ML17309A236
| ML17309A236 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1982 |
| From: | CAPLAN R N Sierra Club |
| To: | DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A639 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8203150125 | |
| Download: ML17309A236 (32) | |
Text
REGULATORY IRMATIONDISTRIBUTION SYST(RIDS)rgb'PR'vACCESSION NBR:82031501?5 DOC~DATE:82/03/11NOTARIZED,'
NO...DOCKETFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUni,t1E'Rochester G05000240AUTHBYNAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION CAPLANERAN~SierraClubRECIP~NAMERECIPIENT AFFILIATIONDENTONEH~REOfficeofNu'clearReactorRegulationp Director
SUBJECT:
Forwardspetit)onforordertoshowcausewhyfacilityOLshouldnotbesuspended orwhypermission
',.torestartreactorshouldnetbewiIthheld until,actionshave'been"taken.toassureIprotectionof>publicsafety.DI'STRIBUTION CODE:YE03SCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
[ENCL-LSIIE:.3-Ll~TITLE:RequestforNRRAction(e'g,2.206Petitions)8Related)Correspondenc NOTES:1copy:SEPSectsLdr.05000244RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME ORB05BCLYONSRJ~01INTERNAL:
EDO/ACBELD/REDNRR/PPAS'COPIES'TTRENCL1111111111RECIP'IENT IDCODE/NAME ORB05LAELDNRRDIR,'COPIESLTTRENCL11111111EXTERNAL:
LPDRNSIC0305111NRCPDRNTIS021111'TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR~ENCL HHI'1Hh'IH'1HPfhHH SPECIALHANDLINGREQUIREDCHANGEDTOPDRDATAENTRYCHANGE824IlEgQQQtcPDRandmakeotherchangesasnotedonpink'coding sheetDDCIQClppQgchangedtcPDR.RequestPDRQClistandattachnotetoDMBredistribution MICROGRAPHICS-RefilmPl-g>gF44gQandchangemicrofilm address SIERRA-=:CLUB530BushStreetSanFrancisco, California 94108(415)981-8634Pleasereplyto:278Washington Blvd.Oswego,NewYork13126HaroldDenton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555
DearMr.Denton:
EnclosedforfilingisaPetitionForpreparedbytheSierraClub.ThepetitionOrdpertainstotheseGinnaNuclearPowerPlant,DocketNo.50-244,andarisesfromtheJanuary25,1982,accident.
Asstaffreviewoftheaccidentisalreadyinprogress, werequestpromptresponsetoourpetition.
Verytnulyyours,RuthN.Caplan,ChairSierraClubNationalEnergyCommittee Enclosure cc.withpetition:
SenatorGaryHartSenatorAlanSimpsonCongressman MorrisUdallCongressman RichardOttingerCongressman EdwardMarkeyCongressman TobyMoffettRichardGoldsmith, Esq.KarinSheldon,Esq.VawterParker,SCLDFJosephFontaine, President, SierraClubEugeneCoan,SierraClubJesseRiley,NuclearSubcom,SierraClubRichardLippes,Chair,AtlanticChapterBeatriceAnderson, Chair,Rochester GroupRobertPollard,UnionofConcerned Scientists JohnE.Maier,Rochester Gas8Electric~8P03150125 820311PDRADOCK05000244'~~G,.'...,'PDR rlgg1~CttlII'Pf%f~Mk'Jf0 UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterof))Rochester GasandElectricCorporation
))R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant))DocketNo.50-244SIERRACLUBPETITIONFORORDERTOSHOWCAUSEINTRODUCTION Thispetitionisbroughtbefore theOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation bytheSierraClub.Pursuantto10CFR2.206,50.54,50.100and50.109,andforreasonssetforthbelow,theSierraClubrequestsChatRochester GasandElectricCompanyberequiredtoshowcause,asprovidedin10CFR2.202,whytheoperating licenseforCheGinnanuclearreactorinOntario,NewYork,shouldnotbesuspended, orinChealternative, whypermission Core-startthereactorshouldnotbewithheld, untilsuchtimeasessential actionshavebeentakenbyChelicenseeandCheCommission toassureCheprotection ofpublichealthandsafety.Thenecessity forsuchactionsarisesfromCheaccidentonJanuary25,1982,whichwasinitiated byasteamgenerator tubebreakandwhichtriggered asiteemergency.
