IR 05000390/2018011
| ML19011A125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/2019 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2018011 | |
| Download: ML19011A125 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 11, 2019
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION (TEAM) REPORT 05000390/2018011 AND 05000391/2018011
Dear Mr. Shea:
On November 29, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, and the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Paul Simmons and other members of your staff. The results of this Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (TFPI) are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these two violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest these violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos.: NPF-90, NPF-96
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000390/2018011 and 05000391/2018011
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s): 50-390, 50-391 License Number(s): NPF-90, NPF-96 Report Number(s): 05000390/2018011 AND 05000391/2018011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-011-0026 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Inspection Dates: November 5 - 9, 2018 November 26 - 29, 2018 Inspectors: L. Jones, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
W. Monk, Reactor Inspector J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an announced team triennial fire protection inspection (TFPI) at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the NRC Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified findings and violations are summarized in the table below. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section: 02.02f.
List of Findings and Violations Inadequate Cold Shutdown Repair Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green H.1 71111.05T -
Systems NCV 05000390-391/2018011-01 02.02i Closed The NRC identified a Green NCV of and Watts Bar License Condition 2.C (8) for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to provide adequate procedures in order to implement cold shutdown repairs.
Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a workable and operational procedure to implement the Cold Shutdown Repairs procedure 2-MI-0.047 objective to ensure long-term inventory reduction cold shutdown repairs. Additionally, the licensee failed to ensure equipment required for repairs was readily available as described in station procedures to implement Cold Shutdown Repairs Procedure 2-MI-0.047.
Failure to Perform Evaluations to Determine Functionality Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green H.13 71111.05T -
Systems NCV 05000390-391/2018011-02 02.02b Closed The NRC identified a Green NCV of Watts Bar OLC 2.F for Unit 1 and 2.C (8) for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to perform a functionality evaluation, in accordance with the sites CAP procedures. Specifically, upon discovery of conditions that could affect the functionality of fire-rated doors, the licensee did not perform an evaluation to determine the conditions effect on the functionality of the doors.
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The team reviewed the selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed licensee personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.05T - Fire Protection (Triennial)
The team evaluated applicable fire protection licensing commitments from November 5, 2018 to November 29, 2018 by review of the following:
Fire Protection Inspection Requirements ===
The team evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Corridor and Hold Up Tank Gallery, FA 8
- (2) 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A, FA-28
- (3) Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room, FA 48 708.C-4
B.5.b Inspection Activities (1 Sample)
The team evaluated feasibility of the following B.5.b Mitigating Strategy:
- (1) The team reviewed the strategy for manual operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
INSPECTION RESULTS Inadequate Cold Shutdown Repair Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating systems Green Finding H.1 71111.05T-50-390, 50-391/2018-011-01 02.02i Closed The NRC identified a Green NCV of Watts Bar License Condition 2.C
- (8) for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to provide adequate procedures in order to implement cold shutdown repairs. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a workable and operational procedure to implement the Cold Shutdown Repairs procedure 2-MI-0.047 objective to ensure long-term inventory reduction cold shutdown repairs. Additionally, the licensee failed to ensure equipment required for repairs was readily available as described in station procedures to implement Cold Shutdown Repairs Procedure 2-MI-0.047.
Description:
On November 28, 2018, the inspectors reviewed a sample of repairs required for achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. Inspectors noted multiple deficiencies during a walk down of procedure 2-MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs, Rev. 0001, with plant personnel.
1) The inspectors noted that operated components and valves listed in the procedure were not the correct components to operate and not located in the specified location as stated in the procedure. In addition, the component identifications were incorrect, therefore the inadequate procedural Step 6.4 could result in an operator not being able to complete the required long-term inventory reduction cold shutdown repair requirements. Specifically, Step 6.3[7] routes the 2-MTR-30-176-B RHR cooler motor cable thru door A163 but this is the opposite direction from the needed direction. Routing the cooler motor temporary power cable on the wrong path would result in the cable not being long enough to supply power to the motor and thus compromising the availability of the fan required for cooling in the RHR room.
