ML17331B430

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Rev 0 to DC Cook Nuclear Plant E-Plan Classification Vs NUMARC/NESP-007 Deviation Basis Document.
ML17331B430
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Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 06/13/1994
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INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
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ML17331B428 List:
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AEP:NRC:1192, NUDOCS 9406220178
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ATTACHMENT 3TOAEP:NRC:1192 DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTE-PLANCLASSIFICATION vsNUMARC/NESP-007 DEVIATION BASISDOCUMENT9406220178 940613PDRADOCK05000315FPDR DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTE-PLANCLASSIFICATION vsNUMARC/NESP-007 DEVIATION BASISDOCUMENT TABLEOFCONTENTSTABLEOFCONTENTSINTRODUCTION, PURPOSEandORGANIZATION INTRODUCTION

.PURPOSEDEFINITIONS CriticalSafetyFunction(CSF)CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)Emergency ActionLevel(EAL)Emergency Condition Category(ECC).Emergency Classification Level.FissionProductBarrier.Initiating Condition (IC)Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)ModerateEarthquake Potential Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)Protected AreaRecognition CategorySafeShutdownArea.SafeShutdownEquipment

.SevereEarthquake Transient Valid.VitalArea..ORGANIZATION

.Recognition Category:

AbnormalRadLevels/Radiological Effluents

..GenericlC:AU1..GenericlC:AU2..GenericIC:SU4GenericlC:AA1.GenericIC:AA2GenericIC:AA3GenericIC:AS1GenericIC:AG1Recognition Category:

SystemMalfunctions GenericIC:SU1GenericIC:SU2..GenericIC:SU3GenericIC:SU5GenericIC:SU6556789101112131313141516PageiRev.0 TABLEOFCONTENTSGenericlC:SU7..GenericIC:SA1~GenericIC:SA2GenericIC:SA3.GenericIC:SA4.GenericlC:SA5.GenericIC:SS1.GenericIC:SS2GenericIC:SS3GenericIC:SS4GenericIC:SS5GenericIC:SS6..GenericIC:SG1..GenericIC:SG2..1718181920212122232325252627Recognition Category:

Natural/Destructive Phenomena

..GenericIC:HU1..GenericIC:HA1..282829Recognition CGenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:HU3HU4HU5HA2HA3HA4HA5HA6HS1HS2HS3HG1HG2ategory:HazardsandOtherConditions Affecting PlantSafetyHU2303031313233343435353636373738Recognition Category:

FissionProductBarriersFUELCLADEAL¹1FUELCLADEAL¹2FUELCLADEAL¹3FUELCLADEAL¹4FUELCLADEAL¹5FUELCLADEAL¹6FUELCLADEAL¹7RCSEAL¹1RCSEAL¹2RCSEAL¹33939393940404041414242PagellRev.0 TABLEOFCONTENTSRCSEALP4RCSEAIP5RCSEALP6CONTAINMENT EALW.CONTAINMENT EALP2CONTAINMENT EALP3.CONTAINMENT EALP4CONTAINMENT EALP5CONTAINMENT EAL@6..CONTAINMENT EAL87..CONTAINMENT EALP8..4343434444454545464646PageillRev.0 INTRODUCTION, PURPOSEandORGANIZATION INTRODUCTION DonaldC.CookNuclearPlanthasproposedarevisiontoitsEmergency Plantoincorporate guidancefromNUMARC/NESP%07, Revision2(January1992),"Methodology forDevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevels."TheNUMARCguidancewasdeveloped toreplacetheguidancefordevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevels(EALs)contained inNUREG4654/FEMA-REP-1 (Revision 1),"Criteria forPreparation andEvaluation ofRadiological Emergency ResponsePlansandPreparedness inSupportofNuclearPowerPlants"thatwasissuedNovember1980.TheNUMARCmethodology wasusedtodevelopasetofgenericEALguidelines, togetherwiththebasis,sothattheycouldbeusedandadaptedbyeachutilityinaconsistent manner.TheNRChasendorseduseoftheNUMARCmethodology asanacceptable alternative methodtoNUREG4654 fordeveloping plant-specific EALsinRegulatory Guide1.101,"Emergency PlanningandPreparedness forNuclearPowerReactors,"

Revision3,August1992.ThisRegulatory Guidefurtherstatesthat:"Licensees mayuseeitherNUREG4654/FEMA-REP-1 orNUMARC/NESP407 indeveloping theirEALschemebutmaynotuseportionsofbothmethodologies."

Themajordifferences betweenNUMARCguidanceandNUREG4654 guidanceare:1.Eventsthatareexplicitly coveredunder10CFR50.72 asone-hourorfour-hour reportsarenotintheUnusualEventclass.Thismeansthatitemssuchascontaminated injuredpersontransported off-site, partialcommunications losses,meteorological measurement losses,shutdownwithintherequirements oftechnical specifications, andinadvertent actuation ofECCSarenolongertreatedasemergencies.

2.Precursor conditions areexplicitly includedintheUnusualEventclass.3.Conditions suchasfire,explosion, gasreleases,

flooding, seiche,tornado,orearthquake canbedirectlyescalated onlyuptotheAlertclassification.

Escalation toSiteAreaEmergency orGeneralEmergency isbasedondegradedsystemresponseaswouldbedetermined byfissionproductbarrier,lossofACpower,orprojected effluenreleaseEALs.4.Eventsequences suchasLOCAandsteamgenerator tuberuptureareaddressed bydetermining theirlevelofchallenge toeachofthethreeprimaryfissionproductbarriers-fuelclad,reactorcoolantsystem,andthecontainment.

Thelevelofchallenge isdetermined inaccordance withtheEmergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)usingsymptoms, CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTreestatus,andrequiredentryintoEOPs.Thisallowstheoperations crewtoreadilyrecognize thecorresponding emergency classification andallowsforreadyescalation toSiteAreaEmergency orGeneralEmergency asconditions mayworsen.ThefissionproductbarriersareincludedintheCookPlant"Barriers" Emergency Condition Category(ECC).Page1of46Rev.0 PURPOSEThisdeviation documentwasdeveloped toaddressthefollowing needs:Toprovidecleardocumentation ofNUMARCguidanceandhowitwasappliedinthedevelopment ofCookPlantupgradedEALs.2.Toprovidejustification ofanyexceptions oradditions toNUMARCguidanceasitisappliedtotheCookPlant.3.Tofacilitate theregulatory approvaloftheupgradedEALsthatIsrequiredunder10CFR50AppendixE.DEFINITIONS CriticalSafetyFunction(CSF)-Subcriticality, corecooling,heatsink,pressure-temperature-stress (RCSintegrity),

containment, andRCSinventory asmonitored inaccordance withtheEmergency Operating Procedures.

CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)-Themethodbywhichlevelofchallenge toeachCSFisdetermined inaccordance withtheEmergency Operating Procedures.

Emergency ActionLevel(EAL)-Apredetermined, site-specific, observable threshold foraplantInitiating Condition thatplacestheplantinagivenemergency class.AnEALcanbeaninstrument reading;anequipment statusindicator; ameasurable parameter (onsiteoroffsite);

adiscrete, observable event;resultsofanalyses; entryintospecificemergency operating procedures; oranotherphenomenon which,ifitoccurs,indicates entryIntoaparticular emergency class.Emergency Condition Category(ECC)-AgroupingofInitiating Conditions orEALs,recognizable totheSiteEmergency Coordinator, applyingtothesameareaofconcernandthatcanlogically leadtoescalating theemergency class.Emergency Classification Level-Thesearetakenfrom10CFR50AppendixE.Theyarelnescalating order:(Notification of)UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency.

FissionProductBarrier-Oneofthethreeprincipal barrierstouncontrolled releaseofradlonuclides,

~i.e.,fuelclad,reactorcoolantsystem(RCS),andthecontainment building(CNTMT).Initiating Condition (IC)-Oneofapredetermined subsetofnuclearpowerplantconditions whereeitherthepotential existsforaradiological emergency, orsuchanemergency hasoccurred.

Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)-Severechaffenge toafissionproductbaniersufficient toconsiderthatbarrierincapable ofperforming itssafetyfunction.

ModerateEarthquake

-Earthquake thatisreadilyfeltbutdoesnotcauseobservable damagetoplantstructures.

Page2of46Rev.0 Potential Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)-Challenge toafissionproductbarriersufficient toconsiderthatbarrierdegradedinitsabilitytoperformitssafetyfunction.

Protected Area-ThatareaofD.C.Cookwhichisenclosedwithinthesecurityfence.Entrytotheprotected areaisviaoneoftheguardIslandsandrequiresasecuritybadge.Recognition Category-Alogicalandconvenient groupingofECCsusedtoquicklyeliminate non-applicable ICsorEALsfromconsideration duringEmergency Classification.

SafeShutdownArea-SelectedareaswithintheProtected Areathatmaybeoccupiedforthesecurityorsafeshutdownoftheunits.Thesafeshutdownareais:~Controlrooms~Centralalarmstation~Containment buildings inModes5and6~Thefollowing areasifaControlRoommustbeevacuated

~Thedieselgenerator rooms~The4KVrooms~VicinityofallLocalShutdownStations.

