ML17331B430

Rev 0 to DC Cook Nuclear Plant E-Plan Classification Vs NUMARC/NESP-007 Deviation Basis Document.

ML17331B430
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Site:	Cook
Issue date:	06/13/1994
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
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ML17331B428	List: ML17331B427 ML17331B430
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AEP:NRC:1192, NUDOCS 9406220178
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ATTACHMENT3TOAEP:NRC:1192DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTE-PLANCLASSIFICATIONvsNUMARC/NESP-007DEVIATIONBASISDOCUMENT9406220178940613PDRADOCK05000315FPDR DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTE-PLANCLASSIFICATIONvsNUMARC/NESP-007DEVIATIONBASISDOCUMENT TABLEOFCONTENTSTABLEOFCONTENTSINTRODUCTION,PURPOSEandORGANIZATIONINTRODUCTION.PURPOSEDEFINITIONSCriticalSafetyFunction(CSF)CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)EmergencyActionLevel(EAL)EmergencyConditionCategory(ECC).EmergencyClassificationLevel.FissionProductBarrier.InitiatingCondition(IC)Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)ModerateEarthquakePotentialLoss(ofafissionproductbarrier)ProtectedAreaRecognitionCategorySafeShutdownArea.SafeShutdownEquipment.SevereEarthquakeTransientValid.VitalArea..ORGANIZATION.RecognitionCategory:AbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluents..GenericlC:AU1..GenericlC:AU2..GenericIC:SU4GenericlC:AA1.GenericIC:AA2GenericIC:AA3GenericIC:AS1GenericIC:AG1RecognitionCategory:SystemMalfunctionsGenericIC:SU1GenericIC:SU2..GenericIC:SU3GenericIC:SU5GenericIC:SU6556789101112131313141516PageiRev.0 TABLEOFCONTENTSGenericlC:SU7..GenericIC:SA1~GenericIC:SA2GenericIC:SA3.GenericIC:SA4.GenericlC:SA5.GenericIC:SS1.GenericIC:SS2GenericIC:SS3GenericIC:SS4GenericIC:SS5GenericIC:SS6..GenericIC:SG1..GenericIC:SG2..1718181920212122232325252627RecognitionCategory:Natural/DestructivePhenomena..GenericIC:HU1..GenericIC:HA1..282829RecognitionCGenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:GenericIC:HU3HU4HU5HA2HA3HA4HA5HA6HS1HS2HS3HG1HG2ategory:HazardsandOtherConditionsAffectingPlantSafetyHU2303031313233343435353636373738RecognitionCategory:FissionProductBarriersFUELCLADEAL¹1FUELCLADEAL¹2FUELCLADEAL¹3FUELCLADEAL¹4FUELCLADEAL¹5FUELCLADEAL¹6FUELCLADEAL¹7RCSEAL¹1RCSEAL¹2RCSEAL¹33939393940404041414242PagellRev.0 TABLEOFCONTENTSRCSEALP4RCSEAIP5RCSEALP6CONTAINMENTEALW.CONTAINMENTEALP2CONTAINMENTEALP3.CONTAINMENTEALP4CONTAINMENTEALP5CONTAINMENTEAL@6..CONTAINMENTEAL87..CONTAINMENTEALP8..4343434444454545464646PageillRev.0 INTRODUCTION,PURPOSEandORGANIZATIONINTRODUCTIONDonaldC.CookNuclearPlanthasproposedarevisiontoitsEmergencyPlantoincorporateguidancefromNUMARC/NESP%07,Revision2(January1992),"MethodologyforDevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevels."TheNUMARCguidancewasdevelopedtoreplacetheguidancefordevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevels(EALs)containedinNUREG4654/FEMA-REP-1(Revision1),"CriteriaforPreparationandEvaluationofRadiologicalEmergencyResponsePlansandPreparednessinSupportofNuclearPowerPlants"thatwasissuedNovember1980.TheNUMARCmethodologywasusedtodevelopasetofgenericEALguidelines,togetherwiththebasis,sothattheycouldbeusedandadaptedbyeachutilityinaconsistentmanner.TheNRChasendorseduseoftheNUMARCmethodologyasanacceptablealternativemethodtoNUREG4654fordevelopingplant-specificEALsinRegulatoryGuide1.101,"EmergencyPlanningandPreparednessforNuclearPowerReactors,"Revision3,August1992.ThisRegulatoryGuidefurtherstatesthat:"LicenseesmayuseeitherNUREG4654/FEMA-REP-1orNUMARC/NESP407indevelopingtheirEALschemebutmaynotuseportionsofbothmethodologies."ThemajordifferencesbetweenNUMARCguidanceandNUREG4654guidanceare:1.Eventsthatareexplicitlycoveredunder10CFR50.72asone-hourorfour-hourreportsarenotintheUnusualEventclass.Thismeansthatitemssuchascontaminatedinjuredpersontransportedoff-site,partialcommunicationslosses,meteorologicalmeasurementlosses,shutdownwithintherequirementsoftechnicalspecifications,andinadvertentactuationofECCSarenolongertreatedasemergencies.2.PrecursorconditionsareexplicitlyincludedintheUnusualEventclass.3.Conditionssuchasfire,explosion,gasreleases,flooding,seiche,tornado,orearthquakecanbedirectlyescalatedonlyuptotheAlertclassification.EscalationtoSiteAreaEmergencyorGeneralEmergencyisbasedondegradedsystemresponseaswouldbedeterminedbyfissionproductbarrier,lossofACpower,orprojectedeffluenreleaseEALs.4.EventsequencessuchasLOCAandsteamgeneratortuberuptureareaddressedbydeterminingtheirlevelofchallengetoeachofthethreeprimaryfissionproductbarriers-fuelclad,reactorcoolantsystem,andthecontainment.ThelevelofchallengeisdeterminedinaccordancewiththeEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOPs)usingsymptoms,CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTreestatus,andrequiredentryintoEOPs.ThisallowstheoperationscrewtoreadilyrecognizethecorrespondingemergencyclassificationandallowsforreadyescalationtoSiteAreaEmergencyorGeneralEmergencyasconditionsmayworsen.ThefissionproductbarriersareincludedintheCookPlant"Barriers"EmergencyConditionCategory(ECC).Page1of46Rev.0 PURPOSEThisdeviationdocumentwasdevelopedtoaddressthefollowingneeds:ToprovidecleardocumentationofNUMARCguidanceandhowitwasappliedinthedevelopmentofCookPlantupgradedEALs.2.ToprovidejustificationofanyexceptionsoradditionstoNUMARCguidanceasitisappliedtotheCookPlant.3.TofacilitatetheregulatoryapprovaloftheupgradedEALsthatIsrequiredunder10CFR50AppendixE.DEFINITIONSCriticalSafetyFunction(CSF)-Subcriticality,corecooling,heatsink,pressure-temperature-stress(RCSintegrity),containment,andRCSinventoryasmonitoredinaccordancewiththeEmergencyOperatingProcedures.CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)-ThemethodbywhichlevelofchallengetoeachCSFisdeterminedinaccordancewiththeEmergencyOperatingProcedures.EmergencyActionLevel(EAL)-Apredetermined,site-specific,observablethresholdforaplantInitiatingConditionthatplacestheplantinagivenemergencyclass.AnEALcanbeaninstrumentreading;anequipmentstatusindicator;ameasurableparameter(onsiteoroffsite);adiscrete,observableevent;resultsofanalyses;entryintospecificemergencyoperatingprocedures;oranotherphenomenonwhich,ifitoccurs,indicatesentryIntoaparticularemergencyclass.EmergencyConditionCategory(ECC)-AgroupingofInitiatingConditionsorEALs,recognizabletotheSiteEmergencyCoordinator,applyingtothesameareaofconcernandthatcanlogicallyleadtoescalatingtheemergencyclass.EmergencyClassificationLevel-Thesearetakenfrom10CFR50AppendixE.Theyarelnescalatingorder:(Notificationof)UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergency.FissionProductBarrier-Oneofthethreeprincipalbarrierstouncontrolledreleaseofradlonuclides,~i.e.,fuelclad,reactorcoolantsystem(RCS),andthecontainmentbuilding(CNTMT).InitiatingCondition(IC)-Oneofapredeterminedsubsetofnuclearpowerplantconditionswhereeitherthepotentialexistsforaradiologicalemergency,orsuchanemergencyhasoccurred.Loss(ofafissionproductbarrier)-Severechaffengetoafissionproductbaniersufficienttoconsiderthatbarrierincapableofperformingitssafetyfunction.ModerateEarthquake-Earthquakethatisreadilyfeltbutdoesnotcauseobservabledamagetoplantstructures.Page2of46Rev.0 PotentialLoss(ofafissionproductbarrier)-Challengetoafissionproductbarriersufficienttoconsiderthatbarrierdegradedinitsabilitytoperformitssafetyfunction.ProtectedArea-ThatareaofD.C.Cookwhichisenclosedwithinthesecurityfence.EntrytotheprotectedareaisviaoneoftheguardIslandsandrequiresasecuritybadge.RecognitionCategory-AlogicalandconvenientgroupingofECCsusedtoquicklyeliminatenon-applicableICsorEALsfromconsiderationduringEmergencyClassification.SafeShutdownArea-SelectedareaswithintheProtectedAreathatmaybeoccupiedforthesecurityorsafeshutdownoftheunits.Thesafeshutdownareais:~Controlrooms~Centralalarmstation~ContainmentbuildingsinModes5and6~ThefollowingareasifaControlRoommustbeevacuated~Thedieselgeneratorrooms~The4KVrooms~VicinityofallLocalShutdownStations.SafeShutdownEquipment-SelectedcomponentsdeemednecessarytoplaceandmaintainaunitinHotShutdownwithcapabilitytoestablishandmaintainColdShutdownasdescribedinSafe-ShutdownCapabilityAssessment,ProposedModificationsandEvaluations(AEPSC),Rev.1-1986.Inbrief,thesafeshutdownequipmentcanbedescribedas:~TheRCSmakeuppathfromtheRWSTviatheCCPsandBITinJectionlines.~ThesecondaryheatsinkconsistingoftheCST,allthreeAFWpumps,associatedAFWvalves,theSGs,theSGSVs,andtheSGsafetiesandPORVs.~TheCCWsystem.~TheESWsystemincludingalternatesupplytoAFW.~TheRHRsystem.~ThedieselgeneratorsandtheemergencyACbuses.~TheCRIDsandmostGRID-poweredinstrumentatlon.~TheDCdistributionsystemincludingbatteriesandbatterychargers.~AllLocalShutdownStations.~UnitcrosstiesforBITflow,RCPsealinjection,CSTsandAFW.SevereEarthquake-Earthquakethatcausesobservabledamagetoplantstructures.Transient-Acondition(1)beyondtheexpectedsteady-statefluctuationsintemperature,pressure,powerlevel,orwaterlevel,(2)beyondthenormalmanipulationsoftheControlRoomoperatingcrew,and(3)thatwouldbeexpectedtorequireactuationoffast-actingautomaticcontrolorprotectionsystemstobringthereactortoanewsafe,steady-statecondition.Valid-Meansjustified.Valid<indications>areobtainedfrominstrumentsthatareconsideredoperableandhavebeenotherwiseindependentlyverified,e.g.,byobservationofInitiatingdamage,byconfirmationofaneventbyoutsideagencies,orbyredundantinstruments.ValidSlIsanactuationeitherautomaticormanualinresponsetoaneventthatcauseslossorshrinkageofRCSinventoryorlossofsecondaryinventory.Page3of46Rev.0 VitalArea-SelectedareaswithintheProtectedAreathatcontainequipmentnecessaryforthesecurityorsafeshutdownoftheunits.Thevitalareasare:~Controlrooms~Controlroomandauxiliarycablevaults~Containmentbuildings~DieselGeneratorrooms~Auxiliaryfeedwaterpumprooms~Essentialservicewaterpumprooms~Spentfuelpoolarea~Electricalequipmentrooms~UPSbatteryandinverterrooms~CentralalarmstationORGANIZATIONThedeviationinformationisorganizedinthefollowingmanner:~GenericICIdentifierandDescriptionNOTE:TheICidentifier(i.e.AU1)containsEmergencyClassificationLevelinformationinthesecondletter.UintheexamplestandsforUE.