Section 6.4 Long Term Inventory Reduction Step [2.3.1], has an isolation valve listed that could not be found in the location indicated. Without isolating this valve, the backup air supply from the nitrogen cylinder would be compromised due to the isolation valve not being shut and thus allowing the contents to bleed out faster than anticipated. With these errors the inspectors determined the procedure was inadequate as written to accomplish the procedures objectives of RHR Room Cooler Motor Circuit Repair/Replacement and long-term inventory reduction.
2) The inspectors noted that required cold shutdown repair equipment, per procedure 2-MI-0.047, was not physically located in its required storage location. Section 4.2, Special Tools, M&TE, Parts, and Supplies, Step [2] states Ensure necessary cables with labeled/color coded conductors, jumpers, ring logs, screws and nuts, and cable damage protectors are available from their pre-staged location, 2-JB-291-9276. During the procedure walkdown it was determined that 2-JB-291-9276, Cold Shutdown Repair equipment storage junction box was empty. Inspectors noted that the storage boxes were only inventoried every four years, and that the boxes were not secured with a tamper resistant device. Because storage box 2-JB-291-9276 was empty, inspectors questioned whether the equipment provided in Unit 1 storage boxes 1-JB-291-6917 and -6918 would be available for use for a fire that affects Unit
2. The licensee confirmed the need for additional equipment being staged due to RHR in Unit
1 requiring a cable not compatible with Unit 2.
As a result of the identified errors the inspectors questioned the development of the procedure and requested the licensee verify the validity of the Unit 1 procedure. Licensee staff confirmed similar errors with the procedure directing cold shutdown efforts for Unit 1.
Corrective Action(s): In response to deficiencies identified by the inspectors, the licensee incorporated the Unit 1 procedure (1-MI-0.047) into the corrective actions associated with the Unit 2 procedural errors. The licensee took immediate corrective action to instruct the Maintenance Procedures department to correct the procedural step errors of the two Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs Maintenance Instructions. Additionally, the licensee took immediate corrective action to locate and replace all the missing equipment. The licensee also informed the inspector that, per their process, it was necessary to perform an extent of condition to verify all other equipment identified in procedures 1-MI-0.047 and 2-MI-0.047 were readily available, stored in designated locations, and included on appropriate inventory preventative maintenance checklists.
Corrective Action Reference(s): This issue is being tracked in the licensees corrective action program by condition report (CR) 1470899.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide an adequate procedure, and the failure to ensure that the required cold shutdown equipment would be readily available to implement cold shutdown procedures was a performance deficiency (PD).
Screening: The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the developed procedures were inadequate to direct and support in-field operator actions required to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems in response to a fire requiring cold shutdown repairs.
Significance: The finding was evaluated for safety significance using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix F. Question 1.4.7: The finding was determined to not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown/hot standby or safe and stable conditions using the credited safe shut down success path. As such, the finding screened to Green, with no further analysis required.
Cross-cutting Aspect: Inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the resources attribute of human performance area, as defined in IMC 0310, because the licensees leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, personnel did not have required equipment readily available in the designate area and adequate procedures to implement the cold shut down repairs [H.1].
Enforcement:
WBN License Condition 2.C(8) for Unit 2, requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP as described in the Fire Protection Report (FPR) for the facility. WBN FPR Part V - Manual Action, Repairs, and Emergency Lighting, Section 3.0, Cold Shutdown Repairs states in part Appendix R Section III.G.b requires that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. There are three generic repairs that are potentially required to ensure cold shutdown capabilities. Repair procedures have been developed and the required materials are available onsite to accomplish the repairs. The three repairs are RHR Room Cooler Repair, RHR/RCS High-Low Pressure Boundary Valve Repair, and Long Term RCS Inventory Reduction.
