies automatic actions

!* Isolations

!* Reports low pressure ECCS did not automatically start (1110509.10)

CRS:

o Directs manually starting LPCI and LPCS BRO:

o References procedures (Hard Cards) and starts LPCI and LPCS SE-EOP~07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 17 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Observe CRS verifies all prerequisites for initiating blow down. CRS:

D Frequently requests status of RPV/L D When RPV/L reaches TAF (-162 in.), enters EOP-3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION (SLOWDOWN) (440701.03)

- Verifies RPV/L at or below TAF

!* Directs containment evacuation

- Verifies shutdown criteria are met

- Verifies Drywell pressure is below 1.68 psig

- Verifies SP/Labove 8 feet Observe crew reports all parameters when requested by CRS. CREW:

D Enters EOP-3 and responds to CRS queries:

- Reports RPV/L and trend

!* Confirms shutdown criteria are met

!* Reports Drywell pressure <1.68 psig (and trend)

!* Reports SP/L CRS:

D Directs ADS initiated in accordance with CPS No. 3101.01 Observe operator references procedure or Hard Card for initiation of ADS. BRO:

D Sounds alarm and announces containment evacuation D Initiates ADS in accordance with CPS No. 3101.01 or Hard Card (440701.06)

D Reports 5 ADS valves are open SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D. l 1l: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 18 of 22

/

CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE CRS:

Ensure crew restore and then maintains RPV water level in the band o Directs opening other SRVs until 7 SRVs are open given by CRS.

BRO:

o Opens 2 other SRVs o Reports 7 SRVs are open CRS:

o Directs maximizing injection with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems, in accordance with CPS No. 4411.03, INJECTION/FLOODING SOURCES If directed to defeat Shutdown Cooling interlocks: o Waits for Shutdown Cooling int~rlock to clear (EOP-3)

TRIGGER FROM THE PENDING PAGE: o May direct defeating Shutdown Cooling interlocks EP207, E12F008, F023, F053A Isolate- TRUE, 3-min. TD OR BRO:

EP208, E12F009, F053B Isolate - TRUE, 3-min. TD o Maximizes injection using available preferred injection systems in accordance with CPS No. 4411.03 After the time delay times out, report the task completed

- LPCS

!* LPCI

!* RHR through Shutdown Cooling SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 19 of 22 CPS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION/ACTIVITY EXPECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE Make ECCS injection valves capable of being throttled as directed: CRS:

TRIGGER FORM THE PENDING PAGE o When RPV/L is above -162 in., directs crew to restore and maintain RPV/L between L3 and L8 by throttling ECCS system_per CPS No. 4411.04 EP201A, RHR A Injection Valve Seal In - TRUE, 10-min. TD D Directs low pressure ECCS injection valves made capable of being throttled EP201 B, RHR B Injection Valve Seal In - TRUE, 10-min. TD o Directs low pressure ECCS not needed to maintain RPV/L between L3 and EP201C, RHR C Injection Valve Seal In - TRUE, 10-min. TD L8 secured as RPV/L returns to normal EP201 D, LPCS Injection Valve Seal In - TRUE, 10-min. TD After the time delay times out, report the task completed.

Observe operator references procedures to secure. ECCS systems. BRO:

D Secures low pressure ECCS not needed to maintain RPV/L as directed CRS D Declares the EAL Classification When plant parameters are stable and RPV/P and RPV/L are being *!* Site Area Emergency (FS1) due to Unisolable MSL break and controlled within the designated bands, or at the discretion of the Floor potential loss of fuel clad (RPV/L s-162.5 in.)

Instructor, place the simulator in FREEZE and inform the crew "Training has control".

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l l l: Retain approved lessons*for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans. May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 20 of 22 OPEX Facility: CLINTON Notification Date: 02/18/2013 Region: 3 State: IL Notification Time: 11 :35 [ET]

Unit: {1} [] [] Event Date: 02/18/2013 RX Type: {1] GE-6 Event Time: 03:18 [CST}

NRC Notified By: MARK DODDS Last Update Date: 02/18/2013 HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL 48765 - HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE On February 18, 2013, at 0318 hours0.00368 days 0.0883 hours 5.257936e-4 weeks 1.20999e-4 months (CST), the Main Control Room received an alarm associated with a transfer of the Division 4 Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) inverter to the alternate source. Plant Technicians were performing a Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance, 'Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased/Neutron Flux Response Time Test,' when a test cable connector contacted a fuse block staple jumper, causing the transfer of the Division 4 NSPS bus from normal inverter source to its alternate source.

TS 3.8.7, 'Inverters - Operating' Surveillance Requirement 3.8.7.1 is not met with the inverter on the alternate source, and Condition C, requires High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system to be declared inoperable immediately since the Division 4 NSPS bus was not energized from the inverter. Since HPCS is an emergency core cooling system and is a single train safety system, this is a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

At 0925 CST, the Division 4 NSPS bus has been restored to service on the normal source. At 0925 CST, HPCS has been declared Operable,.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.l 11: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 21 of 22 TURNOVER

1. Full Power, stable xenon and middle of core life:

2.- Status of Tagged Out Equipment: HPCS out of service for 2 days expected back in service in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , 1D Condensate Pump been out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , not known when it will be returned, MSL 1D Shutoff Valve open and tagged for breaker work, been out of service for 1 day expected back in 3 days.

3. Shift conditions: Day Shift

4. Weather Conditions: Clear & Sunny

5. Thermal Limit Problems or Concerns: None LCOs in effect: 3.5. 1

6. Surveillances / Jobs in progress: None

7. Upcoming Jobs: Support HPCS return

8. Risk Level: Orange

9. Dose equivalent Iodine 131 is reading 1.5 E-6 ~tcuries per gram.

10. Other None Note:

If this scenario is being used for an examination, COLLECT student beepers and PCS phones.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Policy+ 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

Page 22 of 22 Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications This checklist is to be used in the evaluation ofDEP EAL declaration, notification and related activities during all simulator LOR unannounced and evaluated scenarios.

Task Time Comments Time Condition Evident in Control Room Time EAL Matrix Used by SM Time Independent Peer Check of EAL Call Obtained Time of Declaration (as announced)

Time Notification Form completed by SM

- Expected Time t,o Declare (time of condition + 15 min)

- Release in Progress ID (NA if no release in progress)

Escalation Criteria Announced to CR Plant Announcement Time ERO Part 1 Activation Time ERO Part 2 Activation Time Time of Management NotiVcation (NA if ERO is activated)

Time from Declaration to ERO activation EAL Declared (per NARS Form)

- Expected EAL PAR Made

- Expected PAR State & Local Notification time

- Expected Time for State & Local Notification (Declaration+ 15 min)

NRC Notification Time Expected Time for NRC Notification (Declaration + 60 min)

ERDs Activation Time

- VERIFY Wind Speed, Direction, Evacuation Sectors, and DRILL (Evaluator)

- Reference TQ-AA-150 for DEP accuracy criteria Checklist for DEP EAL Declaration and Notifications Plant Turnover 3D.100 Destroy at option.

SE-EOP-07, Rev. 003 SRRS 3D.126/3D.111: Retain approved lessons for life of plant OR Life of Insurance Pplicy + 1 Yr for RP lesson plans.

May be retained in department for two years, then forwarded to Records Management.

ML18360A479

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4.1 STABILIZATION

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