SafeShutdownEquipment

-Selectedcomponents deemednecessary toplaceandmaintainaunitinHotShutdownwithcapability toestablish andmaintainColdShutdownasdescribed inSafe-Shutdown Capability Assessment, ProposedModifications andEvaluations (AEPSC),Rev.1-1986.Inbrief,thesafeshutdownequipment canbedescribed as:~TheRCSmakeuppathfromtheRWSTviatheCCPsandBITinJection lines.~Thesecondary heatsinkconsisting oftheCST,allthreeAFWpumps,associated AFWvalves,theSGs,theSGSVs,andtheSGsafetiesandPORVs.~TheCCWsystem.~TheESWsystemincluding alternate supplytoAFW.~TheRHRsystem.~Thedieselgenerators andtheemergency ACbuses.~TheCRIDsandmostGRID-powered instrumentatlon.

~TheDCdistribution systemincluding batteries andbatterychargers.

~AllLocalShutdownStations.

~Unitcrossties forBITflow,RCPsealinjection, CSTsandAFW.SevereEarthquake

-Earthquake thatcausesobservable damagetoplantstructures.

Transient

-Acondition (1)beyondtheexpectedsteady-state fluctuations intemperature,

pressure, powerlevel,orwaterlevel,(2)beyondthenormalmanipulations oftheControlRoomoperating crew,and(3)thatwouldbeexpectedtorequireactuation offast-acting automatic controlorprotection systemstobringthereactortoanewsafe,steady-state condition.

Valid-Meansjustified.

Valid<indications>

areobtainedfrominstruments thatareconsidered operableandhavebeenotherwise independently

verified, e.g.,byobservation ofInitiating damage,byconfirmation ofaneventbyoutsideagencies, orbyredundant instruments.

ValidSlIsanactuation eitherautomatic ormanualinresponsetoaneventthatcauseslossorshrinkage ofRCSinventory orlossofsecondary inventory.

Page3of46Rev.0 VitalArea-SelectedareaswithintheProtected Areathatcontainequipment necessary forthesecurityorsafeshutdownoftheunits.Thevitalareasare:~Controlrooms~Controlroomandauxiliary cablevaults~Containment buildings

~DieselGenerator rooms~Auxiliary feedwater pumprooms~Essential servicewaterpumprooms~Spentfuelpoolarea~Electrical equipment rooms~UPSbatteryandinverterrooms~CentralalarmstationORGANIZATION Thedeviation information isorganized inthefollowing manner:~GenericICIdentifier andDescription NOTE:TheICidentifier (i.e.AU1)containsEmergency Classification Levelinformation inthesecondletter.UintheexamplestandsforUE.~Equivalent E-PlanICDescription

~BasisforICDeviation

~GenericExampleEAL(s)Note:NUMARC/NESP407 frequently providesmorethanoneexampleEALWhenmorethanoneIsprovided, logicphrasingisusedtodescribewhetherallEALsaresuggested orwhetheratleastoneEALshouldbechosen.ThisdocumentwilllistallexampleEALsfromNUMARC/NESP-007.

~12-PMP2080.EPP.101 EAL(s)~BasisforEALDeviation fromNUMARC/NESP-007 suggestions andexplanations whyanygenericEALwasnotchosenformodification asaD.C.CookEALTherearenotactualEALsfortheFissionProductBarrierRecognition Category.

Inthisrecognitlon categorytherearesymptomsofLOSSorPOTENTIAL LOSSofeachbarrier.Forthisrecognition

category, thedeviation information willconsistofNUMARC/NESP407 genericsymptomsandtheequivalent Cooksymptoms.

Page4of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGERecognition Category:

AbnormalRadLevels/Radiological Effluents GenericIC:AU1:AnyUnplanned ReleaseofGaseousorLiquidRadioactivity totheEnvironment thatExceedsTwoTimestheRadiological Technical SpecTiications for60MinutesorLonger.CookIC:Unplanned eNuentreleasegreaterthan2xTechnical Specification 3/4.11limitslastingatleast60minutes'.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsthe"valueshown"(sitespecificmonitors) indicates thatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterion andIndicates theneedtoassessthereleasewith(sitespecificprocedure):

(sitespecificlist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan60minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbebasedonthevalidreading.2.Confirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicates concentrations orreleaserateswithareleasedurationof60minutesorlongerinexcessoftwotimes(site-specific technical specifications).

3.Validreadingonperimeter radiation monitoring systemgreaterthan0.10mR/hrabovenormalbackground for60minutes[forsiteshavingtelemetered perimeter monitors.]

4.Validindication onautomatic real-time doseassessment capability greaterthan(site-specific value)for60minutesorlongerlforsiteshavingsuchcapability].

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(UE)Unplanned radioactive releaselastingmorethan60minutes't 2timesthehighalarmsetpolntonVRS-1505orVRS-2505.

Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Insteadofplacinganassessment requirement withintheECCTable,wehaveelectedtoincorporate theNOTErequirement intotheEALThiskeepstheinitialclassification schemesimple.Inaddition, theinstrument valuesusedareabovethehighalarmsetpoints whichmeansactionswillbeinprogresstoIdentifyandterminate thesourceofthegaseousradioactivity.

GenericEALs2,3,and4werenotused.GenericEAL82involvesanalysesofsamples.Thecontrolroompersonnel arenotrequiredtoreviewthesesampleresultsfortechnical specification compliance, soinclusion ofthiscomparison asanEALisnotbeneficial basedonourprocedures forcontrolling radioactive eNuents.GenericEAL83andEALLarenotapplicable sincewehaveneitheraperimeter monitoring systemnorareal-time doseassessment capability.

'fthestartingtimeofthereleaseIsunknown,the60minutetimelimitIsnotapplicable andaneventdeclaration shouldbemadeassoonasreleaseratehasbeenconfirmed tobeabovethethreshold value.Page5of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AU2:Unexpected IncreaseinPlantRadiation LevelsorAirborneConcentration.

CookIC:Unexpected increaseinplantradiation levels.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific)

Indication ofuncontrolled waterleveldecreaseInthereactorrefueling cavitywithallirradiated fuelassemblies remaining coveredbywater.2.Uncontrolled waterleveldecreaseinthespentfuelpoolandfueltransfercanalwithallirradiated fuelassemblies remaining coveredbywater.3.(Site-spec Tiic)radiation readingforirradiated fuelindrystorage.4.Validdirectarearadiation monitorreadingsincreases byafactorof1000overnormal'evels.

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels(UE)~Unexpected radiation levelsof:~>2.5mr/hrineitherControlRoomortheCentralAlarmStation~>15mr/hrinSpentFuelarea~Anuncontrolled waterleveldecreaseinanareaholdingirradiated fuelassemblies outsidethereactorvessel.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

GenericEAL¹3wasnotusedbecausewedonothavedrystorageofirradiated fuel.GenericEAL¹1andEAL¹2wereincorporated intooneEALInsteadofusingincreases of1000xnormallevels,wehaveelectedtousefixedvaluesforsimplicity.

Radiation increases intheplantdonotaffectsafeoperation unlessacontinuously mannedareaisaffected.

Thereareonlythreeareasthatarecontinuously manned:bothcontrolroomsandsecurity's centralalarmstation.Ifradiation levelsincreaseintheseareasthemostprobablecausewillbeareleaseofradioactive gaswhichwillbeevaluated usingtheEffiuents ECC.However,thisEALwillcoveranyeventinvolving thelossofcontrolofaradioactive sourcesuchasaradiography device.The15mr/hrlimitforthespentfuelareaprovidesareasonable leveltoidentifythelossofwaterleveleventbeforeirradiated fuelisuncovered.

Normallevelscanbeconsidered asthehighestreadinginthepast24hoursexcluding thecurrentpeakvalue.Page6of46Rev.0

ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:SU4:FuelCladDegradation CookIC:Anyindication offuelcladdamageinactivefuel.ICDeviation:

ThisIChasbeenmovedfromtheSystemsRecognitlon CategorytotheRecognition CategoryforAbnormalRadiation/Radiological ENuents/Fuel Damage.Sincethefuelcladlsnota"system"butdamagetothecladIsassociated withabnormalradiological conditions, thecategorychangewasmadeforconsistency.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific) radiation monitorreadingsIndicating fuelcladdegradation greaterthanTechnical SpecTiicatlon allowable limits.2.(Site-specific) coolantsampleactivityvalueindicating fuelcladdegradation greaterthanTechnical SpecTiication allowable limits.CookEAL(s):ECC:R4FuelDamage(UE)Anyindication offuelcladdamage:~RCSactivity>1.0pCI/graml-131DoseEquivalent for>48Hours~RCSactivity>100/6yCI/gramModes:ALLEALDeviation:

Cooknolongerhasafailedfueldetector, sogenericEAL81Isnotapplicable andnootherequivalent sitespecificEALisavailable.

Page7of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AA1:AnyUnplanned ReleaseofGaseousorLiquidRadioactivity totheEnvironment thatExceeds200TimestheRadiological Technical Specifications for15MinutesorLonger.CookIC:Unplanned eNuentreleaselastingatleast15minutes'hat resultsinaprojected siteboundarydoserategreaterthan10mrem/hr.ICDeviation:

DuetoourshortNorth-South siteboundary, 200xthetechnical specification limitswouldexceedthethreshold forasiteareaemergency declaration.

Ourcriteriaof10mrem/hratthesiteboundaryprovidesadequatemarginagainstunnecessary Alertdeclaration whileproviding sometimemargintotheSiteAreaEmergency threshold.

The10mrem/hrisalsospecifically mentioned ingenericEALk3asavalidlimitforsiteboundarydoserateifaperimeter monitoring systemwasavailable.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsthevalueshownindicates thatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterion andindicates theneedtoassessthereleasewith(sitespecificprocedure):

(sitespecificlist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbebasedonthevalidreading.2.Confirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicates concentrations orreleaseratesinexcessof(200xsite-specific technical speciTications) for15minutesorlonger.3.Validreadingonperimeter radiation monitoring systemgreaterthan10.0mR/hrsustained for15minutes[forsiteshavingtelemetered perimeter monitors.]

