ML17325B555
| ML17325B555 | |
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| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1999 |
| From: | INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
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ATTACHMENT2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchLPOVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOHFOROPERATIONaminimumthefollovingA.C.electricalpoversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ;a.OnecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmissionnetvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorvith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiagaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalrsourcesOPERhBLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREhLTERATXOHSpositivereactivitychanges+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpoversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCEREUIR1DKHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpoversourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERhBLEbytheperfozmaaceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Porpurposesofthisspecification,additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENTNO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.ThedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeloadprofilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaiyfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT2BTOAEP:NRC:1322TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITINGCONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClasslEdistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorwith:1.Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistgaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpower"sourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpo~ersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequiretaencnof4.8.1.1.1and4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirexenu4.8.1.1.2.e.g~*Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.P"Commencingini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,thelg-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZNO.
3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICALPOWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.ThedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeloadprofilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT3ATOAEP:NRC:1322PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C
3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSI<OROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIIK<MENTS3/4.8ELE<CTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andOnedieselgeneratorwith:Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges'ntiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1and4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.'Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICALPOWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourc'esproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'supportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeload'profilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbattery'oadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfecdwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentin'theturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT86,498 ATTACHMENT3BTOAEP:NRC:1322PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3'/4.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorwith:1.Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges'ntiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1'nd4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,'the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.'Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.CpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeload,"profilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbattcrics.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page83/48-1AMENDMENTVB,483 ATTACHMENT4TOAEP:NRC:1322NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION 1AI'I4.
Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsiderationEvaluationI&Mhasevaluatedthisproposedamendmentanddeterminedthatitinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.Accordingto10CFR50.92(c),aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicenseinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationifoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot:1.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzed;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2,"ElectricalPowerSystems,Shutdown,"anditsassociatedbasestoprovideaone-timeextensionofthe18-monthsurveillanceintervalforspecificsurveillancerequirements(SRs).Inaddition,forunit2only,aminoradministrativechangeisincludedtodeleteareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.Forunit1only,aneditorialcorrectionismade.Thedeterminationthatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendmentrequestisindicatedbelow.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Adiscussionofeachoftheapplicableaccidentsfollows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.ThedesignoffuelhandlingequipmentissuchthataninterruptionofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertentlydropped.Therefore,aninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofafuelhandlingaccident.Atpresent,fissionproductactivitiesinthefuelassemblypellet-to-claddinggapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsidersthethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulationzone.Thisdoseisdominatedbytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributorstothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreasesbyone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately18monthsrepresentsover70half-lives.Activityofaradioactivematerialisgenerallyconsideredtobenegligibleafter7half-lives(areductioninactivityof1/128).Bycontrast,theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereductionoflessthan1/10(fromactivatedcharcoalfiltration)inthefuelhandlingbuilding,andnoreductioninthecontainment,priortorelease.Therefore,theconsequencesofafuelhandling Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurancethattheconsequencesofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.Therefore,theconsequencesarenotsignificantlyincreased.AccidentalreleaseofradioactiveliuidsTheinadvertentreleaseofradioactiveliquidwastestotheenvironmentwasevaluatedforthewasteevaporatorcondensateandmonitortanks,condensatestoragetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliarybuildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded,intheUFSARChapter14evaluation,thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironmentisnotacredibleaccident.Thisconclusiondoesnotdependonoperatingmode,hence,furtherevaluationofthiseventisnotrequired.WasteasreleaseRadioactivegasesareintroducedintothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.Theprocessingofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliarysystemsresultsintheaccumulationofradioactivegasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificantgaseousradioactivitythatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecifiedmechanismafterthereactorhasbeenoperatingforonecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.Thereisnoidentifiedmechanismbywhichaninterruptionorlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantlyincreasedbyaninterruptionorlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivitiesatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurancethattheconsequencesofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore,notbesignificantlyincreased.Uncontrolledrodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawalfromasubcriticalconditionThiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs)energized.Withtheexceptionoftestingorspecialma'ntenance,theroddrivemotorgeneratorsetremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.Iftheconditionsforrodwithdrawalaremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstrumentsandtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.AninterruptionorlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstrumentswouldremainavailable.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanuncontrolledRCCAwithdrawalwouldnotbesignificantlyincreasedbyaninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptableconsequencesforthiseventrelyonprecludingitsoccurrence.
~Cfl Ci~IAttachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page3hUncontrolledboron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunctionoftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulatedfailuremodes,thepotentialrateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficienttimetocorrectthesituationinasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunboratedwatermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.AninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperationandaccidentaldilution.TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognizedbya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.Therefore,thepossibilityofanuncontrolledborondilutionisnotsignificantlyincreased.AcceptableconsequencesforthiseventrelyonprecludingitsoccurrenceandbydetectionwiththesourcerangenuclearinstrumentationrequiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.TheproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillancerequirementswhenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirementtoknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.DeferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotentialthatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsdescribedabovedonotrelyonautomaticstartingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermittedinModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformedtoprovideadequateconfidencethattherequiredEDGwillbeavailableifneeded.Therefore,itisconcludedthattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailableandthepreviouslyevaluatedconsequenceswillnotbeincreased.Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableand,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,basedontheabovediscussion,itisconcludedthattheproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated./2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperationoftherequiredelectricalpowersourcesinamannerorconfigurationdifferentthanthosepreviouslyrecognizedorevaluated.NonewfailuremechanismsoftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroducedbyextensionofthesubjectsurveillanceintervals.
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Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page4Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableand,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.DeferralofthespecifiedSRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduceafailuremechanism,andpastperformanceoftheSRshasdemonstratedreliabilityinpassingthedeferredsurveillances.Therefore,theavailabilityofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigationisnotsignificantlyreducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableandthus,doesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation,I&Mhasconcludedthatthesechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.
ATTACHMENT5TOAEP:NRC:1322ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT Attachment5toAEP:NRC:1322Page1EnvironmentalAssessmentI&Mhasevaluatedthislicenseamendmentrequestagainstthecriteriaforidentificationoflicensingandregulatoryactionsrequiringenvironmentalassessmentinaccordancewith10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdeterminedthatthislicenseamendmentrequestmeetsthecriteriaforacategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Thisdeterminationisbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendmenttoalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirementwithrespecttoinstallationoruseofafacilitycomponentlocatedwithintherestrictedarea,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspectionorasurveillancerequirement,andtheamendmentmeetsthefollowingspecificcriteria.(i)Theamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.Asdemonstratedinattachment4,thisproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.(ii)Thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumentedinattachment1,therewillbenosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsreleasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificantchangesintheoperationorconfigurationofthefacility.Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodologyusedforprocessingofradioactiveeffluentsorhandlingofsolidradioactivewaste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiationlevelswithintheplant.Therefore,therewillbenosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposureresultingfromthischange.
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