Inrequesting thisaction,theSierraClubwishestostressourconcernregarding Chepotentially serioussafetyimplications oftheGinnaaccident, notonlytoour500memberslivinginRochester, butalsoCoChegeneralpublic.Further,asanationalenvironmental organisation withapproximately 225,000membersacrossChecountryand18,000membersinNewYorkState,weareconcerned aboutthe 4~k$~~~4'~F~~lekrr,krkIr4J~I~tI'~Jk~(~rark.JkJI~4(F(~Jj~rCFkJl>r','FP~kkrr"i,~TP.t;4k~-\4~~,I,=(F,rl~An,'I\CllIII'kk'lF4~r4~4V~44~l'4r4If4CFI,4FF4'j implications ofCheGinnaaccidentforChesafeoperation ofotherpressurized waterreactors1nNewYorkandacrossChecountry.GivenCheclearsafetyimplications ofbothunder-andover-pressurization whichcanarisesubsequent; toasteamgenerator tubebreak,theSierraClubconcurswithCheNovember24,1981,"Informa-tionReport;-SteamGenerator TubeExperience" byNRCstaffwhichstates:TheseCubes,likemanyinterface components, affectbothCprimaryandsecondary) systems,andtheirfailureisanoperational aswellasaotentialsafetconcern.Therefore, Chesteamgenerator mustbeviewedaspartofChetotalsysteminwhichitoperates.
Thus,maintaining Cheintegrity ofChetubesrequiresasystemsapproachthatshouldencompass mechanical, structural,
- material, andchemicalconsiderations.
(page35,emphasisadded)RELIEFREQUESTED TheSierraClubrequestsChatCheDirectorofNuclearReactorRegulation in1tiateafullreviewbystaffofmatterspertaining CotheabilityofthelicenseetosafelyoperatethereactorsoasCoprotectpublichealthandsafety,inightoftheJanuary25thacci-dent.Suchreviewshouldbemadepartofthereviewnowinprogressbystaffandshouldinclude,butneednotbelimitedCo,thespecificareasdetailedbelow.Pendingcompletion ofthisreviewbythestaff,theOperating LicenseforGinnashouldbesuspended, orinthealter-native,re-startofChereactorshouldnotbepermitted.
l.ThecauseoftheCubebreakinitiating CheJanuary25,1982,accidentshouldbethoroughly explained andcorrective actiontakenCopreventsuchbreaksinthefuture.Themechanical damagearisingfromloosepiecesofmetalshouldbestudiedinChecontextofthegenericcorrosion problemsatGinna.Specifically, corrosion arisingfromAVT(allvolatiletreatment) controlofsecondary waterchemistry shouldbeaddressed inrelationtodentingoftubes,stress 0EI corrosion, andintergranular attack.Thisshouldincludecorrosion inChefeedwater systemandcorrosive impurities introduced bycondenser leaks.2.TheadequacyofChesteamgenerator Cubetestingprogramshouldbeevaluated andadetermination maderegarding thefollowing issues:a.IsCheroutinemulti-frequency eddycurrenttestingmethodbeingemployedatGinnaChebestavailable givencurrentstate-of-Che-art?
Ifnot,whatJustification isCherefornotemploying Chebestavailable technology, inlightofchronicCubedegredation problemsatGinnaandatotherPWR'sandCheexistence oftechniques suchasfiberopticexamination?
c.DoesChecurrenttestingprogram,whichonlytestsasampleofCubesandwhichdoesnottesttheirfulllength,providesufficient information topreventtubefailure?3.Thetechnical specifications definingtheextentofallowable tubedegredation forsteamgenerator Cuberejections shouldbere-viewedinlightoftheGinnaaccidenttodetermine whethertheyaresufficiently stringent topreventaCubebreak.4.Theincreased riskofsteamgenerator Cubebreaks/leaks, ifRG8Eoperatesthereactorwithouthavingproceeded withChepreventa-tivesleevingprogramoriginally scheduled fortheSpring,1982,refueling outage,shouldbeassessedandadetermination madeastowhethertheoriginalscheduleshouldbeadheredto.5.Thesafetyimplications ofcurrentandproposedpluggingandsleevingofsteamgenerator tubesandoffurtherrepairssuchasinsertion ofstabilizing cablesshouldbeexaminedinorderCoassessadditional stress,suchasfromchangesinfluiddynamics, whichmay 1PIUt~N~Cuq4' beinducedintubesremaining inuse.6.Anevaluation shouldbecompleted Codetermine thesafetyimplications ofoperatoractioncurrently requiredtore-establish theinstrument airsystemandCoopenthePORVmanually.
7.Thesafetyimplications ofChefailureofthePORVCocloseshouldbeassessedinlightoftheproblemswhichdeveloped duringtheGinnaaccident, particularly withregardCothe,creationofasteambubbleinthereactorvesselasaresultofdepressurization.
Thepotential foruncovering thecore,duetoasteambubbleinChereactorvesselorelsewhere inCheprimarysystemshouldbeaddressed.
Adetermination shouldbemadeastowhethersafetyfunct1ons per-formedbythePORVrequireChatitbedesignated assafetygradeandberequired'ComeetallNRCregulations applicable tosuchsafetygradedesignation, inorderCoassuresafeoperation ofthereactor.8.Adetermination shouldbemade,giventhedemonstrated unreliability ofChePORV,astowhetherareliablemethodexistsforremovingdecayheatbymeansofChesecondary system,withoutproviding, attheveryminimum,onepathwayforremovingdecayheatwhichconsistsofsafetygradeequipment.