4.Validindication onautomatic real-time doseassessment capability greaterthan(200xsite-specific Technical Specifications value)for15minutesorlonger[forsiteshavingsuchcapability].

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(Alert)Unplanned radioactive releaselastingmorethan15minutesat>4.0x10yCI/cconVRS-1505orVRS-2505.

Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Aspreviously discussed indeviation forGenericEALAU1,insteadofplacinganassessment requirement withintheECCTable,wehaveelectedtoincorporate theNOTErequirement intotheEALThiskeepstheinitialclassification schemesimple.Inaddition, theinstrument valuesusedareabovethehighalarmsetpoints whichmeansactionswillbeinprogresstoidentifyandterminate thesourceofthegaseousradioactivity.

Alsoaspreviously discussed, thethreshold valuewasbackcalculated froma10mrem/hrsiteboundarydoserateusingaveragesitemeteorology of4.5mphwindspeedandPasquillcategoryD.GenericEALsP2and@4werenotusedsincethe200xT.S.limitisnotpartofourIC.'fthestartingtimeofthereleaseisunknown,the60minutetimelimitlsnotapplicable andaneventdeclaration shouldbemadeassoonasreleaseratehasbeenconfirmed tobeabovethethreshold value.Page8of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AA2:MajorDamagetoIrradiated FuelorLossofWaterLevelthatHasorWillResultintheUncovering ofIrradiated FuelOutsidetheReactorVessel.CookICs:R-2:Lossofwaterlevelthatcanuncoverirradiated fueloutsidethereactorvessel.R-3:MajordamagetoIrradiated fuel.ICDeviation:

ThegenericICwassplitforinclusion into2ECCs.Thereisnodeviation inintentasbothpartsofthegenericICareincludedintoourclassification scheme.Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.A(site-specific setpoint) alarmononeormoreofthefollowing radiation monitors:

(site-spec Tiicmonitors)

~Refuelfloorarearadiation monitor~Fuelhandlingbuildingventilation monitor~Fuelbridgearearadiation monitor2.Reportofvisualobservation ofirradiated fueluncovered.

3.Waterlevellessthan(site-specific) feetfortheReactorRefueling Cavitythatwillresultinirradiated fueluncovery.

4.Waterlevellessthan(site-specific) feetfortheSpentFuelPoolandFuelTransferCanalthatwillresultinirradiated fueluncovery.

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels~Unplanned decreaseinwaterlevelthatresultsinuncoveryofanirradiated fuelassemblyoutsidethereactorvessel.Modes:ALLECC:R4FuelDamage(Alert)~Visualindication ofdamagetoanIrradiated fuelassemblyANDvalidhighalarmonANYofthefollowing:

~ERS-1301/1401/2301/2401

~ERS-1305/1405/2305/2405

~VRS-1501/2501Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

GenericEAL81isnotusedsincetherearenotareamonitorsinallregionswherefueluncoverycanoccur.GenericEALP2"Reportsofvisibledamage"wasmodifiedtorequireconfirmation viavalidgas/particulate monitoralarmsthatcladdamagehasoccurredinorderto'escalate totheAlertlevel.GenericEALsP3and44donotdefinelossofwaterlevelintermsoffeetbecauseremotelevelmeasuring systemsdonotexist.Instead,lossofwaterlevelisdefinedasactualuncoveryofafuelassemblywhichisequivalent tothegenericEALs.Page9of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGiCAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AA3:ReleaseofRadioactive MaterialorIncreases inRadiation LevelsWithintheFacilitythatImpedesOperation ofSystemsRequiredtoMaintainSafeOperations ortoEstablish orMaintainColdShutdown.

CookIC:Radiation increases thatimpedesafeoperation.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Valid(site-specific) radiation monitorreadingsgreaterthan15mr/hrinareasrequiring continuous occupancy tomaintainsafetyfunctions:

~(sitespecTiiclist)2.Valid(site-specific) radiation monitorreadingsgreaterthan(site-specific) valuesinareasrequiring infrequent accesstomaintainplantsafetyfunctions.

~(sitespecificlist)NOTE:TheEmergency Directorshoulddetermine thecauseoftheincreaseinradiation levelsandreviewotherICsforapplicability.

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels(Alert)~Unexpected radiation levelsof:~>15mr/hrineitherControlRoomortheCentralAlarmStation~>100mr/hrgeneralareainAuxiliary buildinghallwaysModes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page10of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AS1:BoundaryDoseResulting fromanActualorImminentReleaseofGaseousRadioactivity Exceeds100mRWholeBodyor500mRChildThyroidfortheActualorProjected DurationoftheRelease.CookIC:Projected siteboundarydosegreaterthan100mremTEDEor500mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan100mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.ICDeviation:

WeareusingTEDEandCDEterminology.

Ifatanytimeduringanaccident, thesiteboundarydoserateexceeds100mrem/hr,webelieveitisinthepublicinteresttodeclareasiteareaemergency.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedthevalueshownindicates thatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterion andindicates theneedtoassessthereleasewith(site-specific procedure).

(site-spec Tiiclist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.2.Avalidreadingsustained for15minutesorlongeronperimeter radiation monitoring systemgreaterthan100mr/hr.3.Validdoseassessment capability indicates doseconsequences greaterthan100mRwholebodyor500mRchildthyroid.4.Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding 100mr/hrexpectedtocontinueformorethanonehours;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatechildthyroiddosecommitment of500mrforonehourofinhalation.

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(SAE)Projected siteboundarydosegreaterthan100mremTEDEor500mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan100mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

GenericEAL¹1isnotused.Following anymajoraccident, theSECwillbeginaninitialdoseassessment ifindication ofgaseouseNuentexist.WhentheEOFismanned,theywillassumedoseassessment duties.Duringtheinitialstagesofanaccident, theSECwillnotbeabletocompleteadoseassessment withinthefirst15minutesasrequiredbyGenericIC¹1.Thiscouldresultinthedeclaration ofasiteareaemergency.

BecauseofourlocationonLakeMichigan, thewinddirection iscriticaltoevacuation planning.

Thusanarbitrary 15minutelimitbasedonaradiation monitorreadingaloneisnotinthebestinterestofthepublicforasiteareaemergency declaration.

However,wewilldeclareasiteareaemergency ifthedoseRATEataninlandlocationonthesiteboundaryexceeds100mrem/hr.Thiscouldresultinanearlyevacuation ifaneventofthisseriousness occurs.Notethatthisdeclaration Isaresultofthedoseassessment methodology andevacuation recommendations wouldbeavailable atthesametime.EAL¹2wasnotusedbecausewedonothaveaperimeter monitoring system.Page11of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS/FUEL DAMAGEGenericIC:AG1:BoundaryDoseResulting fromanActualorImminentReleaseofGaseousRadioactivity Exceeds1000mRWholeBodyor5000mRChildThyroidfortheActualorProjected DurationoftheReleaseUsingActualMeteorology.

CookIC:Projected siteboundarydosegreaterthan1000mremTEDEor5000mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsuiveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan1000mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.ICDeviation:

WeareusingTEDEandCDEterminology.

Ifatanytimeduringanaccident, thesiteboundarydoserateexceeds1000mrem/hr,webelieveitisinthepublicinteresttodeclareageneralemergency.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedthevalueshownindicates thatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterion andindicates theneedtoassessthereleasewith(site-specific procedure)

~(site-specific list)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.2.Avalidreadingsustained for15minutesorlongeronperimeter radiation monitoring systemgreaterthan1000mr/hr.3.Validdoseassessment capability indicates doseconsequences greaterthan1000mRwholebodyor5000mRchildthyroid.4.Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding 1000mr/hrexpectedtocontinueformorethanonehours;oranalysesoffieldsuiveysamplesindicatechildthyroiddosecommitment of5000mrforonehourofinhalation.

CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(GE)Projected siteboundarydosegreaterthan1000mremTEDEor5000mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan1000mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

GenericEAL81isnotused.Following anymaJoraccident, theSECwillbeginaninitialdoseassessment ifindication ofgaseouseNuentexist.WhentheEOFismanned,theywillassumedoseassessment duties.Duringtheinitialstagesofanaccident, theSECwillnotbeabletocompleteadoseassessment withinthefirst15minutesasrequiredbyGenericIC@1.Thiscouldresultinthedeclaration ofageneralemergency.

BecauseofourlocationonLakeMichigan, thewinddirection iscriticaltoevacuation planning.

Thusanarbitrary 15minutelimitbasedonaradiation monitorreadingaloneisnotinthebestinterestofthepublicforageneralemergency declaration.

However,wewilldeclareageneralemergency ifthedoseRATEataninlandlocationonthesiteboundaryexceeds1000mrem/hr.Thiswillresultinanearlyevacuation ifaneventofthisseriousness occurs.Notethatthisdeclaration isaresultofthedoseassessment methodology andevacuation recommendations wouldbeavailable atthesametime.EAL42wasnotusedbecausewedonothaveaperimeter monitoring system.Page12of46Rev.0 SySTEMMALFUNCTIONS ecognition Category:

SystemMalfunctions GenericIC:SU1:LossofAllOffsitePowertoEssential BussesforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:LossofalloffsitepowertoACemergency busesfor>15minutes.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Lossofpowerto(site-spec Tiic)transformers forgreaterthan15minutes.AND~Atleast(site-specific) emergency generators aresupplying powertoemergency busses.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(UE)NEITHERSwitchyard NOR69KVpowersuppliesavailable for>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4,5 EALDeviation:

Thereisnoneedtoextendthisto"DEFUELED" sinceourspentfuelcoolingisredundant betweenunits.AddedIC/EALtoECC:SXtoaddressthelossofspentfuelcooling.TherewasnoneedtostatethattheDGsaresupplying theemergency busessincecoincident failureoftheDGsisclearlyrecognizable asalossofallACpowerwhichIsseparately classified.