~EquivalentE-PlanICDescription~BasisforICDeviation~GenericExampleEAL(s)Note:NUMARC/NESP407frequentlyprovidesmorethanoneexampleEALWhenmorethanoneIsprovided,logicphrasingisusedtodescribewhetherallEALsaresuggestedorwhetheratleastoneEALshouldbechosen.ThisdocumentwilllistallexampleEALsfromNUMARC/NESP-007.~12-PMP2080.EPP.101EAL(s)~BasisforEALDeviationfromNUMARC/NESP-007suggestionsandexplanationswhyanygenericEALwasnotchosenformodificationasaD.C.CookEALTherearenotactualEALsfortheFissionProductBarrierRecognitionCategory.InthisrecognitloncategorytherearesymptomsofLOSSorPOTENTIALLOSSofeachbarrier.Forthisrecognitioncategory,thedeviationinformationwillconsistofNUMARC/NESP407genericsymptomsandtheequivalentCooksymptoms.Page4of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGERecognitionCategory:AbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluentsGenericIC:AU1:AnyUnplannedReleaseofGaseousorLiquidRadioactivitytotheEnvironmentthatExceedsTwoTimestheRadiologicalTechnicalSpecTiicationsfor60MinutesorLonger.CookIC:UnplannedeNuentreleasegreaterthan2xTechnicalSpecification3/4.11limitslastingatleast60minutes'.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsthe"valueshown"(sitespecificmonitors)indicatesthatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterionandIndicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(sitespecificprocedure):(sitespecificlist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan60minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbebasedonthevalidreading.2.Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicatesconcentrationsorreleaserateswithareleasedurationof60minutesorlongerinexcessoftwotimes(site-specifictechnicalspecifications).3.Validreadingonperimeterradiationmonitoringsystemgreaterthan0.10mR/hrabovenormalbackgroundfor60minutes[forsiteshavingtelemeteredperimetermonitors.]4.Validindicationonautomaticreal-timedoseassessmentcapabilitygreaterthan(site-specificvalue)for60minutesorlongerlforsiteshavingsuchcapability].CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(UE)Unplannedradioactivereleaselastingmorethan60minutes't2timesthehighalarmsetpolntonVRS-1505orVRS-2505.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:InsteadofplacinganassessmentrequirementwithintheECCTable,wehaveelectedtoincorporatetheNOTErequirementintotheEALThiskeepstheinitialclassificationschemesimple.Inaddition,theinstrumentvaluesusedareabovethehighalarmsetpointswhichmeansactionswillbeinprogresstoIdentifyandterminatethesourceofthegaseousradioactivity.GenericEALs2,3,and4werenotused.GenericEAL82involvesanalysesofsamples.Thecontrolroompersonnelarenotrequiredtoreviewthesesampleresultsfortechnicalspecificationcompliance,soinclusionofthiscomparisonasanEALisnotbeneficialbasedonourproceduresforcontrollingradioactiveeNuents.GenericEAL83andEALLarenotapplicablesincewehaveneitheraperimetermonitoringsystemnorareal-timedoseassessmentcapability.'fthestartingtimeofthereleaseIsunknown,the60minutetimelimitIsnotapplicableandaneventdeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasreleaseratehasbeenconfirmedtobeabovethethresholdvalue.Page5of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AU2:UnexpectedIncreaseinPlantRadiationLevelsorAirborneConcentration.CookIC:Unexpectedincreaseinplantradiationlevels.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific)IndicationofuncontrolledwaterleveldecreaseInthereactorrefuelingcavitywithallirradiatedfuelassembliesremainingcoveredbywater.2.Uncontrolledwaterleveldecreaseinthespentfuelpoolandfueltransfercanalwithallirradiatedfuelassembliesremainingcoveredbywater.3.(Site-specTiic)radiationreadingforirradiatedfuelindrystorage.4.Validdirectarearadiationmonitorreadingsincreasesbyafactorof1000overnormal'evels.CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels(UE)~Unexpectedradiationlevelsof:~>2.5mr/hrineitherControlRoomortheCentralAlarmStation~>15mr/hrinSpentFuelarea~Anuncontrolledwaterleveldecreaseinanareaholdingirradiatedfuelassembliesoutsidethereactorvessel.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:GenericEAL¹3wasnotusedbecausewedonothavedrystorageofirradiatedfuel.GenericEAL¹1andEAL¹2wereincorporatedintooneEALInsteadofusingincreasesof1000xnormallevels,wehaveelectedtousefixedvaluesforsimplicity.Radiationincreasesintheplantdonotaffectsafeoperationunlessacontinuouslymannedareaisaffected.Thereareonlythreeareasthatarecontinuouslymanned:bothcontrolroomsandsecurity'scentralalarmstation.IfradiationlevelsincreaseintheseareasthemostprobablecausewillbeareleaseofradioactivegaswhichwillbeevaluatedusingtheEffiuentsECC.However,thisEALwillcoveranyeventinvolvingthelossofcontrolofaradioactivesourcesuchasaradiographydevice.The15mr/hrlimitforthespentfuelareaprovidesareasonableleveltoidentifythelossofwaterleveleventbeforeirradiatedfuelisuncovered.Normallevelscanbeconsideredasthehighestreadinginthepast24hoursexcludingthecurrentpeakvalue.Page6of46Rev.0

ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:SU4:FuelCladDegradationCookIC:Anyindicationoffuelcladdamageinactivefuel.ICDeviation:ThisIChasbeenmovedfromtheSystemsRecognitlonCategorytotheRecognitionCategoryforAbnormalRadiation/RadiologicalENuents/FuelDamage.Sincethefuelcladlsnota"system"butdamagetothecladIsassociatedwithabnormalradiologicalconditions,thecategorychangewasmadeforconsistency.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific)radiationmonitorreadingsIndicatingfuelcladdegradationgreaterthanTechnicalSpecTiicatlonallowablelimits.2.(Site-specific)coolantsampleactivityvalueindicatingfuelcladdegradationgreaterthanTechnicalSpecTiicationallowablelimits.CookEAL(s):ECC:R4FuelDamage(UE)Anyindicationoffuelcladdamage:~RCSactivity>1.0pCI/graml-131DoseEquivalentfor>48Hours~RCSactivity>100/6yCI/gramModes:ALLEALDeviation:Cooknolongerhasafailedfueldetector,sogenericEAL81IsnotapplicableandnootherequivalentsitespecificEALisavailable.Page7of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AA1:AnyUnplannedReleaseofGaseousorLiquidRadioactivitytotheEnvironmentthatExceeds200TimestheRadiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor15MinutesorLonger.CookIC:UnplannedeNuentreleaselastingatleast15minutes'hatresultsinaprojectedsiteboundarydoserategreaterthan10mrem/hr.ICDeviation:DuetoourshortNorth-Southsiteboundary,200xthetechnicalspecificationlimitswouldexceedthethresholdforasiteareaemergencydeclaration.Ourcriteriaof10mrem/hratthesiteboundaryprovidesadequatemarginagainstunnecessaryAlertdeclarationwhileprovidingsometimemargintotheSiteAreaEmergencythreshold.The10mrem/hrisalsospecificallymentionedingenericEALk3asavalidlimitforsiteboundarydoserateifaperimetermonitoringsystemwasavailable.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsthevalueshownindicatesthatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterionandindicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(sitespecificprocedure):(sitespecificlist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbebasedonthevalidreading.2.Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicatesconcentrationsorreleaseratesinexcessof(200xsite-specifictechnicalspeciTications)for15minutesorlonger.3.Validreadingonperimeterradiationmonitoringsystemgreaterthan10.0mR/hrsustainedfor15minutes[forsiteshavingtelemeteredperimetermonitors.]4.Validindicationonautomaticreal-timedoseassessmentcapabilitygreaterthan(200xsite-specificTechnicalSpecificationsvalue)for15minutesorlonger[forsiteshavingsuchcapability].CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(Alert)Unplannedradioactivereleaselastingmorethan15minutesat>4.0x10yCI/cconVRS-1505orVRS-2505.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:AspreviouslydiscussedindeviationforGenericEALAU1,insteadofplacinganassessmentrequirementwithintheECCTable,wehaveelectedtoincorporatetheNOTErequirementintotheEALThiskeepstheinitialclassificationschemesimple.Inaddition,theinstrumentvaluesusedareabovethehighalarmsetpointswhichmeansactionswillbeinprogresstoidentifyandterminatethesourceofthegaseousradioactivity.Alsoaspreviouslydiscussed,thethresholdvaluewasbackcalculatedfroma10mrem/hrsiteboundarydoserateusingaveragesitemeteorologyof4.5mphwindspeedandPasquillcategoryD.GenericEALsP2and@4werenotusedsincethe200xT.S.limitisnotpartofourIC.'fthestartingtimeofthereleaseisunknown,the60minutetimelimitlsnotapplicableandaneventdeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasreleaseratehasbeenconfirmedtobeabovethethresholdvalue.Page8of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AA2:MajorDamagetoIrradiatedFuelorLossofWaterLevelthatHasorWillResultintheUncoveringofIrradiatedFuelOutsidetheReactorVessel.CookICs:R-2:Lossofwaterlevelthatcanuncoverirradiatedfueloutsidethereactorvessel.R-3:MajordamagetoIrradiatedfuel.ICDeviation:ThegenericICwassplitforinclusioninto2ECCs.ThereisnodeviationinintentasbothpartsofthegenericICareincludedintoourclassificationscheme.