Suchdeterminat1on shouldalsoincludeanassessment ofChereliability ofessential auxiliary supportsystemssuchasinstrument air,andshouldconsiderthecon-sequences oflossofoff-sitepowertodetermine whetherGeneralDesignCriteria¹17of10CFRPart50AppendixAismet.9.Adetermination shouldbemadeastowhethertheemergency operatorprocedures setforthin"Westinghouse Emergency OperatorGuidelines forSteamGenerator TubeRuptureEvents"areadequatetoprotectChepublichealthandsafety.Operatordelay,orapparenthesitancy, interminating CheHPI(highpressureinfection) isofparticular concerninrelationtoCheriskofover-pressurization CW~W~WW~,IV~rrtwcW{'I'WCCC""t
~IWCri~e'CCWWCVWII{'C{WWCI5-grec,{CV{If*~v~v"ccIwvecc~CW,WW~CFIIIIc,,=~(ttrWC%"fC{C>Icccrw~WcI~~IC'IClc'iWCCIFcICIICfI,,CMI~WC{~'-yt.CC*II~'~CCI'CI,{F.t~IeqCe'tf{cc$II~lel~Iecjv,-C-$Cc~C,-~-<<-gf~g,',~~CCC~IWWIe'I~~{V~~tCiW~~W,*~WCc~,C',C~I'II-C-'.~I'C,'g,q{'IICCcgI{IC{C~c{wC'~WC'cccrW,c~-'WWWr,~CFWW ofthereactorpressurevesselasreportedinCheSpeismemorandum (seeinfra811)andtotheincreased relianceonproperfunctioning Iofsteamgenerator safetyValves.Further,CheGinnaemergency procedures shouldbeconformed toCheWestinghouse guidelines.
10.Theconditions underwhichthereactorvesselcanbecomeover-pressurized inChecourseofoperatoractiontocontralanaccidentshouldbeclearlyspecified andadetermination madeastowhetheranautomatic responsesystemwoulddecreaseChechanceofover-pressurization problemsfromdeveloping and,whether theinstal-lationofsuchasystematGinnaisanactionthat"..Millprovidesubstantial, additional protection whichisrequiredforthepublichealthandsafety...."
asprovidedin10CFR50.109.ll.TheconcernsraisedintheSpeismemorandum (ThemisSpeistoRogerNattson,"Preliminary Evaluation ofOperatorActionforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"datedJanuary28,1982,seeinfraAttachment E)regarding problemsandpotential problemsincoolingthereactorfollowing theCubebreakshouldbeaddressed; adeter-'ination madeastotheirsafetysignificance; andnecessary corrective actiontaken.TheseincludeChefollowing problems:
a.theapparentstratification intheBsteamgenerator anditseffectonslowingdepressurization ofthefaultedsteamgenerator; b.theconsequence ofanadditional coolantsystemfailure,including aleakintheAsteamgenerator or'asecondary sidesafety/relief valve"stickingopen;c.Chenecessity toremovedecayheatfrom,.the Asteamgenerator bysteamingtotheatmosphere dueCoimproperfunctioning ofChecondensor; II~~~tIIIU d.theproblemsassociated w9;ththeuseofChePORVforco'olantdischarge during"feedandbleed"cooling.12.Adetermination shouldbemadeasCoCheextenttowhichfailuretoimplement theTMIActionPlanrequirement forinstrumenta-tionCoallowdirectmeasurement ofthewaterlevelinthereactorvesselcontributed Cooperatorproblemsindetermining propertimingforoperating CheECCSpumpsandindetermining Chesizeofthesteambubble.13.Afullinvestigation.;should bemadetodetermine thestateofembrittlemhnt oftheGinnareactorpressurevesseltodetermine thelikelihood Chatover-pressurization willleadtovesselruptureasaconsequence ofpressurized thermalshock.14.TheNRCshoulddetermine whetherChereactorcanoperatesafelywithoutreplacement ofChesteamgenerator andassociated partsofChenuclearsteamsupplysystemandwhetherthenewestWestinghouse steamgenerator designwillameliorate theproblems, givenCherecentproblemswhichhavedeveloped withthisdesignatMcGuireandattEuropeanreactors.