GenericIC:SU2:Inability toReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnical Specification Limits.CookIC:UnitisNOTplacedinrequiredMODEwithinTechnical Specification LCOactiontimelimit.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):PlantIsnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithin(site-spec Tiic)Technical Specifications LCOActionStatement Time.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-7Technical Specifications (UE)UnitlsNOTplacedlnrequiredMODEwithinTechnical Specification LCOactiontimelimit.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page13of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SU3:Unplanned LossofMostorAllSafetySystemAnnunciation orIndication intheControlRoomforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:Unplanned lossofallcontrolroomannunciators for>15minutesBUTSPDSorPPCisoperable.

ICDeviation:

Deletedreference tolossof'most"annunciators andlossofallormostIndicators.

Thelossof"most"annunciators isnotplausible withourdesign.Theonlysinglefailurethataffectsamajorityoftheannunciators willcausethelossof"ALL'nnunciators.

Lossofindications wasdeletedfromthisICbecauseamajorlossofindication (CRIDs)willalsorenderthecompensatory non-alarming Indications inoperable (SPDS/PPC) becauselossoftheCRIDswilldisableInputtothesesystemsalso.Applicable GenericEAL(s):Allofthefollowing conditions exist:~Lossofmostorall(site-specific) annunciators associated withsafetysystemsforgreaterthan15minutes.~Compensatory non-alarming Indications areavailable.

~IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor, thelossoftheannunciators orindicators requiresincreased surveillance tosafelyoperatetheunit(s).~Annunciator orIndicator lossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciators orIndicators (UE)Unplanned lossallcontrolroomannunciators for>15minutesBUTSPDSorPPCisOPERABLE.

Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Deletedrequirement forSStomakeaJudgement ontheneedforincreased surveillance tosafelyoperatewithoutadditional personnel becausewebelieveatthistimethatincreased surveillance willalwaysbenecessary.

Page14of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SU5:RCSLeakage.CookIC:Anyofthefollowing:

~PressureBoundaryleakage>10GPM~UnidentTiied leakage>10GPM~Identified leakage>25GPM~SGtubeleakage>10GPMICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Unidentified orpressureboundaryleakagegreaterthan10gpm.ORIdentified leakagegreaterthan25gpm.CookEAL(s):ECC:S4RCSLeakage(UE)Anyofthefollowing:

~PressureBoundaryleakage>10GPM~Unidentified leakage>10GPM~Identified leakage>25GPM~SGtubeleakage>10GPMModes:1,2,3,4,5 EALDeviation:

AddedSGtubeleakagetotheEALtoforceanUnusualEventdeclaration onsmallSGtubeleaks.ThiswasdonetomeettheintentoftheFissionProductBarrierTable-Containment LosssymptomofSGsecondary sidereleasewithPrimary-to-Secondary leakage.Page15of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SU6:Unplanned LossofAllOnsiteorOffsiteCommunication Capabilities.

CookIC:Unplanned lossofallonsiteORoffsitecommunication capabilities.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Eitherofthefollowing conditions exist:~Lossofall(site-specific list)onsitecommunication capability affecting theabilitytoperformroutineoperations.

OR~Lossofall(site-specific list)offsitecommunications capability.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-8LossofCommunIcation SystemsUnplanned lossofALLonsiteelectronic communication capabilities:

~Telephone

~Pagesystem~RadiosORUnplanned lossofALLoffsiteelectronic communication capabilities:

~Telephone (offsite)

~Microwave transmission

~NRCphone~Loaddispatchline~Cellulartelephones ofPMandAPMsModes:ALLEALDeviation:

NoSignificant Deviation Page16of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SU7:Unplanned LossofRequiredDCPowerDuringColdShutdownorRefueling ModeforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:Unplanned loss'fallvitalDCpowerinModes5or6forgreaterthan15minutes.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Eitherofthefollowing conditions exist:~Unplanned lossofVitalDCpowertorequiredDCbussesbasedon(site-specific) busvoltageindications.

AND~FailuretorestorepowertoatleastonerequiredDCbuswithin15minutesfromthetimeofloss.CookEAL(s):ECC:SQLossofDCPowerUnplanned loss'f250VDCbusesABANDCDfor>15minutes.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:N/ACookIC:Unplanned lossofanyfunctionneededtomaintaincoldshutdowninModes5or6.Unplanned lossofcoolingtothespentfuelpoolforgreaterthan60minutesInanyMode.ICDeviation:

AddedtheseICsattheUEleveltoprovideprecursors forgenericICSA3.Applicable GenericEAL(s):NoneCookEAL(s):Unplanned tossofshutdowncoolingforgreaterthan15minutesinModes5or6.Unplanned lossofSFPcoolingforgreaterthan60minutesinALLmodes.EALDeviation:

AddedtheseEALsattheUEleveltoprovideprecursors forgenericICSA3.'DCbusislostforthepurposeofE-Planclassification wheneverbatteryvoltageislessthan210vdc.Page17of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SA1:LossofAllOffsitePowerandLossofAllOnsiteACPowertoEssential BussesDuringColdShutdownorRefueling Mode.CookIC:CompletelossofallACemergency busesfor>15minutesinModes5or6.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing condition exist:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific) transformers.

AND~Failureof(site-specific) emergency generators tosupplypowertoemergency busses.AND~Failuretorestorepowertoatleastoneemergency buswithin15minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(Alert)~CompletelossofallACemergency busesfor>15minutesinModes5or6.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:

ThegenericEALwasnotusedbecauselossofallACpowerisaspecificEOPeventthatisreadilyrecognized byalllicensedpersonnel.

GenericIC:SA2:FailureofReactorProtection SystemInstrumentation toCompleteorInitiateanAutomatic ReactorScramOnceaReactorProtection SystemSetpointHasBeenExceededandManualScramWasSuccessful.

CookIC:ATWSterminated bymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):(Site-specific) indication(s) existthatindicatethatreactorprotection systemsetpointwasexceededandautomatic scramdidnotoccur,andasuccessful manualscramoccurred.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(Alert)ATWSterminated bymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.Modes:1,2EALDeviation:

Didnotincludesite-specific indications ofanATWS.Recognition ofATWSisanimmediate actionoftheEOPsanddoesnotneedtohavespecificindications calledoutintheEALPage18of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SA3:Inability toMaintainPlantinColdShutdown.

CookIC:Inability tomaintainRCStemperature lessthan200'FinModes5or6.Inability tomaintainspentfuelpooltemperature lessthan200'FinallModes.Inadvertent criticality InModes3,4,5or6.Inadvertent criticality withaconcurrent lossofRCSborationcapability lnModes34.[SAEonly]ICDeviation:

TheseICsareincludedinanECCtitled"LossofShutdownFunctions".

Tomaintaintheplantlncoldshutdown, itisnecessary tokeepRCStemperatures below200'Fandmaintainadequateshutdownmargin.CooklCsWand83areclearlytiedtothedefinltlon of'coldshutdown".

Lossofspentfuel poolcoolingwasaddedtoaddressdeletionof"DEFUEUNG'rom SA1.Coverageofaninadvertent criticality isprovidedbytwoICsandshouldnotbeconfusedwithanATWS.Alossofreactivity controlthatresultsincriticality exceedsthethreshold ofthegenericIC.However,adilutionorxenondecayeventdoesnotcausearapidpowerexcursion andcanbeterminated bypromptinitiation ofboratlonperT.S.LCOactionrequirements.

Sincefuelcladdamageisunlikely, thisICexistsattheAlertlevel.Ifinadvertent criticality occurswithaconcurrent lossofboroncontrol,thesecondICpromptsaSiteAreaEmergency declaration duetotheincreased potential forfuelcladdamage.Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Lossof(site-specific)

Technical Specification requiredfunctiontomaintaincoldshutdown.

ANDTemperature increasethateither:~ExceedsTechnical Specification coldshutdowntemperature limitOR~ResultsInuncontrolled temperature riseapproaching coldshutdownTechnical SpecTiicatlon limit.CookEAL(s):ECC:SALossofShutdownFunctions Anyofthefollowing:

~LossofshutdowncoolingANDRCStemperature isincreasing inanuncontrolled mannerandexpectedtoexceed200'FinModes5or6.~LossofspentfuelpoolcoolingANDspentfuelpooltemperature isincreasing inanuncontrolled mannerandexpectedtoexceed200'FinallModes.~Inadvertent criticality inModes3,4,5or6.[Alertonly]~Inadvertent criticality withaconcurrent lossofRCSborationcapability inModes3W.[SAEonly]EALDeviation:

Eliminated thedirecttiebetweenlossofafunctionANDRCStemperature increaseabove200'FforthelossofCCWandtheinadvertent criticality.

Formoreinformation seeICdeviation section.Page19of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SA4:Unplanned LossofMostorAllSafetySystemAnnunciation orIndication inControlRoomwitheither(1)aSignificant Transient inProgress, or(2)Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators areUnavailable.

CookIC:~Unplanned lossofallcontrolroomannunciators for)15minutes-AND-Either:~Atransient isinprogress.

