ML17264A541

From kanterella
Revision as of 11:47, 29 June 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A541
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/1996
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-005, LER-96-5, NUDOCS 9606260096
Download: ML17264A541 (9)


Text

~CATEGORYREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9606260096 DOC.DATE:

96/06/17NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETgFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STMARTIN,J.T.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester GassElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING,G.S.

Ef050002440NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

SUBJECT:

LER96-005-00:on 960516,PORC determined deficient procedures donotmeetSRsfortestingsafety-related logiccircuits.

Causedbyinadequancies inindividual testingprocedures.

Procedures reImprovedTSsrevised.W/960617 ltr.DZSTRZSUTZON CODE:ZE22TCOPZESRECEZVED:LTR jENCLiSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PDl-1PDINTERNAL:

AEOD/SPDj NTERifE/EENRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHYPG.A NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G.

AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOORE,W.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111221111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.'ONTACT THEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.

43.5-2083)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR25ENCL25 4NPJune17,1996U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

LER96-005,Deficient Procedures forTestingofSafety-Related LogicCircuits, Identified UsingCriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,ResultedinCondition Prohibited byTechnical Specifications R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications",

theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-005isherebysubmitted.

IThiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verylyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStop14C7)PWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector "C.'l)059606260096 9606i7PDRADOCK050002448PDRgpss' NRCFORM366.(4.95)~U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150.0104 EXPIRES04/30/98ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHELICENSING PROCESSANDFEDBACKToINDUSTRY.,

FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT-6F33),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555.0001.

ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTFACILBYNAME(llR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMSLR(2)05000244FAOB(3)1OF7ITLB(elDeficient Procedures forTestingofSafety-Related LogicCircuits, Identified UsingCriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,ResultedinCondition Prohibited byTechnical Specifications MONTHDAYYEAREVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHOAYYEARREPORTDATE(7)FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)DOCKETNUMBER0516OPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)9600096-005-00061796FACILITYNAME20.2201(b) 20.2203(al(1) 20.2203(al(2)(i) 20.2203(a)

(2)(v)20.2203(al(3)

(I)20.2203(al(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)

(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)

SUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRE:(CheckoneorTHISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURDocKET((UMBERmore)(11l50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.7120.2203(al(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)

(ivl20.2203(al(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHERSpecifyinAbsuec(beloworinNRCForm366AAMEELEFHONENUMBER(InCIVrre AreaCedarJohnT.St.Martin-Technical Assistant (716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToNPRDSSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyas,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single.spacedtypewritten lines)(16)OnMay16,1996,atapproximately 1500EDST,theplantwasdefueled.

UsingthecriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,itwasidentified thatseveralsurveillance testprocedures hadnotfullycompliedwiththeSurveillance Requirements oftheGinnaImprovedTechnical Specifications.

ThePlantOperations ReviewCommittee determined thatthesedeficient procedures didnotmeettherequirements ofSpecification 5A.1thatprocedures beestablished, implemented, andmaintained fortheseactivities.

Immediate corrective actionwastoperformtherequiredtestingofthesafety-related logiccircuitsduringthe1996refueling outage.Theunderlying causeoftheinadequate procedures wasanassumption thatitwasadequatetouseindustry-acceptedmethodsfortestingofthesecircuits, andtheneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized.

ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(D).Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4.95)

~NRCFORM366AI4.9SI~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1IOOCKETLERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBERPAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant0500024496pp5pp2OF7TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366A/I17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:

TopreparetheresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)96-01,"TestingofSafety-Related LogicCircuits",

Rochester GasandElectric(RGSE)formeda"GL96-01ReviewTeam"inMarch,1996,withrepresentation fromElectrical Engineering, Instrument andControl,ResultsandTest,SystemEngineering, andNuclearSafetyandLicensing.

Thisteamagreedthattestprocedure reviewsperformed underprioractivities werenotdocumented totheextentdesiredtobecompatible withtheGL96-01requirements.

Therefore, theteamperformed thisreview,startinginearlyApril,1996.Theteamidentified andreviewedprocedures whichimplement theGinnaImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)Surveillance Requirements (SRs).Thisreviewcomparedelectrical schematic drawingsandlogicdrawingsagainstsurveillance testprocedures toensurethatallportionsofthelogiccircuitry areadequately coveredintheprocedure, andtoverifycompliance withallapplicable ITSSRsassociated withsafety-related logiccircuits.

Numerousindividual findingswereidentified duringthecourseofthisreview.Individual findingswereclassified intofourgroups:a.Omission:

Anapplicable logiccomponent isnotintegrated intoanexistingformaltestprocedure.