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.A(site-specificsetpoint)alarmononeormoreofthefollowingradiationmonitors:(site-specTiicmonitors)~Refuelfloorarearadiationmonitor~Fuelhandlingbuildingventilationmonitor~Fuelbridgearearadiationmonitor2.Reportofvisualobservationofirradiatedfueluncovered.3.Waterlevellessthan(site-specific)feetfortheReactorRefuelingCavitythatwillresultinirradiatedfueluncovery.4.Waterlevellessthan(site-specific)feetfortheSpentFuelPoolandFuelTransferCanalthatwillresultinirradiatedfueluncovery.CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels~Unplanneddecreaseinwaterlevelthatresultsinuncoveryofanirradiatedfuelassemblyoutsidethereactorvessel.Modes:ALLECC:R4FuelDamage(Alert)~VisualindicationofdamagetoanIrradiatedfuelassemblyANDvalidhighalarmonANYofthefollowing:~ERS-1301/1401/2301/2401~ERS-1305/1405/2305/2405~VRS-1501/2501Modes:ALLEALDeviation:GenericEAL81isnotusedsincetherearenotareamonitorsinallregionswherefueluncoverycanoccur.GenericEALP2"Reportsofvisibledamage"wasmodifiedtorequireconfirmationviavalidgas/particulatemonitoralarmsthatcladdamagehasoccurredinorderto'escalatetotheAlertlevel.GenericEALsP3and44donotdefinelossofwaterlevelintermsoffeetbecauseremotelevelmeasuringsystemsdonotexist.Instead,lossofwaterlevelisdefinedasactualuncoveryofafuelassemblywhichisequivalenttothegenericEALs.Page9of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGiCALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AA3:ReleaseofRadioactiveMaterialorIncreasesinRadiationLevelsWithintheFacilitythatImpedesOperationofSystemsRequiredtoMaintainSafeOperationsortoEstablishorMaintainColdShutdown.CookIC:Radiationincreasesthatimpedesafeoperation.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Valid(site-specific)radiationmonitorreadingsgreaterthan15mr/hrinareasrequiringcontinuousoccupancytomaintainsafetyfunctions:~(sitespecTiiclist)2.Valid(site-specific)radiationmonitorreadingsgreaterthan(site-specific)valuesinareasrequiringinfrequentaccesstomaintainplantsafetyfunctions.~(sitespecificlist)NOTE:TheEmergencyDirectorshoulddeterminethecauseoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsandreviewotherICsforapplicability.CookEAL(s):ECC:R-2In-PlantRadLevels(Alert)~Unexpectedradiationlevelsof:~>15mr/hrineitherControlRoomortheCentralAlarmStation~>100mr/hrgeneralareainAuxiliarybuildinghallwaysModes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page10of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AS1:BoundaryDoseResultingfromanActualorImminentReleaseofGaseousRadioactivityExceeds100mRWholeBodyor500mRChildThyroidfortheActualorProjectedDurationoftheRelease.CookIC:Projectedsiteboundarydosegreaterthan100mremTEDEor500mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan100mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.ICDeviation:WeareusingTEDEandCDEterminology.Ifatanytimeduringanaccident,thesiteboundarydoserateexceeds100mrem/hr,webelieveitisinthepublicinteresttodeclareasiteareaemergency.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedthevalueshownindicatesthatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterionandindicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(site-specificprocedure).(site-specTiiclist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.2.Avalidreadingsustainedfor15minutesorlongeronperimeterradiationmonitoringsystemgreaterthan100mr/hr.3.Validdoseassessmentcapabilityindicatesdoseconsequencesgreaterthan100mRwholebodyor500mRchildthyroid.4.Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding100mr/hrexpectedtocontinueformorethanonehours;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatechildthyroiddosecommitmentof500mrforonehourofinhalation.CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(SAE)Projectedsiteboundarydosegreaterthan100mremTEDEor500mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan100mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:GenericEAL¹1isnotused.Followinganymajoraccident,theSECwillbeginaninitialdoseassessmentifindicationofgaseouseNuentexist.WhentheEOFismanned,theywillassumedoseassessmentduties.Duringtheinitialstagesofanaccident,theSECwillnotbeabletocompleteadoseassessmentwithinthefirst15minutesasrequiredbyGenericIC¹1.Thiscouldresultinthedeclarationofasiteareaemergency.BecauseofourlocationonLakeMichigan,thewinddirectioniscriticaltoevacuationplanning.Thusanarbitrary15minutelimitbasedonaradiationmonitorreadingaloneisnotinthebestinterestofthepublicforasiteareaemergencydeclaration.However,wewilldeclareasiteareaemergencyifthedoseRATEataninlandlocationonthesiteboundaryexceeds100mrem/hr.Thiscouldresultinanearlyevacuationifaneventofthisseriousnessoccurs.NotethatthisdeclarationIsaresultofthedoseassessmentmethodologyandevacuationrecommendationswouldbeavailableatthesametime.EAL¹2wasnotusedbecausewedonothaveaperimetermonitoringsystem.Page11of46Rev.0 ABNORMALRADIATION/RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENTS/FUELDAMAGEGenericIC:AG1:BoundaryDoseResultingfromanActualorImminentReleaseofGaseousRadioactivityExceeds1000mRWholeBodyor5000mRChildThyroidfortheActualorProjectedDurationoftheReleaseUsingActualMeteorology.CookIC:Projectedsiteboundarydosegreaterthan1000mremTEDEor5000mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsuiveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan1000mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.ICDeviation:WeareusingTEDEandCDEterminology.Ifatanytimeduringanaccident,thesiteboundarydoserateexceeds1000mrem/hr,webelieveitisinthepublicinteresttodeclareageneralemergency.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Avalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedthevalueshownindicatesthatthereleasemayhaveexceededtheabovecriterionandindicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(site-specificprocedure)~(site-specificlist)NOTE:Ifthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.2.Avalidreadingsustainedfor15minutesorlongeronperimeterradiationmonitoringsystemgreaterthan1000mr/hr.3.Validdoseassessmentcapabilityindicatesdoseconsequencesgreaterthan1000mRwholebodyor5000mRchildthyroid.4.Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding1000mr/hrexpectedtocontinueformorethanonehours;oranalysesoffieldsuiveysamplesindicatechildthyroiddosecommitmentof5000mrforonehourofinhalation.CookEAL(s):ECC:R-1ENuents(GE)Projectedsiteboundarydosegreaterthan1000mremTEDEor5000mremCDE.-OR-Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoserategreaterthan1000mrem/hrp-yduringtherelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:GenericEAL81isnotused.FollowinganymaJoraccident,theSECwillbeginaninitialdoseassessmentifindicationofgaseouseNuentexist.WhentheEOFismanned,theywillassumedoseassessmentduties.Duringtheinitialstagesofanaccident,theSECwillnotbeabletocompleteadoseassessmentwithinthefirst15minutesasrequiredbyGenericIC@1.Thiscouldresultinthedeclarationofageneralemergency.BecauseofourlocationonLakeMichigan,thewinddirectioniscriticaltoevacuationplanning.Thusanarbitrary15minutelimitbasedonaradiationmonitorreadingaloneisnotinthebestinterestofthepublicforageneralemergencydeclaration.However,wewilldeclareageneralemergencyifthedoseRATEataninlandlocationonthesiteboundaryexceeds1000mrem/hr.Thiswillresultinanearlyevacuationifaneventofthisseriousnessoccurs.Notethatthisdeclarationisaresultofthedoseassessmentmethodologyandevacuationrecommendationswouldbeavailableatthesametime.EAL42wasnotusedbecausewedonothaveaperimetermonitoringsystem.Page12of46Rev.0 SySTEMMALFUNCTIONSecognitionCategory:SystemMalfunctionsGenericIC:SU1:LossofAllOffsitePowertoEssentialBussesforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:LossofalloffsitepowertoACemergencybusesfor>15minutes.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossofpowerto(site-specTiic)transformersforgreaterthan15minutes.AND~Atleast(site-specific)emergencygeneratorsaresupplyingpowertoemergencybusses.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(UE)NEITHERSwitchyardNOR69KVpowersuppliesavailablefor>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4,5EALDeviation:Thereisnoneedtoextendthisto"DEFUELED"sinceourspentfuelcoolingisredundantbetweenunits.AddedIC/EALtoECC:SXtoaddressthelossofspentfuelcooling.TherewasnoneedtostatethattheDGsaresupplyingtheemergencybusessincecoincidentfailureoftheDGsisclearlyrecognizableasalossofallACpowerwhichIsseparatelyclassified.GenericIC:SU2:InabilitytoReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits.CookIC:UnitisNOTplacedinrequiredMODEwithinTechnicalSpecificationLCOactiontimelimit.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):PlantIsnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithin(site-specTiic)TechnicalSpecificationsLCOActionStatementTime.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-7TechnicalSpecifications(UE)UnitlsNOTplacedlnrequiredMODEwithinTechnicalSpecificationLCOactiontimelimit.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page13of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SU3:UnplannedLossofMostorAllSafetySystemAnnunciationorIndicationintheControlRoomforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:Unplannedlossofallcontrolroomannunciatorsfor>15minutesBUTSPDSorPPCisoperable.ICDeviation:Deletedreferencetolossof'most"annunciatorsandlossofallormostIndicators.Thelossof"most"annunciatorsisnotplausiblewithourdesign.Theonlysinglefailurethataffectsamajorityoftheannunciatorswillcausethelossof"ALL'nnunciators.LossofindicationswasdeletedfromthisICbecauseamajorlossofindication(CRIDs)willalsorenderthecompensatorynon-alarmingIndicationsinoperable(SPDS/PPC)becauselossoftheCRIDswilldisableInputtothesesystemsalso.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Allofthefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossofmostorall(site-specific)annunciatorsassociatedwithsafetysystemsforgreaterthan15minutes.~Compensatorynon-alarmingIndicationsareavailable.~IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor,thelossoftheannunciatorsorindicatorsrequiresincreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatetheunit(s).~AnnunciatororIndicatorlossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciatorsorIndicators(UE)Unplannedlossallcontrolroomannunciatorsfor>15minutesBUTSPDSorPPCisOPERABLE.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:DeletedrequirementforSStomakeaJudgementontheneedforincreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatewithoutadditionalpersonnelbecausewebelieveatthistimethatincreasedsurveillancewillalwaysbenecessary.Page14of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SU5:RCSLeakage.CookIC:Anyofthefollowing:~PressureBoundaryleakage>10GPM~UnidentTiiedleakage>10GPM~Identifiedleakage>25GPM~SGtubeleakage>10GPMICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Unidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakagegreaterthan10gpm.ORIdentifiedleakagegreaterthan25gpm.CookEAL(s):ECC:S4RCSLeakage(UE)Anyofthefollowing:~PressureBoundaryleakage>10GPM~Unidentifiedleakage>10GPM~Identifiedleakage>25GPM~SGtubeleakage>10GPMModes:1,2,3,4,5EALDeviation:AddedSGtubeleakagetotheEALtoforceanUnusualEventdeclarationonsmallSGtubeleaks.ThiswasdonetomeettheintentoftheFissionProductBarrierTable-ContainmentLosssymptomofSGsecondarysidereleasewithPrimary-to-Secondaryleakage.Page15of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SU6:UnplannedLossofAllOnsiteorOffsiteCommunicationCapabilities.CookIC:UnplannedlossofallonsiteORoffsitecommunicationcapabilities.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Eitherofthefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossofall(site-specificlist)onsitecommunicationcapabilityaffectingtheabilitytoperformroutineoperations.OR~Lossofall(site-specificlist)offsitecommunicationscapability.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-8LossofCommunIcationSystemsUnplannedlossofALLonsiteelectroniccommunicationcapabilities:~Telephone~Pagesystem~RadiosORUnplannedlossofALLoffsiteelectroniccommunicationcapabilities:~Telephone(offsite)~Microwavetransmission~NRCphone~Loaddispatchline~CellulartelephonesofPMandAPMsModes:ALLEALDeviation:NoSignificantDeviationPage16of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SU7:UnplannedLossofRequiredDCPowerDuringColdShutdownorRefuelingModeforGreaterThan15Minutes.CookIC:Unplannedloss'fallvitalDCpowerinModes5or6forgreaterthan15minutes.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Eitherofthefollowingconditionsexist:~UnplannedlossofVitalDCpowertorequiredDCbussesbasedon(site-specific)busvoltageindications.AND~FailuretorestorepowertoatleastonerequiredDCbuswithin15minutesfromthetimeofloss.CookEAL(s):ECC:SQLossofDCPowerUnplannedloss'f250VDCbusesABANDCDfor>15minutes.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:N/ACookIC:UnplannedlossofanyfunctionneededtomaintaincoldshutdowninModes5or6.Unplannedlossofcoolingtothespentfuelpoolforgreaterthan60minutesInanyMode.ICDeviation:AddedtheseICsattheUEleveltoprovideprecursorsforgenericICSA3.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):NoneCookEAL(s):Unplannedtossofshutdowncoolingforgreaterthan15minutesinModes5or6.UnplannedlossofSFPcoolingforgreaterthan60minutesinALLmodes.EALDeviation:AddedtheseEALsattheUEleveltoprovideprecursorsforgenericICSA3.'DCbusislostforthepurposeofE-Planclassificationwheneverbatteryvoltageislessthan210vdc.Page17of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SA1:LossofAllOffsitePowerandLossofAllOnsiteACPowertoEssentialBussesDuringColdShutdownorRefuelingMode.CookIC:CompletelossofallACemergencybusesfor>15minutesinModes5or6.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionexist:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific)transformers.AND~Failureof(site-specific)emergencygeneratorstosupplypowertoemergencybusses.AND~Failuretorestorepowertoatleastoneemergencybuswithin15minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(Alert)~CompletelossofallACemergencybusesfor>15minutesinModes5or6.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:ThegenericEALwasnotusedbecauselossofallACpowerisaspecificEOPeventthatisreadilyrecognizedbyalllicensedpersonnel.GenericIC:SA2:FailureofReactorProtectionSystemInstrumentationtoCompleteorInitiateanAutomaticReactorScramOnceaReactorProtectionSystemSetpointHasBeenExceededandManualScramWasSuccessful.CookIC:ATWSterminatedbymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):(Site-specific)indication(s)existthatindicatethatreactorprotectionsystemsetpointwasexceededandautomaticscramdidnotoccur,andasuccessfulmanualscramoccurred.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(Alert)ATWSterminatedbymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.Modes:1,2EALDeviation:Didnotincludesite-specificindicationsofanATWS.RecognitionofATWSisanimmediateactionoftheEOPsanddoesnotneedtohavespecificindicationscalledoutintheEALPage18of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SA3:InabilitytoMaintainPlantinColdShutdown.CookIC:InabilitytomaintainRCStemperaturelessthan200'FinModes5or6.Inabilitytomaintainspentfuelpooltemperaturelessthan200'FinallModes.InadvertentcriticalityInModes3,4,5or6.InadvertentcriticalitywithaconcurrentlossofRCSborationcapabilitylnModes34.[SAEonly]ICDeviation:TheseICsareincludedinanECCtitled"LossofShutdownFunctions".Tomaintaintheplantlncoldshutdown,itisnecessarytokeepRCStemperaturesbelow200'Fandmaintainadequateshutdownmargin.CooklCsWand83areclearlytiedtothedefinltlonof'coldshutdown".Lossofspentfuelpoolcoolingwasaddedtoaddressdeletionof"DEFUEUNG'romSA1.CoverageofaninadvertentcriticalityisprovidedbytwoICsandshouldnotbeconfusedwithanATWS.AlossofreactivitycontrolthatresultsincriticalityexceedsthethresholdofthegenericIC.However,adilutionorxenondecayeventdoesnotcausearapidpowerexcursionandcanbeterminatedbypromptinitiationofboratlonperT.S.LCOactionrequirements.Sincefuelcladdamageisunlikely,thisICexistsattheAlertlevel.Ifinadvertentcriticalityoccurswithaconcurrentlossofboroncontrol,thesecondICpromptsaSiteAreaEmergencydeclarationduetotheincreasedpotentialforfuelcladdamage.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossof(site-specific)TechnicalSpecificationrequiredfunctiontomaintaincoldshutdown.ANDTemperatureincreasethateither:~ExceedsTechnicalSpecificationcoldshutdowntemperaturelimitOR~ResultsInuncontrolledtemperatureriseapproachingcoldshutdownTechnicalSpecTiicatlonlimit.CookEAL(s):ECC:SALossofShutdownFunctionsAnyofthefollowing:~LossofshutdowncoolingANDRCStemperatureisincreasinginanuncontrolledmannerandexpectedtoexceed200'FinModes5or6.~LossofspentfuelpoolcoolingANDspentfuelpooltemperatureisincreasinginanuncontrolledmannerandexpectedtoexceed200'FinallModes.~InadvertentcriticalityinModes3,4,5or6.[Alertonly]~InadvertentcriticalitywithaconcurrentlossofRCSborationcapabilityinModes3W.[SAEonly]EALDeviation:EliminatedthedirecttiebetweenlossofafunctionANDRCStemperatureincreaseabove200'FforthelossofCCWandtheinadvertentcriticality.FormoreinformationseeICdeviationsection.Page19of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SA4:UnplannedLossofMostorAllSafetySystemAnnunciationorIndicationinControlRoomwitheither(1)aSignificantTransientinProgress,or(2)CompensatoryNon-AlarmingIndicatorsareUnavailable.CookIC:~Unplannedlossofallcontrolroomannunciatorsfor)15minutes-AND-Either:~Atransientisinprogress.~SPDSandPPCareINOPERABLE.~UnplannedlossofthreeCRIDs.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossofmostorall(site-specific)annunclatorsassociatedwithsafetysystemsforgreaterthan15minutes.~IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor,thelossoftheannunciatorsorIndicatorsrequiresIncreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatetheunit(s).~AnnunciatororIndicatorlossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.~Eitherofthefollowing:Asignificantplanttransientisinprogress.OR~Compensatorynon-alarmingindicationsareunavailable.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciatorsorIndicators(Alert)~UnplannedlossofthreeCRIDs.~Unplannedlossofallcontrolroomannunciatorsfor)15minuteswitheither:~AtransientIsInprogress.~SPDSandPPCareINOPERABLE.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:DeletedrequirementforSStomakeaJudgementontheneedforincreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatewithoutadditionalpersonnelbecausewebelieveatthistimethatIncreasedsurveillancewillalwaysbenecessary.Page20of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SA5:ACPowerCapabilitytoEssentialBussesReducedtoaSinglePowerSourceforGreaterThan15MinutessuchthatAnyAdditionalSingleFailureWouldResultinStationBlackout.CookIC:AnyACpoweralignmentfor>15minutesthatcouldallowasinglefailuretocausealossofallACpower.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific)transformersforgreaterthan15minutes.AND~Onsitepowercapabilityhasbeendegradedtoone(trainof)emergencybus(ses)poweredfromasingleonsitepowersupplyduetothelossof:(Site-specificlist)CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(Alert)AnyACpoweralignmentfor>15minutesthatcouldallowasinglefailuretocausealossofallACpower.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:TheCookEALdoesnotattempttolistallthecombinationsofpowersupplylossesnordoesitlimitthesingleACsourcetoanonsitepowersupply.Page21of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSCookIC:CompletelossofpowertoACemergencybusesfor>15minutesinModes1,2,3or4.