15.Thetotalpro)ected workerexposureshouldbecalculated inadvanceofNRCapprovalofRGKE'srepairsandaspecificplandeveloped Cokeepworkerexposureaslowasreasonably achievable (ALARA).Thisshouldincludeadetermination astowhethertimeshouldbeallowedforradioactive decay,particularly ofCobalt58,inthesteamgenera-torpriorCorepairs,inordertopreventunnecessary workerexposureandstillallowallnecessary repairstobemade.16.Anoverallsafetyassessment shouldbeperformed beforeChereactorisallowedtore-startinorderthatthecombinedriskofpotential failuremodescanbedetermined, inrelationtotheprotection ofpublichealthandsafety.Ataminimumsuchanassessment should IUInhIV~~SliIIIfC addressChefollowing:
a.Chedegredation oftheGinnasteamgenerators, including Cheplugging, sleevingandotherrepairsrequiredCodateandplanned;b.Cheon-goingcontribution totubedegredation ofcorrosion arisingfromAVTcontrol,fromcondenser leakage,andfromChefeedwater system(asopposedtoChesuspected damagefromloosepiecesofmetalintheBsteamgenerator);
c.Chelackofasafetygradepathwayinthesecondary systemCoremovedecayheat;d.thechancethatoperatorerrorwillleadCoover-orunder-pressurization ofthereactorvessel;e.thestateofreactorvesselembrittlement.
Thefactswhichconstitute thebasisforourrequestaresetforthinAttachments A,B,C,DandE.Werespectfully requestthatadecisiononourpetitionberenderedforthwith.
OnbehalfofCheSierraClub,Respectfully submitted by,RuthN.Caplan,ChairSierraClubNationalEnergyCommittee 278Washington Blvd.Oswego,NewYork13126315-343-2412 IherebyaffirmChatthefactsallegedhereinaretrueandcorrectCothebestofmyknowledge andbelief.DATED:Marchll,1982RutN.Caplan P<<e~ez~rII~II\t)API,~gg,II%I AFFIDAVIT OFBEATRICEANDERSSN1.MynameisBeatriceAndersen.
Iliveat12SpinetDrive,Rochester, NewYork14625,whichisabout~milesfromtheGinnareactorownedbyRochester GasandElectric.
2.IamamemberoftheSierraClubandIchairtheRochester QroupoftheSierraClubwhichhas~50membersintheRochester area.3.OnbehalfofmyselfandtheRochester Group,Iauthorize theSierraClubtorepresent myinterests intherequestforshowcauseactionbeforetheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission.
Theseinterests includethepotential dangertomy&health andsafetyiftheGinnareactorisallowedtorestartpriortosuchactionsasarecalledforintheSierraClubshowcauserequest;.
Swornandsubscribed tobeforemethisdayof,1982.EDWINR.JEFFRIESJR.otaryPubiicintheStateofNewYorkNotaryPublcMONROECOUNTY,NEWYORKCornrnission ExpiresMarch30,19@ZMycommission expires IrrrII,dr,~~rrrJrrIIIIrrlrr'rr4rr~
ATTACHMENT
.FACTUALBASISFORSHOWSEPETITION1.OnJanuary25,1982,asteamgenerator tuberuptureatCheGinnanuclearplantinOntario,NewYork,occurred.
TheruptureoccurredinaCubewhichwaslastinspected inMay,1981,atwhichtimetheCubeshowedlessChan20$was'~ofChetubewall,according to"WeeklyInformation Report,February18,1982,fromT.A.Rehn,Assistant forOperations OfficeofCheEDOCoCheCommissioners",
includedhereinasAttachment B.2.Itisourunderstanding thatRG&Ehasnotyetbeenabletoprovideasatisfactory explanation fortheruptureofthesteamgenerator Cube.Uponinformation andbelief,aclearrelationship hasnotbeenestab-lishedbetweenloosepiecesofmetaldiscovered in';thesteamgenerator, thedamagedperipheral tubes,andCherupturedtube.Analternate explanation,linking therupturetostresscorrosion hasbeenadvancedbyRG&E.(SeeRehmmemo,page2ofEnclosure B)3.Uponinformation andbelief,theGinnaCubetestingprogramhasbeenbasedonmulti-frequency eddycurrenttestingatChetimeofrefueling.
SuchtestinghasincludedonlyasampleofCubesandonlypartofthetubelengthhasbeenexamined..
According toNuclearSafet"mosttubesweretestedtothefirstsupportplate,someCothesixthsupportplate,andafewovertheU-bend."(NuclearSafetpVS22'5pSept.-Oct.,
1981.IncludedinfraasAttachment C.4.Uponinformation andbelief,the"QualityAssurance Manual,GinnaStation-Inservice Inspection Programforthe1980-1989 Interval" allowsthetubeinspection intervaltobeextendedtoonceevery40monthsundercertainconditions.