~SPDSandPPCareINOPERABLE.

~Unplanned lossofthreeCRIDs.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Lossofmostorall(site-specific) annunclators associated withsafetysystemsforgreaterthan15minutes.~IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor, thelossoftheannunciators orIndicators requiresIncreased surveillance tosafelyoperatetheunit(s).~Annunciator orIndicator lossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.~Eitherofthefollowing:

Asignificant planttransient isinprogress.

OR~Compensatory non-alarming indications areunavailable.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciators orIndicators (Alert)~Unplanned lossofthreeCRIDs.~Unplanned lossofallcontrolroomannunciators for)15minuteswitheither:~Atransient IsInprogress.

~SPDSandPPCareINOPERABLE.

Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Deletedrequirement forSStomakeaJudgement ontheneedforincreased surveillance tosafelyoperatewithoutadditional personnel becausewebelieveatthistimethatIncreased surveillance willalwaysbenecessary.

Page20of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SA5:ACPowerCapability toEssential BussesReducedtoaSinglePowerSourceforGreaterThan15MinutessuchthatAnyAdditional SingleFailureWouldResultinStationBlackout.

CookIC:AnyACpoweralignment for>15minutesthatcouldallowasinglefailuretocausealossofallACpower.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific) transformers forgreaterthan15minutes.AND~Onsitepowercapability hasbeendegradedtoone(trainof)emergency bus(ses)poweredfromasingleonsitepowersupplyduetothelossof:(Site-specific list)CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(Alert)AnyACpoweralignment for>15minutesthatcouldallowasinglefailuretocausealossofallACpower.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

TheCookEALdoesnotattempttolistallthecombinations ofpowersupplylossesnordoesitlimitthesingleACsourcetoanonsitepowersupply.Page21of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS CookIC:CompletelossofpowertoACemergency busesfor>15minutesinModes1,2,3or4.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):LossofalloffsiteandonsiteACpowerasindicated by:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific) transformers.

ANDFailureof(site-specific) emergency generators tosupplypowertoemergency busses.AND~Failuretorestorepowertoatleastoneemergency buswithin(site-specific) minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(SAE)CompletelossofallACemergency busesfor>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

ThegenericEALwasnotusedbecauselossofallACpowerisaspecTiicEOPeventthatisreadilyrecognized byalllicensedpersonnel.

GenericIC:SS2:FailureofReactorProtection SystemInstrumentation toCompleteorInitiateanAutomatic ReactorScramOnceaReactorProtection SystemSetpointHasBeenExceededandManualScramWasNOTSuccessful.

CookIC:ATWSNOTterminated bymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):(Site-specific) indications existthatautomatic andmanualscramwerenotsuccessful.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(SAE)ATWSNOTterminated bymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.Mode:1EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page22of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SS3:LossofAllVitalDCPower.CookIC:Unplanned loss'fallvitalDCpowerfor>15minutes.ICDeviation:

ThegenericguidancecallsforthisEALtobethethreshold toasiteareaemergency becauselossofallDCpowercompromises abilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions andprolonged lossofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncoveryandthelossofcontainment Integrity whenthereissignificant decayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.However,atCook,atotallossofDCpowerdoesnotcausethelossofcontrolroomindications sinceourGRIDinverters useACpowerasthenormalsupplybacked-upbyDCpower.Inaddition, thelossofDCpowerwillcausecontainment isolation whichisolatescontainment fromitsnormalcoolingsystem,buttheoperators canlocallyreopenthecontainment isolation valvesaslongascontrolairisavailable.

SinceatotallossofDCpowerdoesnotstopnormalchargingnorcreateanunisolable RCSleakpath,thereisnopotential lossofRCSbarrierorfuelcladbarrier.Therefore, CookdoesNOTusethisICfordeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

Instead,ifthelossofvitalDCpoweroccursinModes1through4,wewilldeclareanALERTcondition becausetherewillbeacompletefailureofautomatic actuation forallsafeguards equipment withaconcurrent lossofallcontrolroomannunciators.

Inaddition, iftheunitisinMode1,thelossofDCpowerwillcausearapidcooldownoftheRCSduetofailureoftheautomatic turbinetripsystems.Applicable GenericEAL(s):LossofallVitalDCpowerbasedon(site-specific) busvoltageindications forgreaterthan15minutes.CookEAL(s):ECC:S4LossofDCPower(Alert)Unplanned loss'f250VDCbusesABANDCDfor>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:SS4:CompleteLossofFunctionNeededtoAchieveorMaintainHotShutdown.

CookIC:Lossofsecondary heatsinkinMode3.LossofBOTHCCWtrainsforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1,2,3or4.[Alertonly]LossofBOTHCCWtrainsANDRCPsealinjection flowforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1R.Inadvertent criticality inModes3,4,5or6.[Alertonly]Inadvertent criticality withaconcurrent lossofRCSborationcapability inModes34.ICDeviation:

TheseICsareincludedinanECCtitled"LossofShutdownFunctions".

ThegenericICisverybroadandiflooselyinterpreted itcouldresultindeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency formanyevents.Forexample,wecannotmaintainhotshutdownconditions withafailureofALLpressurizer heaters.However,thiseventdoesnotrepresent asufficiently seriousthreattopublicsafetytowarrantaSiteArea'DCbusislostforthepurposeofE-Planclassification wheneverbatteryvoltageislessthan210vdc.Page23of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS eEmergency declaration.

Therefore, wehaveelectedtocoverselectedfailurestomaintainhotshutdownconditions.

Allotherinstances willbecoveredbySECJudgement.

Thelossofsecondary heatsinkInMode3isequivalent tolossoftheultimateheatsinkasdiscussed inthebasisforgenericICSS4.Thisisalsoequivalent toaSAEasdescribed ontheFissionProductBarriertableunderbothfuelcladandRCSbarriers.

CoverageoflossofCCWisprovidedbytwoICs.Withinafewminutes,atotallossofCCWresultsinthelossofallforcedcirculation intheRCS,alossofultimateheatsinkifusingECCSintherecirculation mode,andthepotential lossofallhigh-head ECCSpumps(ifoperating).

Thiscondition iscoveredunderT.S.3.0.3andrequiresentryintoMode5whichcanNOTbecompleted duetothenatureofthefailure.SincethiseventresultsInasignTiicantlossofcapability, webelieveitwarrantsanALERTdeclaration.

IfthelossofCCWresultsinalossofRCPsealinjection (whichisverylikely),thentheRCPsealswillstartleakingastheywouldduringaLossofAllACPowerevent.Theleakratewouldapproach80gpmafter10-15minutes.Becauseofitssimilarity toalossofallACevent,webelievethatthiscondition shouldbeclassified asaSiteAreaEmergency.

Coverageofaninadvertent criticality IsprovidedbytwoICsandshouldnotbeconfusedwithanATWS.Alossofreactivity controlthatresultslncriticality exceedsthethreshold ofthegenericIC.However,adilutionorxenondecayeventdoesnotcausearapidpowerexcursion andcanbeterminated bypromptinitiation ofborationperT.S.LCOactionrequirements.

Sincefuelcladdamageisunlikely, thisICexistsattheAlertlevel.Ifinadvertent criticality occurswithaconcurrent lossofboroncontrol,thesecondICpromptsaSiteAreaEmergency declaration duetotheincreased potential forfuelcladdamage.eApplicable GenericEAL(s):Completelossofany(site-specific) functionrequiredforhotshutdown.

CookEAL(s):ECC:SALossofShutdownFunctions

~Inability tofeedanySGANDallwiderangeSGlevels<29%inMode3.~LossofbothCCWtrainsfor>15minutesinModes14.[Alertonly]~'ossofBOTHCCWtrainsandRCPsealinjection flowforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1-4.~Inadvertent criticality asindicated bysustained positivestartuprateinModes3W.[Alertonly]~Inadvertent criticality withaconcurrent lossofRCSborationcapability inModes34.EALDeviation:

RefertotheICdeviation section.Page24of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SS5:LossofWaterLevelThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel.CookIC:LossofshutdowncoolingwithimminentcoreuncoveryinModes5or6.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):LossofReactorVesselWaterLevelasindicated by:~Lossofalldecayheatremovalcoolingasdetermined by(site-specific) procedure.

AND~(Site-specific)

Indicators thatthecoreisorwillbeuncovered.

CookEAL(s):ECC:SRLossofShutdownFunctions (SAE)Lossofshutdowncoolingwithreactorvesselwaterleveldecreasing andexpectedtodropbelow613ft6inches.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:SS6:Inability toMonitoraSignificant Transient inProgress.

CookIC:Inability tomonitorasignificant transient inprogress.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Lossof(site-specific) annunciators associated withsafetysystems.~Compensatory non-alarming Indications areunavailable.

~Indications neededtomonitor(site-specific) safetyfunctions areunavailable.

~Transient inprogress.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciators orIndicators (SAE)~LossofALLcontrolroomannunciators ANDlossofthreeCRIDs.~LossofALLCRIDs.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Themostlikelycauseofasignificant lossofannunciators isafailureintheDCpowersupplytotheannunciators.

Inmodes1or2,thislossofDCpowerisprobablygoingtoinitiateasignificant transient i.e.Reactortriporsafetyinjection.

CombinedwiththelossofamajorityoftheCRIDs(instrument powersupplies) whichresultsinasignificant lossofinstrumentation, meetstheintentofthegenericEALs.Thelossofallvitalinstrument powerwillresultInenoughspuriousalarmstorenderanyvalidalarmsunusable.