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):LossofalloffsiteandonsiteACpowerasindicatedby:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific)transformers.ANDFailureof(site-specific)emergencygeneratorstosupplypowertoemergencybusses.AND~Failuretorestorepowertoatleastoneemergencybuswithin(site-specific)minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(SAE)CompletelossofallACemergencybusesfor>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:ThegenericEALwasnotusedbecauselossofallACpowerisaspecTiicEOPeventthatisreadilyrecognizedbyalllicensedpersonnel.GenericIC:SS2:FailureofReactorProtectionSystemInstrumentationtoCompleteorInitiateanAutomaticReactorScramOnceaReactorProtectionSystemSetpointHasBeenExceededandManualScramWasNOTSuccessful.CookIC:ATWSNOTterminatedbymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):(Site-specific)indicationsexistthatautomaticandmanualscramwerenotsuccessful.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(SAE)ATWSNOTterminatedbymanualreactortripfromthecontrolroom.Mode:1EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page22of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SS3:LossofAllVitalDCPower.CookIC:Unplannedloss'fallvitalDCpowerfor>15minutes.ICDeviation:ThegenericguidancecallsforthisEALtobethethresholdtoasiteareaemergencybecauselossofallDCpowercompromisesabilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctionsandprolongedlossofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncoveryandthelossofcontainmentIntegritywhenthereissignificantdecayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.However,atCook,atotallossofDCpowerdoesnotcausethelossofcontrolroomindicationssinceourGRIDinvertersuseACpowerasthenormalsupplybacked-upbyDCpower.Inaddition,thelossofDCpowerwillcausecontainmentisolationwhichisolatescontainmentfromitsnormalcoolingsystem,buttheoperatorscanlocallyreopenthecontainmentisolationvalvesaslongascontrolairisavailable.SinceatotallossofDCpowerdoesnotstopnormalchargingnorcreateanunisolableRCSleakpath,thereisnopotentiallossofRCSbarrierorfuelcladbarrier.Therefore,CookdoesNOTusethisICfordeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.Instead,ifthelossofvitalDCpoweroccursinModes1through4,wewilldeclareanALERTconditionbecausetherewillbeacompletefailureofautomaticactuationforallsafeguardsequipmentwithaconcurrentlossofallcontrolroomannunciators.Inaddition,iftheunitisinMode1,thelossofDCpowerwillcausearapidcooldownoftheRCSduetofailureoftheautomaticturbinetripsystems.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):LossofallVitalDCpowerbasedon(site-specific)busvoltageindicationsforgreaterthan15minutes.CookEAL(s):ECC:S4LossofDCPower(Alert)Unplannedloss'f250VDCbusesABANDCDfor>15minutes.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:SS4:CompleteLossofFunctionNeededtoAchieveorMaintainHotShutdown.CookIC:LossofsecondaryheatsinkinMode3.LossofBOTHCCWtrainsforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1,2,3or4.[Alertonly]LossofBOTHCCWtrainsANDRCPsealinjectionflowforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1R.InadvertentcriticalityinModes3,4,5or6.[Alertonly]InadvertentcriticalitywithaconcurrentlossofRCSborationcapabilityinModes34.ICDeviation:TheseICsareincludedinanECCtitled"LossofShutdownFunctions".ThegenericICisverybroadandiflooselyinterpreteditcouldresultindeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyformanyevents.Forexample,wecannotmaintainhotshutdownconditionswithafailureofALLpressurizerheaters.However,thiseventdoesnotrepresentasufficientlyseriousthreattopublicsafetytowarrantaSiteArea'DCbusislostforthepurposeofE-Planclassificationwheneverbatteryvoltageislessthan210vdc.Page23of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSeEmergencydeclaration.Therefore,wehaveelectedtocoverselectedfailurestomaintainhotshutdownconditions.AllotherinstanceswillbecoveredbySECJudgement.ThelossofsecondaryheatsinkInMode3isequivalenttolossoftheultimateheatsinkasdiscussedinthebasisforgenericICSS4.ThisisalsoequivalenttoaSAEasdescribedontheFissionProductBarriertableunderbothfuelcladandRCSbarriers.CoverageoflossofCCWisprovidedbytwoICs.Withinafewminutes,atotallossofCCWresultsinthelossofallforcedcirculationintheRCS,alossofultimateheatsinkifusingECCSintherecirculationmode,andthepotentiallossofallhigh-headECCSpumps(ifoperating).ThisconditioniscoveredunderT.S.3.0.3andrequiresentryintoMode5whichcanNOTbecompletedduetothenatureofthefailure.SincethiseventresultsInasignTiicantlossofcapability,webelieveitwarrantsanALERTdeclaration.IfthelossofCCWresultsinalossofRCPsealinjection(whichisverylikely),thentheRCPsealswillstartleakingastheywouldduringaLossofAllACPowerevent.Theleakratewouldapproach80gpmafter10-15minutes.BecauseofitssimilaritytoalossofallACevent,webelievethatthisconditionshouldbeclassifiedasaSiteAreaEmergency.CoverageofaninadvertentcriticalityIsprovidedbytwoICsandshouldnotbeconfusedwithanATWS.AlossofreactivitycontrolthatresultslncriticalityexceedsthethresholdofthegenericIC.However,adilutionorxenondecayeventdoesnotcausearapidpowerexcursionandcanbeterminatedbypromptinitiationofborationperT.S.LCOactionrequirements.Sincefuelcladdamageisunlikely,thisICexistsattheAlertlevel.Ifinadvertentcriticalityoccurswithaconcurrentlossofboroncontrol,thesecondICpromptsaSiteAreaEmergencydeclarationduetotheincreasedpotentialforfuelcladdamage.eApplicableGenericEAL(s):Completelossofany(site-specific)functionrequiredforhotshutdown.CookEAL(s):ECC:SALossofShutdownFunctions~InabilitytofeedanySGANDallwiderangeSGlevels<29%inMode3.~LossofbothCCWtrainsfor>15minutesinModes14.[Alertonly]~'ossofBOTHCCWtrainsandRCPsealinjectionflowforgreaterthan15minutesinModes1-4.~InadvertentcriticalityasindicatedbysustainedpositivestartuprateinModes3W.[Alertonly]~InadvertentcriticalitywithaconcurrentlossofRCSborationcapabilityinModes34.EALDeviation:RefertotheICdeviationsection.Page24of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SS5:LossofWaterLevelThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel.CookIC:LossofshutdowncoolingwithimminentcoreuncoveryinModes5or6.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):LossofReactorVesselWaterLevelasindicatedby:~Lossofalldecayheatremovalcoolingasdeterminedby(site-specific)procedure.AND~(Site-specific)Indicatorsthatthecoreisorwillbeuncovered.CookEAL(s):ECC:SRLossofShutdownFunctions(SAE)Lossofshutdowncoolingwithreactorvesselwaterleveldecreasingandexpectedtodropbelow613ft6inches.Modes:5,6EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:SS6:InabilitytoMonitoraSignificantTransientinProgress.CookIC:Inabilitytomonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Lossof(site-specific)annunciatorsassociatedwithsafetysystems.~Compensatorynon-alarmingIndicationsareunavailable.~Indicationsneededtomonitor(site-specific)safetyfunctionsareunavailable.~Transientinprogress.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-5LossofAnnunciatorsorIndicators(SAE)~LossofALLcontrolroomannunciatorsANDlossofthreeCRIDs.~LossofALLCRIDs.Modes:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:ThemostlikelycauseofasignificantlossofannunciatorsisafailureintheDCpowersupplytotheannunciators.Inmodes1or2,thislossofDCpowerisprobablygoingtoinitiateasignificanttransienti.e.Reactortriporsafetyinjection.CombinedwiththelossofamajorityoftheCRIDs(instrumentpowersupplies)whichresultsinasignificantlossofinstrumentation,meetstheintentofthegenericEALs.ThelossofallvitalinstrumentpowerwillresultInenoughspuriousalarmstorenderanyvalidalarmsunusable.Thus,thiseventalsomeetstheintentofthegenericEALs.Page25of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SG1:ProlongedLossofAllOffsitePowerandProlongedLossofAllOnsiteACPower.CookIC:CompletelossofallACemergencybusesfor>4hoursinModes1,2,3or4.CompletelossofallACemergencybuseswithseverechallengetocorecooling.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):LossofalloffsiteandonsiteACpowerasindicatedby:~Lossofpowerto(site-specific)transformers.AND~Failureof(site-specific)emergencygeneratorstosupplypowertoemergencybusses.AND~Atleastoneofthefollowingconditionsexist:~Restorationofatleastoneemergencybuswithin(site-specific)hoursIsNOTlikely.OR~(Site-specific)indicationofcontinuingdegradationofcorecoolingbasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoring.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-2LossofACPower(GE)CompletelossofallACemergencybusesANDEITHERofthefollowing:~RestorationofoneACemergencybusisNOTlikelywithin4hours.~CoreCoolingCSFST-ORANGEMode:1,2,3,4EALDeviation:Insteadofmonitoringthefissionproductbarriertable,wehaveelectedtousetheCoreCoolingCSFST-ORANGEasthethresholdforageneralemergency.ThisparameterlsonthefissionproductbarriertableandmustbeexceededinordertohavethepotentialforasourcetermlargeenoughtoJustifyageneralemergencydeclaration.The4hoursthresholdIsfromourStationBlackoutcopingstudy.Page26of46Rev.0 SYSTEMMALFUNCTIONSGenericIC:SG2:FailureofReactorProtectionSystemtoCompleteanAutomaticScramandManualScramWasNOTSuccessfulandThereisIndicationofanExtremeChallengetotheAbilitytoCooltheCore.CookIC:ATWSwithextremechallengetocorecoolingorheatsinksafetyfunctions.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):~(Site-specTiic)indicationsexistthatautomaticandmanualscramwerenotsuccessful.AND~Eitherofthefollowing:~(Site-specific)indicationsexistthatthecorecoolingisextremelychallenged.OR~(Site-specific)indicationexiststhatheatremovalIsextremelychallenged.CookEAL(s):ECC:S-1ATWS(GE)SubcriticalityCSFST-RED-AND-EITHERofthefollowingconditions:~CoreCoolingCSFST-RED~HeatSinkCSFST-REDMode:1EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page27of46Rev.0 NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVEPHENOMENARecognitionCategory:Natural/DestructivePhenomenaGeneric1C:HU1:NaturalorDestructivePhenomenaOccurringWithintheProtectedArea.Cook1Cs:~ModerateearthquakeWindspeedswithintheProtectedAreaorattheRMBthatexceedthedesignlimitsforsafety-relatedcomponentsormajorstructures'.Lakeleveloscillationofgreaterthan5feet(seiche)ValidindicationofplantfloodingwithpotentialtoaffectunitoperationAvehiclecrashwithintheProtectedAreaORattheRMBthatcausessigniTicantdamage.AnunexpectedexplosionwithintheProtectedAreaorattheRMBTurbinecasingfailureMaingeneratorhydrogensealfailurewhilethegeneratorispressurizedwithhydrogenICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specTiic)methodindicatesfeltearthquake.2.Reportbyplantpersonneloftornadostrikingwithinprotectedarea.3.Assessmentbythecontrolroomthataneventhasoccurred.4.Vehiclecrashintoplantstructuresorsystemswithinprotectedareaboundary.5.Reportbyplantpersonnelofanunanticipatedexplosionwithinprotectedareaboundaryresultinglnvisibledamagetopermanentstructureorequipment.6.Reportofturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbineorgeneratorseals.7.