ML17325B555

From kanterella
Revision as of 09:14, 29 June 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems & Associated Bases,Providing one-time Extension of 18-month Surveillance Interval for Specific SRs
ML17325B555
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1999
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B553 List:
References
NUDOCS 9904230127
Download: ML17325B555 (27)


Text

ATTACHMENT 2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T 9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchL POVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOH FOROPERATION aminimumthefollovingA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ; a.Onecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmission netvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator vith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiag aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:

MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical rsourcesOPERhBLE, suspendalloperations involving COREhLTERATXOHS positivereactivity changes+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCE REUIR1DKHTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERhBLEbytheperfozmaace ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Por purposesofthisspecification, additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.

10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENT NO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliaiy feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT 2BTOAEP:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~

'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITING CONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:

Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClasslEdistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistg aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical power"sources

OPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical po~ersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requiretaencn of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirexenu 4.8.1.1.2.e.g~
  • Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b

.2.P"Commencing ini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,thelg-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;

~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZ NO.

3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT 3ATOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C

3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS I<OROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIIK<MENTS 3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:

Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andOnedieselgenerator with:Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:

3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.

11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourc'esproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'support entryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load'profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbattery'oad profilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary fecdwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment in'theturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT 86,498 ATTACHMENT 3BTOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3'/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:

a.Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:

3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1'nd 4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,'the 18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.

II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load,"profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbattcrics.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page83/48-1AMENDMENT VB,483 ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION 1AI'I4.

Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsideration Evaluation I&Mhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

According to10CFR50.92(c),

aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"

anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs).Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.

Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismade.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated?

Adiscussion ofeachoftheapplicable accidents follows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.

Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccident.

Atpresent,fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-cladding gapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18monthsrepresents over70half-lives.

Activityofaradioactive materialisgenerally considered tobenegligible after7half-lives (areduction inactivityof1/128).Bycontrast, theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereduction oflessthan1/10(fromactivated charcoalfiltration) inthefuelhandlingbuilding, andnoreduction inthecontainment, priortorelease.Therefore, theconsequences ofafuelhandling Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.

Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.

Therefore, theconsequences arenotsignificantly increased.

Accidental releaseofradioactive liuidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded, intheUFSARChapter14evaluation, thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident.

Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired.

WasteasreleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.

Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.

Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities atthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore, notbesignificantly increased.

Uncontrolled rodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized.

Withtheexception oftestingorspecialma'ntenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.

Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.

Aninterruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable.

Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence.

~Cfl Ci~IAttachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page3hUncontrolled boron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunction oftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution.

TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognized bya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.

Therefore, thepossibility ofanuncontrolled borondilutionisnotsignificantly increased.

Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.Theproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotential thatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviously evaluated accidents described abovedonotrelyonautomatic startingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermitted inModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateconfidence thattherequiredEDGwillbeavailable ifneeded.Therefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable andthepreviously evaluated consequences willnotbeincreased.

Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, basedontheabovediscussion, itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

/2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?

Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperation oftherequiredelectrical powersourcesinamannerorconfiguration different thanthosepreviously recognized orevaluated.

Nonewfailuremechanisms oftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroduced byextension ofthesubjectsurveillance intervals.

fi~,<

Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.Deferralofthespecified SRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduce afailuremechanism, andpastperformance oftheSRshasdemonstrated reliability inpassingthedeferredsurveillances.

Therefore, theavailability ofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigation isnotsignificantly reducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.

Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable andthus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thatthesechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

ATTACHMENT 5TOAEP:NRC:1322 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Attachment 5toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1Environmental Assessment I&Mhasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9)

.Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria.

(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

Asdemonstrated inattachment 4,thisproposedamendment doesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumented inattachment 1,therewillbenosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility.

Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive effluents orhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, therewillbenosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthischange.

4.i"IPC',h