Thus,thiseventalsomeetstheintentofthegenericEALs.Page25of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SG1:Prolonged LossofAllOffsitePowerandProlonged LossofAllOnsiteACPower.CookIC:CompletelossofallACemergency busesfor>4hoursinModes1,2,3or4.CompletelossofallACemergency buseswithseverechallenge tocorecooling.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):LossofalloffsiteandonsiteACpowerasindicated by:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific) transformers.

AND~Failureof(site-specific) emergency generators tosupplypowertoemergency busses.AND~Atleastoneofthefollowing conditions exist:~Restoration ofatleastoneemergency buswithin(site-specific) hoursIsNOTlikely.OR~(Site-specific) indication ofcontinuing degradation ofcorecoolingbasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoring.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(GE)CompletelossofallACemergency busesANDEITHERofthefollowing:

~Restoration ofoneACemergency busisNOTlikelywithin4hours.~CoreCoolingCSFST-ORANGEMode:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:

Insteadofmonitoring thefissionproductbarriertable,wehaveelectedtousetheCoreCoolingCSFST-ORANGEasthethreshold forageneralemergency.

Thisparameter lsonthefissionproductbarriertableandmustbeexceededinordertohavethepotential forasourcetermlargeenoughtoJustifyageneralemergency declaration.

The4hoursthreshold IsfromourStationBlackoutcopingstudy.Page26of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS GenericIC:SG2:FailureofReactorProtection SystemtoCompleteanAutomatic ScramandManualScramWasNOTSuccessful andThereisIndication ofanExtremeChallenge totheAbilitytoCooltheCore.CookIC:ATWSwithextremechallenge tocorecoolingorheatsinksafetyfunctions.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):~(Site-spec Tiic)indications existthatautomatic andmanualscramwerenotsuccessful.

AND~Eitherofthefollowing:

~(Site-specific) indications existthatthecorecoolingisextremely challenged.

OR~(Site-specific) indication existsthatheatremovalIsextremely challenged.

CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(GE)Subcriticality CSFST-RED-AND-EITHERofthefollowing conditions:

~CoreCoolingCSFST-RED~HeatSinkCSFST-REDMode:1EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page27of46Rev.0 NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA Recognition Category:

Natural/Destructive Phenomena Generic1C:HU1:NaturalorDestructive Phenomena Occurring WithintheProtected Area.Cook1Cs:~Moderateearthquake WindspeedswithintheProtected AreaorattheRMBthatexceedthedesignlimitsforsafety-related components ormajorstructures'.

Lakeleveloscillation ofgreaterthan5feet(seiche)Validindication ofplantfloodingwithpotential toaffectunitoperation AvehiclecrashwithintheProtected AreaORattheRMBthatcausessigniTicant damage.Anunexpected explosion withintheProtected AreaorattheRMBTurbinecasingfailureMaingenerator hydrogensealfailurewhilethegenerator ispressurized withhydrogenICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.(Site-spec Tiic)methodindicates feltearthquake.

2.Reportbyplantpersonnel oftornadostrikingwithinprotected area.3.Assessment bythecontrolroomthataneventhasoccurred.

4.Vehiclecrashintoplantstructures orsystemswithinprotected areaboundary.

5.Reportbyplantpersonnel ofanunanticipated explosion withinprotected areaboundaryresulting lnvisibledamagetopermanent structure orequipment.

6.Reportofturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbineorgenerator seals.7.(Site-specific) occurrences.

CookEAI(s):ALIMODESECC:N-1Earthquake ECC:N-2HighWindsECC:N4SeicheECC:N4FloodingECC:N-5VehicleCrashECC:N4Explosion ECC:N-7Equipment orStructural FailureEarthquake isreadilyfeltbutdoesnotcauseobservable damagetoplantstructures.

AtornadotouchesdownwithintheProtected AreaORattheRMB.-OR-Sustained windspeed>90mph.Screenhouselakeleveloscillation

>5feetNOTduetoswitching CWpumps.Validindication ofplantfloodingwithpotential toaffectunitoperation.

AvehiclecrashwithintheProtected Areainvolving asafetysystemrequiredforthecurrentoperating modeorasystemcontaining radioactive material.

-OR-AvehiclecrashattheRMBthatinvolvesasealedradioactive materialstoragecontainer.

Anunexpected explosion withintheProtected AreaORattheRMB.Turbinecasingfailure.-OR-Maingenerator hydrogensealfailurewhitethegenerator ispressurized withhydrogen.

EALDeviation:

This1Chasbeenrestructured asaCook-Specific Recognition Categorytitled:"Natural/Destructive Phenomena.

Thisrecognitlon categoryhasbeensubdivided into7ECCs.EachoftheseECCsthenhaveatleastoneEALintheUEandAlertECLs.Thisarrangement wascreatedtosimplifytheclassification processfortheShiftSupervisor servingasSEC.'lantstructures refertothecontainments, auxiliary buildings, radioactive materialbuilding(RMB),ESWenclosures, AFWpumprooms,RWSTandCST.Page28of46Rev.0 NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA GenericIC:HA1:NaturalorDestructive Phenomena Occurring WithinPlantVitalArea.CookIC:~Severeearthquake

~Visibledamagetoplantstructures'.

~Lakeleveloscillation ofgreaterthan8feet(seiche)~ValidIndication ofplantfloodingthathasaffectedANYsafeshutdownsystem~AvehiclecrashwithinaVitalAreaaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating mode.~Anexplosion withinaVitalAreaaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating mode.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific) methodindicates SeismicEventgreaterthanOperating BasisEarthquake (OBE).2.Tornadoorhighwindsstrikingplantvitalareas:Tornadoorhighwindsgreaterthan(site-specific) mphstrikewithinprotected areaboundary.

3.Reportsofvisiblestructural damageonselectedplantstructures.

(e.g.Reactorbuilding, Intakebuilding, UltimateHeatSink,Refueling WaterStorageTank,DieselGenerator

building, TurbineBuilding, Condensate StorageTank,ControlRoom,Other(Site-specific)

Structures) 4.(Site-specific) indications inthecontrolroom.5.Vehiclecrashaffecting plantvitalareas.6.Turbinefailuregenerated missilesresultinanyvisiblestructural damagetoorpenetration ofany(Site-specific) plantareas.7.(Site-specific) occurrences.

CookEAI(s):ALLMODESECC:N-1Earthquake Earthquake causesobservable damagetoplantstructures.

ECC:N-2HighWindsVisibledamagetoplantstructures.

ECC:N4SeicheScreenhouselakeleveloscillation

>8feetNOTduetoswitching CWpumps.ECC:NXFloodingValidindication ofplantfloodingthathasaffectedANYsafeshutdownsystem.ECC:N-5VehicleCrashAvehiclecrashwithinaVitalAreaaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating modeorcausingthereleaseofradioactive material.

ECC:N-6Explosion Anexplosion withinaVitalAreaaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating mode.ECC:N-7Equipment orVisibledamagetoplantstructures.

Structural FailureEALDeviation:

ThisIChasbeenrestructured asaCook-Specific Recognition Categorytitled:"Natural/Destructive Phenomena.

Thisrecognition categoryhasbeensubdivided into7ECCs.EachoftheseECCsthenhaveatleastoneEALintheUEandAlertECLs.Thisarrangement wascreatedtosimplifytheclassification processfortheShiftSupervisor servingasSEC.Plantstructures referstothecontainments, auxiliary buildings, radioactive materialbuilding(RMB),ESWenclosures, AFWpumprooms,RWSTsandCSTs.Page29of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYRecognition Category:

HazardsandOtherConditions Affecting PlantSafetyGenericIC:HU2:FireWithinProtected AreaBoundaryNotExtinguished Within15MinutesofDetection.

CookIC:FirewithintheProtected AreaorRMBNOTextinguished within15minutesofdetection.

ICDeviation:

WehaveexpandedthescopeofthefireareafromselectedsiteswithintheProtected AreatoincludealloftheProtected AreaplustheRadioactive MaterialBuilding.

SincetheRadioactive MaterialBuildingisnotwithintheProtected Area,theIChadtoberewordedforconsistency.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Fireinbuildings orareascontiguous toanyofthefollowing (site-specific) areasnotextinguished within15minutesofcontrolroomnotification orverification ofacontrolroomalarm:~(Site-specific) listCookEAL(s):ECC:H-1Fire(UE)FirewithintheProtected AreaorRMBNOTextinguished within15minutesofdetection.

Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

WehaveexpandedthescopeofthefireareafromselectedsiteswithintheProtected AreatoincludealloftheProtected AreaplustheRadioactive MaterialBuilding.

Sincethisareaencompasses allofthesuggested areas,theCookEALprovidesatleastthesamelevelofpublicprotection asthegenericEALPage30of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HU3:ReleaseofToxicorFlammable GasesDeemedDetrimental toSafeOperation ofthePlant.CookIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammable gaseswithinornearthesiteboundaries deemeddetrimental tosafeoperation.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Reportordetection oftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldenterthesiteareaboundaryinamountsthatcanaffectnormaloperation oftheplant.2.ReportbyLocal,CountyorStateofficials forpotential evacuation ofsitepersonnel basedonoffsiteevent.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-2ToxicorFlammable Gases(UE)~Releaseoftoxicorflammable gaseswithinornearsiteboundarythatmayaffectnormalplantoperation.