Contrary to the above, since July 29, 2015, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure adequate repair procedures have been developed and the required materials are available onsite to accomplish the repairs for Long Term RCS Inventory Reduction.
Disposition: Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000390/391/2018011-01, Inadequate Cold Shutdown Repair Procedures.
Failure to Perform Evaluations to Determine Functionality Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect N/A Section Mitigating systems Green H.13 71111.05T-50-390, 50-391/2018-011-02 02.02b Open & Closed The NRC identified a Green NCV of Watts Bar OLC 2.F for Unit 1 and 2.C
- (8) for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to perform a functionality evaluation, in accordance with the sites CAP procedures. Specifically, upon discovery of conditions that could affect the functionality of fire-rated doors, the licensee did not perform an evaluation to determine the conditions effect on the functionality of the doors.
Description:
On November 6, 2018, during a site walkdown, the inspectors identified fire door A163, which separates the 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A and the 6.9 KV Shutdown Board Room B with the 480V 2B, ajar and not in its design position of closed. This condition was noted to the site staff supporting the NRC walkdown. The licensee provided the team with CR 1463826 to document the issue. After reviewing the CR, the inspectors questioned the fact that a functionality evaluation had not been performed for the documented condition. Specifically, the CR documented that an engineering evaluation was not needed, and that safety function was maintained.
Site procedure NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, governs the implementation of corrective actions related to the FPP. Section 3.4.1.E.1 of NPG-SPP-22.300 stated, Systems, Structures & Components (SSCs) are evaluated when degraded, nonconforming, or when unanalyzed conditions are identified. Engineering provides the primary recommendation for CRs that document conditions that are potentially degraded or nonconforming.
Functionality and surveillance requirements for fire-rated doors are specified by Operating Requirement (OR) 14.8 of Part II of the sites FPR. Testing and inspection requirement 14.8.b verified functionality of all associated release and closing mechanisms and latches by performing a functional test. The acceptance criteria of this test, implemented by site procedure 0-FOR-410-2, is that all fire doors designed to close and latch function properly.
The inspectors noted that the sites FPR included a commitment to meet NFPA 80-1975, which requires self-closing fire doors to swing easily and freely and shall be equipped with a closure device to cause the door to close and latch each time it is operated. Inspectors interpreted these requirements to mean that proper functioning of fire doors include the ability of the door to close and latch on its own. Based on the above, inspectors determined that a functionality evaluation should have been performed for the door A163s inability to close and latch on its own. Further, given that the as found condition represents a condition that does not meet the acceptance criteria of the doors testing and inspection requirement to demonstrate functionality, inspectors determined that door A163 should have been declared nonfunctional, and the required compensatory measures should have been established until functionality of the door was restored.
Additionally, inspectors requested and reviewed 15 CRs from the previous year associated with fire doors being found unlatched. Of these 15 CRs, inspectors noted eight instances where fire doors were not evaluated using an engineering-supported FE to determine determining the functionality of the doors. The doors in question were located throughout the control building and auxiliary building. The inspectors determined that site personnel inappropriately credited human interface, and not the acceptance criteria in site procedures, as a basis to determine fire door functionality being maintained when fire doors were found ajar.
Corrective Action(s): The license is going to evaluate the issue to make necessary corrections to how door functionality determinations are made.
Corrective Action Reference(s): This issue is being tracked in the licensees corrective action program by CR 1466016.
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform a functionality evaluation for fire-rated doors found ajar and/or unable to close and latch unassisted was a performance deficiency (PD).
Screening: The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the PD could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, if degraded fire doors are not evaluated for functionality, the doors could potentially be left in a condition where it would not perform its design function in the case of a fire.