Failureorinoperability ofthiscomponent couldadversely affectarequiredsafetyfunction.

Deficiency:

Anapplicable logiccomponent isincorporated intoanexistingformaltestprocedure.

However,thestepsusedtotestallrequiredfunctions andfailuremodesareinadequate toverifycompleteoperability ofthesubjectcomponent.

Failureorinoperability ofthiscomponent couldadversely affectarequiredsafetyfunction.

Weakness:

Anapplicable logiccomponent isincorporated intoanexistingformaltestprocedure.

However,thestepsusedtotestallrequiredfunctions andfailuremodesareinadequate toverifycompleteoperability ofthesubjectcomponent.

Duetotheinherently conservative designoftheassociated logiccircuitry, failureorinoperability ofthiscomponent cannot,byitself,preventoractuatearequiredsafetyfunction.

Thesubjectcomponent functionandfailuremodesarenotrequiredtobetestedbyanyITSSR.Proactive Initiative:

Alogiccomponent thatisoutofthescopeoftherequirements ofGL96-01,whereithasbeenidentified thatthestepsusedtotestallassociated functions andfailuremodesmaybeinadequate toverifycompleteoperability ofthesubjectcomponent.

Failureorinoperability ofthiscomponent cannot,byitself,preventoractuatearequiredsafetyfunction.

Improvements totheassociated testprocedure wouldenhancethesafeandreliableoperation oftheplant.Thisreviewwascompleted onMay14,1996,andtheresultsweredocumented ininternalplantdocuments.

Therewereno"omissions",

sixteen(16)"deficiencies",

twenty-one (21)"weaknesses",

andseven(7)"proactive initiatives" identified bytheteam.The16deficiencies werecorrected duringthe1996Refueling outageassoonasfeasibleafteridentification, andpriortotheaffectedcomponent havingtobeoperablepertheITS.Allweaknesses andproactive initiatives willberesolvedpriortostartupfromthe1997Refueling outage.NRCFORM366A(495I

~NRCFORM366Ai495)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETLERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF796-005-00TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm886AI(17)DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:

January29,1996:NRCGL96-01isreceivedatRG&E.0May14,1996:GL96-01ReviewTeamidentifies noomissions andsixteen(16)deficiencies.

0May16,1996,1500EDST:ThePORCdetermines thatthesedeficiencies didnotmeettherequirements ofSpecification 5.4.1.Eventdateandtime.0May16,1996,1500EDST:Discovery dateandtime.0May21,1996:Theaffectedcomponents forall16deficiencies havebeensatisfactorily tested.B.EVENT:OnMay16,1996,atapproximately 1500EDST,theplantwasdefueled(whichisnotamodeasdefinedintheITS)withnospecificoperational oroutageactivities inprogressrelatedtothereviewofGL96-01ortothetestingofcomponents identified duringthisreview.TheGL96-01ReviewTeamreportedtheresultsoftheirreviewtothePORC.ThePORCconcurred withtheresultsofthereview.ThePORCdetermined thathaving16deficient procedures didnotmeettherequirements ofSpecification 5.4.1,whichstates,inpart,thatwrittenprocedures shallbeestablished, implemented, andmaintained coveringapplicable procedures recommended inRegulatory Guide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978.Regulatory Guide1.33recommends writtenprocedures forsurveillance testsforthereactorprotection systemandothersystems.ThePORCdetermined thatwrittenprocedures werenotadequately established fortheseactivities, whichisacondition prohibited bySpecification 5.4.1.ThePORCconcluded thattheseprocedures weredeficient duetoacommonrootcauseandcollectively represented asubstantial breakdown inthesurveillance testingprogram.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

NoneNRCFORM366Ai495)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)rLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGE(3)4OF7TEXTIifmorespeceisrequired, useeddirionel copiesofNRCForm386AI(17)METHODOFDISCOVERY:

RG&EformedtheGL96-01ReviewTeaminMarch,1996,toensurethatallportionsoflogiccircuitry forsafety-related systemsandcomponents areadequately coveredinanassociated surveillance testprocedure tomeetallapplicable ITSSRs.Thisreviewwascompleted onMay14,1996.TheReviewTeamreportedtheresultsoftheirreviewtothePORConMay16,1996.ThePORCdetermined thathaving16deficient procedures didnotmeettherequirements ofSpecification 5.4.1.OPERATORACTION:TheOperations Groupreviewedthestatusoftestingoftheindividual findings(deficiencies, weaknesses, andproactive initiatives),

anddirectedthatamoderestriction beplacedontheplantnottoenterMode5untilthecompletion ofallapplicable testingforanyremaining deficiencies.