~Reportbyrecognized authority ofneedforpartialsiteevacuation becauseofoff-sitetoxicgasrelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:HU4:Confirmed SecurityEventWhichIndicates aPotential Degradation intheLevelofSafetyofthePlant.CookIC:Confirmed securityeventwhichindicates apotential degradation inthelevelofplantsafety.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):1.Bombdevicediscovered withinplantProtected AreaandoutsideplantVitalArea.2.Othersecurityeventsasdetermined from(Site-specific)

Safeguards Contingency Plan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(UE)~Bombdevicediscovered withintheProtected AreaorRadioactive MaterialBuilding.

~Othersecurityeventswhichrepresent apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page31of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HU5:OtherConditions ExistingWhichintheJudgement oftheEmergency DirectorWarrantDeclaration ofanUnusualEvent.CookIC:NoneICDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification".

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classification fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromjudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassTiication prevailing.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Otherconditions existwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergency Directorindicateapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.CookEAL(s):Thefollowing statement iscontained withinthebodyoftheEmergency ClassTiication procedure:

~Inthejudgement oftheSEC,conditions whichindicateapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplantwarrantadeclaration ofanUnusualEvent.EALDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification".

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classTiication fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromjudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassTiication prevailing.

Page32of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HA2:FireorExplosion Affecting theOperability ofPlantSafetySystemsRequiredtoEstablish orMaintainSafeShutdown.

CookIC:Fireaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating mode.ICDeviation:

Deletedreference toexplosion sincethateventiscoveredintheNatural/Destructive Phenomena recognition category.

Thosesystemsneededtoestablish safeshutdownareincludedinthosesystemsthatarecoveredbyTechnical Specifications forthecurrentoperating mode.Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~Fireorexplosion inanyofthefollowing (site-specific) areas:~(Site-specific list)AND~Affectedsystemparameter indications showdegradedperformance orplantpersonnel reportvisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment withinthespecTiiedarea.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-1Fire(Alert)Fireaffecting theoperability ofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperating mode.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Deletedreference toexplosion sincethateventiscoveredintheNatural/Destructive Phenomena recognition category.

InsteadoflistingspecTiicareasorsystems,theEALremainsgenerictoallowtheSECtodetermine whatequipment isneededineachOperating Mode.Ingeneral,thosesystemsneededtoestablish safeshutdownareincludedinthosesystemsthatarecoveredbyTechnical Specifications forthecurrentoperating mode.Page33of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HA3:ReleaseofToxicorFlammable GasesWithinaFacilityStructure whichJeopardizes Operation ofSystemsRequiredtoMaintainSafeOperations ortoEstablish orMaintainColdShutdown.

CookIC:Toxicorflammable gaseslnanarearequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownofaunit.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

CApplicable GenericEAL(s):~Reportordetection oftoxicgaseswithinaFacilityStructure inconcentration thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel.

~Reportordetection offlammable gaseswithinaFacilityStructure inconcentrations thatwillaffectthesafeoperation oftheplant.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-2ToxicorFlammable Gases(Alert)~Toxicgasinanarearequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownofaunitinconcentration thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel.

~Flammable gasinanarearequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownofaunitInconcentration nearflammability limit.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:HA4:SecurityEventinPlantProtected Area.CookIC:SecurityeventinProtected Area.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):~Intrusion intoplantprotected areabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventsasdetermined from(site-specific)

Safeguards Contingency Plan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(Alert)~Intrusion intotheProtected Areabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventswhichindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegraded.

Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page34of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PIANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HA5:ControlRoomEvacuation HasBeenInitiated.

CookIC:ControlRoomevacuation hasbeeninitiated.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Entryinto(site-spec Tiic)procedure forcontrolroomevacuation.

CookEAL(s):ECC:HAControlRoomEvacuation (Alert)ControlRoomevacuation hasbeeninitiated.

Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Wesometimes useportionsoftheEmergency RemoteShutdownprocedure attimesotherthanControlRoomEvacuation.

Therefore, insteadofentryintoOHP4025series,wewillusetheICwording.Thereisnochangeinintent.GenericIC:HA6:OtherConditions ExistingWhichintheJudgement oftheEmergency DirectorWarrantDeclaration ofanAlert.CookIC:NoneICDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification".

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classification fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromJudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassification prevailing.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Otherconditions existwhichintheJudgmentoftheEmergency Directorindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegradedandthatincreased monitoring ofplantfunctions iswarranted.

CookEAL(s):Thefollowing statement iscontained withinthebodyoftheEmergency ClassTiication procedure:

~Inthejudgement oftheSEC,conditions whichindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegradedANDthatincreased monitoring ofplantfunctions isneededwarrantadeclaration ofanAlert.EALDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesailthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification.

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classification fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromjudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassification prevailing.

Page35of46Rev.0

HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HS1:SecurityEventinPlantVitalArea.CookIC:SecurityeventinVitalArea.ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Intrusion Intoplantvitalareabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventsasdetermined from(site-specific)

Safeguards Contingency Plan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(SAE)~Intrusion intoanyVitalAreabyahostileforce.~OthersecurityeventswhichIndicatelikelyoractualfailureofplantsafetysystemsintendedforprotection ofthepublic.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

GenericIC:HS2:ControlRoomEvacuation HasBeenInitiated andPlantControlCannotbeEstablished.

CookIC:ControlRoomevacuation hasbeenInitiated ANDplantcontrolcannotbeestablished.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Thefollowing conditions exist:~ControlRoomevacuation hasbeeninitiated.

AND~Controloftheplantcannotbeestablished per(site-specific) procedure with(site-spec Tiic)minutes.CookEAL(s):ECC:HXControlRoomEvacuation (SAE)ControlRoomevacuation hasbeeninitiated ANDtheShiftSupervisor determines thatRCSinventory controlhasNOTbeenestablished after15minutes.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:

Definedcontroloftheplantindefinitetermsforeaseofclassification.

Page36of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HS3:OtherConditions ExistingWhichintheJudgement oftheEmDeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency enoemergencyDirectorWarrantCookIC:NoneICDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesallthetime,soithasbeenincororatedintoprocedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.

corporantothebodyoftheimplementing SECtodetermine classTiication fromtheReconitionCat.101,Emergency OassiTication".

Instructions intherogoegorytablesANDfromJudgement foreveryegestclassiTication prevailing.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Otherconditions existwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmerencDirefailuresofplantfunctonededfcionsneorprotection ofthepublic.oemergencyDirectorindicateactualorlikelymajorCookEAL(s):Thefollowing statement iscontained withinthebodoftheEmeInthejudgntofthSECodltlowhioe,conditions whichindicatelikelyoractualmajorfailuresofplantnconsnefortheprotection ofthepublicwarrantadeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

EALDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesailthetime,soithasbeenlncooratedintprocedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.

corporaedintothebodyoftheimplementing SECtodetermine classiTication fromtheRecognition Cateo.101,Emergency ClassTiication".

Instructions lntherlththhlhtI~ifitioGenericIC:HG1:SecuriEventResItyultnglnLossofAbilitytoReachandMaintainColdShutdown.

CookIC:Securityeventresulting inlossofabilitytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.

ICDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):~Lossofphysicalcontrolofthecontrolroomduetosecurityevent.~Lossofphysicalcontroloftheremoteshutdowncapability duetosecurityevent.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(GE)~Imminentlossofphysicalcontrolofacontrolroomduetoasecurityevent.~Imminentlossofphysicalcontrolofaunit'sremoteshutdowncapability dtuetoaModes:ALLEALDeviation:

actuallossofphysicalcontrol.WeexpandedthegenericEALtoaddresslmmlnetmnentoranticipated lossofphysicalcontrolaswellasPage37of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HG2:OtherConditions ExistingWhichintheJudgement oftheEmergency DirectorWarrantDeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

CookIC:NoneICDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification'.

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classification fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromjudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassification prevailing.

Applicable GenericEAL(s):Otherconditions existwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergency Directorindicate(1)actualorImminentsubstantial coredegradation withpotential forlossofcontainment, or(2)potential foruncontrolled radionuclide releases.

Thesereleasescanreasonably beexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposureleveloutsidethesiteboundary.

CookEAL(s):Thefollowing statement iscontained withinthebodyoftheEmergency Classification procedure:

~Inthejudgement oftheSEC,conditions whichindicateanactualorimminentsubstantial coredegradation withpotential forlossofcontainment fromEITHERunitwarrantadeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

eEALDeviation:

Thiscriterion appliesailthetime,soithasbeenincorporated intothebodyoftheimplementing procedure "12-PMP2080.EPP.101, Emergency Classification".

Instructions intheprocedure directtheSECtodetermine classification fromtheRecognition CategorytablesANDfromjudgement foreveryeventwiththehighestclassification prevailing.

Page38of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRecognitlon Category:

FissionProductBarriersFUELCLADEALP1:CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusLOSS:CoreCooling-REDPOTENTIAI:

CoreCooling-ORANGEHeatSink-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:POTENTIAL:

CoreCooling-REDCoreCooling-ORANGEHeatSinkCSF-RED-AND-WIderangelevelinatleast3SGsis<29%(<43%foradversecontainment).

EALDeviation:

Secondary heatsinkisnotlostunlessbothflowcapability andactualSGlevelarelost.According toERGFR-H.1Background documents, theSGswillcontinuetoactasanadequateheatsinkuntilwiderangelevelIslost.WeelecttotransfertofeedandbleedcoolingIfthreeoutoffourSGshavelessthantheindicated widerangelevel.ThisEOPeventisaneasilyrecognized threshold fordeclaring apotential lossofthefuelcladbarrierandprovidesabettercriteriathenthatspecified inthegenericsymptomlist.FUELCLADEALP2:PrimaryCoolantActivityLevelLOSS:CoolantActivityGREATERTHAN(site-specific value)POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:RCSactivitylevel>300pCI/ccI-131equivalent.

POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

FUELCLADEAL83:CoreExitThermocouple ReadingsLOSS:GREATERTHAN(site-specific) degreeFPOTENTIAL LOSS:GREATERTHAN(site-specific) degreeFCookEAL(s):NOTUSEDEALDeviation:

Thisgenericsymptomisencompassed byCoreCoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionstatustreemonitoring.

Page39of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERStFUELCLADEAL¹4:ReactorVesselWaterLevelLOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:LevelLESSthan(site-specific) valueCookEAL(s):NOTUSEDEALDeviation:

~Thisgenericsymptomisencompassed byCoreCoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionstatustreemonitoring.

FUELCLADEAL¹5:Containment Radiation Monitoring LOSS:Containment RadmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)

R/hrPOTENTIAL LOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:Containment arearadiation

>200R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:

~VRS-1310/1410 (U1)~VRS-2310/241 0(U2)POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainment radiation monitorsbecausetheradiation levelstforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantly decreasing withtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plot ofradiation vsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviability ofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiation readingwithinthattimeframeassociated withthelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.

Therefore thissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociated withICs.FUELCLADEAL¹6:Other(Site-Specific)

Indications LOSS:(Site-Specific) asapplicable POTENTIAL LOSS:(Site-Specific) asapplicable CookEAL(s):LOSS:Atleast5%claddamage.POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page40of46Rev.0 SSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSFUEICLADEALP7:Emer7:Emergency DirectorJudgement Anycondition intheoinPOTELLOSpnionoftheErnergcyDirectorthatindicates LOS:Anycondition InthIc'sOSSofPOTENTIAL LOSSoftheopinionoftheEoefuelcladbarriermergencyDirectorthtIandicatesCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudPOTENTIAL LOSS::SECJudgement EALDeviatloation:Nosignificant deviation RCSEALPt;Criticalr'alSafetyFunctionStatusPOTENTIAL LOSS:RCSIntegrity

-REDHeatSink-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:POTENTIAL:

IAL:CoreCooling-REDHeatSinkCSF-RED-AND-WIderangsis<29%(<43%forEALDeviation:

Secondary heatsinkisnotlostuSecondaosunlessbothflowcabilddtthS*eGswillcontinuetoactasaectotransfertofeedandbleedcoolingifthrehisEOPeventfsaneasilrecuecladbarrierandprovid'aIS.esabettercriteriathoreclaringaraenthatspecified inthegenericPage41of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRCSEALP2:RCSLeakRateLOSS:GREATERTHANavailable makeupcapacityasindicated byalossofRCSsubcooling.POTENTIAL LOSS:Unisolable leakexceeding thecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmode.CookEAL(s):LOSS:RCSsubcoollng

<30'FANDcanNOTberestored.

POTENTIAL LOSS:ECCSoperating inSlmodeANDSlisnotdiagnosed as"inadvertent".

EALDeviation:

OnthelossEAtweaddedthecaveatthatsubcoollng cannotberestored.

Thisallowssomeleewayinthosecircumstances wheretheEOPsdirectminimizing subcooling forsomemitigating action.Forthepotential lossEAlwehavesubstituted ECCSoperating InanySlmodebecauseduringaccidentmitigation, theleakratevarieswithRCSpressure.

Ifpossible, wewillperformSltermination orSlreduction, tonormalcharging.

SincethisisanormalactionintheEOPs,itisfamiliartotheSS/SECsandprovidesathreshold equivalent tothatproposedinthegenericguidance.

RCSEAL83:SGTubeRuptureLOSS:(Site-specific) indication thataSGisrupturedandhasanon-isolable secondary linebreakor(site-specific) indication thataSGIsrupturedandaprolonged releaseofcontaminated secondary coolantisoccurring fromtheaffectedSGtotheenvironment.

POTENTIAL LOSS:Site-specific indication thataSGisrupturedandtheprimary-to-secondary leakrateexceedsthecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmode.CookEAL(s):LOSS:ANYSGisBOTHRUPTUREDandFAULTEDPOTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

OurlossEALreliesonoperatorknowledge ofthemeaningofRUPTUREDandFAULTEDasusedIntheEOPs.Basedonthesemeanings, ourlossEALisequivalent tothegenericEALWedonothaveapotential lossEALforSGtuberupturebecausethepotential lossEALassociated withRCSleakratecompletely coverstheeventproposedbythegenericEALPage42of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRCSEAL¹4:Containment Radiation Monitoring LOSS:Containment radmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)

R/hr.POTENTIAI LOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:Containment arearadiation

>10R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:

~VRS-1310/1410 (U1)~VRS-2310/241 0(U2)POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainment radiation monitorsbecausetheradiation levelsforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantly decreasing withtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plot ofradiation vsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviability ofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiation readingwithinthattimeframeassociated withthelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.

Therefore thissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociated withICs.RCSEAL¹5:Other(Site-Specific)

Indications LOSS:(Site-Specific) asapplicable POTENTIAL LOSS:(Site-Specific) asapplicable CookEAL(s):LOSS:ECCSoperating inanySlRECIRCULATION MODE.POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

RCSEAL¹6:Emergency DirectorJudgement LOSS:Anycondition intheopinionoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates LOSSoftheRCSbarrierPOTENTIAL LOSS:Anycondition intheopinionoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates POTENTIAL LOSSoftheRCSbarrierCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudgement POTENTIAL LOSS:SECJudgement EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation Page43of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENT EALP1:CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusLOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Containment

-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Containment CSFST-REDEALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

CONTAINMENT EALP2:Containment PressureLOSS:Rapidunexplained decreasefollowing initialincrease.

ORContainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions.

POTENTIAL LOSS:(Site-specific)

PSIGandincreasing.

ORExplosive mixtureexists.ORContainment pressuregreaterthancontainment depressurization setpointandlessthanonefulltrainofdepressurization equipment operating.

CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Containment pressure/sump levelresponseNOTconsistent withexpectedconditions.

ORCNTMTH2>4'ALDeviation:

WedonotusealossEALbecausethesymptomsdescribed inthegenericguidancemayoccurduetoactivation ofouricecondenser.

Forexample,duringasmallbreakLOCA,theicecondenser doorsmaynotopenbecausetheleakratemaybetoosmall.However,atsometimeduringtheevent,thedoorsmayopenandcausearapidcontainment pressuredrop.WithSECjudgement, theSECmayelectedtocallthistrendalossofcontainment whichprovidesthesamesymptomatic coveragethatadiscretelossEALwouldprovide.Bythesameargument, thecontainment sumplevelresponseisalsovariableandisnotusedasadiscretesymptomofcontainment loss.However,bothlossEALswerecombinedandretainedaspotential losssymptom:"Containment pressure/sump levelresponseNOTconsistent withexpectedconditions."

Thepotential lossEALsassociated withpressureareadequately coveredbytheContainment CSFST-REDcondition.

Page44of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENT EALP3:Containment Isolation ValveStatusafterContainment Isolation LOSS:Valve(s)notclosedanddownstream pathwaytotheenvironment exists.POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:Following PhaseA(orB)Isolation

-ANYflowpathonFR-Z.1Attachment A(orB)NOTisolatedANDadownstream pathwaytotheenvironment exists.POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

CONTAINMENT EAL84:SGSecondary SideReleasewithPrimarytoSecondary LeakageLOSS:Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakagegreaterthantechnical specTiicatlon allowable.

POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>CookEAL(s)LOSS:SGisRUPTUREDANDtherupturedSGhasknownsteamflowoutsidethecontainment forgreaterthan30minutes.POTENTIAL LOSS:<none>EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

CONTAINMENT EAL85:Significant Radioactive Inventory inContainment LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Containment radmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)

R/hr.CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Containment arearadiation

>1000R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:

~VRS-1310/1 410(U1)~VRS-2310/2410 (U2)EALDeviation:

Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainment radiation monitorsbecausetheradiation levelsforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantly decreasing withtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plot ofradiation vsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviability ofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiation readingwithinthattimeframeassociated withthelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.

Therefore thissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociated withICs.Page45of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENT EAL86:CoreExitThermocouple ReadingsLOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:Coreexitthermocouples inexcessof1200'Fandrestoration procedures noteffective within15minutes;or,coreexitthermocouples inexcessof700'Fwithreactorvessellevelbelowthetopofactivefuelandrestoration procedures arenoteffective within15minutes.CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:CoreCoolingCSFST-REDANDcoretemperature doesNOTdecreasewithin15minutes.EALDeviation:

Thereisnosignificant deviation becausetheCoreCoolingCSFST-REDisequivalent totheeventdescribed inthegenericEALCONTAINMENT EALP7:Other(SIte-Specific)

Indications LOSS:(Site-Spec Tiic)asapplicable POTENTIAL LOSS:(Site-SpeciTic) asapplicable CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIAL LOSS:>20%claddamage.EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

CONTAINMENT EALP8:Emergency DirectorJudgement LOSS:Anycondition intheopinionoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates LOSSofthecontainment barrierPOTENTIAL LOSS:Anycondition intheopinionoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates POTENTIAL LOSSofthecontainment barrierCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudgement POTENTIAL LOSS:SECJudgement EALDeviation:

Nosignificant deviation.

Page46of46Rev.0

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