Significance: The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated October 28, 2018, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Finding dated October 7, 2016, which determined that an IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated May 2, 2018, was required as the finding involved the ability to confine fires. For the 8 noted examples of improperly evaluated fire doors, the finding was screened as Green based on Questions 1.4.4-B being answered yes and question 1.4.4-D being answered no. Specifically, for the barriers identified, either there was an adequate automatic suppression system on either side of the fire door or the fire finding involves the failure of a fire door to properly latch but did not affect the ability of the fire door to close, and these doors did not protect areas relying on a gaseous suppression system.
Cross-cutting Aspect: Inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the consistent process attribute of human performance area, as defined in IMC 0310 because individuals did not use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Specifically, the site staff did not use provided guidance to evaluate the functionality of fire doors. [H.13].
Enforcement:
WBN Operating License Condition 2.F for Unit 1 and License Condition 2.C(8) for Unit 2, requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP as described in the FPR for the facility. WBN FPR Part II - Fire Protection Plan, Section 6, Fire Protection Quality Assurance states TVA procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.5, Fire Protection Quality Assurance (Q07), defines the augmented Quality Assurance (QA)
Program for fire protection. This procedure satisfies the guidelines for QA for Fire Protection established by Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for fire protection features that provide protection for safety-related structures, systems or components and fire safe shutdown systems. Section 3.2.9 of NPG-SPP-18.4.5 stated, in part, that nonconforming, inoperative, or malfunctioning features shall be handled in accordance with the NPG Corrective Action Program (NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program). Section 3.4.1.E.1 of NPG-SPP-22.300 stated, Systems, Structures &
Components (SSCs) are evaluated when degraded, nonconforming, or when unanalyzed conditions are identified. Engineering provides the primary recommendation for CRs that document conditions that are potentially degraded or nonconforming.
Contrary to the above, since initial Unit 2 startup in October 2016, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform a Functional Evaluation related to the functionality of degraded or non-conforming fire doors.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation [05.01e -
Section 02-02f]
This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: The licensee identified a green NCV of Watts Bar OLC 2.F for Unit 1 and 2.C (8)for Unit 2 for the sites failure to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions for a postulated fire. Specifically, for a fire in the Control Building, the fire could cause a spurious safety injection signal, which would cause both RHR pumps to start, and the fire could also cause damage to the pumps minimum flow valve, causing it to not be able to be opened. This would subject the pumps to a deadhead condition, and cause failure of the pumps.
Significance/Severity: Using IMC 0609 App. F, the finding was screened to Green using question 1.4.7-C because the licensee can reach hot shutdown and the finding only affects the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On November 29, 2018, the lead inspector and team presented the TFPI results to the Site Vice President Paul Simmons, and other members of the Watt Bar Nuclear Plant staff.
LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
PROCEDURES
0-AOI-8, Tornado Watch or Warning, Rev. 21
0-AOI-30.1, Plant Fires, Rev. 6
0-AOI-30.2, Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 0
0-AOI-30.2, Appendix B Fire Safe Shutdown Elevation Diagrams, Rev. 1
0-AOI-30.2, Appendix D Fire Safe Shutdown Long-Term Action, Rev. 0
0-AOI-30.2, Appendix E Post App. R Fire Cooldown Strategies, Rev. 0
0-AOI-30.2 C.29, Fire Safe Shutdown Room 757-A21, Rev. 0
0-AOI-30.2 C.46, Fire Safe Shutdown Room 713-A1A East, Rev. 1
0-AOI-30.2 C.47, Fire Safe Shutdown Room 713-A1B, Rev. 1
0-AOI-30.2 C.69, Fire Safe Shutdown Room Control Building, Rev. 2
0-AOI-30.2 C.78, Fire Safe Shutdown Room 713-A1A North, Rev. 3
0-AOI-42.01, Security Events, Rev. 3
0-GOI-7, Generic Equipment Operating Guidelines, Rev. 7
0-PI-OPS-14.0, Staged EOP Items, Rev. 18
0-TI-2018, Demonstration of Appendix R Actions, Rev. 1
1-FOR-1-3, SG PORV Operation Using Emergency Nitrogen Supply Performance Test, Rev. 9
1-JB-291-6917, Inventory of Appendix R Repair Equipment in 1-JB-291-6917 OR 1-JB-291-
6918, Rev. 0B
2-FOR-1-3, SG PORV Operation Using Emergency Nitrogen Supply Performance Test, Rev. 5
2-MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs, Rev. 1
FPDP-3, Fire Protection Report Management, Rev. 10
NPG-SPP-03.6, Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory Reviews, Rev. 8
NPG-SPP-12.8.1, Cyber Security Access Control, Rev. 8
OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 42
NPG-SPP-18.4.6, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Rev.0011
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Transient Combustibles, Rev. 11
NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources, Rev. 7
0-FOR-26-20, Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 0014
0-FOR-26-23, Diesel Fire Pump Battery Quarterly Inspection, Rev. 0006
0-FOR-304-2, Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Visual Inspection, Auxiliary Building,
Rev. 0007
0-FOR-410-1, 31 Day Fire Door Inspection, Rev.0013
0-FOR-410-2, 12 Month Fire Door Operational Test, Rev.0016
WBN PM 0-FPS-510-0010, Inventory and Inspection of Emergency Fire Fighting Equipment,
Rev. 15
FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Operations, Rev. 8
FPDP 5, Development and Evaluation of Fire Drills, Rev. 5
WBN-0-DOOR-410-INSPECT, Fire Door Inspection PMUG 1748F, Dated November 3, 2016
CALCULATIONS, EVALUATIONS, & SPECIFICIATIONS
EDQ00099920090012, Units 1&2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, Appendix N, Rev. 18
EDQ00099920090016, Appendix R - Units 1&2 Manual Action Requirements, Rev. 3
EEB841219901, Appendix R Analysis for Intraplant Communications Systems, 6/23/2017
EPMRAC 032392, Evaluation of Fire Suppression System Discharge, Rev. 2
MDQ 00299920110381, Appendix R-Operator Manual Action Evaluations, Rev. 3
EDQ 00299920090021, Appendix R Fire Protection Suppression Effects Evaluation, Rev. 001
EDQ0009992012000085, WBN Unit 2 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Evaluations, Rev. 0
CONDITION REPORTS
CR 1469884, Appendix R Control Building Issue for RHR Pumps
CR 1331871, OE Review: NRC IN 2017-04: High Energy Arcing Faults, 5/16/2018
CR 1470066, Safety Issue for Fire Operations and the Plant Personnel
CR 1398928, Operations and Fire Operations Integration
CR 1178004, Fire Detection panel Equipment is not UL Certified
CR 1060820, The Fire Alarm Monitor (0-M-029) Needs Additional review
CR 1426361, Appendix R Labeling Not Consistent on Plant Equipment. TFPI WBN-ENG-FSA-
18-001, 8/24/2018
WORK RDERS AND COMPLETEED SURVEILLANCE RECORDS