TheNRCSeniorResidentInspector hadalreadybeennotifiedofthesefindingsbytheOperations Group.Theplantwasdefueledatthistime,andthefindingsdidnotaffectanysafetyfunctions requiredwiththeplantinthiscondition.

Therefore, nootheractionswererequiredoftheoperators.

G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:

NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeofthe16deficient procedures usedforthetestingofsafety-related logiccircuitswasinadequacies inindividual surveillance testingprocedures.

B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeoftheinadequacies insurveillance testingprocedures wasunidentified deficiencies inthesurveillance testingprogram.NRcFORM366A(4-95I NRCFORM36BAI4.95)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEIl)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERIB)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGEI3)5OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366Al(17)ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofnotpreviously identifying thedeficiencies inthesurveillance testingprogramwasanassumption thatitwasadequatetouseindustry-accepted methodsfortestingofsafety-related logiccircuitstomeetITSSRs.Theneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized, duetothisassumption and,inmanycases,<ue tothedesignofthesystem.Thespecificity ofGL96-01(including thedirection forthescopeoftheexpectedreviews,levelofdetail,andexamplesforindividual contacts) providedtheclarification neededtoidentifytheprogramdeficiencies.

Whiletechnically establishing nonewrequirements, GL96-01providedtheseclarifications, whichledtothediscovery oflogictestingdeficiencies whichwerepreviously unrecognized.

ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(D),"Defective Procedure".

ThiseventdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure",

becausetherewerenofunctional failures.

IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyop'eration orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications".

Thedeficient surveillance testingprocedures fortestingofsafety-related circuitsidentified duringtheGL96-01reviewdidnotmeettherequirements ofSpecification 5.4.1.Thefollowing ITSSRshaddeficiencies:

SR3.3.1.5SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.2.4forTable3.3.2-1,Function2.a(viaTable3.3.5.1,Function4)SR3.3.2.7forTable3.3.2-1,Function1.b(twodeficiencies)

SR3.3.2.7forTable3.3.2-1Function6.bSR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.6SR3.7.5.5(twodeficiencies)

SR3.7.5.6(threedeficiencies)

SR3.8.1.9(threedeficiencies)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)

~NRCFORM36BA(4.95)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGE(3)6OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofiVRCForm386A)(17)Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:

Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed tothedeficient procedures usedforthetestingofsafety-related logiccircuitsbecause:0Allsafety-related logiccircuitsweretestedtothecompleterequirements oftheITSSRs.0Nocomponent failureswereidentified duringthistesting.0Theidentified surveillance inadequacies didnotresultintheunavailability ofthesafetysystemwhencalledon.0Theaffectedsystemshadsufficient redundancy tomitigateanaccidentintheeventthattheuntestedlogicfailed.Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:0Procedures associated withperforming theITSSRswererevised,asnecessary, tofullycomplywiththeSRs.0All16deficiencies intestingofsafety-related logiccircuitswerecorrected bycompleting therequiredtestingpriortothecomponent havingtobeoperablepertheITS.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:

0Surveillance testprocedures identified bytheGL96-01ReviewTeamwillbeverifiedtofullycomplywiththeITSSRspriortothenextscheduled surveillance fortheassociated component.

0Findingsforcomponents thatcouldhavethepotential foradversely affecting asafetyfunctionwerecorrected duringthe1996Refueling outage.Findingsidentified aseither"weaknesses" or"proactive initiatives" willberesolvedpriortostartupfromthe1997Refueling outage.0AspartofContinuing

Training, NRCGL96-01,GL96-01ReviewTeamfindings, andlessonslearnedwillbeprovidedtoappropriate personnel.

ThePlantChangeRequestIPCR)processwillbereviewed, toensurethattheprocessforanyplantmodification (thatchangesorinstallssafety-related logiccircuits) includesconsideration ofthelessonslearnedfromGL96-01.NRCFORM366A(4.95)

NRCFORM36/AI4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER95-005-00PAGEI3)7OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AJl17)Vl.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:

NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:LER93-005wasasimilarevent(failuretoperformTSSR,resulting inacondition prohibited byTS),withadifferent rootcause(misinterpretation ofTS).0LER94-004wasasimilarevent(missedsurveillances notidentified inLER93-005,resulting inacondition prohibited byTS),withasimilarrootcause(lackofclearlydefinedinterpretations ofTSrequirements).

C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:

NoneNRCFORM366AI4-95I