(Site-specific)occurrences.CookEAI(s):ALIMODESECC:N-1EarthquakeECC:N-2HighWindsECC:N4SeicheECC:N4FloodingECC:N-5VehicleCrashECC:N4ExplosionECC:N-7EquipmentorStructuralFailureEarthquakeisreadilyfeltbutdoesnotcauseobservabledamagetoplantstructures.AtornadotouchesdownwithintheProtectedAreaORattheRMB.-OR-Sustainedwindspeed>90mph.Screenhouselakeleveloscillation>5feetNOTduetoswitchingCWpumps.Validindicationofplantfloodingwithpotentialtoaffectunitoperation.AvehiclecrashwithintheProtectedAreainvolvingasafetysystemrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmodeorasystemcontainingradioactivematerial.-OR-AvehiclecrashattheRMBthatinvolvesasealedradioactivematerialstoragecontainer.AnunexpectedexplosionwithintheProtectedAreaORattheRMB.Turbinecasingfailure.-OR-Maingeneratorhydrogensealfailurewhitethegeneratorispressurizedwithhydrogen.EALDeviation:This1ChasbeenrestructuredasaCook-SpecificRecognitionCategorytitled:"Natural/DestructivePhenomena.Thisrecognitloncategoryhasbeensubdividedinto7ECCs.EachoftheseECCsthenhaveatleastoneEALintheUEandAlertECLs.ThisarrangementwascreatedtosimplifytheclassificationprocessfortheShiftSupervisorservingasSEC.'lantstructuresrefertothecontainments,auxiliarybuildings,radioactivematerialbuilding(RMB),ESWenclosures,AFWpumprooms,RWSTandCST.Page28of46Rev.0 NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVEPHENOMENAGenericIC:HA1:NaturalorDestructivePhenomenaOccurringWithinPlantVitalArea.CookIC:~Severeearthquake~Visibledamagetoplantstructures'.~Lakeleveloscillationofgreaterthan8feet(seiche)~ValidIndicationofplantfloodingthathasaffectedANYsafeshutdownsystem~AvehiclecrashwithinaVitalAreaaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmode.~AnexplosionwithinaVitalAreaaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmode.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.(Site-specific)methodindicatesSeismicEventgreaterthanOperatingBasisEarthquake(OBE).2.Tornadoorhighwindsstrikingplantvitalareas:Tornadoorhighwindsgreaterthan(site-specific)mphstrikewithinprotectedareaboundary.3.Reportsofvisiblestructuraldamageonselectedplantstructures.(e.g.Reactorbuilding,Intakebuilding,UltimateHeatSink,RefuelingWaterStorageTank,DieselGeneratorbuilding,TurbineBuilding,CondensateStorageTank,ControlRoom,Other(Site-specific)Structures)4.(Site-specific)indicationsinthecontrolroom.5.Vehiclecrashaffectingplantvitalareas.6.Turbinefailuregeneratedmissilesresultinanyvisiblestructuraldamagetoorpenetrationofany(Site-specific)plantareas.7.(Site-specific)occurrences.CookEAI(s):ALLMODESECC:N-1EarthquakeEarthquakecausesobservabledamagetoplantstructures.ECC:N-2HighWindsVisibledamagetoplantstructures.ECC:N4SeicheScreenhouselakeleveloscillation>8feetNOTduetoswitchingCWpumps.ECC:NXFloodingValidindicationofplantfloodingthathasaffectedANYsafeshutdownsystem.ECC:N-5VehicleCrashAvehiclecrashwithinaVitalAreaaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmodeorcausingthereleaseofradioactivematerial.ECC:N-6ExplosionAnexplosionwithinaVitalAreaaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmode.ECC:N-7EquipmentorVisibledamagetoplantstructures.StructuralFailureEALDeviation:ThisIChasbeenrestructuredasaCook-SpecificRecognitionCategorytitled:"Natural/DestructivePhenomena.Thisrecognitioncategoryhasbeensubdividedinto7ECCs.EachoftheseECCsthenhaveatleastoneEALintheUEandAlertECLs.ThisarrangementwascreatedtosimplifytheclassificationprocessfortheShiftSupervisorservingasSEC.Plantstructuresreferstothecontainments,auxiliarybuildings,radioactivematerialbuilding(RMB),ESWenclosures,AFWpumprooms,RWSTsandCSTs.Page29of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYRecognitionCategory:HazardsandOtherConditionsAffectingPlantSafetyGenericIC:HU2:FireWithinProtectedAreaBoundaryNotExtinguishedWithin15MinutesofDetection.CookIC:FirewithintheProtectedAreaorRMBNOTextinguishedwithin15minutesofdetection.ICDeviation:WehaveexpandedthescopeofthefireareafromselectedsiteswithintheProtectedAreatoincludealloftheProtectedAreaplustheRadioactiveMaterialBuilding.SincetheRadioactiveMaterialBuildingisnotwithintheProtectedArea,theIChadtoberewordedforconsistency.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Fireinbuildingsorareascontiguoustoanyofthefollowing(site-specific)areasnotextinguishedwithin15minutesofcontrolroomnotificationorverificationofacontrolroomalarm:~(Site-specific)listCookEAL(s):ECC:H-1Fire(UE)FirewithintheProtectedAreaorRMBNOTextinguishedwithin15minutesofdetection.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:WehaveexpandedthescopeofthefireareafromselectedsiteswithintheProtectedAreatoincludealloftheProtectedAreaplustheRadioactiveMaterialBuilding.Sincethisareaencompassesallofthesuggestedareas,theCookEALprovidesatleastthesamelevelofpublicprotectionasthegenericEALPage30of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HU3:ReleaseofToxicorFlammableGasesDeemedDetrimentaltoSafeOperationofthePlant.CookIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinornearthesiteboundariesdeemeddetrimentaltosafeoperation.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.Reportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldenterthesiteareaboundaryinamountsthatcanaffectnormaloperationoftheplant.2.ReportbyLocal,CountyorStateofficialsforpotentialevacuationofsitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteevent.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-2ToxicorFlammableGases(UE)~Releaseoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinornearsiteboundarythatmayaffectnormalplantoperation.~Reportbyrecognizedauthorityofneedforpartialsiteevacuationbecauseofoff-sitetoxicgasrelease.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:HU4:ConfirmedSecurityEventWhichIndicatesaPotentialDegradationintheLevelofSafetyofthePlant.CookIC:Confirmedsecurityeventwhichindicatesapotentialdegradationinthelevelofplantsafety.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):1.BombdevicediscoveredwithinplantProtectedAreaandoutsideplantVitalArea.2.Othersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom(Site-specific)SafeguardsContingencyPlan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(UE)~BombdevicediscoveredwithintheProtectedAreaorRadioactiveMaterialBuilding.~Othersecurityeventswhichrepresentapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page31of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HU5:OtherConditionsExistingWhichintheJudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorWarrantDeclarationofanUnusualEvent.CookIC:NoneICDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification".InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassificationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromjudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassTiicationprevailing.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):OtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.CookEAL(s):ThefollowingstatementiscontainedwithinthebodyoftheEmergencyClassTiicationprocedure:~InthejudgementoftheSEC,conditionswhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplantwarrantadeclarationofanUnusualEvent.EALDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification".InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassTiicationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromjudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassTiicationprevailing.Page32of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HA2:FireorExplosionAffectingtheOperabilityofPlantSafetySystemsRequiredtoEstablishorMaintainSafeShutdown.CookIC:Fireaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmode.ICDeviation:DeletedreferencetoexplosionsincethateventiscoveredintheNatural/DestructivePhenomenarecognitioncategory.ThosesystemsneededtoestablishsafeshutdownareincludedinthosesystemsthatarecoveredbyTechnicalSpecificationsforthecurrentoperatingmode.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~Fireorexplosioninanyofthefollowing(site-specific)areas:~(Site-specificlist)AND~AffectedsystemparameterindicationsshowdegradedperformanceorplantpersonnelreportvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipmentwithinthespecTiiedarea.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-1Fire(Alert)Fireaffectingtheoperabilityofsafetysystemsrequiredforthecurrentoperatingmode.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:DeletedreferencetoexplosionsincethateventiscoveredintheNatural/DestructivePhenomenarecognitioncategory.InsteadoflistingspecTiicareasorsystems,theEALremainsgenerictoallowtheSECtodeterminewhatequipmentisneededineachOperatingMode.Ingeneral,thosesystemsneededtoestablishsafeshutdownareincludedinthosesystemsthatarecoveredbyTechnicalSpecificationsforthecurrentoperatingmode.Page33of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HA3:ReleaseofToxicorFlammableGasesWithinaFacilityStructurewhichJeopardizesOperationofSystemsRequiredtoMaintainSafeOperationsortoEstablishorMaintainColdShutdown.CookIC:Toxicorflammablegaseslnanarearequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownofaunit.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.CApplicableGenericEAL(s):~ReportordetectionoftoxicgaseswithinaFacilityStructureinconcentrationthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnel.~ReportordetectionofflammablegaseswithinaFacilityStructureinconcentrationsthatwillaffectthesafeoperationoftheplant.CookEAL(s):ECC:H-2ToxicorFlammableGases(Alert)~Toxicgasinanarearequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownofaunitinconcentrationthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnel.~FlammablegasinanarearequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownofaunitInconcentrationnearflammabilitylimit.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:HA4:SecurityEventinPlantProtectedArea.CookIC:SecurityeventinProtectedArea.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):~Intrusionintoplantprotectedareabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom(site-specific)SafeguardsContingencyPlan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(Alert)~IntrusionintotheProtectedAreabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventswhichindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegraded.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page34of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPIANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HA5:ControlRoomEvacuationHasBeenInitiated.CookIC:ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiated.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Entryinto(site-specTiic)procedureforcontrolroomevacuation.CookEAL(s):ECC:HAControlRoomEvacuation(Alert)ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiated.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:WesometimesuseportionsoftheEmergencyRemoteShutdownprocedureattimesotherthanControlRoomEvacuation.Therefore,insteadofentryintoOHP4025series,wewillusetheICwording.Thereisnochangeinintent.GenericIC:HA6:OtherConditionsExistingWhichintheJudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorWarrantDeclarationofanAlert.CookIC:NoneICDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification".InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassificationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromJudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassificationprevailing.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):OtherconditionsexistwhichintheJudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegradedandthatincreasedmonitoringofplantfunctionsiswarranted.CookEAL(s):ThefollowingstatementiscontainedwithinthebodyoftheEmergencyClassTiicationprocedure:~InthejudgementoftheSEC,conditionswhichindicatethatplantsafetysystemsmaybedegradedANDthatincreasedmonitoringofplantfunctionsisneededwarrantadeclarationofanAlert.EALDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesailthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification.InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassificationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromjudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassificationprevailing.Page35of46Rev.0

HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HS1:SecurityEventinPlantVitalArea.CookIC:SecurityeventinVitalArea.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):IntrusionIntoplantvitalareabyahostileforce.~Othersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom(site-specific)SafeguardsContingencyPlan.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(SAE)~IntrusionintoanyVitalAreabyahostileforce.~OthersecurityeventswhichIndicatelikelyoractualfailureofplantsafetysystemsintendedforprotectionofthepublic.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.GenericIC:HS2:ControlRoomEvacuationHasBeenInitiatedandPlantControlCannotbeEstablished.CookIC:ControlRoomevacuationhasbeenInitiatedANDplantcontrolcannotbeestablished.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):Thefollowingconditionsexist:~ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiated.AND~Controloftheplantcannotbeestablishedper(site-specific)procedurewith(site-specTiic)minutes.CookEAL(s):ECC:HXControlRoomEvacuation(SAE)ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedANDtheShiftSupervisordeterminesthatRCSinventorycontrolhasNOTbeenestablishedafter15minutes.Modes:ALLEALDeviation:Definedcontroloftheplantindefinitetermsforeaseofclassification.Page36of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYGenericIC:HS3:OtherConditionsExistingWhichintheJudgementoftheEmDeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyenoemergencyDirectorWarrantCookIC:NoneICDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesallthetime,soithasbeenincororatedintoprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.corporantothebodyoftheimplementingSECtodetermineclassTiicationfromtheReconitionCat.101,EmergencyOassiTication".InstructionsintherogoegorytablesANDfromJudgementforeveryegestclassiTicationprevailing.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):OtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmerencDirefailuresofplantfunctonededfcionsneorprotectionofthepublic.oemergencyDirectorindicateactualorlikelymajorCookEAL(s):ThefollowingstatementiscontainedwithinthebodoftheEmeInthejudgntofthSECodltlowhioe,conditionswhichindicatelikelyoractualmajorfailuresofplantnconsnefortheprotectionofthepublicwarrantadeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.EALDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesailthetime,soithasbeenlncooratedintprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.corporaedintothebodyoftheimplementingSECtodetermineclassiTicationfromtheRecognitionCateo.101,EmergencyClassTiication".InstructionslntherlththhlhtI~ifitioGenericIC:HG1:SecuriEventResItyultnglnLossofAbilitytoReachandMaintainColdShutdown.CookIC:Securityeventresultinginlossofabilitytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.ICDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):~Lossofphysicalcontrolofthecontrolroomduetosecurityevent.~Lossofphysicalcontroloftheremoteshutdowncapabilityduetosecurityevent.CookEAL(s):ECC:H4SecurityEvents(GE)~Imminentlossofphysicalcontrolofacontrolroomduetoasecurityevent.~Imminentlossofphysicalcontrolofaunit'sremoteshutdowncapabilitydtuetoaModes:ALLEALDeviation:actuallossofphysicalcontrol.WeexpandedthegenericEALtoaddresslmmlnetmnentoranticipatedlossofphysicalcontrolaswellasPage37of46Rev.0 HAZARDSANDOTHERCONDITIONSAFFECTINGPLANTSAFETYIGenericIC:HG2:OtherConditionsExistingWhichintheJudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorWarrantDeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.CookIC:NoneICDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesallthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification'.InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassificationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromjudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassificationprevailing.ApplicableGenericEAL(s):OtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorindicate(1)actualorImminentsubstantialcoredegradationwithpotentialforlossofcontainment,or(2)potentialforuncontrolledradionuclidereleases.ThesereleasescanreasonablybeexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposureleveloutsidethesiteboundary.CookEAL(s):ThefollowingstatementiscontainedwithinthebodyoftheEmergencyClassificationprocedure:~InthejudgementoftheSEC,conditionswhichindicateanactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentfromEITHERunitwarrantadeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.eEALDeviation:Thiscriterionappliesailthetime,soithasbeenincorporatedintothebodyoftheimplementingprocedure"12-PMP2080.EPP.101,EmergencyClassification".InstructionsintheproceduredirecttheSECtodetermineclassificationfromtheRecognitionCategorytablesANDfromjudgementforeveryeventwiththehighestclassificationprevailing.Page38of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRecognitlonCategory:FissionProductBarriersFUELCLADEALP1:CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusLOSS:CoreCooling-REDPOTENTIAI:CoreCooling-ORANGEHeatSink-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:POTENTIAL:CoreCooling-REDCoreCooling-ORANGEHeatSinkCSF-RED-AND-WIderangelevelinatleast3SGsis<29%(<43%foradversecontainment).EALDeviation:SecondaryheatsinkisnotlostunlessbothflowcapabilityandactualSGlevelarelost.AccordingtoERGFR-H.1Backgrounddocuments,theSGswillcontinuetoactasanadequateheatsinkuntilwiderangelevelIslost.WeelecttotransfertofeedandbleedcoolingIfthreeoutoffourSGshavelessthantheindicatedwiderangelevel.ThisEOPeventisaneasilyrecognizedthresholdfordeclaringapotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrierandprovidesabettercriteriathenthatspecifiedinthegenericsymptomlist.FUELCLADEALP2:PrimaryCoolantActivityLevelLOSS:CoolantActivityGREATERTHAN(site-specificvalue)POTENTIALLOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:RCSactivitylevel>300pCI/ccI-131equivalent.