WO 116216667, Implement DCN 60384 Harris Site Radio System
WO 116034432, Inventory of App. R Repair Equipment
WO 116997929, WBN Dual Unit Emergency Lighting Test
WO119554555, High Pressure Fire Protection System Flushing
WO119541367, 0-FOR-410-1 31 Day Fire Door Inspection
WO119389016, 0-FOR-410-1 31 Day Fire Door Inspection
WO114309723, WBN-0-DOOR-410-W005, Intake Pumping Station Door W5
WO119968783, WBN-0-DOOR-410-W006, Intake Pumping Station Door W6
WO119970603, WBN-0-DOOR-410-W009, Intake Pumping Station Door W9
WO119507789, 0-FPV-26-143 is Leaking
WO117376748, Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Visual Inspection, Auxiliary Building,
WO119531339, 0-FOR-410-2, 12 Month Fire Door Operational Test
WO116230701, 0-FOR-26-13, 18 Month Inspection of High Pressure Fire Protection Sprinkler
Systems in Accessible Safety Related Areas
DRAWINGS
0-47W240-2, Fire Protection Compartmentation - Fire Cells - Plan El. 708.0 & 713.0, Rev. 0
2-45W749-1, Wiring Diagram 480V Shutdown Bd 2A1-A Single Line, Rev. 17
2-45W724-3, Wiring Diagram 6900V Shutdown Board 2A-A Single Line, Rev. 18
0-45W760-70-11, Wiring Diagrams Component Cooling System Schematics Diagram, Rev. 4
2-45W760-62-6, Wiring Diagrams Chemical & Volume Control Sys Schematic Diagrams,
Rev. 10
1-45W760-1-2, Wiring Diagram Main Steam System Schematic Diagrams, Rev. 13
1-45W760-62-3, Wiring Diagrams Chemical & Volume Control Sys Schematic Diagrams,
Rev. 11
0-45W760-67-14, Wiring Diagrams ERCW System Schematic Diagrams, Rev. 3
46W454-4, Architectural Door & Hardware Schedule, Rev. 35
0-47W832-1, Flow Diagram Raw Service Water & Fire Protection System, Rev. 3
0-47W832-2, Flow Diagram Raw Service Water & Fire Protection System, Rev. 2
0-47W832-3, Flow Diagram Raw Service Water & Fire Protection System, Rev. 1
0-47W850-1, Flow Diagram Fire Protection System & Raw Service Water, Rev. 2
0-47W850-2, Flow Diagram Fire Protection System & Raw Service Water, Rev. 6
48W1226-3, Miscellaneous Steel Fire Protection Hood & Water Shields Below El. 772.0, Rev. 7
PLANT MODIFICATIONS AND ENGINEERING CHANGES (EC)
DCN 35957, Modify MCC internal wiring to reduce potential for spurious valve closure due to
fire damage
DCN66338, Replace the Fire Detection Monitoring Panel in the Main Control Room Panel 0-
CMPT-013-M029
DCN 63107
LICENSE BASIS DOCUMENTS
CNL-14-161, Watts Bar Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2 - Dual Unit Mitigation Strategy Tables,
9/30/2014
WBN UFSAR, Chapter 9, Section 9.5, Other Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 15
WBN Fire Protection Report Part I, Introduction, Rev. 52
WBN Fire Protection Report Part II, Fire Protection Plan, Rev. 54
WBN Fire Protection Report Part III, Safe Shutdown Capabilities, Rev. 54
WBN Fire Protection Report Part IV, Alternate Shutdown Capability, Rev. 51
WBN Fire Protection Report Part V, Manual Actions, Repairs, and Emergency Lighting, Rev. 51
WBN Fire Protection Report Part VI, Fire Hazard Analysis, Rev. 54
NUREG-0847 Supplement 18, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, October 1995
NUREG-0847 Supplement 19, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, October 1995
NUREG-0847 Supplement 29, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, October 2015
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
WBN-Prefire Plan, AUX-0-713-01, Rev. 1
WBN-Prefire Plan, AUX-0-713-02, Rev. 3
WBN-Prefire Plan, AUX-0-713-03, Rev. 4
WBN Pre-fire Plan, IPS-0-728-01, Rev. 3
Fire Protection Program Health Report, P1-2018
G-40, Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Electrical Conduit, Cable Trays and Boxes,
Rev. 22
G-47, Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Electrical Grounding Systems, Rev. 9