Section2.5ofthisdocumentstates:Theinservice inspection intervals fortheexamination ofsteamgenerator tubesshallnotbemorethan24months.However,ifoveranominaltwoyearperiod(e.g.,Cwonormalfuelcycles)atleasttwoexaminations oftheseparatelegsresultinlessChan10$ofChetubeswithdetectable wallpenetration (Othan20$)andnosignificant (O,than10$)furtherpenetration oftubeswithpreviousindications, theinspection intervaloftheindividual legsmaybeextendedCoonceevery40months.(page5of22)5.Uponinformation andbelief,RGREreportedCotheNRCstaffonFebruary10,1982,ChattestsaftertheaccidentdidnotrevealseriousproblemswithChesteamgenerator CubeswhichwouldpreventRG&Efromre-starting thereactor.YetAfterfiberopticexamination wasrequiredbystaff,seriousproblemswerefoundintubespreviously plugged.JohnMaier,RGREVice-president forElectricandSteamGeneration, commented tothepressthenextday:"Thepicturesareverydramatic....
Itlookslikesomebodywentinwithahacksaw.SomeoftheCubesshowseveredentingandexternaldegredation."
(APquot;edinPalladium-Times, Feb.12,1982)Furtherexamination revealedCwopiecesofmetalweighing"'acoupleofpounds'...with oneofChemaslargeas6.5x4inchesandseven-sixteenths inchesthick."(Nucleonics WeekFeb.18,1982AsreportedinNucleonics Week,Feb.25,1872,oneRGREsourcestated:"'Somearecorroded, someareimploded, somearegustsheared.'"
4'As~~f~44-Fs~I'4rhrh,ee4I'IL4fhtIe>>IvsstF'I\I~-t4=A~~I'll*IAFlt4Frt~~I~l,hes~F(4eheVIF-)I'F'I~e44"4r4I'IH4~~e4IHh4~I~~Ve~I~h~~I'l~IehSVfht'>>=r4~I=4~Iqr~,44Ar((",'4+Ifl'4~"Yehe4VVHrs~ISVI~h~Hp*hhrr~(~~'4S,(Sht4~'4~Ie(~4"E4Hrrl,ieS\~~llFIet~~~*'ISSHIts(',~'I'44FhtI(SSt~Ilte5'4'hI"hit'e(~evr~I~~4h'ehre'4't~tChIh~A~4s,'Itt*II'th4AvV~F4 Attachment A.page2I6.Uponinformation andbelief,RG&Ewasplanninganextensive sleevingprogramCoremedycorrosion problemsregarding Chesteamgenerator tubes.InaletterfromJohnMaierCoDennisCrutchfield, January15,1982,RG8Erequested permission to"deleteChe25sleevelimitation" soChatmoresleevescouldbeinstalled duringeachsteamgenerator inspection.
(Seeinfra,Attachment D.)7.AsrecentlyasSeptember 21,1981,Ginnawasnotlistedasoneofthe11unitswiththemostserioussteamgenerator problems(NewYorkTimes,Sept.21,1981,B-10).ItisouropinionChatthisfactemphasizes theunpredictable natureofCheruptureandreinforces Cheneedformuchmorestringent testprocedures.
8.Uponinformation andbelief,Cheintroduction ofAVTcontrolofsecondary waterchemistry atGinnahasledCoproblemsofintergranular attackandtubecorrosion, requiring Chepluggingofsteamgenerator tubes.(NuclearSafet,Ibid.)9.Asindicated inthePointBeachproceedings, AVTcontroldoesnotfunctiontoprecipitate outsolidimpurities thatleakintoChegenerator anddoesnotpreventbuild-upofhardnessscaleontheheattransfersurfaces.
Bothconditions degradesteamgenerator tubes.(Docket6630,ER-10,Exhibit16Eat14-15)10.AsobservedbyNRCstaff,"denting" ofsteamgenerator tubesoacur-redinseveralPWRfacilities, including TurkeyPoint,Units3and4,andSurry,Units1and2,after4Co14monthsofoperation, following Checonversion fromasodiumphophatetreatment CoAVTchemistry forthesteamgenerator secondary coolant.("Information Report-SteamGenerator TubeExperience, November24,1981,SECY81-664,"'Appendix B,page3.)Wenotehtereport'sobservation Chat:"TubedentingismostsevereinCherigidregionsorso-called
'hardspots'nChetubesupportplates.Thesehardspotsarelocated...around Cheperipheral locations ofChesupportplatewhereCheplateiswedgedtoChewrapperandshell."(Ibid.,page3)Uponinformation andbelief,thestaffhasalreadyrequested ChatRGREhaveWestinghouse prepareareportregarding thismatter.11.TheNRC"Information Report-SteamGenerator TubeExperience" con-cludes:"copperalloysshouldbeeliminated fromallareasofChecondensate/feedwater/steam condensation cycle.Substantial evidenceexistsChatcopperoxidesinChesteamgenerators areanimportant catalystinaccelerating therateofcorrosion processes withinthesteamgenerator s."(Ibid-.,p.42)12.Condens'er leakageisalsorelevantCotheactionathand.Staffstates:"Withtheexception ofafewreactorswhicharesitedwherenoacidproducing speciesexistsinChecondenser coolingwater,allcurrently operating plantsaresusceptible todenting,ifsufficient condenser leakageoccurs.Becausecopperoxidehasbeendemonstrated tobeacatalyst, thoseplantswithcopperin"Chbirsecondary cyclesareevenmoresusceptible."