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.FUELCLADEAL83:CoreExitThermocoupleReadingsLOSS:GREATERTHAN(site-specific)degreeFPOTENTIALLOSS:GREATERTHAN(site-specific)degreeFCookEAL(s):NOTUSEDEALDeviation:ThisgenericsymptomisencompassedbyCoreCoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionstatustreemonitoring.Page39of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERStFUELCLADEAL¹4:ReactorVesselWaterLevelLOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:LevelLESSthan(site-specific)valueCookEAL(s):NOTUSEDEALDeviation:~ThisgenericsymptomisencompassedbyCoreCoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionstatustreemonitoring.FUELCLADEAL¹5:ContainmentRadiationMonitoringLOSS:ContainmentRadmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)R/hrPOTENTIALLOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:Containmentarearadiation>200R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:~VRS-1310/1410(U1)~VRS-2310/2410(U2)POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainmentradiationmonitorsbecausetheradiationlevelstforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantlydecreasingwithtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plotofradiationvsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviabilityofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiationreadingwithinthattimeframeassociatedwiththelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.ThereforethissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociatedwithICs.FUELCLADEAL¹6:Other(Site-Specific)IndicationsLOSS:(Site-Specific)asapplicablePOTENTIALLOSS:(Site-Specific)asapplicableCookEAL(s):LOSS:Atleast5%claddamage.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page40of46Rev.0 SSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSFUEICLADEALP7:Emer7:EmergencyDirectorJudgementAnyconditionintheoinPOTELLOSpnionoftheErnergcyDirectorthatindicatesLOS:AnyconditionInthIc'sOSSofPOTENTIALLOSSoftheopinionoftheEoefuelcladbarriermergencyDirectorthtIandicatesCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudPOTENTIALLOSS::SECJudgementEALDeviatloation:NosignificantdeviationRCSEALPt;Criticalr'alSafetyFunctionStatusPOTENTIALLOSS:RCSIntegrity-REDHeatSink-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:POTENTIAL:IAL:CoreCooling-REDHeatSinkCSF-RED-AND-WIderangsis<29%(<43%forEALDeviation:SecondaryheatsinkisnotlostuSecondaosunlessbothflowcabilddtthS*eGswillcontinuetoactasaectotransfertofeedandbleedcoolingifthrehisEOPeventfsaneasilrecuecladbarrierandprovid'aIS.esabettercriteriathoreclaringaraenthatspecifiedinthegenericPage41of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRCSEALP2:RCSLeakRateLOSS:GREATERTHANavailablemakeupcapacityasindicatedbyalossofRCSsubcooling.POTENTIALLOSS:Unisolableleakexceedingthecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmode.CookEAL(s):LOSS:RCSsubcoollng<30'FANDcanNOTberestored.POTENTIALLOSS:ECCSoperatinginSlmodeANDSlisnotdiagnosedas"inadvertent".EALDeviation:OnthelossEAtweaddedthecaveatthatsubcoollngcannotberestored.ThisallowssomeleewayinthosecircumstanceswheretheEOPsdirectminimizingsubcoolingforsomemitigatingaction.ForthepotentiallossEAlwehavesubstitutedECCSoperatingInanySlmodebecauseduringaccidentmitigation,theleakratevarieswithRCSpressure.Ifpossible,wewillperformSlterminationorSlreduction,tonormalcharging.SincethisisanormalactionintheEOPs,itisfamiliartotheSS/SECsandprovidesathresholdequivalenttothatproposedinthegenericguidance.RCSEAL83:SGTubeRuptureLOSS:(Site-specific)indicationthataSGisrupturedandhasanon-isolablesecondarylinebreakor(site-specific)indicationthataSGIsrupturedandaprolongedreleaseofcontaminatedsecondarycoolantisoccurringfromtheaffectedSGtotheenvironment.POTENTIALLOSS:Site-specificindicationthataSGisrupturedandtheprimary-to-secondaryleakrateexceedsthecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmode.CookEAL(s):LOSS:ANYSGisBOTHRUPTUREDandFAULTEDPOTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:OurlossEALreliesonoperatorknowledgeofthemeaningofRUPTUREDandFAULTEDasusedIntheEOPs.Basedonthesemeanings,ourlossEALisequivalenttothegenericEALWedonothaveapotentiallossEALforSGtuberupturebecausethepotentiallossEALassociatedwithRCSleakratecompletelycoverstheeventproposedbythegenericEALPage42of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSRCSEAL¹4:ContainmentRadiationMonitoringLOSS:ContainmentradmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)R/hr.POTENTIAILOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:Containmentarearadiation>10R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:~VRS-1310/1410(U1)~VRS-2310/2410(U2)POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainmentradiationmonitorsbecausetheradiationlevelsforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantlydecreasingwithtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plotofradiationvsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviabilityofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiationreadingwithinthattimeframeassociatedwiththelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.ThereforethissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociatedwithICs.RCSEAL¹5:Other(Site-Specific)IndicationsLOSS:(Site-Specific)asapplicablePOTENTIALLOSS:(Site-Specific)asapplicableCookEAL(s):LOSS:ECCSoperatinginanySlRECIRCULATIONMODE.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.RCSEAL¹6:EmergencyDirectorJudgementLOSS:AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicatesLOSSoftheRCSbarrierPOTENTIALLOSS:AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicatesPOTENTIALLOSSoftheRCSbarrierCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudgementPOTENTIALLOSS:SECJudgementEALDeviation:NosignificantdeviationPage43of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENTEALP1:CriticalSafetyFunctionStatusLOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:Containment-REDCookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:ContainmentCSFST-REDEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.CONTAINMENTEALP2:ContainmentPressureLOSS:Rapidunexplaineddecreasefollowinginitialincrease.ORContainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions.POTENTIALLOSS:(Site-specific)PSIGandincreasing.ORExplosivemixtureexists.ORContainmentpressuregreaterthancontainmentdepressurizationsetpointandlessthanonefulltrainofdepressurizationequipmentoperating.CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:Containmentpressure/sumplevelresponseNOTconsistentwithexpectedconditions.ORCNTMTH2>4'ALDeviation:WedonotusealossEALbecausethesymptomsdescribedinthegenericguidancemayoccurduetoactivationofouricecondenser.Forexample,duringasmallbreakLOCA,theicecondenserdoorsmaynotopenbecausetheleakratemaybetoosmall.However,atsometimeduringtheevent,thedoorsmayopenandcausearapidcontainmentpressuredrop.WithSECjudgement,theSECmayelectedtocallthistrendalossofcontainmentwhichprovidesthesamesymptomaticcoveragethatadiscretelossEALwouldprovide.Bythesameargument,thecontainmentsumplevelresponseisalsovariableandisnotusedasadiscretesymptomofcontainmentloss.However,bothlossEALswerecombinedandretainedaspotentiallosssymptom:"Containmentpressure/sumplevelresponseNOTconsistentwithexpectedconditions."ThepotentiallossEALsassociatedwithpressureareadequatelycoveredbytheContainmentCSFST-REDcondition.Page44of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENTEALP3:ContainmentIsolationValveStatusafterContainmentIsolationLOSS:Valve(s)notclosedanddownstreampathwaytotheenvironmentexists.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>CookEAL(s):LOSS:FollowingPhaseA(orB)Isolation-ANYflowpathonFR-Z.1AttachmentA(orB)NOTisolatedANDadownstreampathwaytotheenvironmentexists.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.CONTAINMENTEAL84:SGSecondarySideReleasewithPrimarytoSecondaryLeakageLOSS:ReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakagegreaterthantechnicalspecTiicatlonallowable.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>CookEAL(s)LOSS:SGisRUPTUREDANDtherupturedSGhasknownsteamflowoutsidethecontainmentforgreaterthan30minutes.POTENTIALLOSS:<none>EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.CONTAINMENTEAL85:SignificantRadioactiveInventoryinContainmentLOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:ContainmentradmonitorreadingGREATERTHAN(site-specific)R/hr.CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:Containmentarearadiation>1000R/hrwithinfirst90minutesafteraccident:~VRS-1310/1410(U1)~VRS-2310/2410(U2)EALDeviation:Wehaveappliedatimelimitontheuseofcontainmentradiationmonitorsbecausetheradiationlevelsforagivenamountoffueldamagewillbeconstantlydecreasingwithtime.InordertopreventtheSS/SECfromhavingtorefertoatime-plotofradiationvsfueldamage,wehavelimitedtheviabilityofthissymptomandusedthelowestradiationreadingwithinthattimeframeassociatedwiththelevelofcoredamageassumedinthegenericguidance.ThereforethissymptomisnotusedontheFissionProductBarriertableassociatedwithICs.Page45of46Rev.0 FISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSCONTAINMENTEAL86:CoreExitThermocoupleReadingsLOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:Coreexitthermocouplesinexcessof1200'Fandrestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15minutes;or,coreexitthermocouplesinexcessof700'Fwithreactorvessellevelbelowthetopofactivefuelandrestorationproceduresarenoteffectivewithin15minutes.CookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:CoreCoolingCSFST-REDANDcoretemperaturedoesNOTdecreasewithin15minutes.EALDeviation:ThereisnosignificantdeviationbecausetheCoreCoolingCSFST-REDisequivalenttotheeventdescribedinthegenericEALCONTAINMENTEALP7:Other(SIte-Specific)IndicationsLOSS:(Site-SpecTiic)asapplicablePOTENTIALLOSS:(Site-SpeciTic)asapplicableCookEAL(s):LOSS:<none>POTENTIALLOSS:>20%claddamage.EALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.CONTAINMENTEALP8:EmergencyDirectorJudgementLOSS:AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicatesLOSSofthecontainmentbarrierPOTENTIALLOSS:AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicatesPOTENTIALLOSSofthecontainmentbarrierCookEAL(s):LOSS:SECJudgementPOTENTIALLOSS:SECJudgementEALDeviation:Nosignificantdeviation.Page46of46Rev.0