EPRI NP-7253, Effects of Fire Suppressants on Electrical Components in Nuclear Plants,
3/1991
Test Summary Report SPT-039-02, CO2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary
Instrument Rooms, Rev. 0
Jensen-Hughes Report 006030-RPT-01, Condition Assessment of the Watts Bar Nuclear MCR
Fire Alarm equipment, 10/23/2015
NANTeL Generic Plant Access Training Content Document, Effective Date November 19, 2016
Watts Bar Keeping Current Bulletin, March 30, 2018
Watts Bar Keeping Current Bulletin, September 12, 2018
NFPA 80-1975, Fire Doors and Windows
NFPA 80-2016, Fire Doors and Windows
WBN Purchase Requisition 673228 for Fire Rated Class B Door No. C024
Field Evaluation Services Final Report for Fire Alarm Central Station Receiving System,
Underwriters Laboratory Order Number 11484747, May 2, 2018
General Engineering Specification G-73, Installation, Modifications and Maintenance of Fire
Protection systems and features, Revision 8
General Engineering Specification G-98, Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Electrical
Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, Revision 11
Information Notice No. 83-41, Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of
Safety Related Equipment, June 22, 1983
Information Notice No. 94-12, Insight Gained from Resolving Generic Issue 57: Effects of Fire
Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment, February 9, 1994
Carbon Dioxide Suppression System Design Changes, Draft White Paper for Industry Review,
January 31, 2005
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division, Topical Report
Eagle-21 Microprocessor-Based Process Protection System, December 1991
Fire Protection Impairment Permit C-18-0575, 0-Door-410-W005
Fire Protection Impairment Permit C-18-0839, 0-Door-410-W006 and 0-Door-410-009
Fire Protection Impairment Permit C-18-0786, Door A-173
WBN Fire Watch Route Sheet C18-0839, 11/8/2018
WBN Fire Watch Briefing and Turnover Form C18-0839, 11/8/2018
WBN Badge Access Transaction Report, 11/8/2018
Watts Bar OR Log for C-18-0839
Watts Bar OR Log for C-18-0575
Watts Bar OR Log for C-18-0786
Fire Drill Evaluation Report, WBN Unit 1, Shift D, Crew 1, 11/7/2018
SDD-N3-13-4002, Fire Detection System U1/U2, Rev.7
SDD-N3-26-4002, High Pressure Fire Protection U1/U2, Rev.11
SDD-N3-39-4002, CO2 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging, Rev.12
CONDITION REPORTS & WORK ORDERS GENERATED DURING TFPI
CR 1464083 Calculation WCG1143 Section O Labeled Incorrectly - 2018 TFPI
CR 1466016, 0-FOR-304-2 Needs Additional Guidance for Door Inspections-2018 TFPI
CR 1464413, Hand Held CO2 Fire Extinguisher Hoses are Not Conductivity Tested. 2018 TFPI,
CR 1464835, Laptop in the AB, E
CR 1465652, Three ELBPs Outside the U1 TDAFW Pump Room are Not Aimed Correctly. 2018
TFPI,
CR 1470345, 0-AOI-42.01 Copies Were Rev. 2 and not Rev. 3 in Response Cabinets. 2018
TFPI,
CR 1470403 0-AOI-30.2 C.46 Attachment 7 Lists System 2 Components. 2018 TFPI,
CR 1470899, A walk down of 1- & 2-MI-0.047 Determined Several Problems. 2018 TFPI,
CR 1471268 Evaluate Potential Gap in Processing IT Equipment. 2018 TFPI
CR 1470893 Inspect wetted Thermo-lag to verify degradation is cosmetic. 2018 TFPI
CR 1470892 Anti-sweat insulation is missing for a tee section of 20 inch System 70 pipe. 2018
TFPI
CR 1468491 Doc deviation between dwg 45W1767-1 and the App R Block Diag for 2-FCV-67-
CR 1464709 An OPS person passed thru door A163 and did not ensure it was closed and
latched. 2018 TFPI
CR 1463826 Door A163 needs the door closure adjusted. 2018 TFPI
CR 1449674 NRC identified. Cable tray 1N70 has damaged Vimasco coating
CR 1449367 NRC identified. Two plastic buckets and plastic sheet to be removed from the Heat
and Vent Room