(Ibid.,AppendixA,page6)13.Steamgenerator problemsarenotautomatically solvedbyinstalling newsteamgenerators asevidenced byCheproblemsfacedbyPrairieIsland2andbyNorthAnna1.Brookhav~
NationalLaboratory commented PlI1~~Tlv('IIVv','p~'gj~~IItpfI~hl'.ff~pI11~ii>>VT~Jt~I~V)/1',gh'I1'I~\b>><<~1<<h,1IIhfl'>>t=;g~tq~hhf,r~~II-Jkrfl/f~gI,ct1.I~h~P~w"'f~IIww.bl.~T~Iht'<<~Ihb'~k.v>>ltg'TPVPCb~,f',,Pthrl'~IrtII-C>>~~,lhtI~I<<Ivthlf't~~~h~~It,lh~b*t'l1~vklk,IvtphtfV/VPhl/Q$fvtllbttPW()IlTPt'IP'khf'1~PVIyr,~Plh~tI'p<<tr~'ffI>>Pk>>hhgt,I.Vlkf<<1>>e,V'-'Il~1Wl~~'<<~~PITl'P'I111-tt'VVI'hhIttrIe>>I'I't~1"r1blIbfIb>>~I'~'hbP'1>>'gtP~>>>>h$~PI~'J Attachment A,page3'~~lastyearasfollows:ItseemsironicalthatPrairieIsland2,whichhasno'icopperinthesystem,stainless steelcondensers, andmeticulous monitoring ofwaterchemistry, shouldbetheoneunitCohavesufferedfromthisparticular phenomenon (ofCubecorrosion):
ChePrairieIslandUnitshavetodatebeena~.ihind.ng~<examp3.e ofwhatwethoughtwasCheproperwayCoavoidcorrosion problems;-'-',
I,-(Docket6630,CE-20,Exhibit40,.p.3)Suchexperiences makeitallChemoreimperative tohaveastringent testingschedulefortubesandstrictstandards forremovingtubesfromservice.14.Uponinformation andbelief,ChesequenceofeventsduringtheJanuary25accidentclearlyindicateCheinterdependency ofthenuclearsteamsupplysystemandthereactorsafetysystem.ReactortripinresponseCoChetubebreakinitiated containment isolation whichresultedinlossofinstrument air.ThisrequiredoperatoractiontoopenChePORVmanually, whenChevalvewasrequiredCorelieveover-pressurization.
Thereactorvesselbecameunder-pressurized whenthePORVstuckopenandtheblockvalvehadtobeclosed.LoweredpressureproducedasteambubbleinthetopofChereactorvesselwhenwaterflashedtosteam.Aseconddropinpressureabout30min-uteslateragainledCowaterinChereactorvesselflashingCosteam.(Source:"Preliminary Evaluation ofOperatorActionsforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"byThemisSpeis.SeeinfraAttachment E.)15.Uponinformation andbelief,CheSpeismemo.alsoindicates Chatover-pressurization ofthereactorvesselwasofconcernduringthesequenceofeventsduringwhichoperators Criedtostabilize Chereactor.First,chargingpumpswererestarted beforeCheBsteamgenerator wasisolated, leadingCoabuild-upofreactorpressure.
Second,CheSIpumpwasrestarted withoutapparentneedCodoso,whichhaselicitedconcernregarding operatorhesitance toterminate HPIandCheconsequence forpressurized thermalshock.16.According Cothe"Information Report-SteamGenerator TubeExper-ience,"thetotalman-remsexposurecanbequitesignificant.
Thereportstates:"Wherema)orrepairorreplacement effortsarere-quired,doseexpenditures mayrangefrom2000Co3500man-rems."
(Ibid,page51)Thelargestdosagereportedresultsfromsteamgenerator repairatSanOnofreUnit1,where3493man-remsexposureisreportedforthe273-dayoutageduring1980-3.981.
(Ibid,Table6)ThisismorethanChe1759man-remsforsteamgenerator replacement atSurry,Unit1orthe2140man-remsforSurry,Unit2replacement.
(Ibid.,AppendixB,page13andTable6)ItisourbeliefChatthesedoselevelspointCoCheneedtoevaluatetotalman-remsexposureindetermining thebestcourseofactiontobefollowedatGinna.
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ACHNENTBFebruar18,1982For:TheCommissioners From:T.A.Rehm,Assistant forOperations, OfficeoftheEDO~Sub'ett:
WEEKLYINFORMATION REPORT-MEEKENDINGFEBRUARY12,1992Asu+naryofkeyeventsisincludedasaconvenience tothoseCommissioners whomaypreferacondensed versionofthisreport.ContentsAdministration NuclearReactorRegulation NuclearMaterialSafetyandSafeguards Inspection andEnforcement NuclearRegulatory Research.Executive legalDirectorInternational ProgramsStateProgramsManagement andProgramAnalysisController Enclosure AGAnalysisandEvaluation ofOperational DataKSmallS.Disadvantaged BusinessUtilization LRegionsItemsApprovedbytheCommission
- Noinputthisweek.Contact:T..A.Rehm,OEDO49-27781~~T.A.Rehm,Assistant forOperations OfficeoftheExecutive DirectorforOperations fORSUBSCRIBERS ONLY R.E.GINNATherupturedtubeintheGinnasteamgenerator wasinspected inMay1981.TheECTresultsshowedthattherewas20Kpenetration (anODsignal)3to.,6in.abovethetubesheet.
Thefailedtubeisinrow42,column55whichisneartheperiphery ofsteamgenerator.
Itislocatedinthe"wedgearea"ofthesteamgenerator.
Thisisthesectionofthesupportplates'..that,doesnothavefloeholes.Threeofthesixprevioussmallleaks.thathavebeenexperienced havebeeninthat'rea:Thereisnosludgepi1einthatarea.2.TherupturedtubeintheGinnasteamgenerator hasbeeninspected
.usingfiberoptics.Therupturehasbeendetermined tostartapproximately 2,to3inchesabovethetubesheetandisapproximately 5incheslong.Theruptureis-kite-shaped withamaximumwidthof3/4to7/8inch.'G&Eostulates thattheruturewasduetostresscorrosion liestodifferential exansionbetweenthetubeandthetubewraperintheedereion(aregion.wherethetubesupportplateisfastenedtothewrapper.Profilometry, todetermine bulgingorunusualshapeofthe'tubes,showedsomebowingofthetubesintheareaoftherupture,thusaddingcredancetothistheory.Therupturedtubeisbeingpluggedandremovalofthetubeisnotanticipated'due toitslocationinthetubebundle.'GEE isplanningtousefiberopticstoinspecttherupturedtubefromthesecondary side.~Eddycurrenttesting(ECT)ofthe"B"steamgenerator hasbeencompleted.'n additiontotherupture'd tube,twentyotherhotlegtubesarescheduled tobeplugged..
Threeofthetubesareadjacenttotherupturedtubewhiletheothersaretubesnonrelated totheaccidentthatindicateintergranular attack(IGA)or>405degradation.
- Noplugging, otherthantherupturedtube,isplannedforthecoldlegofthe"B"steamgenerator.'GEE hascommitedtoECT100%ofthe"A".steat'enerator hotlegtubesplusallperiphery tubesandarandomsampleofthesludgeareatubesinthecoldlegofthe"A"steamgenerator.
ENCLOSURE B R.E.GIHHACont'd3.OnWednesday, February10,1982,membersoftheHRCstaffmetwithrepresentatives ofRochester GasandElectricCorporation (RGB)todiscusstherequirements tobemetpriortorestartoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.RGAEhadscheduled thestartupofGinnaforMonday,February15,1982,andproposedoperation untilthescheduled May15,1982refueling outage,atwhichtimetheplantwouldbeshut.downandeddycurrenttests(ECT)'of'hesteamgenerators (S/G)wouldbeperformed.
RGEEpresented information onthecauseandcorrective actionforthetubelocatedinthewedgeareathatruptured.
Inaddi-.tion,therewasadescription ofPowerOperatedReliefYalve(PORY)modifications anddiscussion ofemergency procedures.
'-RGhE'has performed extensive ECTofbothS/Gs.Therupturedtubehasbeeninspected using.fiberopticequipment andavideotape oftherupturewassho~natthemeeting.Fiberopticinspection ofthesecondary sideofthe"B"S/Gisinprogress.'n addition.to thefailedtube,the.licenseehasplugged20additional tubesinthe"B"S/Gbecauseofinter-granularattackorwastageindications.
Thestaffhasconcluded thattherewasnotsufficient technical basis~~~resentedatthistimetopermittheGinnaplanttoreturntooperation.
pecifically, thestafffeltthatpriortorestartRGAEshould:'1.Finishthefiberopticinspection ofthesecondary sideof"B"5/Gincluding inspection forlooseparts;'Z.ObtaintheS/Gdesigner's opinionontheeffectsofplugginginthewedgearea;and3.Provideamorecompletebasisforoperating fortheproposed3months..Ameetingtodiscusstheremaining'areas willbesetupwhenRGBhaspreparedtheirresponse.
IEHCLOSURE B
l Fariey1,USAATTACHMENT COneleahngtubewaspluggedatFarley1.ThcdefectwaslocatedattheU.bend,butthecauseoffailurewasnotdetermined.
Eddyeurrent inspection wasperformed on153tubesinsteamgcncrator Aand306tubesinstcamgenerator C,wheretheleakingtubewaslocated.Remotetelevision inspection wasusedtoaugmentaeddyeurrent testing,IndianPoint2and3,USATwenty-six steamgenerator tubeswerepluggedatIndianPoint2becauseofreducedtubediameteratthesupportplates.Thcscdefectswerefoundbycddy-currentinspection of1519hot-legtubes.Ginna,USANineteentubes,allinsteamgenerator B,wercpluggedatGinnaduring1979.Tlurtecnofthetubeshadindications ofintergranular attackinthetubesheetcrevice;twotubesshowedwallthinningjustabovethetubesheet.Tubecorrosion byintergranular causticSCCistypicalofsteamgenerators withalongtubesheetcrevice.AtGinna,thesefailureshaveoccurredeveryyearsince1975,theyearafterintro.ductionofAVTcontrolofsecondary-water chemistry.
Thewallthinningatsupportplates1and2wasthoughttobecausedbywaterflashingtosteamintheannulusduringtheearlyyearsofoperation.
Theseannuliarenowpackedwithcorrosion products.
Othertubeshavethistypeofdefect,butthethinningis<20%ofthetubewallthickness.
Thewastagedefectsarethoughttobecausedbyahydraulic-mechanical mechanism ratherthancorrosion becauseallaffectedtubesareintheperiphery oftheburidlewheresludgedoesnotnormallyaccumulate.
aTubeinspection wasperformed bymtdttfrequen~c eddy.current testing,asin1977aridtpyg.Theinspection patternwassim11artothatoft97g:mosttubesweretestedto.thefirstsupportplate,sometothesixthsupportplate,andafewoverthe.Upend..
About2000tubesweretestedineachsteamgenerator, witha5:1ratiobetweenthestotandcoldlegs.GinnawasthefirstPNRstationwithrecirculating steamgenerators touseMl-flowdeep-bedcondensate demineralization intheUnitedStates.vVerygoodexperience hasbeenreportedwithsteamgenerator waterchemistry controlandwiththeoperation ofthedemineralizer system.\Denting,aphenomenon causedbyingressofcltloride leadingtoacid.formingconditions, resultsinnonprotcctivc corrosion productdeposition intube-to-tubc.support annuliinstcamgenerators withdrilled-holecarbonsteelsupportplates.Ithasbeenpostulated thattheadditionofboricacidtosecondary watermitigates dentingbyformingstable,protective ironborates.Thistreatment isnowbeingusedatIndianPoint2.Ofthe437tubespluggedinthcfoursteamgenerators atIndianPoint3,dentingdefectswereobserved'in 69tubesatsupportplateintersections.
Becausedentingcausesinwarddistortion atthesup-portplate,givingrisetothepotential forSCCatthcsmall-radius U-bends,alltubesinrowIwereplugged(368tubes).Thestcamgenerators atIndianPoint3wereinspected bytechniques commonlyusedatplantswithsignificant denting.Thisincludesusingeddywurrent probesofdifferent diameterandphotographing thcsecondary sidetomeasuredistortion offlowslots.Thcsludgedepositonthetubesheetwasfoundtobesoft,and'itwasestimated thatM2%couldberemovedbylancingwithwater.Boricacidisaddedtosteamgenerators duringcondenser leakage.JoseCabrera,SpainThreetubeswerepluggedbecauseoffrettingattheantivibration bars,andonewaspluggedbecauseofphosphate wastagejustabovethetubesheet.OnlyseventubeshavebeenpluggedintheJoseCabrerasteamgenerator in2915EFPDofoperation withphosphate treatment ofsecondary water,andsixofthesefailureswerecausedbyfrettingattheantivibra-tionbars.Multifrequency eddyeurrent testingwasusedtoinspect80tubesattheU-bendandalmostalltubestothefirstsupportplate.Phosphate wastageof40to49%ofthetubewallwasdetectedinsixtubes(including 1thatwasplugged),
andwastageof30to39%wasdetectedin46tubes.Thisisthefirstreportedinstanceofphosphate wastageatJosdCabrera.KKSStade,FederalRepublicofGermanyeEddy<urrent.
Inspection.
of574tubesinsteamgenerator Iand1262tubesinsteamgenerator 2showedthatthreetubesinsteamgenerator 1and56insteamgenerator 2hadphosphate wastageof<25%ofthetubewall.Twotubeswereremovedformetallur-gicalexamination.
Stade,likeBorssele, hasIncoloy800tubesandhasusedlow-phosphate treatment (2to6mgNUCLEARSAFETY,Vol.22,No.5,September-October 1981